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ABSTRACT 
In 1991 the Australian Commonwealth parliament voted unanimously to establish an 
independent and bipartisan body charged with the responsibility to promote a 
'reconciliation' between indigenous and non-indigenous Australia. The new Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) was to have stewardship but not control of a process 
limited by legislation to a decade. This thesis presents a history of that process. In 
particular, it presents the language of Aboriginal reconciliation as a 'secularised' form of 
Christian theology. The deployment of that language onto the imagined moral corpus of 
the nation also resembled a Christian form of confessional technology; the sacrament of 
reconciliation or 'penance'. Secularisation is here presented as the transformation rather 
than as the decline or delineation of the sacred. The 'transposition' of religious concepts 
into apparently mundane or earthly political language renders the separation of church 
and state, religion and politics, unstable: the liberal constitutional state is unable to finally 
identify the religious. 
It was clear that the Council had failed to bring indigenous and non-indigenous Australia 
to any kind of reconciliation. 'Reconciliation* seemed to point to a future unity between 
indigenous and non-indigenous Australia, yet conservative and progressive supporters of 
reconciliation imagined a unity that was fundamentally different: the politics of 
citizenship and the politics of indigeneity each found expression in the language of 
reconciliation. It is the contention of this thesis that this secularised religious language 
did not provide either side with an answer to the question, what should be the shape of 
the political and legal relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous Australia? 
Rather, the discourses of Aboriginal reconciliation repeated the ambiguities and aporias 
that also mark the theology of reconciliation. The Aboriginal reconciliation process was, 
for this reason and in the sense described by Derrida, 'impossible'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Australian reconciliation process occurred in the context of what Tully, after 
Wittgenstein, has called a background agreement in forms of life or language. That 
language is the Christian language of reconciliation. Whilst not determinative of any 
particular proposition in regards to any political dispute, that language has given a 
particular shape to the debate about the relationship between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples in Australia. It is a form of language that has, like Wittgenstein's 
image of a picture which holds us captive, both limited and structured the way in which 
Australian politics has been conceived. On the one hand, the great Christian themes of 
sin and forgiveness, apology and unity, have been applied to Australian politics, and 
have produced a new and challenging moral dynamic. On the other hand, reconciliation 
has obscured an older debate, that regarding Indigenous sovereignty, in the image of an 
approaching or desired unity which, nevertheless, presumes or requires contemporary 
political difference. 
As a response and an alternative to treaty politics, reconciliation can be considered as part 
of the ongoing nation-building project of a settler-society.1 Promising unity, it cut against 
Pearson describes 'settler societies* as those contemporary nation-states 'born out of the colonisation of 
territories and peoples by, in this case, European migrant groups with intentions to settle and build "self-
sustaining states" with their own newly minted nationhood. Such motives demanded, often their initial, but 
invariably subsequent, political domination over indigenous populations and their control of immigrant 
Others.* Australia, Canada and New Zealand are three examples of settler-societies; The Politics of 
Ethnicity in Settler Societies\ p5. On state formation and nation building in settler societies, see pp 8-10, 73-
74. Rowse also argues that 'one way to make sense of the politics of indigenous Australians is to frame 
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the claim made by some Indigenous peoples that they were and remain sovereign. 
Conservative politicians argued that a reconciled Australia was marked by an essential 
unity in which no one group enjoyed rights not enjoyed by others. In a more radical 
sense, conservative understandings of reconciliation figured a reconciled Australia as a 
nation in which groups did not exist in anything other than a social or rhetorical sense. 
The important point, said Prime Minister John Howard, was that all citizens share a 
commitment to the unity of the nation. This logic underwrote the argument made by 
conservative figures like Nick Minchin that native title rights for Indigenous peoples 
were a threat to the unity of the nation and hence to the reconciliation process itself. In 
that sense, the reconciliation process was, especially in its more 'practical' guises, a 
species of a liberal assimilationist politics which revolved around the concept of 
citizenship. Coalition understandings of reconciliation stressed that Indigenous 
disadvantage was to be addressed as an incident of Australian citizenship, and not as 
restitution or reparation for past mistreatment, or in recognition of any specifically 
Indigenous rights to land or to government funds. 
Just as reconciliation repeated the politics of liberal assimilationism insofar as 
conservative participants were dismissive of the claims to sovereignty or to other rights 
derived from indigeneity, it also carried with it a treaty politics by another name. The 
process was framed at beginning and end by talk of a treaty and repeatedly returned to the 
subject of'compacts' and 'framework agreements* throughout the life of the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR). There was a constant tension between the politics of 
their actions within a wider narrative: the changing approaches of settler-colonial liberalism to the 
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citizenship, ranging from the benign vision of a culturally pluralistic Australian society to 
Peter Howson's vision of reconciliation as assimilation , and the politics of indigeneity, 
which does not necessarily accept that Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples should be 
governed by uniform political institutions. This tension persists as the central problem of 
an ongoing Australian reconciliation process. This was not a new debate. What was new 
about reconciliation politics was the manner in which Christian imagery and derivative 
forms of Christian penitential technologies were deployed upon the imagined moral 
corpus of the nation, and on this problem of political difference and unity. This is not to 
say that the language of reconciliation gave either side a definitive answer to the 
question, what should be the shape of the relationship between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples in Australia? Rather, it repeated a series of tensions between unity 
and difference which it did not, and could not, resolve. 
Labor, the Coalition and various Indigenous groups all adopted stances towards the 
reconciliation process that were at times highly pragmatic. This is not necessarily to 
integration of a colonised minority into national political life.' Roswe, T, Obliged to be Difficult, p2I8. 
* Howson, P, 'Why there should be no apology* Sydney Morning Herald* 10 May 2000 p. 17 Monica 
Morgan also described the reconciliation process as an assimilationist program. For Morgan, reconciliation 
means *a process where Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people are supposed to melt together and forgive 
each other'; Morgan, M, quoted in It's Not Easy Walking in There, pi 44. 
Reconciliation discourses demonstrated what Foucault has described as a polyvalent propensity to work 
in multiple directions and strategies, against as well as with the original goal desired. Foucault writes, 
'there is not, one the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite, another discourse that runs counter to it. 
Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can exist different 
and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary circulate without 
changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy'; Foucauit, M, The History of 
Sexuality, Vol One, pIOl. 
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suggest that there was a lack of good-will on anyone's part. Mor do I believe that the 
countless private citizens who gave of their own time and energy were possessed of any 
machiavellian intent. Their participation in the process might in fact have been one of the 
great successes of Aboriginal affairs policy in the nineties. But the question of goodwill is 
not, in my opinion, the most important one. Nor is this thesis a history of the forms of 
social practice encouraged by government policy. Perhaps one of the most significant 
aspects of the reconciliation process, the Study Circles Project, is not covered here at all. 
The Bridge Walk, the countless instances of 'reconciliation in the community' as well as 
those other practices that might have led to what was described, ubiquitously, as a 
reconciliation of the hearts and minds, are also absent. These activities are instances of 
the social practice of citizenship, of learning how to be a particular kind of citizen, an 
Indigenous or non-Indigenous citizen. These practices do not necessarily entail a 
particular social or political imaginary. Like the policy of self-determination, 
reconciliation as government policy encouraged particular forms of social practice, action 
and organization that could be understood on a local or (as in the case of reconciliation) 
on a personal or even spiritual level. 
Self-determination and reconciliation can also be understood as projects pertaining to the 
nation, as operating on a social body or entity which exists beyond the lived experience 
of any particular citizen and which is for that reason, in the terms developed by Benedict 
Anderson, an imagined whole. This thesis addresses the manner in which the discourses 
of reconciliation, by relating Indigenous to non-Indigenous in the desired or perceived 
For a double sided reading of such practices, see Tully, J, 'The Struggles for and of Freedom', in Ivison, 
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unity of an approaching post-colonial state, operated to effect changes on this social 
imaginary.5 My question concerns the way in which a particular political discourse 
positioned Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in relation to each other, as collective 
political constituencies, and to the nation as constituent parts of a whole. How were 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples both separated and joined by this project of 
reconciliation? Such an investigation is not apolitical, or a work approaching fiction. The 
importance of the social and political imaginary lies in its ability to determine the 
horizons of possibility for government policy. The question of a treaty, for example, is 
one that can be understood in terms of these localised forms of social action encouraged 
by the policy of self-determination. But the prospects for such a treaty at the national 
level are firmly bound up with the kind of discursive work performed in the context of 
reconciliation. When John Howard expresses his opposition to a treaty between the 
D, et al. Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
See also Judith Brett's recent seminar paper presented at the Australian Institute for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Studies, "The Treaty Process and the limits of Australian Liberalism', 
http://www.aiatsis.eov.au/rsrch/smnrs/papers/brett.htm, accessed 21/03/2002. Rowse refers to 'moral 
community1, a 'dimension of the imagined community that is nationhood's cultural basis.1 Indigenous 
peoples have been venturing an 'hypothesis of moral community.' For example, Rowse suggests the Mabo 
plaintiffs 'sensed the possibility of the colonists moral self-criticism'; Rowse, T, After Mabo: Interpreting 
Indigenous Traditions* pp 6,9. 
I accept the definition of internal colonialism developed by Tully: The essence of internal colonisation is 
not the appropriation of labour, depopulation or the appropriation of self-government: 'Rather, the ground 
of the relation is the appropriation of the land, resources and jurisdiction of the indigenous peoples, not 
only for the sake of resettlement and exploitation (which is also true in external colonisation), but for the 
territorial foundation of the dominant society itself Tully, J 'The Struggles For and Of Freedom' in Ivison, 
D, et al. Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, p39. See also Reynolds, H, Aboriginal 
Sovereignty, pi 17; Rowse, T, 'The Humanitarian Legacy' Arena, February 2000, p 33; Fleras, A, 
'Politicising Indigeneity: Ethnic Politics in White Settler Dominions' in Havemann, P, Indigenous Peoples 
Rights, p 187; Rowley, CD, Aboriginal Policy and Practice, Vol III the Remote Aborigines, p 1. 
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Commonwealth and Indigenous peoples he operates within a particular form of political 
imaginary which stresses the 'essential unity of the Australian nation.' The Australian 
reconciliation process, however, structured that unity in diverse and contradictory forms 
and in a manner which repeated the theological ambiguities of Christian reconciliation. 
The Aboriginal reconciliation process ended without an apology to the Stolen 
Generations and without a document or documents of reconciliation with any real 
importance or weight in law. There was a widespread sense that the process was 
incomplete and for that reason alone a failure. No doubt many observers would lay 
responsibility for that failure at the feet of the Howard government, and in particular at 
the Prime Minister's own recalcitrance on a number of key issues. It might strike a rather 
pessimistic note to say that the Aboriginal reconciliation process was impossible, always 
incomplete, doomed from the very beginning. But this is so not for any want of effort on 
behalf of the many Australians who devoted so much time and energy to its success. Nor 
is it owing to the impossibility of a true or final reconciliation in the context of deep and 
historically conditioned cultural diversity (although this is an idea to which I will return, 
in the context of discussing the relationship between reconciliation and justice.) Rather, 
the theological language of reconciliation, secularized and brought to bear on the problem 
of Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations in Australia, was from the beginning related 
to an idea which is, in the sense described by Derrida, impossible. It is impossible 
because the economy of reconciliation, of exchange and of conditional redemption, of 
making the polity work, even when fashioned to map onto an institutionalized political 
process, only makes sense in relation to the idea of a pure gift, a pure forgiveness, an 
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unconditional reconciliation. This is the same idea that makes it possible to write the kind 
of critique found in the Chapter Four of this thesis, to describe the politics of healing and 
of reconciliation as subject to an economy of exchange. This idea of the unforgivable 
makes reconciliation thinkable at the same time as it renders all actual manifestations of 
such a process subject to critique. 
It is tempting to dismiss the theological dimensions of the Australian reconciliation 
process as a violation of those basic liberal principlesffiat there will be a separation of 
church and state, of religion and politics, of the public and private spheres/No doubt such 
an approach could be presented as afait accompli, as the last word that is already also, 
because it is a taken for granted assumption of contemporary Australian politics, the first 
word. An alternative thesis is presented here. Liberal democracy, despite or because of 
secularisation, is unable to police with any finality those lines which are thought to be 
central to it. This is so because liberalism is unable to locate and hence to finally identify 
the religious. Secularisation, rather than being the eradication of the sacred, appears here 
as the transposition of religious language and symbols into 'earthly' political discourse. 
Rather than the end of religion, we see a fundamental blurring of the line between faith 
and reason, religion and politics, church and state. 
These theoretical questions of religion and politics are taken up in Chapter One. Chapter 
Two considers the history of the language of reconciliation, as developed in the Christian 
churches, in the context of both theologically formulated doctrine and the more ordinary 
language of Christian penitential technologies. It also presents a methodology, drawn 
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from Jame| Tully's recent use of Ludwig Wittgenstein to discuss the language of 
constitutionalism, which can account for the methodological problems bedevilling the 
study of religion and politics in Australia. Chapter Three provides a necessarily brief 
over-view of the politics of reconciliation in the nineties, documenting the emergence of 
reconciliation as the dominant discourse in the politics of Indigenous affairs in Australia. 
Chapter Four, which has an immediate focus on the language of 'healing', considers the 
politics of apology and forgiveness. The chapter identifies the reconciliation process as a 
political technology for the moral rehabilitation of the nation, an economy of exchange in 
which apology and perhaps penance meet forgiveness and a transcendent unity. It also 
considers the impossibility' of coming to any final reconciliation between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous Australia. Chapter Five examines the relationship between justice 
and reconciliation, focusing on penance and guilt as an aspect of the language of 
reconciliation, and linking those themes to both social justice and treaty-talk. 
Each of these last two chapters is concerned, in its own way, with the tension between 
sovereignty and citizenship, unity and difference. Chapter Five approaches these issues 
through one part of the language of reconciliation, penance, via an examination of the 
historical debates concerning treaty politics and reconciliation. Chapter Four comes at 
these same issues through an alternative part of the same language, apology and 
forgiveness. Each makes the point that reconciliation is a project which, whilst promising 
unity, presumes historical and contemporary difference, without providing any definitive 
method by which that difference might be overcome, or what the quality of the expected 
unity might be. Will a reconciled Australia be characterised by a uniformity of political 
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institutions, by a diversity of cultures, by a permanent recognition of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous as distinct political constituencies, or, as a project destined to fail, by some 
polyglot amalgam of diverse political projects and incomplete Utopias? 
CHAPTER ONE 
THREE THESES ON SECULARISATION 
Given that we live in a liberal democratic and constitutional state, and given the formula, 
that in this state, there is a separation of religion and politics (or, the not strictly 
equivalent formulation, the 'separation of church and state'), how can we say where 
politics begins and where religion ends, and vice versa? Yes, we can discern the 
'extreme case.' It is possible to imagine a theocracy because there has been and there are 
theocracies. But it is much harder to discern the opposite pole of what we might think of 
as a spectrum of church-state integration and separation. Can we really imagine a 
politics without religion, a polity in which church and state are actually and in every 
sense separate? That we cannot see let alone imagine this pole must make, us doubt that 
this relation of integration and separation forms a spectrum at all. That is, theocracy is 
not the extreme case, because there is nowhere and nothing to which it is related that 
makes it the radical example or opposite of any particular thing. And if there is no 
spectrum, there is no middle point at which we might be tempted to place our own 
tolerant liberalism, where we might think that religion and politics, although presently 
(and perhaps unfortunately?) muddled, could be, in theory and with great effort, 
somehow disentangled. 
This formulation, the separation of church and state, firstly depends upon the invention 
of religion as a separate realm, upon the identification and so the localization of both 
Connolly writes: 'the relation between church and state would be better characterised, not as a separation, 
but as a series of intersections and interdependancies mediated by institutional distinctions and linkages. 
Secularism is better conceived, not simply as a counterpoint to theism, but as an ambiguous phenomenon 
that confronts theism on some planes and absorbs its legacy into secular vocabularies and practices on 
others. Secularism, in one of its dominant modes, constitutes the after life of Augustinianism'; 
Identity/Difference, pi 45. 
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religion and politics (this is where faith is, and this is where politics is.) The distinction 
between religion and politics is internal to the language of secularisation itself. 
Secularists themselves categorise what they then proceed to divide institutionally. But 
the distinction between religion and politics is not equivalent to the distinction made 
within Christianity between the sacred and temporal, for example. That these divisions 
might generally be thought to be the same, or roughly the same, is the product of a 
confusion and not a correspondence between them. These distinctions, although sharing 
a resemblance which reveals the dependence of liberalism upon a particular theology, are 
not the same, and the difference between them renders contemporary liberalism unstable 
in respect of the question it supposedly answers. Politics and religion, despite or because 
of'secularisation', are constantly confusing themselves before our very eyes. 
We need firstly to distinguish between two easily confused theses concerning the 
relationship between religion and politics. 'Secularism' may be understood as a narrower 
claim going merely to the distinction between the political and religious spheres. Dating 
from the early modern period and coming to prominence in the religious wars of the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation, it does not assert that there is any necessary link 
between modernity and the decline and eventual disappearance of religion. A broader 
thesis, that modernity is marked by 'disenchantment' or a gradual 'secularisation' of life 
in all its spheres is of more recent vintage. Max Weber is perhaps the most famous 
Caputo, describing the secularisation of European intellectual life during the Enlightenment, writes: 
'Another way you could describe what happened is to say that in the meantime somebody invented 
"religion" and declared it off limits from "reason." In the Middle Ages the word religio was a word for 
virtue, the habit of being religious.. ..there was no separate sphere or delimited region called "religion" 
which was to be differentiated from reason, politics, art, science or commerce.* On Religion, p43. 
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proponent of the broader secularisation thesis, but he was neither the first nor the last to 
suggest that the modern world would witness the passing of religion. A range of 
thinkers from Descartes, Comte, Kant and Marx through to Nietzsche and Freud 
accepted, in one way or another, an 'Enlightened' suspicion of religion. The Australian 
reconciliation process points, however, to-the continued relevance of religion (although 
in novel and perhaps unrecognised forms) in modern or post-modern politics. This 
unacknowledged religious dimension suggests a third thesis: that 'secularisation' is not 
the triumph of reason over faith but the transposition of theological concepts into 
mundane or earthly political language. Or, that a divine remnant animates earthly forms 
of political expression. The necessarily brief discussion of these three theses contained in 
this chapter frames the substantive discussion of the Australian reconciliation process 
contained in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Peter Berger describes secularisation as 'the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed 
from the domination of religious institutions and symbols'; Berger, P, 'The Desecularisation of the World: 
A Global Overview* in Berger, P, (ed) The Desecularisation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World 
Politics, p2. Howard uses the term secularisation to refer to *a complex of processes in which religion came 
to lose its authority over other social institutions. Modem Europe, unlike its pre-modem past, has largely 
ceased to legitimize the authority of its law, learning and social arrangements by appeal to religious 
sanctions and supernatural endorsement*; Howard, A, Religion and the Rise of Historicism, pi 7. Donald 
Smith developed his definition of the secular state in the course of his study of Indian constitutionalism. 
For Smith, the secular state is defined by three interlocking separations or oppositions; the separation of 
religion and the state, the separation of religion and the individual (freedom of religion) and the separation 
of state and the individual (citizenship); Smith, D.E, 'India as a Secular State* in Bhargarva, R(ed) 
Secularism and its Critics, pi77. See Aldridge, A, Religion in the Contemporary Worlds for an overview 
of the secularisation thesis from Comte to Wilson and Berger, pp56-88 and Hallencreutz, C and 
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1. Secularisation as a 'Modus Vivendi.' 
Connolly provides a sketch of the typical historical narrative in which the Reformation 
and religious conflict in Europe are said to have led to the separation of church and state: 
the intractability of religious disputes convinces Europeans to relegate questions of faith 
to the private sphere and to accept a form of public reason as the basis of agreement and 
debate on non-religious issues. The secularisation of public life makes civil peace 
possible and guarantees individuals a measure of private freedom in so far as they are no 
longer subject to the demands of state sanctioned religious tests and duties. On this view, 
secularisation or 'secularism' is a modus vivendi between contending religious forces 
each of which recognises the common interest in demarcating the state as a no-go zone. 
Even within this particular thesis of secularisation, which I have called 'secularism', there 
is variation. The particular character of the compromise between denominations might 
take one of several forms. One form of secularism attempts to base a political ethic on a 
common ground of religious belief, adopting a minimally theistic position acceptable to 
all faith groups. An alternative strategy is the attempt to define a political ethic 
independent of religious faith. The formulation of this ethic involves the search for rules 
Westerlund, D, 'Anti-Secularist Policies of Religion' in Westerlund, D, Questioning the Secular State: The 
Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics, pi. 
Connolly, W, Why 1 am not a Secularist, p 20. 
" ibid,p\9. 
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governing the human condition that can provide the basis for exceptionless norms, such 
as peace and political obedience. 
Accounting for each of those claims directs one back, however, to Christian formulations 
of the relationship between the ecclesiastic and temporal realms. Whilst Derridatnay be 
right, in some senses, to point to the Judaic-Christian-Moslem tradition as a single, 
monotheistic and 'Abrahamic1 tradition, Fortin draws a distinction between Christianity 
and the other two monotheisms to make a point about the way each figures the 
relationship between the 'temporal' and the 'divine.' Whereas Judaism and Islam present 
themselves as divine laws of an all-inclusive social order, Christianity is a faith or sacred 
doctrine, requiring adherence to a set of fundamental beliefs, but otherwise leaving the 
faithful a large degree of autonomy. This difference grounded the development of two 
distinct powers, one civil and the other ecclesisastical, each relatively free (in principle ) 
from interference from the other. Whilst the former guided the faithful to their temporal 
end, the latter looked beyond this world in guiding humanity to its spiritual or 
supernatural destination.1 
Taylor, C, 'Modes of Secularism' in Bhargave, R, op cit, p 33. Taylor cites Grotius as one exponent of 
this second view. 
Fortin, E, *St Thomas Aquinas* in Strauss, L and Cropsey, J History of Political Philosophy* p25I. 
Bartelson describes the medieval political thought in this period as being 'christological', and as 
characterised by the use of a distinctively Christian technology': *The question of the proper locus of 
supreme authority involved the continuous exchange of the concepts and symbols, insignia and legal 
axioms of authority between Church and secular authority*; Bartelson, J, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, p 92. 
Hinsley similarly notes that Papal-Imperial struggles up to the twelfth century were contests "between two 
theocratic authorities for leadership in a ritual community rather man a conflict between secular and 
spiritual authorities for the government of a body politic*; Hinsley, F.H, Sovereignty, p60. 
Fortin, E, op cit, p251. 
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Contemporary secularism is thus heir to a particularly Christian way of considering the 
relationship between divine and profane time, space and action. On this view, secularism 
or 'secularisation' is not reason in opposition to faith, but a particular way of relating and 
hence joining distinct spheres which are not strictly equivalent to reason and faith. The 
term 'secufijjr' is itself of Christian origin. ^Saeculum \ Latin for century or age, acquired 
a special meaning when applied to profane time, the time in which humanity lives 
between the Fall and the Parousia: 'This time was interwoven with higher times, 
different modes of what is sometimes called 'eternity', the time of the Ideas, or of the 
Origin, or of God. Human beings were seen as living in all these times, but certain acts, 
or lives, or institutions, or social forms could be seen as more thoroughly directed, 
towards one or another. Government was more 'in the saeculum' by contrast with the 
Church, for instance.' For some scholars, this peculiar aspect of Christian theology is 
the basis of modern secularism. As Taylor put it, 
Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the 
political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with 
other ranges. Moreover, as many Muslims are well aware, Western 
liberalism is not so much an expression of the secular, postreligious outlook 
that happens to be popular among liberal intellectuals as a more organic 
Also: 'the existence of these oppositions reflected something fundamental about Christendom, a 
requirement of distance, of non-coincidence between the Church and the world. There were through the 
mediaeval centuries great overlap and great conflict between the Church and the state, but in all versions, 
and on all sides, it was axiomatic that there had to be a separation of spheres'Taylor, C, 'Modes of 
Secularism* in Bhargave, R, op cit, p32. 
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outgrowth of Christianity...the division of church and state goes back to the 
earliest days of Christian civilization. 
St Augustine's City of God, for example, draws a distinction between the earthly and 
heavenly cities along the lines of virtue and vice.18 The believer possesses a twin 
citizenship of the earthly and divine cities, and continues to order his life within the 
framework of civil society,1 The City of God, as the only path to that peace and 
happiness desired by all people, aims at a goal higher than that to which civil society may 
aim. The Pauline doctrine that the powers that be are ordained by God for the purposes of 
ensuring civil peace in a Fallen world is upheld. But the two cities are inextricably mixed 
in this life, to be separated by God only at the end of history. The City of God thus 
transcends and supplements the political sphere, but does not supplant the earthly city.2 
Taylor, C, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition; p62 . Pointing to Weber, Troeltsch, Berger 
and Dumont, Madan notes 'the essential linkages among Protestantism, individualism and secularisation.' 
Rather than a transcendent principle of universal application, secularisation is a 'gift of Christianity to 
mankind....The privatisation of religion, through the assumption by the individual of the responsibility for 
his or her own salvation without the intervention of the Church, is very much a late Christian idea.1 Madan, 
T,' Secularism in Its Place* in Bhargava, R, op cit, p298. Derrida also makes the point that he would never 
oppose secularisation to sacredness: the concept of secularisation is a religious concept, 'it belongs to a 
tradition of religious culture.* Derrida, J, 'A Discussion with Jacques Derrida' in Theory and Event, 5:1. 
18
 Fortin, E, *St Augustine1 in Strauss, L and Cropsey, J History of Political Philosophy,pl95. 
I9rt/4pl97. 
" Augustine's formulation of the relationship between the two cities, inextricably mixed in this world and 
awaiting the judgement of the Lord before finally separated in the next, was corrupted in the centuries that 
followed. As Fortin explains, 'beyond the broad statements that set apart and define the domains of the 
spiritual and the temporal and their respective jurisdictions, one does not find in Augustine a detailed 
theory of church and state similar to the ones elaborated, allegedly on the basis of his principles, during the 
centuries that followed.1 op cit, pi97. 
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We might be tempted to describe the Christian division of the temporal and religious 
realms as a prototypical tS&eralism, but such a description would be a distortion. 
Ecclesiastic and temporal do not map onto the distinction between public and private, 
religion and politic^ The ecclesiastic realm may have been a place of relative freedom 
from civil authority, but it was not a realm of personal freedom per se. Each authority 
possessed coercive powers. In Luther we see a transformation: the end of the coercive 
power of the ecclesiastic estate, and, in some Reformed Churches, the beginnings of state 
control over ecclesiastic organisation. The notion that there might be a spiritual estate 
capable of exercising jurisdiction over temporal affairs was at odds with Luther's notion 
of the ^priesthood of all believers.' The significance of the reformation for modern 
democratic politics is to be found in Luther's emphasis on individuality, and the manner 
in which that emphasis on personal faith undermined the power of doctrinal 
communities."' The Pauline doctrine that the powers that be are ordained by God was 
reiterated- Christians were to offer (qualified) submission to the earthly political 
authorities. m But there was no notion of the 'two swords', or of parallel realms, but 
rather a complete denial of any jurisdiction inhering in the Church at all. The civil power 
was for its part directed to the temporal ends of humanity and was to be guided in the 
exercise of its power not by faith but by reason. As Luther put it, 
* Howard points to Protestant Christianity as the source of secularisation; 'not only did the Reformation 
question ecclesiastical control and diminish sacerdotalism and sacramentalism, but on a cognitive level the 
importance of independent inquiry into the Bible . ..set the precedent for a later, more pervasive, faith-
threatening conception ofKritik.' Howard, A, op cit, pi 7-18. 
J
 Skinner, Q. Foundations of Political Thought, Vol II, ppl 1-15. See also pp 36-39. 
18 
God made the secular government subject to reason because it is not to have 
jurisdiction over the welfare of souls or things of eternal value, but only 
over bodily and temporal goods, which God places under man's dominion. 
For this reason, nothing is taught ist the Gospel about how it is to be 
maintained and regulated, except that the Gospel bids people honour it and 
not oppose it. 3 
One might look profitably at 'the heathen books and writers' for guidance on matters of 
temporal or civil government. 
2. Secularisation as 'Disenchantment' 
We can discern the origins of secularism, narrowly understood as the distinction between 
the two ends of humanity and therefore of government, in the Christian distinction 
between civil and ecclesiastic power. But the liberal and modernist distinctions between 
public and private, religion and politics, church and state, do not map onto the 
Augustinian distinction between the two cities or onto any medieval formulation of the 
'two swords'. O'Donovan notes that the separation of church and state is an 
Luther, M cited in Forrester, D, Theology and Politics, p31. 
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'uncommunicative formula..^nce those words assert nothing that could have perturbed 
the most traditional apologist for dual jurisdiction in Christendom' 
secularity pertained only to certain functions within society which had their 
raison d'etre in relation to this age (saeculum), not the next. The distinction 
of spiritual and secular was a distinction of two kinds of government within 
the one society....there were not a spiritual society and a secular society, 
only a society of the sacred and the society of the damned." 
In that sense, the civil power had, in specie if not always in the particular, a theological 
foundation or defence. By contrast, the modernist project of constructing a perfectly 
rational public sphere was based on the relegation of religion or theology to a private 
sphere of personal and subjective consumption. The distinction between the sacred and 
the damned made way for a more thorough-going distinction between objective reason 
and subjective faith and an assumption that the progressive rationalisation or 
secularisation of the world would culminate in the passing of religion itself. The young 
Marx borrowed the model of his critique of religion from Feuerbach: 
The foundation of irreligious criticism is this: man makes religion, religion 
does not make man. Religion is, in fact, the self-consciousness and self-
esteem of man who has either not yet gained himself or has lost himself 
again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the 
O'Donovan, O, The Desire of the Nations, p244. 
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world of man, the state, society. Thtt state, this society, produce religion, 
which is an inverted world consciousness... 
Christian theology had long distinguished between the civil and spiritual ends of 
humanity. But the modernist or liberal formula of church-state separation is the 
transformation rather than the repetition of these Christian distinctions between 
ecclesiastic and temporal government, and relates more to Enlightenment scepticism 
about the suitability of questions of faith for public abstraction than to any distinction 
between this world and the next." 
The sine qua non of modernity is a bracketing of religion; the decision, as Caputo puts it, 
to make up one's mind by reason alone. Modernity relies upon a series of distinctions, 
between fact and value, secular and religious and so on, which did not precede but were 
in fact the invention of, modernity: 
Modernity has a powerful sense of jurisdiction, of the need to settle 
questions of law, quid juris.... the moderns have a rigorous set of 
25
 ibid, 247. 
26
 Marx, K,4 A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', in Ricouer, P, Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia, p23. 
* See also O'Donovan, op cit, 241. 
Caputo and Scanlon argue that modernity is marked by a 'bracketing', dating from the 17th century, to 
make up its mind by reason alone: 'our wager, the more enlightened we get about Enlightenment, the more 
likely religion is to get a word in edgewise.' Caputo, J and Scanlon, M, 'Apology for the Impossible: 
Religion and Postmodernism*, in Caputo, J and Scanlon, M (eds) God, the Gift and Postmodernism, p2. 
See also Caputo, J, On Religion, pp42-43 
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boundaries, limits, and proper domains, and they make everything turn on 
drawing these boundaries neatly and cleanly. They insist on drawing sharp 
lines between subject and object, consciousness and the external world, 
science and religion, faith and reason, public and private, rational and 
irrational.29 
This transformation of human reason made man the measure of all things not just in 
relation to secular or earthly politics but also in relation to God. This is the key to 
understanding the difference between the liberal separation of church and state and the 
apparently congruent distinction found in Christianity between temporal and ecclesiastic 
government* It is also the key to understanding the distinction between secularism and 
secularisation. The separation of religion and politics involved, as Caputo put it, the 
invention of religion as a particular sphere of human activity, as a localised place 
unfamiliar to the encompassing religious rigour of the middle ages. The same separation 
involved the invention of politics as politics rather than as temporal or ecclesiastic 
governance. The relegation of religious questions to the 'private* realm made way for an 
over-riding technicity or instrumental rationality in the public sphere. Temporal and 
ecclesiastic governance had directed humanity to its earthly and spiritual ends 
respectively. The transformation in human subjectivity as the orientation towards an 
objective, rational truth transformed each of these realms and ushered in the 
secularisation thesis: that modernity was marked by 'disenchantment.' 
*" Caputo, J, D, On Religion, pp46-47. 
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Weber argued that the rationalisation or 'disenchantment' of the modern world 
proceeded, ironically, from a particular protestant anxiety derived from belief in 
predestination.30 Unable to obtain the consolation provided by the 'very human Catholic 
cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release', the protestant sublimated personal anxiety 
into activity in a material world now considered to be free of the divinity which 
Catholicism had attributed to it.3I The Christian becomes a 'tool* of God's will in a 
world conceived dynamically: 'in Calvinism, good works confirmed a salvation that was 
already established through predestination, but because no authority could determine or 
guarantee when or if that status had in fact been attained, there ensues the compulsion to 
sublimate the consequent anxiety more and more into one's economic vocation or 
'calling' in order to demonstrate salvation.'32 The result, post the dissipation of the 
original religious motivations, is a view of the world as a machine. 
At least two kinds of rationalism converge to produce what Weber termed the 'iron cage' 
of modernity. The dominance of scientific rationality in intellectual life and of 
bureaucratic rationalisation in the administration of the practical world tend to a wide-
Weberalso pointed to a much older connection between modern disenchantment and ancient Judaism. As 
a break from the cosmological and polytheistic world-view of the mesopotamian religions, the this-worldy 
religion of the Jews fostered an orientation to rational law. As Aldridge explains, 4moneotheism...had 
powerful consequences.. .it liberated humanity from dependance on mythology and magic, while at the 
same time forcing us to confront ethical choices. The natural world had the spirits driven from it, and 
became an arena for human endeavour in the service of God.' For Weber, the this-worldly ascetiscism of 
Protestant Christianity was a return to the rationalising impulse of ancient Judaism (of which Catholicism 
had been an interruption.) Aldridge, A, op cit, pp79-8I. 
McCormick, J, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology, p38. 
32
 ibid. See also Aldridge, A, op cit, pp71-72, 
33
 ibid, p39. 
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spread instrumental ism and an orientation to the norms of efficiency, calculability and 
standardisation.34 In intellectual life, rationalisation was premised on the notion that 'if 
one but wished one could learn at any time'. 
Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces 
that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master j | i things by 
calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer 
have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as 
did the savage, for whom mysterious power existed. Technical means and 
calculations perform the service.3 
The rationalization of the public realm proceeded upon the separation of questions of 
social organisation from questions of the family, the erotic and the emotional. Causal 
relationships, universal laws of science and questions of technology and efficiency 
govern the 'administration of things.' They do not, however, provide the law-maker or 
'administrator' with a moral compass. Instrumental and bureaucratic rationality are 
insufficient to the task of selecting the moral ends to which rational action is directed. 
Bernstein, J, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, pp6-10. Poole, R, Morality and Modernity, p47. Poole 
considers that three conceptions of rationality were at work in Weber's thesis; instrumental, or means/ends 
rationality, the formal rationality of the law, and cognitive or scientific reason. The dominant form of 
rationality in the modem world is, according to Poole, instrumental reason, p36-37. 
From Weber, M, "Science as a Vocation' cited in Bernstein, J, op cit, p7. Original emphasis. 
*To put it another way, if scientific reason demonstrated the non-rational nature of all values, how could 
it explain the commitment to science? The choice of science as a way of life could not be demonstrated to 
be any more 'rational1 than one's choice of faith'; Poole, R, op cit, p 67. See also Maclntyre, A, After 
Virtue , p25, Bernstein, J, op cit, pp7-9. Also McCormick: 'but science unlike religion can provide 
24 
The separation of reason from any substantive conception of the good or of God threatens 
to enslave humanity as technology orients itself to the manipulation of humanity as 
object. But the effort to restore a substantive conception of the good or of religious value 
fails and exposes a paradox particular to modernity. The paradox of morality in the 
modern world Ms that it lays claim to an objective status which is no longer available to 
it.'37 All substantive understandings of the good are rendered personal and subjective. 
Alasdair Maclntyre dates the effort to provide a rational justification for morality to the 
period 1630-1850. It was during this period that the word 'moral' began to refer to 'that 
particular sphere in which rules of conduct which are neither theological nor legal nor 
aesthetic are allowed a cultural space of their own.' The project of rational justification, 
says Maclntyre, 'failed and fails', leaving modern culture in a state of crisis. Maclntyre 
describes the modern standpoint on moral value as one 
which envisages moral debate in terms of a confrontation between 
incompatible and incommensurable moral premises and moral commitment 
as the expression of a criterionless choice between such premises, a type of 
choice for which no rational justification can be given* 
humanity with no substantive meaning. It offers only the emotionally, psychologically and spiritually 
unsatisfactory means for 'mastery' through 'calculation.' This mastery entails domination not only of 
nature but of human beings as well; bureaucracy, itself an 'animate machine* in Weber's estimation, has 
the potential for unprecedented human enslavement'; op cit, p39. 
37
 Poole, R, op cit, p69. 
jS
 Maclntyre, A, op cit, p38. 
ibid. Poole points out that 'the aspirations of modern science to describe and explain the world imply that 
nothing in it corresponds to the claims of religion and morality.' Poole, R, op cit, pp 66-69.0n Weber and 
nihilism and his debt to Nietzsche, see Bernstein, J, op cit, p6-7. 
25 
Modernity is thus characterised by a multiplicity of value-systems of purely subjective 
validity, which, for that reason, have no claim on and are unrecognizable to the rational-
technical state as anything more than expressions of personal opinion. For Weber, the 
only response to the increasing rationality of the modern world, itself a form of 
enslavement in which the factory as well as the bureaucracy seek to master both 
humanity and nature, is to act responsibly by taking personal ethical 'stands.' 
McCormick considers that, under the weight of such difficulties, Weber's call for a 
politics of responsibility 'ultimately collapses.'4 
It was against these contradictions in Weberian social science that Schmitt formulated his 
critique of the objectivity and technicity of liberalism and the modern state. Schmitt 
locates the origins of secularisation in the religious wars of the sixteenth century, after 
which the West had sought a neutral political space in which agreement could be reached 
and conflict avoided. " That decision, to give up theology for metaphysics, then for 
humanitarian morality, economics and positivism, culminates in the technicity of the 
twentieth century: the value neutrality of the state machine which connects means to ends 
but which cannot itself decide on ends. For Schmitt, modernity is marked by a 
secularisation which neutralises moral substances, producing a world and a state unable 
McCormick, J, op tit, p40. 
41
 ibid. 
' Schmitt, C, 'Neutralizations', in McCormick, J, op citt p44. 
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to appeal to any objective moral standards.43 The political nature of decision-making is 
obscured: 
there must no longer be political problems, only organizational-technical 
and economic-sociological tasks. The kind of economic-technical thinking 
that prevails today is no longer capable of perceiving a political idea. The 
modern state actually seems to have become what Max Weber envisioned: a 
huge industrial plant. 
The technical-positivist state is a rational structure without objective ends, neither 
capitalist nor communist, but a vehicle for each. The predominance of what Schmitt 
called 'economic-technical thought', the abstract contentless and manipulative 
orientation to nature, neutralizes all ethical or religious substances and creates a moral 
vacuum. The indifference of technology and economics to the substance upon which 
McCormick, J, op cit, pp 42, 43. Schmitt: *Law became power; loyalty, calculability; truth, generally 
recognized correctness; Christianity, a pacificist group. A widespread confusion and falsification of values 
governed souls. In place of the distinction between good and evil appeared a sublime division between 
usefulness and uselessness.' Cited in McCormick, J, op cit, p43. 
Schmitt, C, *On the Counter-Revolutionary Philosophy of the State' in Schmitt, C, Political Theology: 
Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, p65. '"Business" becomes the predominant concern for men 
who 'have become poor deviljg *they know everything and believe nothing."* Business as the superbly 
functioning means to some pathetic or senseless end, the universal priority of the means over the end, 
business which annihilates the individual such that he does not even feel his nullification and who thereby 
does not rely on an idea but at most on a few banalities and always only asserts that everything must go 
smoothly and without any needless friction.' Cited in Meier, H, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four 
Chapters on the Distinction Between Political Theology and Political Philosophy, p3. 
45
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they act, humanity, leaves rationality 'fantastically warped.' Weber, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger had all emphasised this abstract and relative rationalism as a feature of 
modernity, and tended to view all experiences of the concrete and the qualitative as 
historical hang-overs or instances of the exercise of subjective will. The modern 
antinomies of rationalism and subjectivity are related by Schmitt, however, not as poles 
of modernity, but as structurally related aspects of modernity. Modern philosophy is 
governed by the distinction between subject and object, concept and reality: objects 
obtain substantive content only through the work of the subject. 
Schmitt pointed to a fundamental incompatibility between liberalism and democracy: 
liberalism, as a doctrine of the individual, could not form the basis of a political group, 
and hence of a demos. Schmitt's concept of the political, contra the value neutrality of the 
technological and neutral state, and the subjective aestheticism of the romantics^ is based 
upon the friend/enemy distinction, and relates, as Meier describes it, to Schmitt's own 
47
 ibid, p27,43. 
ibidy pp 66-7. 
ibid, ppl 1,65. See also Skinner, Q, 'Modernity and Disenchantment' in Good, J and Velody, I, The 
Politics of Postmodernityi p57. 
Schmitt: \ . ..because the very "structure" of modern thought renders concrete reality irrational, the 
unrestrained, subjective ego picks out various instances of it and imparts meaning to it; however, this 
meaning, freed as it is from the confinement of the kind of religious or cultural prohibitions that obtained in 
the West before modernity, is not derived from any reflective thought process but is basically arbitrary 
whim. Harmless objects, such as a jewel, a book, a lock of hair, become objects of intense, subjective 
aestheticization, but so too, do political-philosophical concepts, such as "humanity" by the revolutionary 
Left, or "history** by the conservative Right* Cited in McCormick, J, op cit, p48.Capital ism and liberalism 
are thus allied to and are not to be thought of as opposed to romanticism; 'It is only in an individualistically 
disintegrated society that the aesthetically productive subject could shift the intellectual center to itself; 
Schmitt, C, 'Political Romanticism', cited in McCormick, J, opcit, p65. 
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political theology, in which revelation, and not reason, is foundational. The political, in 
this formulation, is authoritative. The political grasps man wholly and existentially, and is 
evident only in the context of the real possibility of conflict, and most clearly, in the dire 
emergency: 'the political "springs up" wherever two or three have gathered who are 
bound together by the will to oppose one enemy....the dire emergency identifies and 
differentiates to the highest degree.'52 Says Schmitt: 
The political unit is consequently always, as long as it is at all present, the 
authoritative unit* total and sovereign. It is 'total' firstly because every 
concern potentially can be political and therefore can be effected by the 
political decision, and secondly because man is wholly and existentially 
grasped in political participation. Politics is destiny.53 
The liberal constitutional state diffuses powers and so obscures the basis of the legal 
order: the decision rather than the norm.3 The decisionistic character of the sovereign, 
Meier, H, op cit, pp xiv, xvt 26. 
52
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 Schmitt, C, 'The Concept of the Political1,1932, cited in Meier, H, op cit p 35. See also O'Donovan, O, 
The Desire of the Nations, p4. McCormick makes a more disturbing claim concerning the relationship 
between liberalism, technology and fascism. Afterij$eorists of the Frankfurt school* McCormick claims that 
'there is a certain fluidity between liberalism, with its insurmountable categorical contradictions, on the one 
hand, and the phenomenon of fascism, on the other, which may not be an altogether distinct alternative to 
liberalism, but which itself appears to be the product of, and solution to, liberalism's theoretical-practical 
impasses.'Central to this dynamic relation between liberalism and fascism was 'technology*, conceived not 
simply as applied science but as a mindset for the mastery of nature, in which the wo$$ is merely a 
machine; op cit, pp 13,37-38. 
The state in Schmitt is based on the exception not the norm: 'sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception^ 'Definilifei of Sovereignty' in Schmitt, C, op cit, 5. Liberal constitutionalism suppresses the 
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the capacity to decide the exception, is lost. The liberal constitutional state evades the 
question of sovereignty and by so doing remains a machine which connects means to 
ends but which is itself devoid of ethical or substantive content. It suggests no 
existential knowledge of the kind derived from the friend/enemy distinction. 
3. Secularisation as the Transformation of the Sacred. 
The secularisation as disenchantment thesis encompasses the notion that there is or 
should be a separation of church and state and extends to a wider claim about the 
rationalisation of all spheres of life, including the religious sphere. It goes to the decline 
as well as to the delineation of the religious sphere. It is based on a particular 
understanding of human subjectivity as a rational orientation and relation to objective 
truth. This modernist transformation in the conceptualisation of human subjectivity, 
already described above by Caputo, had far reaching implications not just for the conduct 
of politics but also for the supposed fate of the 'irrational', including religious belief. 
There was (and is) an assumption that religion would pass from this world as humanity 
became progressively more 'mature1 or 'Enlightened.' Recent scholarship has, however, 
question of sovereignty by, for example, making the law sovereign. Schmitt: 'the exception, which is not 
codified in the existing legal order, can at best be recognized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the 
existence of the state, or the like.' Schmitt continues: vthe exception remains, nevertheless, accessible to 
jurisprudence because both elements, the norm as well as the decision, remain within the framework of 
the jurist^ Schmitt, C 'Definition of Sovereignty*, pl2-13. 
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highlighted the 'return of the religious' to the center of contemporary politics and 
philosophy/5 Schmitt had himself posited a structural correspondence between secular 
and theological concepts as early as the 1930's: 'all significant concepts of the modern 
state are secularized theological concepts.' This was so not only 
because of their historical development in which they were transferred from 
theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent 
God became the omnipotent law-giv^j> but also because of their systematic 
structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological 
consideration of these concepts. 
Gianni Vattimo, for example, considers that a philosophical prohibition on religion has come to an end 
with the breakdown of the great systems of thought developed in the modern period. He considers that the 
appeal of religion lies in its ability to speak to needs reason cannot address- "more than the sense of guilt 
and sin, the need for forgiveness.* Vattimo, G, The Trace of the Trace* in Derrida, J and Vattimo, G (eds) 
Religion, pp 81, 86. Maurizio Ferraris suggests that a secularized world may wish to hang onto moral and 
political theology as a means to respond to 'demands that are ultimately psychological or philosophical.* 
Ferraris, M, 'The Meaning of Being as a Determinate Ontic Trace' in Derrida, J and Vattimo, G (eds) 
Religion, p 172. Hent De Vries has described the turn of philosophy to religion, underpinned by the general 
recognition that religion has not been 'killed' by rationalism and secularisation. De Vries postulates a 
'secret alliance' between dichotomous terms, such as faith and reason, and speculates on their common 
origin: De Vries, H, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, p435. See also Aldridge on the 'new 
voluntarism* of Stark and Bainbridge and other recent reformulations of the secularisation thesis, op cit, 
pp89-122. Also Jorgensen, D, 'Religion and Modernization: Secularization or Sacralization* in Neusner, J 
(ed) Religion and the Political Order: Politics in Classical and Contemporary Christianity, Islam and 
Judaism, pp 19-29. 
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He provided an example of how metaphysics played out into politics in his work On The 
Counter-Revolutionary Philosophy of the State: 'Every political idea in one way or 
another takes a position on the 'nature1 of man and presupposes that he is either "by 
nature good''' or "by nature evil." Schmitt also argued that the concept of the 
exception in jurisprudence was analogous to the concept of the miracle in theology.5 
More generally, Schmitt also claimed that there was a congruence between widely held 
metaphysical beliefs and the shape of political systems: 
The metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world- has the 
same structure as what the world immediately understands to be appropriate 
as a form of its political structure.5 
Schmitt cited Leibniz as one thinker who recognised the link between jurisprudence and 
theology, as opposed to any link that might have been made between theology and any 
other branch of knowledge, such as mathematics or medicine. Schmitt cites Leibniz: 'We 
have deservedly transferred the model of our division from theology to jurisprudence 
because the similarity of these two disciplines is astonishing.'60 These disciplines shared 
two principles in common. Firstly, the use of reason, in the form of natural theology and 
Schmitt, C, 'On the Counter-Revolutionary Philosophy of State* in Schmitt, C, Political Theology; Four 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, p56. 
Schmitt, C, 'Political Theology' in Schmitt, C, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty, p36. 
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natural law. And secondly, the use of scripture, in the form of a written text containing 
both positive directions and revelations. 
These observations bring us to a further understanding of 'secularisation', albeit one that 
is not shared by Schmitt. Schmitt noted a series of structural resemblances or 
correspondences between theological and secular-political images. He nevertheless 
argued that modernity was marked by the 'neutralisation1 of ethical substances. Theology 
no longer grounded action in a world animated by economic-technological rationality and 
the subjective and aestheticized romanticism of myth. The liberal constitutional state 
obscures the question of sovereignty and remains indifferent to any substantive vision of 
God or the Good, lending itself to an unlimited and potentially perverse range of goals. 
The sovereign, although bearing the secularised image of the omnipotent God, was 
invisible until the moment of the dire emergency. The kind of existential knowledge 
generated by the friend/enemy distinction was not available to the liberal constitutional 
state. 
Schmitt's observations do however touch on a claim made in more recent times about 
the absorption of the sacred into the everyday world. On this view, secularisation is not 
the rationalisation of the world to the exclusion of the sacred, but the secularisation of 
theological concepts themselves, such that they are no longer thought to make sense only 
in connection with the divine. Meyer Abrams, for example, writes that process of 
secularisation 'has not been the deletion and replacement of religious ideas, but rather the 
assimilation and reinterpretation of religious ideas, as constitutive elements in a world-
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view founded on secular premises.'61 Abrams further commented, in the course of his 
study of nineteenth century Romanticism, that we 
remain unaware of the full extent to which characteristic concepts and 
patterns of....(19th century) philosophy and literature are a displaced and 
reconstituted theology, or else a secularized form of devotional 
experience....(we) readily mistake our heriditary ways of organizing 
experience for the conditions of reality and the universal forms of thought. 
Variations of such a thesis have been described as the 'transposition thesis1, described by 
Hornig as follows: 
Abrams, M, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature, p 13. 
ibid* p65-66. Marcuse argued that 'the prevailing state of man is the result of a long historical process in 
which all transcendental values have been "secularized1 and made the aim of man's empirical life. The 
happiness he sought in heaven and in pure thought can now be satisfied on earth.1 Marcuse, H, Reason and 
Revolution, 1960, Boston, Beacon Press, pp268, in Fenn, R, Beyond Idols: The Shape of a Secular Society, 
p20. Also Max Horkheimer: "Behind every genuinely human action stands theology....a politics which 
does not preserve a theological movement in itself is, no matter how skilful, in the last analysis, mere 
business.' Cited in Forrester, D, op cit, pl70. Gauchet argues that the radical originality of the modem 
West is its 'reincorporation, into the very heart of human relationships and activities, of the sacral element, 
which previously shaped this world from outside', The Disenchantment of the World: a Political History of 
Religion, p3. Howard contends that the development of a secular understanding of time, an understanding, 
that is, of history existing outside of God's purposes, owes much to the theological training of the historical 
scholars of that period. He notes that the German Enlightenment was a profoundly religious movement, 
aiming not at the dissolution of religion but its transcendental justification and foundation: 'Might then a 
secular historical outlook, born in the wake of the German Enlightenment, retain traces, revealing elisions, 
hereditary marks that betray significant continuities between premodern-theological and modern-historical 
ways of thinking?'; Howard, A, op cit, pp 3,139. 
34 
Secularisation is conceived as the transportation of beliefs and patterns of 
behaviour from the 'religious' to the 'secular' sphere...the culmination of 
this kind of secularisation process would be totally anthropologized religion 
and a society which had taken over all the functions previously attaching to 
the religious institutions.63 
It is not hard to find examples of such 'transposited' concepts. Teleological schemas once 
connected to theology have been taken up in social and economic theory. The concept of 
Progress and Marx's communist eschatology might be considered to be two prime 
examples.64 Susan Kirscher provides another example of this phenomenon when she 
draws the link between Christian and psychoanalytic developmental narratives, claiming 
that the latter is a 'secularized' version of the former. Rather than disappearing, the 
sacred has become personalized, such that the 'persona! ...and interpersonal images have 
become subtly divinized.' At the same time, the sciences, including the human sciences, 
tNNPI invested with the functions and aspirations previously reserved to theology.66 
Caputo's discussion of a religion without religion distinguishes between the institutional 
structures of the traditional faiths and the capacity of those structures to contain the 
religious: "there is an unmistakable tendency to wrest religious phenomena free from the 
Quoted in Howard, A, op cit, p20. 
See Howard, A, op cit, p20. 
Kirscher, S, The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis, pp 1,37, 
ibid, pi 1. Kirscher also cites David Walsh's argument that the early modern period was 'not a world 
increasingly separating itself from God, but a world progressively absorbing the divine into itself* Walsh, 
D, The Mysticism of Infflkc Worldly Fulfillment' 1983, cited in Kirscher, S, op cit, p 30 
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religions, to reproduce the structure of religion outside the traditional faiths and outside 
the classic oppositions of religion and science, body and soul, this world and the next.' 
To speak of a religion without religion means to return to the medieval sense of religion 
as virtue, as a rigor of faith or a way of doing one's duty to God, as opposed to religion as 
an institutionalised and hence localised and defined practice. The traditional faiths 
provide a critical mass for religious faith, supplying a structural and 
institutional embodiment that keeps our religious memories alive, that 
undertakes scrupulous and scholarly study of these memories, and that 
houses our hopes for the future. They provide an organizing and 
humanising power in the daily lives of large numbers of people. 
But the traditional faiths nevertheless 'contain something that they cannot contain.'68 
For Derrida, a religion without religion is opposed to the great messianic traditions 
which lead, inevitably, to war. 6 Such a religion without religion is an opening on to the 
wholly Other, and not an institutionalised and closeted conception of the good. Yet 
Derrida's discussion of religion outside of the institutional structures by which it has 
traditionally been defined does not always evoke the anarchic appeal of a force opposed 
67
 Caputo, J. D, On Religion, p89. 
ibid, pp 11,112. See also Beckford, J, Religion and Advanced Industrial Society, p 171. For Beckford, a 
secular society is one in which the religious or the sacred is not institutionalized. Religion is best 
understood as a "cultural resource, the "deregulation' of whicfcft "one of the hidden ironies of 
secularization.* 
See also Fenn, R, op cit, pi I. 
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to all rigidity, all order, all finality. Here^ Christianity outside of its traditional forms is 
not simply disruptive but also potentially over-determining. In his discussion of global 
scenes of forgiveness and reconciliation Derrida refers to the 'globalatinisation' rather 
than to the 'globalisation' of politics. He makes this distinction 
to take into account the effect of Roman Christianity which today 
overdetermines all language of law, of politics, and even the interpretation 
of what is called the 'return of the religious.' No alleged disenchantment, no 
secularisation comes to interrupt it. On the contrary.' 
Secularised concepts retain the sense of something sacred, IS Derrida puts it, 'the 
inheritance of a theological memory. It is a theological phantasm or concept.' A 
democracy to come would be brought about by an interrogation or deconstruction of 
these onto-theological concepts. ' Not only are faith and reason not opposed, as 
Derrida, J, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p32. 'The globalisation of forgiveness resembles an 
immense scene of confession in progress, thus a virtually Christian convulsion-conversion-confession, a 
process of Christianisation which has no more need for the Christian Church'; p31. See also De Vries, H, 
op c/f, ppl4-15. 
Derrida notes the surprise with which many have greeted the 'return' of religion to the domestic politics 
of the modern Western democracies, and to the apparent resurgence of religious fundamentalism around the 
world: 'Why does it particularly astonish those who believe that an alternative opposed Religion, on the 
one side, and on the other, Reason, Enlightenment, Science, Criticism....as though the one could not but put 
an end to the other?*Derrida, J, 'Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of 
Reason Alone' in Derrida, J and Vattimo, G (eds) Religion, p5. Richard Fenn has developed a novel 
argument on the nature of a secular society in which he breaks the rationalist dichotomy between the sacred 
and the secular. For Fenn, a secular society is not one governed by instrumental reason or by an 
independent political ethic, but is one which is open to a wide range of possibilities: 'Some of these 
possibilities are clearly interesting and even exciting, some are filled whit the potential for liberation and 
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opposites, but 1 is difficult to delimit the religious from the ethical, the juridical, the 
political and the economic: 'The fundamental concepts that often permit us to isolate or 
to pretend to isolate the political- restricting ourselves to this particular circumscription-
remain religious or in any case theologico-polideal.'72 Nor can one distinguish between 
the fundamentalism of the East and the religion of the West, for, as Derrida asks, aren't 
the wars (or 'military interventions') of the West, in support of 'the best causes', also 
wars of religion?' 
Liberalism and the liberal democratic state would seem to be forever open to the kinds of 
value-laden politics of which the reconciliation process was but one example. We can 
disagree as to whether the 'return' of religion represents a new awareness of the heritage 
or the remainder of once great religious systems, or whether these theological 
'phantasms' still possess their former vitality. To put it another way, whether the 
religious dynamics of contemporary politics are essentially museum pieces, creatures of 
the satisfaction of human desire and aspiration. Other possibilities are more burdensome or fill one with 
dread. They include a wide range of influences and dangers, threats and disasters, from infection and 
infestation to invasion and the loss of sovereignty over the self or over one's society. In their totality they 
constitute the Sacred, with a capital S. A truly secular society is therefore one that is wholly open to the 
Sacred.* Fenn argues that the process of secularisation is not the eradication of religious significance but 
the destruction of the distinction between the sacred and the profane. Fenn, R, Beyond Idols: The Shape of 
a Secular Society, pp5-7, 11- 13, 162. 
12
 ibid, p25. 
ibid. See also Derrida, J, * A Discussion with Jacques Derrida' in Theory and Event, 5:1. John D.Caputo 
and Michael Scanlon consider that Derrida's own work on deconstruction is itself structured like a 
messianic religion, as an opening or welcome to the wholly other; 'deconsturction is structured like a 
religion. Like a prayer and tear for the coming of the wholly other (taut autre) for something impossible, 
like a messianic prayer in a messianic religion'; Caputo, J and Scanlon, M, 'Apology for the Impossible: 
Religion and Postmodernism', in Caputo, J and Scanlon, M (eds) God, the Gift and Postmodernism, p4. 
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untutored habits, or the manifestation of some deep and abiding human spiritual need, 
we do not know.74 For the moment I only wish to make this point; regardless of whether 
this religious dimension is seen as a residue or as the mark of something more 
permanent, it renders the traditional distinctions between politics and religion, church 
and state, public and private, unstable, and to that extent, brings liberalism unstuck 
(unable, that is, to finally discern and hence to police these distinctions.) The liberal 
democratic state, far from being the technical scientific apparatus described by Schmitt, 
is forever open to because it cannot finally identify the religious. 
The 'Secularisation' of Australian Politics 
Insofar as the Australian state can be considered as rational, modern and secular, and 
consequently as a machine which connects means to ends but which is itself neutral in 
regards to ends, we can characterise the Australian reconciliation process as a form of 
political technology. The Australian reconciliation process demonstrates a certain 
'technicity' in at least two respects. Firstly, as a discursive attempt by the state to 
perform what Foucault, commenting on the use of Christian technologies of the self, 
referred to as 'certain operations and transformations', on the self-hood of the nation, 
reconciliation might be thought to have been a supremely technical and rational process 
fer the redefinition of the polity and of its own understanding of itself. Secondly, 
Fenn, R, op tit, ppl5-16. 
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reconciliation might be thought to demonstrate the technicity of the state insofar as 
reconciliation was aimed at the 'socio-economic' disadvantage of Indigenous peoples. 
In both cases, the state as machine was morally neutral but lent itself to ends which 
could have easily have been different, and which might have included such things as 
'assimilation', 'self-determination* or some other as yet unimagined project. 
It is a commonplace of both Australian political science and of Australian political debate 
that the Australian Commonwealth is a modern, secular, rational state, even, as Melleuish 
put it, a 'peculiarly post-Christian' state. But is it correct to assume, as the above 
analysis assumes, that the Australian state is modern, secular, rational, as simply a 
machine which operates in the context of society characterised by multiple subjective 
visions of the good? As a tool for the pursuit of a given but not objective political goal? 
The 'separation of diurch and state' does not feature as an unambiguous proposition of 
the Commonwealth Constitution. 
Section 116 prohibits the Commonwealth from making law in respect to the 
establishment of religion and suggests a separation of the political and the religious 
realms. The Constitution also prevents the Commonwealth from making any law 
limiting the free exercise of religion. But section 116 also prevents discrimination on the 
grounds of religious belief in selection for public office. It was not assumed that the 
Melleuish, G, 'Christianity and Australian Political Thought' St Mark's Review, Autumn 2000, p24. 
Section 116 of the Constitution provides that 'The Commonwealth shall not make any law for 
establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of 
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Australian state would be staffed by atheists. The section has nothing to say of the 
relationship between religion and politics in the states, as opposed to the federal 
government.77 Nor does the section expressly apply to the executive as opposed to the 
legislative power of the Commonwealth. 
Section 116 paints a somewhat ambiguous picture of the relationship between religion 
and the state. These ambiguities became evident in the public debate on John Howard's 
appointment of then Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane Peter Hollingworth as Governor-
General of the Commonwealth in 2001. Concern that the appointment might 'blur the 
lines1 between church and state was trumped by the non-discrimination clause in si 16, 
and, importantly, by the Archbishop's public commitment to stay out of public affairs. 
The point is, the Australian Constitution prevents the institutionalisation of a state 
church, without at the same time insisting that reason oppose faith, or that politics and 
religion be wholly separate. On one reading, it merely establishes a state neutral in 
regards to the diversity of religious beliefs existing within its jurisdiction. On another 
reading, and one which has been made of similar sections of the American Constitution, 
si 16 protects organised religion from state intrusion, and does not suggest that the 
'public' realm be based on reason alone.7 Australian High Court judgments are 
any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the 
Commonwealth.1 
Only the Tasmanian Constitution provides for freedom of religion. The prohibition of religious 
discrimination in Victoria, Western Australia, Queensland and New South Wales has legislative and not 
constitutional force; Maddox, M, For God and Country* pi06. 
See O'Donovan on the ambiguity of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution: 'the paradox 
of the first amendment is thalU measure conceived as a liberation for authentic Christianity has become, in 
this century, a tool of anti-religious sentiment, weakening the participation of the church in society and 
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equivocal as to whether the section establishes a firm separation between church and 
state. In Attorney-General (Victoria); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 
559 the Court ruled that section 116 did not prevent the Commonwealth from providing 
financial assistance to schools operated by religious organisations. Stephen J considered 
that the section did not contain "some broad statement of principle concerning the 
separation of church and state, from which may be distilled the consequences of such 
79 
separation. 
The Australian Christian churches were active participants in the politics of Indigenous 
affairs in the nineties, just as they have been since colonisation in 1788. The manner in 
which reconciliation replaced Makarrata or treaty, that is, at the suggestion and the 
lobbying of the Australian Christian Churches in 1988, might be taken to suggest that 
the ethically neutral machinery of t l^ state adopted a project to which it was neither 
depriving it of access to resources for its social role'; op cit, p245. Peter Butt points out that although 
section 116 was modeled on two provisions of the American Constitution *the High Court has diverged 
sharply from the more expansive reading of its counterparts developed in the United States. In Australia the 
work of the court has concentrated on the free-exercise and anti-establishment clauses of si 16; and there 
has been practically no judicial discussion of the prohibitions on religious observance and religious test 
terns.* Butt further points out that whilst the Court has taken a relatively wide view of the meaning of 
'religion*, the protection granted to religious freedom has been relatively narrow. Butt, P, Constitutional 
Law in Australia, p537-539. 
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 (191) 146 CLR 559 at 609. Cited in Butt, P, opdt, p538. See also Gaze, B and Jones, M, Law, Liberty 
and Australian Democracy, pp 243-322. 
On 19 century Christian missionary activity in Australia see Griffiths, M, op cit, p34-39. See also 
Hogan, M, Australian Catholics: The Social Justice Tradition. See also Australian Council of Churches, 
Justice for Aboriginal Australians, Sydney, 198lpp8-I0, cited in Reynolds, H (ed). Dispossession, pl80. 
See also Hogan, M, Australian Catholics: The Social Justice Tradition, pp 6-7,21-22, 96,99-100. Also 
Rowley, CD, Aboriginal Policy and Practice, Vol One, pp95-106. See also Dodson, P, Regional Report of 
Inquiry into Underlying Issues in Western Australia, p330. 
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necessari ]y committed nor opposed. These observations may not surprise the political 
scientist, who by assimilating religious organisations to the category o f interest group' 
might preserve for themselves a pluralist model of politics in which the National 
Farmer's Federation and the Roman Catholic Church sit side by side in the same 
conceptual basket. No doubt such a model of politics has certain explanatory benefits. It 
is clear that religious and sectional-economic interests organise both in order to exact 
benefits or concessions from the state and to alter the terms of political debate in a 
manner favourable to themselves. 
If we accept the conventional understanding of the Australian state as rational and secular 
we can also formulate some rather generic objections to the Christian dimensions of the 
reconciliation process. These objections are described as 'generic' because no one 
rejected the reconciliation process because of its Christian dimensions. This might follow 
from the fact that fewer still identified the process as religious in character, although at 
least some of the participants, including some Council members, drew an explicit link 
betweef their faith and their politics. The failure to identify the reconciliation process as 
a particularly and peculiarly Christian project was, in fact, one of the great failings of the 
voluminous literature it generated. If no one had identified the process as Christian in 
character, how could anyone reject the process as a violation of the cherished liberal 
principle that religion and politics, as well as the institutions of church and state, ought to 
be kept separate? 
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On the one hand, the choice of reconciliation as a principle to structure the relationships 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples embodies a value choice, derived from 
QSistianity, for which reason can supply no support. The contestability and subjectivity 
of value choices leads to the liberal position that the political processes are to embody a 
procedural rationality, or a theory of right, but are not to endorse a substantive vision of 
the good. On this view, state endorsement of a Christian value system threatens the 
freedom of those who do not subscribe to such a world-view. On the other hand, the 
state's adoption of reconciliation as a framework for public policy threatens the 
rationality of the state. It is not so much that the Churches have strayed from their 
properly apolitical role, but that the use of religiously derived concepts frustrates the 
modernist project of building a perfectly rational public sphere. The moral anxieties of 
guilt and forgiveness, for example, are conceived of as being a distraction; better to 
examine the causal relations between Aboriginal 'disadvantage' and socio-economic 
'processes' than to engage in a superstitious nonsense productive only of guilt. 
But the observation that the language in which a supposedly secular political process was 
conducted was Christian in origin and shape upsets this schema and puts a limit to 
whatever insights may be gained from such an approach. This observation upsets the 
distinction between the secular and the religious upon which the above analysis rests, and 
Patricia Williams, referring to an apology motion in the US Congress *Wrote: *I start to twitch when 
gestures, and essentially religious ones at that, appear in the empty rhetorical spaces created by the 
abandonment of serious political process. Love! Manners! Good values! Are all supremely attractive 
attributes in boy or man, but to be blunt, we should expect more than good wishes from the House of 
Representatives.' Apologising is 'flaccidly nice* and 'too easy'; Williams, P, 'Apologia Qua Amnesia' in 
The Nation, July 14th, 1997, plO, cited in Yamamoto, E, op cit, p55. 
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generates another bundle of theoretical questions which cannot be accounted for without 
also questioning the supposed secularity and rationality of the modern Australian state. 
The discourses of Australian reconciliation politics repeated the theological heritage and 
shape of that term. Reconciliation was more than essentially contested, more than 
something everyone could support because each understood it differently. Reconciliation 
was understood differently in the sense that disagreement on what reconciliation meant 
did not revolve around meanings of that term created ex mhilo. Those disagreements, 
evident in the public discussion of reconciliation and its relationship to the shape of the 
Australian political community, repeated a series of tensions or ambiguities in the history 
of Christian theology relating to penance, apology, forgiveness and unity. 
That is, there might be something more than a merely structural resemblance between the 
forms of contemporary politics and religious ideas, such as between the sovereign state 
and the omnipotent God, in the language of contemporary Australian politics. Could it be 
that the language of Australian politics, at least in the period of reconciliation, carried 
with it some memory of the sacred? A memory evident in ways of talking about the 
relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia, even if, as is 
suggested, that language did not, in the end, provide an answer to that question? 
Schmitt argued that the liberal democratic and constitutional state had been reduced to 
the status of a mere machine indifferent to ethical or religious ends. He also pointed to 
the fundamental incompatibility between liberalism and democracy insofar as liberalism 
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could not form the basis of a political group, and hence of a demos. The liberal tradition 
of the rule of law, individual rights and liberty is fundamentally at odds with the 
democratic focus on equality, identity between governed and governing and popular 
sovereignty.82 The combination between these two traditions in the institutions of liberal 
democracy does not provide a neat synthesis but only a temporary domination of the one 
by the other. The combination is paradoxical. Drawing on Schmitt, Chantal Mouffe 
accepts that democracy always entails drawing a frontier between *us' and 'them', 
between those who belong and those who do not. This principle of identity, and of 
sovereign and democratic identity, is somewhat at odds with the project of universal 
human rights inhering in the individual and exercisable against the majority. Mouffe 
dismisses the attempts by Rawls and Habermas to solve this fundamental tension, 
criticising Rawls for privileging liberalism over democracy, and Habermas for doing the 
opposite. 3 Mouffe's own project, and the point of her departure from Schmitt, is to 
recognize the tensions between liberty and equality, or liberalism and democracy, not as a 
'mode of contradiction but as the locus of paradox': 
while Schmitt is right to highlight the different ways in which the 
universalistic liberal logic is in opposition to the democratic conception of 
equality and the need to politically constitute a 'demos', this does not force 
us to relinquish one of the two traditions. To envisage theif articulation as 
resulting in a paradoxical configuration makes it possible to visualize the 
- Mouffe, C, The Democratic Paradox, pp2-3. 
*ibid,pp4i&. 
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tension between the two logics in a positive way, instead of seeing it as 
leading to a destructive contradiction. 
Other scholars have pointed to a more intimate but generally unacknowledged link 
between liberalism and the nation. Margaret Canovan considers the collective identity of 
or 
the nation to be the unstated background assumption of much modern political thought. 
The liberalism of modern democracy is not the individualism of the universal-human 
subject, but an individualism bounded by the nation. Canovan points to 'Hobbesian truths 
about the need for a stable body politic before any more ambitious politrcal agenda can be 
pursued.'86 For example, she cites Michael Walzer's argument that a theory of 
distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which distribution can take 
place.87 Like Mouffe, Canovan points to the tensions between universalism and 
particularism in the politics of citizenship, immigration and cultural pluralism; a 
universalist humanitarianism presupposes a particular power base sustained by solidarity, 
but the maintenance of that power base contradicts the very principles it renders 
plausible. 
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 ibid, p9. 
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 Canovan, M, Nationhood and Political Theory, p2. See also Poole, R, Nation and Identity, p5. Smith 
likewise argues that the imperative to constitute a people that feels itself to be a people is politically 
necessary., .few if any people can hope to pursue their needs and aspirations successfully in the absence of 
such bounded political communities. And most people cannot be fully happy unless they live in a political 
society that they regard as in some sense worthy in itself, as well as supportive of their identities and 
interests as they understand them'; Smith, R, Civic Ideals, p474. 
80
 ibid, pi4. 
Walzer, M, 'Spheres of Justice* p31, cited in Canovan, M, op cit, p27. 
Canovan, M, op tit, pl33. William Connolly draws a darker conclusion from this insight. Connolly 
points out that from Mill and de Tocqueville through to contemporary liberalism representative 
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Yael Tamir likewise highlights the conceptual difficulty of reconciling cultural or 
national diversity and civic unity within the structures of the multinational state. Despite 
the persistence of certain obvious tensions, however, Tamir argues that the liberal and 
national traditions are capable of, and are in fact in need of, a reconciliation: 
Liberals can acknowledge the importance of belonging, membership and 
cultural affiliations, as well as the particular moral commitments that follow 
from them. Nationalists can appreciate the value of personal autonomy and 
individual rights and freedoms, and sustain a commitment to social justice 
both between and within nations. 
government, freedom and liberty are premised upon the existence of a nation marked by a certain 
homogeneity or unity. Connolly cites Tocqueville's description of American democracy: 'What keeps a 
great number of citizens under the same government is much less a reasoned desire to remain united than 
the instinctive and, in a sense, involuntary accord which springs from the like feelings and similar opinions; 
only when certain men consider a great many questions from the same point of view and have the same 
opinions on a great many questions and when the same events give rise to like thoughts and impressions is 
there a society. Although there are many sects among the Anglo-Americans, they all look at religion from 
the same point of view'; cited in Connolly, W, 'The Liberal Image of the Nation' in Ivison, D et al (eds) op 
cit> pi 85. Connolly argues that this combination 4ushers forth a liberalism divided against itself.' The 
pursuit of the nation is a dangerous Utopian project: la nation is something that has been or will be but 
never is at any actually existing moment.. ..its promise as future unity is thus defined less by positive 
exemplification than by marking a set of constituencies who deviate from it in need of assimilation, 
correction, punishment or elimination'; Connolly, W, Why J am not a Secularist, pp 82-85. 
4The liberal tradition, with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection and choice, and the national 
tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty and solidarity, although generally seen as mutually 
exclusive, can indeed accommodate one another'; Tamir, Y, Liberal Nationalism* p6. 
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The age of the culturally homogenous nation-state, or more precisely, of fc image or 
dream of such uniformity amidst the demos, is over. Yet polities characterised by deep 
diversity cannot do without a shared civic or liberal bond. Tamir*s Liberal Nationalism is 
an effort to theorise the relationship between the kind of liberal or civic education that 
fosters co-operation between diverse sub-national or cultural groups and the legitimate 
demands of those groups for the recognition of their collective identities and rights. 
The assertion that a particular liberal democracy is only possible in the context of a given 
nation seems to go some way to resolving Schmitt's critique of liberalism: liberalism 
presumes what Schmitt thought it rejected. On Schmitt's view, liberal democracy, as a 
rejection of the political, gives way to the political figured as a mythic counter-reaction 
based on faith or revelation, that which grasps men wholly and existentially. To build on 
the observations of Canovan and Tamir, we could say that the liberal democratic state is 
not the merely technical machine envisaged by Schmitt but is in fact situated in 
particular cultural and linguistic context which gives shape to a demos characterised by a 
peculiar kind of unity. The unity of this liberal demos is not characterised by agreement 
on substantive moral-political issues but by background agreements in forms of life or 
language that make both agreement and disagreement on those issues intelligible and 
hence possible. 
Kymlicka refers to an emerging consensus in the literature on minority rights and multiculturalism; 
liberal nationalism: 'According to liberal nationalism, it is a legitimate function of the state to protect and 
promote the national cultures and languages of the nations within its borders.' The liberal element of such a 
nationalism is the set of constraints imposed upon the state. A liberal nationalism would not; for example, 
coercively impose a national identity upon those of other nationalities; Politics in the Vernacular, p39. 
49 
In the course of the Australian reconciliation process deep historical, cultural and 
political differences were transcended, at least superficially, in the use of a common 
language. The differences in the way participants understood reconciliation obscures the 
fact that those disagreements were intelligible because they occurred in the context of a 
background agreement in forms of language. It seems ironic then, that reconciliation was 
a process designed to achieve or which promised to create a future unity, but the 
background agreement in forms of life or language which made it possible to express 
that difference constituted a unity that was already here. The participants were strangely 
united in their shared use of a language which presumed that they were in some respects 
different, but which nonetheless promised to unite them, in other ways, in the future. 
But the aporetic and prophetic quality of this unity must be noted. If the language of 
reconciliation provided Indigenous and non-Indigenous with a background agreement in 
forms of life or language sufficient to render political discussion possible this was not an 
agreement of the sort sufficient to settle substantive disagreement on the shape of 
Australia's political and legal institutions. Nor did it settle the question of whether an 
apology ought to be made to members of the Stolen Generations and their families. I have 
argued that the liberal democratic state is open to because it cannot finally identify the 
Jeremy Webber li&akes a similar point in relation to the contentious issue of Quebecois secession in 
Canada. Democratic nations are defined more, says Webber, by their disagreements than their agreements. 
Not in the sense that democracies are characterised by conflicting parties whose contentions are 
unintelligible to one another, but that fundamental disputes are conditioned or structured in particular and 
common ways. The distinctive structure of political disputes i» these democracies reflects patterns in public 
life built out of the terms of public discussion used in those societies. It is for that reason that Webber 
moves away from the language of nations and nationalism in favor of political communities marked by 
distinctive terms and structures of 'conversation'; Reimagining Canada. 
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religious. This openness can take the form of appropriation and of manipulation: by the 
establishment of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) as through the policy 
of'practical reconciliation' the state purported to use this language of reconciliation as its 
own. Its attempt to achieve a reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
peoples necessarily presupposed a particular vision of what such a reconciliation entailed. 
But the very idea of reconciliation remains subject to an aporia. To say that reconciliation 
implied some form of penance or payment or some measure of justice also raised, in the 
same breath, the need to forget in the name of a common, united future. This aporia at the 
centre of reconciliation, to forgive on condition of penance or to make a gift of 
forgiveness, gracious and without condition, is described in the following chapter. For 
now it is only necessary to note that this aporetic experience is an 'impossible' one. 
Impossible in the sense that ft subjects us to a double injunction at once both 
irreconcilable and indissociable. 
This is not to suggest that the liberal democratic state is itself the bearer of some 
substantive vision of the good, such that state action is limited by immanent principles of 
moral knowledge or identity guiding action. Nor should this be taken to suggest that the 
state progresses forward along some teleological path, or, that the aporetic decision 
" Justice not a regulative ideal but refers to the singular that must escape all universalisations; 'the heart of 
justice aches over these singularities with a kind of biblical justice, rather the way the kingdom of God is 
concerned more with the one sheep that is lost than the ninety-nine safely grazing in the flock'; Caputo, J in 
Derrida, J, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, pi35. Derrida argues that the liberal democratic state is, like all 
polities, founded in violence: 'All nation-states are born and found themselves in violence. I believe that 
truth to be irrecusable....the moment of foundation, the instituting moment* is anterior to the law or 
legitimacy which it founds. It is thus outside the law, and violent by that very fact.'; On Cosmopolitanism 
and Forgiveness, p57. 
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makes apparent in a way not conceived of by Schmitt the distinction between friend and 
enemy. But it does suggest a limit to the unlimited technicity of Schmitt's liberal 
constitutional state: the liberal constitutional state is not itself immune to an imperative 
of theological origin now secularised in the language of reconciliation. By committing 
itself to this process of reconciliation, by using the language of reconciliation as its own 
in even the most manipulative and cynical of fashions, the state subjects itself to double, 
contradictory and indissociable injunctions, notwithstanding the separation of church and 
state, and notwithstanding the dominance of economic-technical thinking in almost all 
realms of public policy. The task of making the polity work remains but the state cannot 
for that reason escape this aporetic call* This impossible experience escapes the realm 
of the politico-juridical relation between state and subject: 
if 'polities' is what you designate in speaking of 'pragmatic processes of 
reconciliation', then, taking seriously these political urgencies, I believe 
also that we are not defined through and through by the political, and 
above all by citizenship, by the statutory belonging to a Nation-State. 
As Caputo put it, 'the work of deconstruction is set in motion, engaged only by a pledge of 
responsibility, indeed of unlimited responsibility...For Derrida, deconstruction is set in motion by 
something that calls upon and addresses us, overtakes us (sur-prises) and even overwhelms us, to which we 
must respond, and so be responsive and responsible. Endlessly.' Caputo, Jin Derrida, J, Deconstruction 
in a Nutshell, p5L Alternatively, 'deconstruction is the affirmation of the coming of the other'; ibid, p53. 
De Vries cites Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, to illustrate this theme of an infinite responsibility: 
'All of us are guilty of everything and responsible for everyone in the face of everything and I more than 
others*; op cit, p435. 
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Must we not accept that, in heart or in reason, something arrives which 
exceeds all institution, all power, all juridico-political authority? 94 
Derrida, J, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness\ p54. See also Derrida, J, 'Faith and Knowledge: The 
Two Sources of'Religion* at the Limits of Reason Alone1 in Derrida, J and Vattimo, G (eds) Religion: 
'however little may be known of religion in the singular, we do know that it is always a responsibility that 
is prescribed, not chosen freely in an act of pure and abstractly autonomous will. There is no doubt that it 
implies freedom, will and responsibility, but let us try to think this: will and freedom without autonomy. 
Whether it is a question of sacredness, sacrificiality or of faith, the other makes the law, the law is other: to 
give oneself back, and up, to the other. To every other and the utterly other'; p47. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEOLOGY OF RECONCILIATION 
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 does not contain a definition of 
'reconciliation.' The CAR itself acknowledged in its final report to parliament that 
defining reconciliation is an 'inherently difficult' task.95 The CAR made its vision 
statement stand in for any precise definition. That vision was of 'a united Australia which 
respects this land of ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage; and 
provides justice and equity for all.* The difficulties experienced in coming to an agreed 
definition of reconciliation were exacerbated by a desire to avoid, in a 'secular' and 
'multicultural' polity such as Australia, the suggestion that the state had adopted a 
particular religious language as its own, to the exclusion of others. Some participants in 
the reconciliation process did, however, acknowledge the link between Christian theology 
and political practice. Rev Bill Hollingsworth, of the Uniting Aboriginal and Islander 
Christian Congress, felt that 'as a Christian I have no choice but to work for 
reconciliation....! am extending what I do in the church into the wider society.' Delsie 
Lillyst, an Aboriginal employee of the Catholic Education Office,J|lso considered that 
her support for reconciliation was informed by her Catholic values; 'when you look at 
reconciliation in terms of gospel values, you can't go past reconciliation to be a good 
Catholic, so to speak.' Lillyst considered that reconciliation was not just about 'accepting 
difference', but also 'the blending...of differences.' 7 
CAR, Final Report: Appendix 5, explanatory notes to Reconciliation Bill, proposed legislation. The CAR 
had also noted in its first annual report that 'market research' indicated that the concept of reconciliation 
was 'difficult and abstract*; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Annual Report, 1993-93, 
www.austlii.edu/au/au/special/rsiproiect/rsilibrarv/car/arI992-93/ 
Hollingsworth, B, cited in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together, No 2, Feb 1993. 
Quoted in It's Not Easy Walking in There, p53 Also Graham Paulson : 'the Bible provides a model for 
reconciliation, a ministry and message of reconciliation, and a motive for reconciliation'... 'the Catholic 
Church in Australia today is symbolic of the continuing body of Christ and as such should be at the 
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Norman Habel's book Reconciliation: Searching for Australia's Soul, also makes an 
explicit connection between the Australian reconciliation process and Christian 
theologies of reconciliation. The Council's vision statement, for example, 'reminds me of 
the hopes of the biblical prophets who dreamed of a day when all peoples would unite in 
worshipping God.' Habel, citing Hamilton, argues that the Christian Churches could offer 
a 'gift' to Australia: 
The gift which the church can offer is nowhere clearer than in the'theory and 
practice of reconciliation. In the first place, the church has recognised the 
symbols of reconciliation and has developed them...while these symbols 
may be rusty in the contemporary church, they are a rich source for reflection 
on a symbolically impoverished national life. 
The theological dimensions of Aboriginal reconciliation were also evident to some of 
those on the 'secular' side of the church-state divide. Senate President Margaret Reid 
drew a link between Christianity and the reconciliation process in her announcement of 
government support for the National Centre for Christianity and Australian Culture in 
1998: 'one of the most important concepts of the Centres creation will be its focus on 
forefront of the process of reconciliation playing whatever sacrificial role it needs to in order to accomplish 
the changes in attitudes and actions that are necessary for reconciliation to be achieved.' Paulson, G,8 A 
Just and Proper Settlement: An Aboriginal Perspective', Murtang Upa, p276-277, 283. See also Australian 
Catholic Bishops Conference, Towards A Reconciled Australia, 
www.catholic.org.au/whatsnew/reconweek. accessed September 1999; 'Pilgrimage to the Heart1 Walking 
Together, no 29, August 2000. 
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reconciliation with Australia's Aboriginal peoples." Then Governor-General Sir 
William Deane offered a rare insight into the theological dimensions of his commitment 
to reconciliation in his speech to the Southern Queensland Theological Library. Deane 
noted that 'the scope of theology obviously includes the relationship between God and 
man' and that 'that relationship encompasses the relationship between man and man1: 
That being so, I see the relationship between Australia's indigenous peoples 
and the nation as a whole as not only raising basic issues of justice and 
decency. I also see it as one of the most important theological issues 
confronting us as we approach the new millennium.... 
In general, however, the references to religion in reconciliation discourse were oblique 
only. The CAR related to faith groups as it related to other organisations, even as its own 
political language played on Christian images of healing and spiritual maturity. But it is 
98
 Hamilton, A, *In Whose Name?' Interface, 1, 1998, pp43-52, cited in Habel, N, op ciU pl9. 
The Senator went on to say that Centre would 'provide Australians with a focus on reconciliation, 
multiculturalism and spiritual expression close to the heart of government, as well as a place to 
memorialize events and people who shape Australian history*; Senator Margaret Reid, Press Release, 21 
September 1998. Sir William Deane also noted that 'central to it (the National Centre for Christianity) is 
our shared longing for true and lasting reconciliation between indigenous Australians and the nation of 
which they form such an important part1; Liturgy for Ecumenical Pilgrims to celebrate the 50th 
anniversary of the World Council of Churches, Canberra, 20 September 1998, www.aph.gov.au online text: 
410989 
Deane continued: 'Hopefully (by the bicentennary of federation), the allegorical saga of 
dispossession by Captain Cook and those who came after him will have been supplemented by a sequel: 
one in which an Aborigine and a non-Aborigine went forth together throughout the country as friends and 
equals to overcome injustice and disadvantage and, thereby, understood the true meaning of reconciliation 
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the contention of this thesis that the Australian reconciliation process shares with a 
number of international political examples what Tully has called a background agreement 
in forms of life or language. 
How can we bring these theological aspects of political discourse to light without at the 
same itoe allowing them to over-determine the inquiry? Or, how to study theology 
without becoming a theologian? Australian political science provides few guides for such 
a task, although there are certainly some examples to be considered. Gregory Melleuish 
has provided one model for the study of religion and politics in Australia. Melleuish first 
notes a paradox of Australian political culture: that while Australia is often characterised 
as a 'peculiarly secular and post-Christian' polity, its political thought is rich in concepts 
derived from the Christian tradition. Graham Maddox makes the broader point that the 
political thought of the West is itself heavily under the influence of Christian notions of 
liberty and even prophecy. ~ But Melleuish makes the particular point that there has 
existed in Australian intellectual life a tradition, admittedly outside the mainstream but 
nevertheless apparent, of Christian political thought concerned with issues of value or 
not only between Man and Man but also between Man and God'; Millennium Dinner, Southern 
Queensland Theology Library, Toowoomba, 5 November 1999, www.aph.gov.au Online Text: 434095. 
Visitors to this country also note its seeming religious peace. William Connolly, an American academic 
who spent three months as a Visiting Fellow at ANU's Humanities Research Centre, described Australia as 
'the most secular country I have yet to visit and the least haunted by religious wars'; Connolly, W, Why I 
am not a Secularist', p ix. Patrick O'Farrell, historian of Australian Catholicism wrote: *what is most 
significant historically about religion is its weakness.. .its tenuous and intermittent hold on the minds and 
hearts of Australian people*; 'Writing the General History of Australian Religion' in Journal of Religious 
History, vol 9, nol 1976, p66. 
* See Maddox, G, Religion and the Rise of Democracy. 
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substance, over and above the genera! pre-occupation with matters technical. He 
identifies a number of nineteenth century intellectuals as having been motivated by ideas 
of a spiritual, and particularly Christian, nature. He includes in this group John Dunmore 
Lang, John West and John Woolley. Later intellectuals Melleuish places in the Christian 
tradition of Australian political thought include Francis Anderson, Ernest Burgmann, 
B.A. Santamaria and James McAuley. In his book Cultural Liberalism in Australia 
Melleuish describes an Australian liberal tradition, dating from 1880 to 1960, that 
operated as a compelling critique of mere 'efficiency.*' Cultural liberalism, embued with a 
'powerful religious dimension1 , aimed to reconcile scientific rationality, civic 
humanism and the spiritual development of humanity. It had a 'particular conception of 
the sacred'; an understanding of'culture' as the means to re-enchant a world stripped of 
its spirituality by an uncomprehending rationality. It understood humanity as a spiritual 
and ethical entity.105 
But the tradition of Australian cultural liberalism described in Melleuish's book is now 
an empty and exhausted one, having lost its vital force around the I960's. What are we 
then to say of the unselfconsciously religious dimensions of an apparently 'secular' and 
contemporary process. Historical, conceptual and biographical investigation of the kind 
practiced by Melleuish are not enough, on their own, to provide a reading of the 
103
 Melleuish, G, 'Christianity and Australian Political Thought' St Mark's Review, Autumn 2000, p24. 
Melleuish, G, Cultural Liberalism in Australia: A Study in Intellectual and Cultural History, Cambridge 
University Press, Melbourne, 1995, pi. Also Melleuish, G, 'Christianityand Australian Political Thought* 
St Mark's Review^ Autumn 2000, p25. 
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Australian reconciliation process which captures the religious dimensions of 
contemporary Australian politics, especially where the religious is hard to recognize, 
entangled with the secular, and disruptive of the very distinctions by which we tend to 
describe it. 
There is certainly some scope for adopting a biographical approach to the study of the 
Australian reconciliation process. Pat Dodson's training as a Catholic priest (the first 
Aboriginal man to be ordained) opens up one obvious line of inquiry. And there are a 
host of 'minor characters' who could no doubt have been assembled as something of a 
cast for such a story. Amongst the third Council alone could be found the following 
religiously devoted figures: Rev. Djiniyini Gondarra was ordained in Uniting Church; 
Jenny Mitchell, CWA member, was a licensed lay preacher in Anglican Church; May 
O'Brien, a stolen child: 'in her youth... became involved with reconciliation on a 
personal level with God and has devoted her iife to this since then'; Democrat Senator 
John Woodley, a Uniting Church Preacher; Kerry Blackman, from the Gurang People: i 
am a justice leader who stands for truth and righteousness and am totally committed to 
reconciliation in the Biblical context of building bridges between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people....! believe that reconciliation should be based on the three r's: 
Repentance, for wrongs which must be put right; Reconciliation, to understand the costor 
harm done; and recompense, to restore what's been taken.' 106 To this list could be added 
ibid, plOl. The University was the New Church, initiating students into the 'mysteries of oneness.* 
Culture functioned as a 'quasi-secular version of civil religion which, it was hoped, could provide both the 
spiritual bonds of social unity and a model of rational behavior1; p58. 
CAR, Walking Together: Australians for Reconciliation Information Kit, p4. Walking Together, No 21, 
March 1998. 
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Sir Ronald Wilson and Sir William Deane, and no doubt many others. But the weakness 
of this approach is its inability to explain the way in which reconciliation was expressed 
as a secular project even by its religious supporters, and inversely, the way in which 
reconciliation repeated the theological ambiguities of Christian reconciliation even when 
supported by those of a 'secular' orientation. Clearly, another methodology was required. 
Journalist and author David Marr has provided one of the few recent attempts to link 
contemporary Australian politics to Australian Christianity. His book, The High Price of 
Heaven, is a polemical swipe at the creeping conservatism of the late nineties, especially 
as manifest in the ideological links between the Howard government and the Christian 
Right. Marr utilises, or shifts between, two distinct methodologies; between 
conceptualising the Australian Christian churches as well organized, powerful lobby or 
interest groups, and a derivative biographical approach that details the formative imprint 
of Methodism, for example, on conservative leaders such as John Howard. As Marr puts 
it, Australia is a 'secular country but the Churches remain the most resilient, most 
respected and the best connected lobby groups in the nation....sin is their business.'107 He 
adopts a biographical approach when he turns to the Prime Minister's controversial 
politics of race; 'it all goes back to his Methodist youth.' Marr highlights the values of 
sobriety, respectability and hard work, plus the Methodist focus on charity and education 
rather than justice and restitution, as formative influences on John Howard still apparent 
in his approach to reconciliation. 
Marr, D, The High Price of Heaven, p xiii. 
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Whilst Marr's methodological pluralism is to be applauded, this particular combination 
never seems to stretch quite far enough as an explanatory tool. Marr describes the 
religious using a secular language of pluralism, interests and conflict. He renders 
theology or religion in a political idiom which is alien to it and hence misses the 
significance of theology and religion. 109 Marr uses this secular language to describe 
religion as an identifiable and localised political force. He locates religion in the 
churches, as political lobby groups, and in the formative influences of Australian 
childhoods. But Marr's stated purpose, to disentangle theology from politics, is more 
ambitious than it seems. The line between the political and the theological or the 
religious is not easy to discern, even in the 'post-Christian' Australian Commonwealth. 
For if Marr is to remain true to his methodology, he must, after locating religion as there 
and not here, identify a place of no-faith, of no-religion. But where are we to find this 
place? In the gay and lesbian community? Surely not. As every good queer knows, 
sexuality, even when cast out from the Church, does not obey reason. Nor is it a stranger 
to the divine. 
Marion Maddox has provided a survey of the methodological problems bedevilling the 
study of the relationship between religion and politics in Australia. She notes that a 
history of sectarian conflict has 'bequeathed Australian studies the assumption that 
108
 ibid, pp 27-28,30. 
Caputo on Wittgenstein and language games: 'there are multiple language games, each with its own 
internal rules of consistency and meaning, each of which serves a different end. On that telling it would be 
a mistake to try to translate or to reduce one game to the other, to reduce what is going on in a prayer, for 
example (which clearly belongs to an especially religious language game), to the terms of economics or 
psychoanalysis. Something would get lost in the translation (namely, the prayer)* On Religion, p65. 
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discussion of religion and politics means Catholics in the ALP.' A large body of 
literature on the relationship between Catholicism and the Labor split, for example, has 
featured as part of a more general search for a relationship between religion and voting 
behaviour.112 The decline in church attendance and the more general 'secularisation' of 
Australian culture have rendered this approach next to meaningless.1 Rodney Smith also 
points to serious methodological weaknesses in the study of religion and politics in 
Australia: 'the search for the electoral meanings of Australian religion goes on in fits and 
starts. Unless such a search is guided by better conceptual tools and evidence, it is likely 
to continue in the desert for another forty years.* 
Maddox urges researchers to move beyond the Catholic-Protestant divide towards a 
qualitative study of the interaction of faith and politics: 
Marr, D, op cit, pxiv. 
Maddox, M, For God and Country; Religious Dynamics in Australian Federal Politics, p3. Judith Brett 
has recently argued that the foundations of the Australian party system are not to be found primarily in a 
particularly Catholic appeal to the working class but in certain aspects of a liberal social imaginary linked, 
by Brett, to Protestantism; The Treaty Process and the limits of Australian Liberalism, 
http://www.ai atsis.gov.au/rsrch/smnrs/papers/brett.htm 
~ Maddox, M, op cit, p3. 
Maddox argues 'the inherited tendency among political analysts to assume that the religion-politics 
nexus is best explored by correlating denomination with voting behaviour became becalmed in a series of 
inconclusive fishing exercises.1 Maddox also argues that researchers need to look both ways when studying 
the relationship between religion and politics; rather than searching for the political effects of fixed 
religious convictions, we should also consider the possible effects of changes in one's political 
commitments on one's theological commitments; op cit, pp 3-4,21-22. 
Smith, R, 'Religion and Electoral Behaviour in Australia: The Search for Meaning1 Australian Religion 
Studies Review, vol 11, no 2, 1998, p34, cited in Maddox, M, op cit, p4. See also Smith, R, Australian 
Political Culture, pp252-277. 
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greater attention to the detail of how theological and political 
considerations fit together in the social consciousness of people from a 
wide variety of Christian and non-Christian traditions would provide a 
body of information which could then be drawn on to develop the tools 
needed to move Australian political science's understanding of religion 
beyond what Smith calls its present 'conceptual underdevelopment, 
impiausibility and contradiction.'1 
Maddox's own work is an impressive contribution to that effort. Examining the interplay 
of religion and politics in the proceedings of the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth Australian 
parliaments, Maddox points to the way in which Australia's 'apparently secular structure 
has proved permeable to the sacred's destabilising residues or influences, which, in every 
case, have turned out to have significant political effects.' 16 Those political effects do not 
exhibit a uniform tendency to the Left or to the Right; 'instead, ...(they) reflect the dual 
tendencies of religion, at times investing the hierarchically ordered status-quo with an 
aura of religious legitimation, at other times challenging existing structure by a special 
critique from the margins.' Maddox also points to a change in the meaning of religious 
15
 Maddox, M, op tit, plO. 
"*/W«lp285. 
ibid. Forrester also points to two quite different modes of religious politicization, one radical and 
ecumenical, the other conservative, Establishment (Christianity as legitimation of conservative political 
tradition); Theology and Politics, p53. Gauchet, however, argues that *we must completely discard the 
widely accepted view of religion as an "instrument of legitimation*, a view that assumes an unvarying 
reli gious function behind its variable content and consequently assumes that through the ages both rulers 
and subjects hold an identical position with regard to the sacredly established order,' A Political History of 
Religion, p50. 
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statements in late-twentieth century Australia: 'Rather than statements of shared faith, 
they provide a way of expressing- and sometimes, resolving- new anxieties and 
• ? 118 
preoccupations. 
Some of Maddox' concerns are echoed in this thesis. For example, the religious 
dimensions of the Australian reconciliation process are not easily explained in terms of a 
dichotomy between Catholicism and Protestantism overlayed onto a further series of 
dichotomies relating to party and class. Yet, as Maddox points out, the apparent 
secularism of the process and of Australian politics in general belied a significant 
Christian dimension which operated both to support and to challenge the status quo. 
Rather than tending exclusively to the Left or the Right, the discourses of Australian 
reconciliation featured a series of tensions regarding political unity and difference, as 
well as sin, apology, forgiveness and penance, which also marked the theological 
discourses of reconciliation. This thesis turns to the work of James Tully for a 
methodology by which these aspects of the Australian reconciliation process might be 
fruitfully examined. Rather than engage in qualitative research of the kind recommended 
by Maddox, it considers the shape of theological discourses as one way to understand 
11S
 Maddox, M, op a% p 41. David Gill, General Secretary, National Council of Churches in Australia, *To 
Ecumenical Friends*, June 1997, on the 1997 Australian Reconciliation Convention:'the piety wasn't overt. 
Nobody sang songs or said prayers. But the spirituality was there, just beneath the surface. The language of 
faith kept intruding into the proceedings because.. .well, when the going is rough what other language can 
you use?* 
Pile and Keith note that despite ititinifying teleology, 'reconciliation* does not do away with the need 
for resistance but 'produces diversely positioned effects whi^l unavoidably complicate the straightforward 
oppositional arrangement within which resistance has been conventionally framed'; Pile, S and Keith , M 
(eds) Geographies of Resistance, p205. 
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how the ideal of reconciliation has structured the debate regarding the shape of 
Australia's legal and political institution I also refer to the recent work of Jacques 
Derrida on the aporetic nature of the Christian heritage of reconciliation and forgiveness. 
In particular, Derrida counterposes two distinct but indisocciable understandings of 
forgiveness already given to us in that same heritage; forgiveness as a gracious and freely 
given 'gift' (a forgiveness that can never appear as such) and a qualified and conditional 
forgiveness aimed at reconciliation, normalisation and political 'therapy.' 
Tully on Constitutionalism and Wittgenstein 
Tully's project in Strange Multiplicity is to approach contemporary constitutionalism 
'from the perspective of the struggles of Aboriginal peoples (so that) unnoticed aspects of 
its historical formation may be brought to light.' He does so by means of a Wittgenstinian 
analysis of the discourses of'modern' and 'common' constitutionalism, contrasting the 
imperialist aspects of the former to what he describes as the relatively open character of 
the latter. As he explains it, the method consists of a 
survey of the language employed in the current debate over recognition in 
order to identify the shared conventions (the distinctions, assumptions, 
inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course 
of the debate) which render recognition problematic and give rise to the 
Tully, J, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, pp58-70, 115-139. 
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range of conflicting solutions. To free ourselves of the hold of these 
conventions of the age, so that we do not remain blinded by them like 
Oedipus, a historical survey of the philosophical debates and practical 
contexts in which they were forged is then carried out. 
This method, derived from Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy, and which also 
owes something to Foucault's later genealogical method, aims at a 'perspicuous 
representation' or a 'clear view' of the grammar and hence the meaning of a word. As 
Wittgenstein puts it in section 122 of the Philosophical Investigations, 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a 
clear view of the use of our words-Our grammar is lacking in this sort of 
perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding 
ibid, p 35. In Strange Multiplicity Tully characterises the contemporary politics of indigenous affairs as 
a 'special example of the phenomenon of the politics of cultural recognition.' That is, Tully locates the 
political debate over the rights of indigenous peoples as one which goes to the fundamentals of the polity, 
as a debate not so much about the rights of minority groups within already constituted polities, but as a 
constitutional dialogue going to the nature of the polity in which those rights, whatever they may be, are 
enjoyed. Demands for cultural recognition, says Tully, are not just demands for the recognition of the 
aesthetic or historical significance of certain cultures, but a demand that these cultures be recognised 
politically, now, in appropriate forms of self-government; ibid, pp 3-4. Tully has more recently described 
the struggle for indigenous rights in the terms of the 'the struggles for and of freedom.' The practical 
problem, as Tully describes it, 'is the relation between the establishment and development of 
westernsocieties and the pre-existence and continuing resistance of indigenous societies on the same 
territory.'' (original emphasis} The challenge is to escape this relation of'internal colonisation.' Tully seeks 
the conditions under which a just dialogue between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples can be 
maintained; Tully J, *The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples For and Of Freedom1 in Ivison, D, et al (eds), op 
tit, pp37-59. 
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which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and 
inventing intermediate cases. 
Such a perspicuous representation is not a comprehensive view of language, or the 
proverbial view from nowherfe Rather, the task of constructing a perspicuous 
representation proceeds by way of using objects of comparison to 'to throw light on the 
facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.'That is, 
understanding the meaning of a word is not the same thing as being able to give reasons 
as to why a word should be understood in a particular way. The giving of reasons comes 
to an end; 'but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, ie, it is 
not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-
game.' Wittgenstein continues, at section 217, 'if I have exhausted the justifications I 
have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: This is simply 
what I do.' What we take as given is a 'form of life.' ~ 
Nor is the ability to understand the meaning of a particular word the practice of following 
a rule. Wittgenstein employs the analogy of the sign-post at section 85: 
' Wittgenstein develops a novel argument as to the role of philosophy: 'we must do away with all 
explanation, and description must take its place...the problems are solved, not by giving new information, 
but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of the 
intelligence by means of language;1 Philosophical Investigations, p27, section 109. 
At section 217, cited in Tully, J, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: Understanding Practices of 
Critical Reflection*, Political Theory, vol 17, no 2, May 1989, ppl72-204 at 181. Wittgenstein further 
remarks, at s289, 'to use a word without a justification does not mean to use it without right.' 
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A rule stands there like a sign-post. Does the sign post leave no doubt open 
about the way I have to go on? Does it show which direction I am to take 
when I have passed it; whether along the road or footpath or cross-country? 
But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of 
its finger or (eg) in the opposite one? -And if there were not a single sign-
post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marked on the ground- is there 
only one way of interpreting them? 
Following a rule 'correctly' is not an interpretation of that rule, for, as Wittgenstein 
contends, whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule; kany 
interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any 
support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning.'125 Rather, the ability 
to use a word is just that, an ability or practical normative ability acquired through 
participation in language games. ' Plant adds, 'it is commitment to practice which is the 
basis for practical reasoning, not some pure attempt to argue for the incorrigibility of a 
particular set of propositions as a universal foundation for practical judgment.1 ~7 
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 ibid, p\94. 
Wittgenstein, L, PhilosophicaUnvestigations, Section 198, cited in Tully, J, 'Wittgenstein and Political 
Philosophy: Understanding Practices of Critical Reflection1 at pi 94. 
As Tully puts it, the grasping of a rule is not an interpretation, nor the possession of a theory, 'but the 
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Wittgenstein remarks that language is like a picture with the potential to hold us captive; 
'and we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat 
it to us inexorably.'128 Owen links this observation to a Foucauldian analysis of power; 
the emergence and development of our ways of reflecting on x are 
interwoven with the emergence and development of particular forms of 
conduct and practical identities- and, thus, of how our ways of reflecting on 
x have become hegemonic, of how this hegemony is sustained and of the 
effects of domination that taking these ways of reflecting on x as th£ way of 
reflecting on x engenders.1*" 
Tully argues in Strange Multiplicities that modern constitutionalism has obscured our 
view of an older but arguably less imperialist form of thinking about constitutionalism. 
He sets out to recover that tradition, which he calls 'common' constitutionalism, and to 
apply it to the politics of Indigenous affairs. The task of this thesis is related to Tully's 
enterprise in at least one respect; it attempts to tease out the ambiguities and tensions 
already present in the Christian theologies of reconciliation. It aims at understanding 
disputes about the meaning of reconciliation internal to the use of that word. Internal, that 
WittgensteitviL, op cit, p48, Section I !5. Wittgenstein continues, at section 129: 'the aspects of things 
which are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to 
notice something- because it is always before one's eyes.) The foundations of his enquiry do not strike a 
man at all. Unless that has at some time struck him.- And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once 
seen, is most striking and powerful'; Wittgenstein, L, op cit, Section 129. 
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iss to the agreement in forms of life or language manifest in the wide-spread use of the 
term 'reconciliation.' 
Winch has argued that the rules of particular language games are 'implicit or background 
"understandings" embedded in practice and shared by ail members of the community.'13 
Plant also argues that many of the themes of communitarian political thought are implicit 
in Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy. He points, for example, to the 
communitarian notion of 'the internal relation of reasons to particular practices and the 
way in which ideas such as a reason for action have to be linked to a common 
understanding and a common vocabulary.' He further remarks that, to the extent that 
one agrees with Wittgenstein, one must more and more come to regard as defective 
certain of the central assumptions of liberalism, such as the 'unencumbered' self: 
Liberal political theory insofar as it seeks to derive some universal reasons 
for action from the idea of the unencumbered self, agency, a thin theory of 
the good, all done in abstraction from any particular social practice, is 
sending language and thought on holiday.133 
Wittgenstein: 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life'; op c//, p8, section 18; or 'the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life'; pi I, section 23; '"so you are saying that 
human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"- it is what human beings say that is true and 
false; and they agree in the language they use. That is, not agreement in opinions but in forms of life'; p88, 
no241. 
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Such a reading might cast Wittgenstein in a communitarian mould. Owen and Tully, 
however, warn against an overly conservative reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy of 
language; there is no single definitive way of using words that could be or is shared by an 
entire community. The use of words is too varied and tangled to be governed by 'rules.' 
Tully argues that 'understanding a general term is not the theoretical activity of 
interpreting and applying a general theory or rule in particular cases.*134 The use of 
particular words may constitute a background agreement in forms of life or forms of 
language, but the use of a general term in particular or actual language games is always 
marked by the opportunity to use that term in a non-conventional manner. 
But the problems of unanimity, or of reaching what might be thought to approach a 
communitarian understanding of the good or of justice within a given tradition of 
thought, are more fundamental even than this. The problem of coming to any final 
agreement is not simply that different speakers are likely to use the same terms in 
different ways, or that different 'language games' have their own 'rules' and hence are 
not reducible to each other (although this presents a problem for those like Marr who 
would render the theological in a secular idiom). A more significant obstacle to such an 
See also Tully, J, 'Wittgenstein and PoIitdMU Philosophy: Understanding Practices of Cilfct 
Reflection*, Political Theory, vol 17, no 2, May 1989, ppl72-204 at 184 
Tully: ^lis not only novitiates being inducted into a language-game who may reasonably 'go on 
differently*- in continuing a series and so on. Seasoned practitioners, who are all masters of 
techniques....continue to use the words in slightly different ways and there is no sharp demarcation between 
normal and abnormal uses or between 'same* and 'different'. Indeed, Wittgenstein's examples seem set up 
to show how it is always possible to unsettle in a reasonable way or most settled and convention laden ways 
of thought. Moreover, it is always possible to attempt to justify a deviant use of, say 'democracy', by 
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agreement is the existence of those deep fissures in language (or, after Derrida, of 
'aporias'). These are places where understanding, let alone agreement, is difficult; where 
language presents for us a problem for which there is no immediate answer. For 
Wittgenstein such aporias 'have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes. Their 
roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as 
the importance of our language.' 
A point of difference between Derrida and Wittgenstein emerges here. For Wittgenstein 
these deep disquietudes are 'problems arising though a misinterpretation of our forms of 
language.' The task of philosophy is to 'dissolve' the 'problem' by an investigation or 
description of the language games of which it is composed. For Derrida, these aporias are 
not soluble but remain the very condition in which a decision must be made. For 
example, the contradictory logic animating the concepts of forgiveness and of 
reconciliation is not that of an antinomy, of two imperatives which are merely 
contradictory. These dual imperatives are also indissociable. The work of exchange, of 
political reconciliation through a conditional forgiveness, refers 'to a certain idea of pure 
and unconditional forgiveness, without which this discourse would not have the least 
meaning.' The two poles are distinct but indissociable elements of the same tradition. 
As Critchley and Kearney contend, Derrida's identification of this contradiction or aporia 
appeal to an intersubjective warrant that is not, in that context, in doubt and so can function as a ground1; 
Tully, J, op cit, 185 
6
 Wittgenstein, L, op cit, p47, Section 111. 
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'is not staged in order to paralyse political action, but on the contrary, in order to enable 
it.'138 
Christian Theologies of Reconciliation 
Then Chair of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Evelyn Scott argued that the 
concept of reconciliation did not bear a partioilarly Christian shape but emanated from 
the common spiritual foundations of humanity. 
The spiritual part of reconciliation emanates from the hearts and minds -
and, if you like, the common spiritual foundation - of individuals of all races 
and religions. It's not contaminated by politics or commerce or even by the 
ritual requirements of the various religions. The Arabic community and the 
Jewish community are among the strongest supporters of reconciliation in 
this country. 
Insofar, as Derrida points out, our concept of forgiveness belongs to an Abrahamic 
tradition from which all the monotheisms, Jewish, Christian and Islamic are derived, it is 
true that reconciliation resonates with a common religious tradition that includes the 
Critchley, S and Kearney, R * Preface1, in Derrida, J, Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, px. See also 
Caputo in Derrida, J, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, pI40. 
Scott, E, The Common Spiritual Foundation of All Peoples, Speech to the Bahai Community of Cairns, 
24 January 1999, http://www.austlii.edu.aU/au/other/lndigLRes/car/1999/2401 .html 
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Jewish and Moslem communities of Australia.140 But it was apparent that the particular 
shape, the distinctive resonances and tensions of the process, were most keenly and most 
readily apparent as variations or as 'secularised' equivalents of Christian theologies and 
practices of reconciliation. The focus on atonement, apologising and forgiveness, for 
example, bore a particularly Catholic shape, and a good deal of this section therefore 
focuses on Catholic teaching. It is not my aim, however, to relate particular aspects of the 
reconciliation process or specific doctrinal debates to theological positions held by 
various denominations. My aim is the much more modest: first, to highlight some generic 
aspects of the history, theology and practice of reconciliation, and secondly, to highlight 
an aporia in that language that is not specific to any of the denominations, but marks the 
language of reconciliation as a whole. 
Theological reconciliation relates to the work of grace and forgiveness which is 
productive of a unity in both human relations and between humanity and God.141 
Christian theologians have not developed, however, a ready made formula or an applied 
theology of reconciliation that might be applied to a 'secular' political relationship, such 
as that between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia. This was at least 
partly because the Christian Churches themselves have failed to develop what might be 
thought of as an 'applied' theology of reconciliation. Reconciliation has traditionally 
See also Gopin, M, * Forgiveness as an Element of Conflict Resolution in Religious Cultures' in Abu-
Nimer, M, Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, p88-99. 
For example, Petersen writes of reconciliation as a 'restoration or even a transformation toward an 
intended wholeness that comes with transcendent or human grace, expresses the result of a restored relation 
in behaviour... it restores and transforms'; Petersen, R, 'A Theology of Forgiveness' in Helmick, R and 
Petersen, R, Forgiveness and Reconciliation, pi 3. 
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been understood as primarily related to the relationship between humanity and God, 
rather than in terms of social relationships and hence of social responsibilities. 
Although there has long been an acceptance that reconciliation operates both horizontally 
and vertically143, amongst humanity and between humanity and God, the former has 
traditionally been subordinated to the latter. 4 A second way in which the Churches have 
obscured the 'social meaning' of reconciliation is almost diametrically opposed to this 
quietest introverted stance. The second approach has been, as Volf puts it, 'to concede 
tacitly the interraiatedness of social responsibility and reconciliation but then to critique 
social withdrawal and place the pursuit of freedom and the struggle for justice at the 
centre of the Christian social agenda.' 
142
 Volf M, 'T&e Social Meaning of Reconciliation', Interpretation, April 2000 v54(2) pl58. 
See. for example, John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and Penance: Origin and 
Meaning of the Document, December 2, 1984. John Paul II stresses that vertical reconciliation (with God) 
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collective and large scale; op cit, p54. See also Shriver, D, An Ethic for Enemies, pp 51-58; Petersen, R, 'A 
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 Volf, M, op ciu p54. Petersen also notes a division in modern theological reflection on the work of 
forgiveness and reconciliation between 'those who join forgiveness to justification, with a personal and 
vertical view of salvation, and those who connect it with justice and the search for reconciliation but in 
language that often moves from transcendence to a prevailing political rhetoric* Petersen, R, *A Theology 
of Forgiveness Terminology, Rhetoric and the Dialectic of Interfaith Relationships* in Helmick, R et al 
(eds) Forgiveness and Reconciliation,^. Cilliers Breytenbach has argued that there has never been a 
consensus in the way theologians have considered reconciliation, but that theologians have responded to 
their lived context in terms of different theologies of reconciliation; Breytenbach, C, 'Reconciliation: Shifts 
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But the problem is not for any want of theorising. The difficulty of coming to any 
definitive understanding of what an institutionalised process of political reconciliation 
might look like lies in the language of reconciliation, whether 'applied' or not. The 
commonality of language that links Canada, South Africa, Argentina and Ireland to 
Australia is the Christian theology or theologies of reconciliation. It is within this form 
of language, the use of which constitutes a background agreement that makes discussion 
and hence intelligible disagreement possible, that the highly contentious politics of 
Aboriginal reconciliation has been played out in Australia. The discourses of Aboriginal 
reconciliation repeated the tensions of that language, such as that between apology and 
penance, unity and difference, without resolving them. Nor would it be possible to 
develop an applied theological understanding of reconciliation that might escape those 
tensions. The language of'reconciliation' did not and could not map out onto the political 
process in any ready made fashion. To reiterate the Tully/Wittgenstein observation then, 
we might say that historically the theology of reconciliation has not been linear, unified 
or determinative of any theological proposition, but has constituted a background 
agreement in forms of life or language, the context in which and by which agreement as 
well as disagreement are intelligible and hence possible. It is, moreover, a language 
which presents for us some 'deep disquietudes' or 'aporias.' These are problems of 
in Christian Soteriorology\ 1986, cited Goldman, G, 'Reconciliation: An Urgent Task; A Review of the 
Literature1 Neten Yuba, no 67, 1997, p 20. 
On international examples of national apology, see Gardiner-Garden, J, From Dispossession to 
Reconciliation, p33. 
77 
coming to any final understanding of what reconciliation between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples might look like or how it would come about. 
Schreiter argues that reconciliation has emerged since the 1980's as the new mission 
paradigm of the Christian Churches worldwide, following on from the previous 
paradigms of'expansion* and 'accompaniment* Expansion characterised the period from 
the end of the nineteenth century to the close of World War II, and was closely related to 
European colonialism. 'Accompaniment' marked the period from the 1960's to the 
1980's, and is linked to Liberation theology and solidarity with the Other. Reconciliation, 
according to Schreiter, is a response to the phenomenon of globalisation and the 
oppression of the poor. The theology and practice of reconciliation does of course have 
a much longer and more tangled history. The language of reconciliation has developed in 
two related contexts: firstly, in the Biblical texts and in theological discussions thereof, 
and secondly, in the context of Christian penitential technologies, in particular, the 
Catholic sacrament of reconciliation or confession. There are several references to 
reconciliation in the Old Testament, such as in the Second Book of Maccabees, but other 
concepts, such as expiation and atonement by sacrifice, predominate.148 Reconciliation is 
a creature of the New Testament, and in particular, of Pauline Christianity. The word 'to 
Cited by Goldman, G, 'Reconciliation: An Urgent Task; A Review of the Literature* Nelen Yuba, no 67, 
1997, ppl-23, at p2. Petersen links the growing interest In reconciliation and forgiveness to both the 
historical experience of World War II and, in the North American context, to 'reflection and analysis in the 
health-care sciences'; Petersen, R, *A Theology of Forgiveness: Terminology, Rhetoric and the Dialectic of 
Imerfaith Relationships' in Helmick, R et ai (eds) Forgiveness and Reconciliation. p6. 
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reconcile' (katallassein149) is found thirteen times in the New Testament, and all of these 
references are in the Pauline or Deuteropauline texts. Reconciliation operates in the 
Pauline texts on three levels.150 Christologically, God reconciles the world through Christ 
(Romans 5:11). The death of Christ substitutes and atones for the sins of humanity, and 
marks the beginning of a world that is not merely redeemed, but transformed. 
Ecclesiologically, Christ reconciles disparate cultures, such as Jew and Gentile 
(Ephesians 2:12-18). This is a kind of horizontal reconciliation. And thirdly, Christ 
effects a cosmological reconciliation of all the universe (2 Corinthians 5:11-21). 5I 
Goldman, following Schreiter, identifies five aspects of Christian teaching derived from 
the Pauline understanding of reconciliation. Firstly, Paul understands reconciliation as 
the work of God within us, or of the experience of grace, rather than as the result of 
repentance or forgiveness. Secondly, reconciliation is a spirituality, akin to a 
worldview, rather than a strategy or institutionalised practice. Thirdly, reconciliation 
transforms victim, bystander and wrong-doer, and makes of them a new creation. Paul 
articulated a new understanding of the Greek idea of reconciliation, which related to the 
cessation of hostilities, by linking reconciliation to the notion of transformation. As Paul 
put it in 2 Cor 5.17, reconciliation produces a 'new creature'; Closely related to Paul's 
understanding of reconciliation is the new understanding, found in the New Testament, of 
The New Catholic Encyclopedia dates the origins of the Greek word for 'reconciliation* to the word 
^ritat*,pi29. 
Goldman, G, op cit, p4. 
See also New Catholic Encyclopedia, pi29. 
" Goldman, G, op cit, pp5-6. 
79 
redemption. From the New Testament onwards redemption is understood not only as 
deliverance from physical oppression, such as the experience of Israel in Egypt, but also 
as the purification of guilt. It is a personal transformation- 'a love that changes the human 
heart.' I54 Next, the process of reconciliation is the narrative of the death and resurrection 
of Christ, and this memory subverts injustice. L&stly, the power of reconciliation is 
overwhelming, and according to Schreiter, can only be grasped 'cosmically and perhaps 
eschatologically.' This last point suggests that reconciliation is a miraculous gift which 
exists beyond rational or logical calculation. 
This is not to suggest that early Christian theological reflection on grace, forgiveness and 
reconciliation completely supplanted already existing notions of retributive justice. Early 
Christian historians, including St Luke, did not cease to look for patterns of divine justice 
or vengeance in temporal affairs. G.W.Trompf has recently argued that early Christian 
historiography took up and transformed but did not abandon earlier Hebrew and Graeco-
Roman schemas of retributive justice. 5 Nor did early colonial Christians ignore the 
retributive consequences of corporate sin against the Aboriginal peoples of Australia. 
Rev. John Saunders, a Baptist, based his sermon of 14 October 1838 on Isaiah 26:21: 
'Behold the Lord Cometh out of his place to punish the inhabitants of the earth for their 
133
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iniquity: the earth shall disclose her blood, and shall no more cover her slain.' Saunders 
argued that the colonists had robbed, brutalised and murdered Aboriginal peoples, and 
that for their sins they stood in danger of Divine punishment: 
That the Almighty exercises not only a general providence, but one of a 
special, and often of a retributive nature, will be evident to every believer 
in the sacred volume, who are the parties to whom I appeal....this 
dispensation is more manifest to nations, for as they have a mere civil and 
temporal being, there is no future state in which they can have a national 
existence; the nations are judges on earth, they are punished or rewarded 
on earth.156 
The means to avert the Lord's judgment was repentance: 'Then it is at once our duty, and 
our wisdom to humble ourselves in penitence before God. But repentance supposes 
reformation, and where injuries have been inflicted it involves recompense.'157 We can 
see the melding here of retributive logic with the promise of reconciliation through 
repentance and transformation. 
Theological reflection on the nature of 'reconciliation' featured prominently at the 
Second Vatican Council, itself a significant event in the development of Catholic social 
teaching. Appleby refers to Vatican II as the Roman Catholic Church's 'internal 
revolution': 
Sutton, J, (ed) Rev. John Saunders: A Beacon Light and Some Baptiste Reflections, pp6-9. 
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in a striking twentieth century revolution, the Catholic Church abandoned 
its previous claims to political privilege, renounced the theocratic model 
of political order, and became a powerful proponent of religious liberty 
and universal human rights. 
Having retained an essentially medieval world-view right up until the 1960'% the Church 
now became a firm supporter of democratic government. The Council argued that 
political liberty accrues to groups as well as individuals 'because both human nature and 
religion have a social dimension.' This evolution in Catholic social teaching, identified 
by the Council as being at the centre of 'Roman Catholic self-understanding, ecciesiology 
and pastoral practice', has inspired and legitimated new forms of Catholic social 
activism. South American liberation theology is the most famous example of these new 
forms of activism. Appleby cites the legal scholar John Witte Jr: 
Structurally, the Council's policy of decentralization both created new 
transnational networks in the church and urged initiatives adapted to the 
local level of the Church's life. The combined effect of these concilliar 
actions was to impel Catholicism into human rights struggles throughout 
the international system well into the next century.159 
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The language of human rights, democracy and reconciliation continues to feature as an 
important part of Roman Catholic social teaching. Pope John Paul II has noted that 
Vatican II defined the Church itself as a sacrament whose mission was to 'reconcile 
people; with God, with themselves, with neighbours, with the whole of humanity.'16 His 
predecessor Paul VI had described the goal of the Second Vatican Council as being 'to 
foster whatever can produce union among all who believe in Christ.' The 1964 
Dogmatic Constitution of the Church, for example, defined the Church as both an 
instrument and a sign of a very closely knit union with God and of the unity of the whole 
human race.' That unity was instituted by God at Creation: 'in the beginning, God made 
human nature one and decreed that all his children, scattered as they were, would finally 
be gathered together as one....though there are many nations, there is but one people of 
God/ * The Church recognises cultural differences, 'insofar as they are good', as an 
expression of the 'genius' of each people. Clearly though, it is for the Church to decide 
which aspects of cultural difference are 'good.' It is the Church that takes up difference in 
order to purify, strengthen, elevate and ennoble it. Christ and the Church are, 
furthermore, universal, transcending 'every peculiarity of race or nation.'163 The Church 
itself is a unity, or one body: 'if one member endures anything, all the members co-
John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and Penance: Origin and Meaning of the 
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endure it, and if one member is honoured, all the members together rejoice.' The unity 
of humanity and the unity of the person with God is a divinely instituted order. But it is 
marred, until the final reconciliation, by original sin. Forgiveness is guaranteed, but sin is 
likewise certain: 
Reconciliation with God, with oneself, and with others implies overcoming 
that radical break which is sin. And this is achieved only through the interior 
transformation or conversion which bears fruit in a persons life through acts 
of penance. 
John Paul II, in his 1984 Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and Penance; identified 
a 'longing for sincere and consistent reconciliation' amongst the peoples of the world. 
That longing was experienced as the need lto heal the wounds and establish at all levels 
an essential unity.* That unity had been marred by sin found 'in man's inmost self.' 7 
The reconciliation to be achieved could not be any less profound than the division to be 
overcome- it had to be a response to sin, itself the root of all other wounds. It fell to 
Church to make known this truth, and to assert the 'profoundly religious meaning of 
reconciliation and its full scope.'168 
IM
 ibid, p7. 
John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and Penance: Origin and Meaning of the 
Document, December 2, 1984, p4, www.cin.org/cin. accessed 10/8/2000. 
166
 ibid, p4. 
167ibid, pi. 
168
 ibid, p4. 
84 
Personal transformation is seen as making possible a unity amongst individuals, as the 
pre-requisite for 'reaching brotherhood, concord and peace at all levels and in all sectors 
of human society.' John Paul II referred to 'obstinate discord....between groups within 
the same nation' as a 'sin against the common good.1 Social sin constituted a 'direct 
attack upon one's neighbour.' It is committed collectively, but should not be seen as a 
pure contrast to personal sin such as to abolish individual responsibility- there is 
corporate and individual sin at the same time, not one in the place of the other. The notion 
that 'structures, systems or other people' could excuse the individual from personal 
responsibility vcan readily be seen to derive from non-Christian ideologies and systems. 
Real responsibility...lies with individuals.'1 
John Paul II turns to the example of Jesus in reference to the 'law of forgiveness....on 
these conditions...it is possible to have a true reconciliation between individuals, 
families, communities, nations and peoples.' Reconciliation brings a unity premised on 
the forgiveness of past sins. The most worrying aspect of reconciliation theology, 
however, is the suggestion that forgiveness, and hence reconciliation, is easy or cheap. 
Christ guarantees forgiveness. Luke 17:3, for example, cites the example of Jesus in this 
way: 'if your brother repents, forgive him; and if he sins against you seven times in the 
day, and turns to you seven times and says, "I repent", you must forgive him. Does 
this mean that forgiveness and reconciliation are possible without restitution? Or that a 
70ibid,p\6. 
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wrong-doer is always already forgiven? Volf argues that such a concept of reconciliation 
as 'cheap' currently dominates public discourses on inter-group conflict: 
One speaks of 'national reconciliation' and expects from it 'collective 
healing' and greater 'political unity', or conversely, fears that behind it 
lurk organic notions of the social 'body' and the centralisation of power. 
Stripped of its moral content, reconciliation is contrasted so starkly with 
'justice' that one has to weigh the relative values of 'justice' and 'unity" 
in order to assess to what extent the sacrifice of justice can be morally 
acceptable and politically desirable in order to achieve political unity.173 
Goldman argues that reconciliation is 'not a hasty process', that it is not characterised by 
the too soon forgetting of sin. He claims that 'those who call for forgetting are actually 
participating in the ongoing victimisation of the person: they are really saying (the) 
other's experience is not important.' Desmond Tutu also writes that 'true reconciliation 
is not cheap. It cost God the death of his only Son.' He argues that 'confession, 
forgiveness and reparation, wherever possible, form part of a continuum'175 The First 
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Nations Alliance Churches of Canada also understands reconciliation i s a costly 
business. Referring to the Old Testament story of the three year famine during the reign 
of David, the Alliance argues that the sinner must ask the victim what is required for 
reconciliation: 'that reconciliation only comes at a cost is supremely demonstrated in the 
ultimate reconciliation, between God and humanity, which required the physical death of 
God's Son to bring it about/'76 This formulation arguably misses the point that the 
suffering of Jesus was vicarious, that if this was a price to be paid for salvation it was one 
made in a curious, perhaps perverted, bargain. But the point is clear enough; it is possible 
to understand reconciliation as requiring a penance, moreover, as requiring some kind of 
suffering, on the part of the wrong-doer. 
Volf relates the 'social meaning* of reconciliation to the new understanding of grace and 
justice developed by Paul after his conversion experience on the Road to Damascus. 
Reconciliation tato be understood primarily in terms of the 'vertical' relation between 
humanity and God but should also be considered in terms of the 'horizontal1 relationships 
between believers on Earth. By way of contrasting different understandings of justice, 
Volf compares Paul's initial righteousness, his desire to punish and persecute the 
Christians in the name of the Lord, to a new understanding of justice in terms of 
forgiveness and grace. Volf cites Seyoon Kim 
Christian reconciliation, it is sin.' Yamamoto describes justice as the 'transcendent idea that connects 
love.. .with genuine peace. * Inter-racial Justice: Conflict and Reconciliation in Post Civil Rights America, 
pp 159, 161. Also Petersen, R, *A Theology of Fo^givii!tess, in Helmick, R and Petersen, R, Forgiveness 
and Reconciliation, pp 13-15. 
First Nations Alliance Church of Canada, www.cbccts.sk.ca/fnacc/reconcile.thm , accessed 12/6/2001. 
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it is most likely that Paul's use of the metaphor of reconciliation grew out of 
his own theological reflections on his Damascus road experience....For on 
the Damascus road, Paul, who came to see himself as God's enemy in his 
activities before Damascus, experienced God's reconciling action, which 
brought forgiveness of sins and the making of a new creation by his grace.. 
Justice is, on this formulation, subordinate to grace. Injustice is affirmed and transcended 
rather than forgotten in the act of divine forgiveness; 'Grace and forgiveness....do not 
stand in opposition to justice and blame, but affirm justice and. blame in the act of 
transcending them.' The idea of forgiveness necessarily implies an affirmation of justice 
and is therefore not a substitute for justice: 'Forgiveness is no mere discharge of a 
victim's angry resentment and no mere assuaging of a perpetrator's remorseful anguish, 
one that demands no change of the perpetrator and no righting of wrongs. On the 
contrary: every act of forgiveness enthrones justice; it draws attention to its violation 
precisely by offering to forego its claims.' Turning to the conversion experience of 
Paul, Volf highlights the new understanding of righteousness evident in the New 
Testament. Rather than righteous punishment of the enemy, the new notion of 
reconciliation involves a turning to the enemy in a spirit of love and forgiveness which is 
not, at the same time, a 'cheap reconciliation.' The act of forgiveness involves a naming 
by which wrong-doing is recognised: 
S. Kim, 'God Reconciled His Enemy to Himself: The Origin of Paul's Concept of Reconciliation1 Cited 
in Volf, M, *The Social Meaning of Reconciliation', Interpretation^ 54 (2), April 2000, ppI58-172. 
Volf, M, Exclusion and Embrace* p!23. 
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The divine voice named the action by its proper name; 'persecution" (Acts 
9:4). Disapproval of the action was powerfully conveyed—Paul 'fell to the 
ground' (v.4). And the exalted Christ asked the uncomfortable question 
'Why?' 'Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?' (v.4). Jesus Christ named the 
injustice and resisted the behaviour. 
Volf points to the distinction between this new understanding of reconciliation and older 
understandings of righteousness and retribution: 'though justice was an indispensable 
element of reconciliation, peace between Paul and the speaker of the divine voice was 
not the consequence of justice carried out, but of justice both affirmed and unmistakably 
transcended in an act of undeserved grace.' 
The Cross is a symbol of both solidarity and absolution. Jurgen Moltman explicates this 
dual and apparently contradictory symbolism: Christ suffers with, identifies with, the 
poor, the oppressed, the weak. But the Cross is simultaneously a symbol of atonement, 
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i r i $ Volf puts it, of 'divine self-donation for the enemies and their reception into the 
eternal communion of God.' The symbolism of 'the Cross underscores that evil is 
irremediable1, cutting against the modernist thrust towards final peace, the final solution. 
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 This is not a contradiction, but an 'asymmetrical dialectic' between the grace of self-
donation and the demand for truth and justice.183 Rather than a mission of 'inclusion' (a 
word that resonates with the grand narratives we tell ourselves about the emergence and 
teleology of the advanced Western democracies), Volf argues that Jesus' mission was one 
of 'grace/ There is a scandalous aspect to this mission: sinners are subjects of grace as 
much the sinned against, and all, not just the wrong-doer, are called to' repent, and to be 
transformed.1 
of the world. The Lord called them blessed in his Gospel/ Paul VI, Dogmatic Constitution of the Church, 
November 21, 1964, p41.. www.cin.org/v2church.htmL 
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Reconciliation as Spiritual Practice: 
Christian Technologies of Guilt and Forgiveness 
Aside from larger doctrinal issues regarding unity, sin and division, the theology of 
reconciliation has developed in the context of penitential practices and institutions dating 
back to the time of the early Christians. These penitential practices repeated on an 
individual level the narrative of unity, sin and reconciliation which was thought to 
characterise the relationship between humanity and God. The sacrament of penance or 
I O C 
confession also goes, for this reason, by the name of 'reconciliation.' Tentler relates 
Christian penitential practices to both the production and the consolation of personal 
guilt: they exercised a discipline over the faithful, and at the same time they met the need 
for consolation such disciplinary regimes produced. The rituals worked their discipline 
over those in power as well as the laity, for, as Tentler puts it, those who administered the 
system were the most 'explicitly subject to its regulation.' Brooks also notes the 
intersection of confession, dogma and inquisition in the canons of the Fourth Lateran 
Council. Canon twenty one, Omnis utriusque sexus, mandated annual confession for the 
faithful. Canon one, Firmiter credimus, defined, for the first time, the orthodox teachings 
of the Church, whilst the third Canon , Excommunicamus et anathemizamus, established 
See Goldman, G, op c/7, p3. John Paul II also points out that each of the Catholic sacraments is 'also a 
sign of penance and reconciliation'; John Paul II, op c/7, p28, www.cin.org/cin 
Tentler, T, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation, pp xiii,xxvii. 
,niW<tpxx. 
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the Catholic Inquisition. Confession, true belief and inquisition intersect, in the canons of 
Lateran IV, to produce a complex of truth, consolation and discipline. 
Ernst Troeltsch has described the sacrament of penance as 'the great support for the 
spiritual domination of the world'; 'as self-examination and direction of conscience, as 
absolution, and as the key to a whole system of satisfactions and merits, as the unification 
of all ethical problems and inconsistencies by the authority of the Church.' Foucault, 
commenting more generally, highlights the complexity and effectiveness of religious 
practice as a disciplinary tool: 
Historically, what exists is the Church. Faith, what is that? Religion is a 
political force. ...it is a superb instrument of power for itself. Entirely woven 
through with elements that are imaginary, erotic, effective, corporal, sensual 
and so on, it is superb! 
The contribution of Christianity to sexual ethics, for example, is not to be found in its 
advocacy of certain principles of monogamy and abstinence, themselves already widely 
practiced in the Roman world, but in the new techniques it developed for the imposition 
of that morality. That new mechanism was the pastorate; 'a category of individuals 
Brooks, P, Troubling Confessions, p93. 
Troeltsch, E, op ict, p233. 
Foucault, M, *On Religion', in Carrette, J, Religion and Culture / by Michel Foucault, pi07. 
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absolutely specific and singular...who in the Christian society play the role of pastor, 
shepherd in relation to others who are their sheep or their flock.' 
Pastoral power individualised. It aimed at the salvation of each person, and for this 
reason, was a mode of surveillance. The pastor, if he was to carry out his responsibilities 
properly, must know what each was doing, and what was happening inside each soul, and 
for this reason elicited an 'exhaustive and permanent confession.'1 The individual was 
also required to perform this saving work on himself, to be constantly searching his own 
soul, and to be perpetually obedient to the pastoral power. Foucault refers to as 
'technologies of the self those 
techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own 
thoughts, on their own conduct, and this is a manner to transform 
themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of 
happiness, of supernatural powers and so on. 
Foucault, M, 'Sexuality and Power', in Carrette, J, op cit, pl21. 
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The confession is a discursive ritual which promises and seems to effect a liberation 
(from sin, misunderstanding etc) but which is in fact imbued with relations of power: 
for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a 
partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the 
confession, prescribes and appreciates it and intervenes in order to judge, 
punish, forgive, console and reconcile. 
The Christian confessional technique was developed as a disciplinary tool in the monastic 
and ascetic orders, but by order of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, was extended, at 
least in principle, to all believers. The rhythm of confession was accelerated in the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformations. 
The pastoral technique was taken up and utilised in medicine and science, and applied to 
human sexuality, became one of the supports for a politics of bio-power, itself connected 
to human health and reproduction. In demography as much as sexology and psychiatry, 
the Christian pastoral technique elicited an exhaustive confession: 
we have since become a singularly confessing society. The confession has 
spread so far and wide. It plays a part injustice, medicine, education, family 
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relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, 
* 196 
and in the most solemn rites. 
Western man, said Foucault, has become a 'confessing animal.' The technique was now 
so thoroughly ingrained in society that the individual no longer experienced the 
obligation to confess as an effect of a power that constrains, but on the contrary, saw in 
confession the truth of the self. Rather than appearing as an effect of a particular 
confessional technology^ this personal truth appears as though it 'demands only to 
surface.' Brooks claims that the confessional model, which he describes as a ritualised 
performance productive of a potentially infinite guilt, is now so deeply embedded in 
western culture as to span the divide between believers and non-believers: 'even those 
whose religion or non-religion has no place for the Roman Catholic practice of 
confession are nonetheless deeply influenced by the model.5 
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Foucault writesr'the obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different mechanisms, is so 
deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us; on the 
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John Paul II, for example, relates the practice of confession to spiritual liberation: the first step in 
reconciliation is the acknowledgment of one's own sinfulness; 'to acknowledge one's sin...to recognise 
oneself as being a sinner, capable of sin and inclined to commit sin, is the essential first step in returning to 
God*; John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and Penance: Origin and Meaning of the 
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Lenman argues that the effectiveness of these penitential rituals was undermined by two 
factors.199 The institutional weakness of the church in some areas meant that its reach 
was insufficient to include all of its flock in any regular, supervised, penitential regime. 
Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, Lenman argues that the personalisation and 
privatisation of sin ran against the strong current of corporate responsibility amongst 
medieval peoples, many of whom had 'an ingrained tendency to think in terms of 
communal self-purification rather than individual penance.' There were also great 
doctrinal difficulties, even prior to the reformation, regarding the workings of the 
sacrament of reconciliation. The dual role of penitential rituals, as both the source and 
consolation of guilt, complicated the effort to provide any clear formulation on the 
workings of penance. 
Tentler points out that the literature on penance and reconciliation, consisting of popular 
and doctrinal tracts, is not reducible to any 'neat and narrow theology.' There was a 
diversity both of language of conclusions in regards to several issues, including the 
relationship between personal contrition and the workings of sacramental grace. 20° 
Nevertheless, the literature in question belongs to the same doctrinal tradition, and the 
desire to be orthodox has been productive of at least a broad consensus, or a background 
agreement in forms of life. Furthermore, the explanation of what occurred between priest 
and penitent to produce divine mercy had to occur within the Augustinian theology of 
Lenman, B, The Limits of Godly Discipline in the Early Modern Period* in Greyerz, K (ed) Religion 
and Society in Early Modern Europe, p 126 
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both grace and freedom.201 The concepts of free will and providence set boundaries for 
the theologians, but these boundaries were themselves in need of reconciliation. 
Four elements have persisted throughout the history of these 'rituals of forgiveness7: 
1. Sinners must feel sorrow for having sinned.20' 
2. They are to make some kind of confession of their sins or of their 
sinfulness. 
3. They have assumed, or have had imposed upon them, penitential 
exercises of some nature. 
4. And they have participated in an ecclesiastical ritual performed 
with or by priests who have the power to absolve them of their sins 
and to reconcile them with the body of the faithful. 
'Canonical penance', a publicly endured and sometimes arduous ritual, developed in the 
western Christian churches in the period from the second to the seventh century AD. A 
formal ceremony, usually the laying on of hands, inducted the sinner into an order of 
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penitents, who fasted, gave alms, and were publicly humiliated, before being received 
back into the community of the faithful by means of a second public ceremony. 
Penitential practice did not then involve a simple remission of sins, but was the entry of 
the penitent into a particular condition. Although reconciled to their community, the 
penitents were permanently disabled; depending on their particular sin, they might be 
barred from entering the clergy or the military, or from participating in public affairs. 
There was a uniformity of such practices amongst the western churches between the fifth 
and seventh centuries. Foucault cites the Didascalia, a document recording the teachings 
of the twelve apostles written in the third century, as a description of this kind of public 
penance. He notes that the Didascalia does not describe a public and detailed statement 
of sins committed but rather tells of a 'collective right in which each one recognises 
himself as a sinner before God.' The penitential practices themselves, which might 
involve acts of austerity and manner of dress, were primarily non-verbal. The verbal 
analysis of sins, by way of confession, came later. 
The modern institutions of Christian forgiveness derive from the penitential practices 
developed in Ireland in the sixth century AD. These practices are known as the 
'penitentials', after the popular genre of short manuals that classified sins and told priests 
what specific penance to impose for each particular sin. The system reached the continent 
by about 600, and was spread there by Anglo-Saxon missionary monks. It was dominant 
in the western Church by the tenth century AD.206 In contrast to the canonical system, 
Foucault, M *On the Government of the Living', in Carrette, J, op cit, pi 55. 
See also Brooks, P, op cit, p94. 
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the penitential ritual was a private relation between the priest and the penitent. 
Furthermore, it left no harsh disabilities, and involved no public shaming. That is not to 
say that penance became essentially symbolic- early penitential manuals, such as the 
Roman Penitential, included harsh punishments for some sins. Perjurers endured seven 
years of penance, usurers three years. Penitential exercises included fasting, long periods 
of asceticism, worship and charity. The fundamental shift was not so much in the 
character of the penitential punishment, but in the movement, as Tender describes it, 
'from a penance of shame and expiation...to a penance of guilt and remorse.' Brooks 
describes the transformation in penitential ritual as the move to a verbal transaction, 
involving a detailed articulation of sin by the confessant, met by the confessors 
performative absolution; 'I forgive thee.5 
The acceptance of death-bed confession by Pope Leo the Great in the fifth century had 
long term consequences for the theology of reconciliation. St Leo, arguing that 'no one 
is to be despaired of while he still lives in the body', had implicitly recognised that 
contrition, and not the performance of penance, was the most important element of 
reconciliation. This point was commonly argued by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
and left open the question, what is the role of the priest, or of the sacrament itself?210 
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Penitential exercises were the link between the old and new systems, recalling the 
asceticism of the canonical system. But the exercises themselves became increasingly 
symbolic, to the point that the act of confession was itself seen as a penance. There was 
a general concern that heavy penances might overwhelm a penitent, and it was thought 
that no one should be made to accept a penance they did not want. To not complete a 
penance, however, was to commit a mortal sin. This led to the practice of separating 
penance into an obligatory, lenient component, and a more arduous, but voluntary 
212 
component. 
More rigidly defined and enforced was the requirement that the penitent make restitution 
in this world to the victims of his sin.21 This requirement was enforced by the canon law, 
and guilty parties were subject to its requirements in both public and in conscience. A 
murderer, for example, might be required to pay to his victims family the value of the 
deceased's future potential earnings. Financial restitution was also to be made for loss of 
property, earnings and reputation. Divine forgiveness could not be assured until such 
restitution had been made. A similar logic animated the thought of Bartolome de la 
Casas, Bishop of Chiapa, who in 1546 argued that the Spanish conquistadors had sinned 
against the Indigenous peoples of South America, and that penance required the 
restitution of land and goods. Haren details the relationship of confession and 
reconciliation to the payment of monetary restitution in the realm of'commercial' sins in 
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the 14th century English penitential, the Memoriale Presbiterorum. The development of a 
money economy in the 12th and 13th centuries had Ment a special relevance to this matter 
of administering penance.' Medieval canon lawyers imposed controls on the use of 
wealth and trade, seeing in commerce an opportunity for sin, and extending the influence 
of the church into areas now properly thought to be within the preserve of the state. 
The Thomist view of the sacrament of reconciliation as consisting of three parts 
(contrition, confession and acts of satisfaction) was confirmed as orthodox by the 
Catholic Church at the Council of Florence in 1439. ' That view remains the orthodox 
Catholic view today. The leaders of the Reformation, however, contested this view of the 
sacrament, and in some cases, denied the sacramental quality of reconciliation altogether. 
Luther, for example, drew on the work of the Franciscans and Duns Scotus in his 
criticism of the Catholic sacrament.217 Whilst Luther accepted that reconciliation was a 
sacrament, he asserted that complete contrition was humanly impossible, and that 
reconciliation must Aerefore consist in the free action of God, which was effective 
whatever the state of mind of the penitent.218 Shriver points out that for Luther the divine 
forgiveness of personal sin was assured. Neither contrition nor works of goodness or 
satisfaction were efficacious elements of the sacrament. Luther also asserted that 
confession must always remain free, and that the Church could not require the faithful to 
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confesi* For Luther the practice of confession was however consistent with a good 
Christian life. He saw fc the practice of confession an effective means of personal 
consolation. 
Calvin likewise valued the personal consolation provided by the practice of confession, 
but denied that reconciliation was a sacrament. Calvin's understanding of the nature of 
a 'sacrament' has of course been contested from the sixteenth century to our own, and it 
is not my place to enter that debate here. The point that I wish to take up is that made by 
Max Thurilli, that although Calvin attacked the Catholic sacrament of reconciliation and 
warned against superstition and magic, he nevertheless affirmed the practice of personal 
confession to a pastor as a means of obtaining personal consolation and spiritual 
direction. Like Luther, Calvin considered that penance consists in absolution, which is the 
work of God, and not on the quality of personal contrition.222 Good works are a sign and 
not a payment for mercy freely given by God. The promise of God, and not reparation, 
was essential to absolution. As in Luther, Calvin considered that it was impossible to 
~ Shriver, D, An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics, p53. 
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provide full satisfaction for sins committed against God. He did suggest, however, that it 
is necessary to make amends for one's sins to others. 
Troeltsch notes that it is commonplace to categorise the Protestant Reformation as a 
revival of Pauline and Augustinian 'grace1 at the expense of a particularly Catholic 
concept of'law.* Troeltsch argues, however, that what was at stake was a new concept of 
grace itself. Catholic grace was sacramental, mystical, miraculous, hierarchically 
imparted and entrusted to the Church. For Luther, grace is a temper of faith, a divine 
conviction or spirit, as Troeltsch puts it, faith or trust in the 'loving will of God which 
brings with it the forgiveness of sins.' " Sacramental mediation is replaced by mediation 
through the Word. This grace is not an achievement, but a gift.224 
The difference between predominantly Thomist Catholic and reformed Christian 
understandings of reconciliation as penitential practice relates, on the one hand, to 
sacramentality, personal contrition and penance, and on the other, to an already given and 
unpurchasable gift of forgiveness. In the Thomist understanding of reconciliation 
confession, contrition and penance combine, in the appropriate ritual, to effect 
forgiveness. In one sense this is a difficult or demanding model of reconciliation; it 
requires this kind of painful or guilty confession and the doing of some penance. But 
3
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nevertheless it provides some kind of formula or guarantee of forgiveness, available, in 
theory, to all. The reformed understanding of reconciliation as penitential practice aimed 
merely at consolation, and which considered tim forgiveness and salvation were the work 
of God, and related solely to absolution, likewise seems to be an 'easy' model of 
reconciliation. Forgiveness is the gift of God, given freely. But applied to concrete 
problems of political justice this model of reconciliation leaves everyone at sea, for there 
is no knowing, in this schema, who are the elect and who are the damned. Forgiveness 
might be easy, but there is, paradoxically, no guarantee that all will be forgiven, no recipe 
or ritual which effects reconciliation sacramentally, only the hope, and the anxiety, of 
divine absolution. 
This is, in a sense, expressing the matter far too reductively. Reformed Chr^lanity is not 
a stranger to an economic understanding of reconciliation, at least in so far as the practice 
of confession is concerned. Tell me your sins, and you shall be comforted, released from 
anxiety, unburdened. Notwithstanding that each taught that the forgiveness of sins was a 
divine prerogative, truly a gift, Luther and Calvin both affirmed this aspect of the practice 
of confessing as spiritual relief. Conversely, Catholic tradition is also alive to the thought 
that the death and resurrection of Christ achieved not just a miracle in the shape of the 
bodily resurrection of ClsSst but a gift of forgiveness from God to humanity surpassing 
all calculation and all human understanding; 'forgive them, for they know not what they 
do.' Even here, at the point of what seems like a pure gift, is not quite an unconditional or 
unearned salvation. Christ dies, sacrificed for man, suffering vicariously in an inverted or 
Petersen, R, 4A Theology of Forgiveness: Terminology, Rhetoric and the Dialectic of Interfaith 
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perverted model of exchange; / will die for you, so that your sins will be forgiven. But 
nevertheless, there is the idea, in Catholicism as in Reformed Christianity, of mercy, of 
forgiveness without explanation or exchange. 
So the picture is more complex and more difficult than the above discussion suggests. 
But this rough schema of Catholic sacramentalism and of the Reformed understanding of 
forgiveness and absolution as a divine and unpurchaseable gift does map out, if only for 
simplicity's sake, onto the poles identified by Derrida as 'irreconcilable but 
indissociable' elements of the Abrahamic tradition. This aporia in the heritage, which 
Derrida describes as a heritage shared by all the religions of the Book, and for that reason 
describes as Abrahamic rather than as simply Christian, is the very condition in which a 
decision must be made.22 Derrida writes of 'this conditional logic of the 
exchange...according to which forgiveness can only be considered on the condition that 
it be asked, in the course of a scene of repentance attesting at once to the consciousness 
of the fault, the transformation of the guilty, and the at least implicit obligation to do 
everything to avoid the return of evil.' And opposite this economy of exchange, another 
idea; 'the idea which is also a demand for the unconditional, gracious, infinite, 
aneconomic forgiveness granted to the guilty as guilty, without counterpart, even to those 
Relationships' in Helmick, R et al (eds) Forgiveness and Reconciliation) p5. 
" Derrida, J, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p45. 
**" Derrida writes of these two poles as 'absolutely heterogeneous, and must remain irreducible to one 
another. They are nonetheless indissociable: if one wants, and it is necessary, forgiveness to become 
effective, concrete, historic; if one wants it to arrive, to happen by changing things, it is necessary that this 
purity engage itself in a series of conditions of all kinds (psycho-sociological, political etc). It is between 
these two poles, irreducible but indissociable, that decisions and responsibilities are to be taken'; ibid, 
pp44-45. 
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who do not repent or ask forgiveness.' What does it mean, asks Derrida, 'to inherit when 
the heritage includes an injunction at once double and contradictory?' The way in 
which this aporia animated the Australian reconciliation process is the story of chapters 
four and five of this thesis. 
"
7
 ibid, pp34-35. See also De Vries, H, op cit, pp25-31. Also Caputo, J, on the aporia of the gift in Derrida, 
J, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, pp 141-148. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS IN THE NINETIES 
FROM TREATY POLITICS TO 
RECONCILIATION AND BACK AGAIN 
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Reconciliation had its institutional beginnings in 1991, the year the Commonwealth 
parliament unanimously passed the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act. That Act 
established the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation as an independent body charged 
with the responsibility for promoting better community relations. Specifically, that meant 
educating non-Indigenous peoples about Indigenous culture and the history of 
Indigenous/non-indigenous relations in Australia. The beginnings of reconciliation can 
also be dated discursively: when were earlier projects, such as assimilation, given up in 
favour of new ones? This is not to assume that a discursive change is always a clean 
break; the taken for granted concepts of one discourse might well be the product of an 
earlier project."" And this is true for reconciliation, which has been a discourse in which 
many older policy debates have been repeated. Reconciliation rests upon the development 
of two exclusive subject positions which were the product of 'self-determination' and 
between which citizens must choose; Indigenous and non-Indigenous. In fact, the entire 
project of reconciliation could be seen as the attempt to relate in an appropriate way these 
two subject positions bequeathed to it by an earlier public discourse of Indigenous affairs. 
Self-determination seemed to head logically towards 'separatism', 'separate 
development' and 'sovereignty'. Reconciliation might be said to be an effort to contain 
For example, Rowse argues that indigenous peoples are now 'being asked to be self-determining within 
the social forms bequeathed by an era of assimilation.' White Flour, White Power, pp 10, 218, 221. See 
also Hughes, I, Self-determination : Aborigines and the State in Australia, Phd Thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1997; 'since the foundation of the state in Australia Aboriginal Affairs policies have been 
characterized by contradictions... .rather than resolving contradictions, successive phases of policy have 
incorporated contradictions within themselves, providing the conditions for later policy shifts'; p50. 
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those tendencies by relating Indigenous to non-Indigenous by means of the unity of 
Australia, a subject position in which difference is made to make sense. 
The Hansard of 1991 carries the seeds of &tter aciffaionious debates. Michael 
Wooldridge's comments on the undefinability of reconciliation and the Liberal Party's 
preference for the practical would later be echoed by John Howard's repudiation of the 
symbolic enterprise of reconciliation historiography. But we can look back as well as 
forward, and see how the Coalition carried on its earlier policy commitments and 
reshaped them in the language of reconciliation. The resistance to special rights, the 
desirability of 'One Nation', the jurisdictional supremacy of the Australia State- all of 
these pre-1991 commitments were at home in reconciliation. Then Minister for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Robert Tickner was also looking backwards 
in time when he said that the beginnings of reconciliation were to be found in the 1967 
referendum." That referendum deleted the two negative references to Indigenous 
peoples in the Australian Constitution, effectively allowing Indigenous peoples to be 
counted in the census (the deletion of si27) and removing the inability of the 
Commonwealth to legislate in respect of Indigenous peoples (the amendment of s51 
29
 Pearson: 'Canada and Australia were nationally reconstituted by the state as multiculturally unified 
through difference, with New Zealand seeking to take a similar route to a bicultural destination. 
Homogeneity and assimilation seemed to have been superseded, and for those members of the dominant 
majority supporting an unfettered cultural pluralism, a radical uncoupling of settler nationalism is 
envisaged in post-settler times. But this position, currently, has neither unqualified elite nor mass support. 
There is still an emphasis on 'core' national values, and strict limits to sovereign authority and the 
boundaries of cultural acceptance/ Pearson, D, The Politics of Ethnicity in Settler Socieities, p 175. 
230
 Tickner, R, May 9, 1991, Hansard, p3411. See also Dodson, P, Until the Chains are Broken, Lingiari 
Lecture 1999; Johnson, E, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, vol V, p38. 
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(xxvi)). Tte 1967 referendum is more properly characterjjpd as being concerned with 
issues of citizenship and equality, and in that sense, was a species of liberal 
assimilationism.231 The legal significance of the referendum has been widely 
exaggerated, but the sheer size of the 'Yes' vote, at over ninety percent nation-wide, has 
sanctioned a widespread myth that 1967 marked the year in which Indigenous peoples 
were finally given 'full citizenship.' In fact the Commonwealth was reluctant to exercise 
its powers until the election of the Whitlam government and, it might be said, for .most of 
the time since then. The race power has since been interpreted by the High Court as 
authorising the Commonwealth to legislate for the detriment of Indigenous peoples." ' 
Tickner's assertion has, despite the anachronism, been widely taken up by both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous commentators. But the most blatantly revisionist 
narrative of reconciliation came from the CAR itself: 'The story of reconciliation really 
starts when Britain established its colony at Sydney Cove on the twenty-sixth of January 
1788.' 233 There is some textual support for such an assertion, although CAR does not 
Rowse argues that 'assimilation was a program of inclusion of indigenous Australians and it presumed 
and urged their ultimate sameness. The 1967 referendum did not challenge assimilation, but rather 
expressed and reinforced the values of inclusiveness and sameness.1 The mandate claimed was nevertheless 
'potently equivocal. Two distinguishable conceptions of social justice were endorsed in May 1967/ Justice 
as equality of treatment confirmed the assimilationist thrust of the Menzies government, an alternative 
concept of justice singled out indigenous peoples as a 'special case' for whom temporary ameliorative 
measures were needed. Rowse, T, Obliged to be Difficult, pp 11,21. 
232
 Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 337. 
233 
CAR, Finding Common Ground.Towards a Document for Reconciliation 2000, 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/docrec/relevant/docbook/p3.htm accessed August 1999. 
110 
cite it. Arthur Philip made at least two references to reconciliation in his letters. And 
Arthur Robinson, a preacherM Van Dieman's Land, undertook a government sanctioned 
'conciliation' mission prior to the Governor Arthur's Black War. John Batman, signatory 
to an early and unauthorised treaty with the Aboriginal peoples living around the Port 
Philip area, also made ambiguous use of the term 'reconciliation.' 5 The emphasis in 
Philip, Robinson and Batman is on reconciling Indigenous peoples t& the presence of the 
new arrivals. Philip's 'reconcile' was a reference to the desirability of socialising the 
local Aboriginal population to European ways of living. Robinson's mission was a 
strategic means of making settlement safe by removing Indigenous peoples from their 
land. An evangelical mission of salvation was compatible with a governmental interest in 
security. Reconciliation 'as advanced by Batman and others was entirely one-sided; much 
more than the cessation of hostilities, its purpose waf to achieve the expulsion of the 
Aborigines from their tribal territories, albeit by persuasion rather than by force.' The 
contemporary reconciliation project, despite its focus on history, guilt and justice, might 
be said to share that earlier compatibility with the interests of the settler-state, at least in 
Griffiths cites Governor Phillip's letter to Lord Sydney, 10 July, 1788; 'when I shall have time to mix 
more with them, very means shall be used to reconcile them to live amongst us, and to teach them the 
advantages they will reap from cultivating t i i land.../ Griffiths also cites Phillip's letter, again to Lord 
Sydney, of 12 February 1790; 'not a native has come near the settleme^for many months, and it was 
absolutely necessary that we should attain their language, or teach them ours, that the means of redress 
might be pointed out to them if they are injured, and to reconcile them by showing the many advantages 
they would enjoy by mixing with us.' Griffiths, M, Aboriginal Affairs: A Short History, pp21-22. Beryl 
Timberry Beller also referred to the meeting of Bennelong and Captain Watkin Tench as an example of 
reconciliation; 'Welcome to Country, Corroboree 2000', Walking Together, no 29, August 2000. 
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 Hughes, R, The Fatal Shore, p422. 
" See Campbell, A, John Batman and the Aborigines, p37. 
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so far as reconciliation operates as a counter discourse to the demand for Aboriginal 
'sovereignty.' 
We need to move much further forward to find the beginnings of the Aboriginal 
reconciliation process. The first references to reconciliation in academia came from 
C.D.Rowley in 1972. Rowley's major work, Aboriginal Policy and Practice, was 
published in three volumes in the early nineteen seventies. He wrote of the need for 
Australians to undertake a 'patient attempt at reconciliation and negotiation* with 
Aboriginal people, entailing 'an admission of colonial guilt' and 'apologies to the 
Aborigine who is still here and stronger than before.'2 8 Reconciliation was not, however, 
the guiding or even dominant theme of Rowley's work. Rowley employed an historically 
conditioned distinction between 'tribalised' or remote Aborigines and detribalised, part-
Aboriginal 'fringe-dwellers.' This distinction made Aboriginal Policy and Practice 
something of an awkward bridge between assimilationist or integrationist policy and the 
new concern with autonomy or self-determination. Awkward in the sense that the 
distinction between remote and urban Aboriginal is by no means taken for granted as an 
' Aboriginal Policy and Practice examined the historical conditions of colonisation, as well as the 
contemporary aspects of indigenous life in both urban and remote Australia. It Laid out some of the policy 
ideas and concerns later taken up by the Whitlam and Fraser governments, including problems of 
Aboriginal autonomy, socialisation and leadership, legislation to facilitate the formation of Aboriginal 
companies and incorporated bodies and new 'community development' programs. In that sense Aboriginal 
Policy and Practice is an important part of the development of self-determination. 
Rowley, CD, 'From Humbug to Politics: Aboriginal Affairs and the Academy Project',1972, pl9, 
quoted in Yardi, R and Stokes G, op cit, p45. 
Rowse refers to Rowley as committed to a 'sophisticated assimilationism' or a 'assimilationist 
liberalism'; After Mabo: Interpreting Indigenous Traditions, p34. 
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appropriate distinction by contemporary policy makers, nor is it accepted as legitimate by 
advocates of pan-Aboriginal political strategies. 
But Aboriginal Policy and Practice does share a common concern with reconciliation 
politics, at least in so far as Rowley recognised the fundamental importance of history to 
the resolution of contemporary social and political problems. Concern for the welfare of 
Indigenous peoples, where it did exist, was but 'a widespread and inexplicit breast-
beating' uninformed by historical knowledge."4 Rowley set out to fill the historical 
'vacuum' that had made the formulation of adequate policy near impossible. Historical 
awareness was connected not just to good policy but also to the wider question of 
Australian national identity; Rowley linked the success or failure of Aboriginal affairs 
policy, to 'the kind of society which eventually takes place in Australia.' Volume 
Three, The Remote Aborigines, developed these themes further: 
There may still be time for a reconciliation between two traditions. If the 
'white' community is well on the way to 'developing' the country, there Still 
remains the question of what life is all about.,.For the Aborigine who has 
retained something from his Dreaming has retained something unique for 
the enjoyment of nature in this country, if only we can develop the humility 
to learn from him how to share it; and what it meant to Australians through 
the millennia before Europeans saw it. 
240
 Rowley, C, Aboriginal Policy and Practice, Vol 1, p8. 
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Rowley suggested that 
it may be more logical to recognise that a great wrong has been done, and to 
work now for reconciliation, and for equality of general economic 
opportunity....from now on Aborigines will have the moral initiative. A 
major and symbolic national rejection of earlier policies is required. Even 
economic demands express a feeling that governments should offer 
symbolic compensation, as a basis for reconciliation. 
The connection between Australian history and identity, as well as the motif of the land 
and the notion of white Australia finding its authentic spiritually in dialogue with 
Indigenous peoples, would all take on great significance in the politics of reconciliation 
two decades later. Aboriginal Policy and Practice, although undoubtedly time-bound in 
its concerns, particularly in regards lo "integration' policy, is also a work of great 
foresight in so far as it takes up the themes not just of self-determination but also of 
reconciliation. 44 
The first parliamentary reference to reconciliation in the context of Aboriginal affairs 
came from the then Minister Ian Viner in 1980. Commenting on the Noonkabah conflict 
in Western Australia, Viner described the difficulties which would render 'the necessary 
241
 ibid, p!7$. 
See Yardi, Rand Stokes, G, 'Foundations for Reconciliation in Social Science: The Political Thought of 
C.D.Rowley\ Melbourne Journal of Politics, vol 25, no 1, I998,pp45-6I. 
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reconciliation, the necessary accommodation' impossible. He offered no reflection on 
what a reconciliation politics might look like, or on the relationship between 
reconciliation and history, or justice, or healing. The concerns which would later come to 
dominate reconciliation discourses were wholly absent. Viner's comment seems to have 
been largely ofllhanded, and his use of the term reconciliation implied no program, no 
specific commitment to any type of public policy in regards to the relationship between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia. 
A more elaborate reconciliation discourse emerged with the election of the Hawke Labor 
government in 1983. Or rather, a more confused use of the term 'reconciliation' spanned 
a number of policy areas only one of which was Aboriginal affairs. Industrial relations 
and foreign affairs were two policy areas in which the language of reconciliation 
featured. And in regards to the direction and style of the new Labor government as a 
whole, the mandate claimed, on the back of Robert Hawke's reputation earned at the 
ACTU as the 'great conciliator', was one of national consensus, reconstruction and 
reconciliation."4 Aboriginal Affairs Minister Clyde Holding, speaking to a motion 
detailing the government's new policy program in 1983, applied the Hawke meta-
principle of reconciliation to his own portfolio. The motion recognised the prior 
"
5
 Hansard, 1980, vol 119, p38; cited in Griffiths, M, opcit, pp!93-4. For an account of the major legal 
developments in Aboriginal affairs in the period 1972 through to the Mabo decision in 1992 see 
Chesterman, J and Galligan, B, Citizens Without Rights: Aborigines And Australian Citizenship, ppl94-
222. The authors conclude that advances in civil and political rights have 'been more theoretical than 
practical.. .the slow recognition of indigenous rights has not translated into material improvements in the 
life situations of most Aborigines.' 
Hawke identified the 'great national goals* of his government to be 'national reconciliation, national 
reconstruction and national recovery'; Hawke, R, May 3,1983, Hansard, p90. 
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ownership of Australian lands by Indigenous peoples, noted the link between historical 
dispossession and present socio-economic disadvantage, and proceeded to lay out a 
comprehensive program of policies designed to address that disadvantage. Holding 
considered the government's new policy to be the beginning of a program of 
reconciliation which would extend beyond the life of any particular policy, and in the 
context of which particular policies and measures would operate: 
The principles of reconciliation can and must be clearly established by 
1988. Effective reconciliation between pre- and post-colonial Australia can 
be expected, if we begin now, to take until the end of the century, but it will 
bring real benefits for the nation as a whole.2 7 
Here is the first programmatic use of the term reconciliation in respect of Aboriginal 
affairs policy in the Australian parliament, and it is at this point that reconciliation 
politics might be said to have begun. But it was also something of a false start: the 
principles of reconciliation which Holding sought to establish by 1988 were elusive, and 
little attempt was made to define them. There was, in addition, a divergence in the 
manner in which the term reconciliation was used. Both government and opposition 
conceived of reconciliation in several distinct senses, the most important differences for 
present purposes being reconciliation as a principle to be applied in a specific policy area, 
and reconciliation as a principle of bipartisanship between Labor and Coalition in the 
parliament, and between the federal government and the states. It became unclear as to 
247
 Holding, C, December 8,1983, House Hansard, p3485. 
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whether it was the political parties themselves that were to be reconciled, or whether the 
government ought to pursue policies in furtherance of reconciliation between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous Australians regardless of the stance of the opposition, or of the states. 
Clyde Holding, for example, juxtaposed the link between a treaty and 'justice' to the 
requirements of parliamentary and inter-governmental reconciliation: 
no one should be in any doubt. Although this is a Government of national 
reconciliation and although we shall seek harmony in our relations with the 
States, the demands of Aboriginal people for justice will no longer be 
denied....the human rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Australians must take precedence over states rights.' 
The Coalition, however, -clearly conceived of reconciliation as a principle to be 
maintained between government and opposition, as well as between the Commonwealth 
and the states. Commenting on the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
(Interim Protection) Bill 1984, J.R Porter claimed that Holding had 'sought through 
confrontation to implement an inflexible and unrealistic predetermined set of principles 
without consultation or reconciliation/24 Paul Everingham, Country Liberal member for 
the Northern Territory, made a similar claim when he described the governments' 
decision to hand back Uluru to its traditional owners as a 'knife thrust that wounds the 
heart of every Australian': 
ibid, p3490. 
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As a result of the legislation there was to be a trade-off by both sides, but 
the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, almost immediately on assuming office, 
forgot about reconciliation and consensus and threw the 10-point package 
out the window. 
Parliamentary debate on the governments' national land rights proposals revolved around 
the opposing poles of social justice and national responsibility on the one hand, and the 
requirements of federalism on the other. Senator Peter Baume of the Liberal Party 
explained Coalition opposition to national land rights in terms of his party's commitment 
to states rights in a federal polity. National land rights did in fact founder upon the 
opposition of conservative state premiers, particularly Labor's own Brian Burke, Premier 
of Western Australia. Burke, under pressure from mineral and energy concerns, had 
threatened to mount a High Court challenge to the government's preferred legislation.252 
™ Porter, J.R, May 31, 1984, House Hansard, p2670. 
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Bennett also notes that the federal Liberal party had moved back into a closer, more conservative 
alignment with the states by the mid-eighties. The Howard election manifesto of 1987, for example, had 
abandoned the Fraser government's commitment to self-management and promised 'effective consultation 
mechanisms so that Aborigines are drawn into the broader community rather than segregated into a racial 
lobby group*; White Politics and Black Australians,pp 63-64, 69. Labor MHR Warren Snowdon also noted 
the growing tendency of the Opposition to use the Senate Estimates Committee as a 'star chamber* from 
which to discredit the accountability of indigenous persons and organisations. Snowdon argued that such a 
tactic was a deliberate effort to undermine popular support for the government's policy by appealing to 
base racist emotions; November 8, 1988, House Hansard, p2563. 
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By 1987 the Hawke government had all but abandoned its pretence of being a 
government of national reconciliation. Reconciliation no longer applied as a principle of 
inter-party dialogue and co-operation, or as an adjunct to federalism. The field of its 
application had been narrowed so that by the time Gerry Hand released his Ministerial 
Statement Foundations for the Future, reconciliation was a term applied almost 
exclusively to Aboriginal affairs. The centre-piece of that statement was the creation of a 
new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), an experiment in self-
determination that sat oddly within the structures of responsible government. Whilst 
the Opposition now accepted that reconciliation was a goal to be pursued between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, it did not consider that Foundations for the 
Future was in any sense a policy statement incorporating that principle. In regards to the 
preamble to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Bill, Liberal MHR 
Chris Miles argued that 'there is no focus on reconciliation. It focuses on the past and 
then talks largely in terms of compensation.' Miles pointed out that the Coalition, 
although supportive of the concept of reconciliation, did 'not believe in talking about 
compensation (for dispossession).' Attempts to address Indigenous disadvantage would 
follow from, rather than be part of, the process of reconciliation: 
Before there can be genuine progress in this area of Australia, there needs 
to be a recognition by both Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal people of 
a deep desire to work together and to be reconciled about our history. There 
are deep hurts, and there needs to be reconciliation. Before we start to 
For example, see Rowse on ATSIC's role in post-Mabo intergovernmental negotiations; Obliged to be 
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address the needs of the Aboriginal community, which are indeed large, I 
believe that we should at least attempt a reconciliation at the hearts and 
minds level.254 
That reconciliation was a mind-set oriented towards the future, or an 'ideology of 
forgetting* as Colin Tatz put it, would come to be something of a mantra for those 
conservatives who did not want to be seen to be opposed to reconciliation but who were 
uncomfortable with its revisionist history.255 Miles acknowledged that history had indeed 
left its wounds but there was to be no compensation for a history of dispossession. Quite 
the opposite: an antagonism born of history was now the reason to defer steps taken to 
address the needs of the Aboriginal community. There is in Miles's statement the 
beginnings of a shift away from reconciliation as justice or as a framework for policy, in 
the sense described by Holding in 1983, to reconciliation as a spiritual enterprise, or *a 
reconciliation at the hearts and minds level.' 
1988 was the year in which the Australian Christian churches made their most decisive 
contribution to the development of Australian reconciliation politics. The heads of 
fourteen churches had released a booklet entitled 'Towards Reconciliation in Australian 
Society* in early 1988 in which they called on the Commonwealth parliament to pass a 
motion in support of reconciliation. The booklet had supplied the full text of the motion, 
and the Australian Catholic Bishops sent their Aboriginal affairs adviser, Father Frank 
Difficult, pp205-206. 
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Brennan, to lobby parliamentarians for support.2 7 Labor and the Coalition offered in 
principle support but were unable to agree on a particular form of words. In May, August 
and December the parties debated various motions with neither side willing to make any 
significant concessions. In August Prime Minister Hawke moved the motion in the form 
suggested by the church leaders. 
Hawke claimed that a 'real and lasting reconciliation' between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians would be compatible with, and in fact would be achieved by 
See also Gardiner-Garden^ I, From Dispossession to Reconciliation, pplO, 15. 
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 Brennan gave his own account of the passage of the motion: 'Waiting for the Resolution' Australian 
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that the inspiration for the motion came from the Churches: At the start of our bicentennial year the heads 
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Hawke moved 'That this House-1 .acknowledges that: A. Australia was occupied by Aborigines and 
Torres Strait Islanders who had settled for thousands of years before British settlement at Sydney Cove on 
26 January 1788; B. Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders suffered dispossession and dispersal upon 
acquisition of their traditional lands by the British Crown; and C. Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders 
were denied full citizenship rights of the Commonwealth of Australia prior to the 1967 Referendum;2. 
affirms: A. the importance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture and heritage; and B. the 
entitlement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders to self-management and self-determination subject to 
the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia; and 3. considers it desirable that the 
Commonwealth further promote reconciliation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander citizens providing 
recognition of their special place in the Commonwealth of Australia.* Hawke, R.J.L, 23 August 1988, 
House Hansard* pi37. See also Johns, G 'Reconciliation: Read the Fine Print', Quadrant, November 1999, 
pl6; on the churches* suggestion that there be a reconciliation process, Johns (a minister in the Keating 
government) says *a grateful Labor government ran with it as a means of keeping the constituency 
occupied, knowing that no Australian government would ever accept the breach of sovereignty that a treaty 
implies.* 
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means of, a treaty or compact, as well as by the renewed commitment to self-
determination manifested in the proposed Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC).259 But reconciliation, although achieved by policy, was not 
something which could itself be measured in terms of policy. Rather, it supplemented 
policy, and worked in a quasi-spiritual or inspirational manner: 'If we provide budgetary 
assistance but not hope, not confidence, not effective consultation, not reconciliation, that 
assistance will fail to lift Aboriginal and Islander people from their disadvantaged 
state.'260 
The Coalition sought to amend the resolution to attach, at the end of the reference to self-
determination and self-management, the words 'in common with all other Australians/ 
The problem for Aboriginal affairs policy makers was one of 'disadvantage', and such 
disadvantage ought to be 'removed as part and parcel of their rights and their entitlements 
as Australians and as part of the Australian nation.* Howard warned of the dangers of 
creating the 'impression of divisions in the Australian community' and the 'unwisdom of 
Hawke: 'the Government is committed to a real and lasting reconciliation, achieved through full 
consultation and honest negotiation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal citizens of this nation. This 
will be recognised by the preamble to the Commission legislation. It will be recognised by the compact or 
treaty which we are committed to negotiating with Aboriginal and Islander people, and it will be recognised 
by our support for this motion. Without this overall approach, without a proper settlement and proper 
recognition, there can be no real and lasting improvement for the Aboriginal and Islander people. That is 
why this motion is no mere symbolism or empty tokenism.' 23 August 1988, House Hansard* pl37. Rowse 
argues that the Labor government failed 'to provide a philosophical defence against the argument, 
presented with vigour since then, that indigenous Australians have no distinct, historically based rights to 
govern themselves.' He further argues that the ATSIC proposal was 'corporatism tricked out in the rhetoric 
of "self-determination"...the government needed a national indigenous interlocutor and it would devise 
one.* Obliged to be Difficult, pl9f. 
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encountering a treaty.' The opposition 'totally understood and supported' the sentiments 
of the Churches, yet it was 'concerned that the motion ....can create the perception of 
separate development and the impression of divisions in the Australian community.1 
Howard saw the symbolic nature of the concept of reconciliation, and whilst he accepted 
the relevance of symbolism to public life, the reconciliation motion 
will not of itself improve the health or the education standards or necessarily 
lift the horizons of Aboriginal Australians. Anybody who imagines that 
resolutions and symbolism are a substitute for effective working policies in 
this, or indeed any other area is deluding himself. 
But Howard was himself engaged in a politics of a highly symbolic nature. It was 
important to him to relate Aboriginal disadvantage to the unity of Australia. He did this 
by making it clear that the Coalition did not consider Indigenous peoples to have any 
specific entitlement to government services-
We want the Aboriginal disadvantage to be removed as part and parcel of 
their rights and entitlements as Australians and as part of the Australian 
nation. We are not interested in any conduct or activity that in any way 
creates division between Aboriginal and other Australians. 
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The Coalition had been running a petition campaign, and through 1988 and 1989 
Coalition parliamentarians, predominantly Shadow Minister for Aboriginal Affairs CMfe 
Miles, presented for the attention of parliament numerous standard form petitions which 
claimed that, whilst there was a need for 'a continuing reconciliation between Aboriginal 
and other Australians to enhance the unity of the Australian nation', the government's 
proposed treaty would 'would recognise Aborigines and other Australians as two separate 
nations and thereby divide Australia and set back prospects for reconciliation.! 3 The 
petitioners defined 'treaty' as 'an agreement between two sovereign states.1 Howard's 
1987 'Future Directions' policy statement had bemoaned the growing sense of shame 
Australians felt, and were being made to feel, in regards to their own history: 'even 
people's confidence in their nation's past came under attack as the professional purveyors 
of guilt attacked Australians heritage and people were told they should apologise for pride 
in their culture, traditions, institutions and heritage.'" In the context of a flagging treaty 
proposal, and in the thick of a continuing debate on the establishment of ATSIC, Miles 
now asserted that ALP policy would 'separate' Australians. The ATSIC proposal was 
itself 'based on an ideology of the seventies rather than the administrative realities of the 
eighties and it would lead to separation...Aboriginal Australians should be assisted on the 
basis of needs and not on the basis of race.' The ALP, said Miles, had gone on a 'guilt-
J
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trip.' The government was focused, to the detriment of Aboriginal persons themselves, on 
'symbolism, separation and perpetual guilt.1" 
Parliamentary debates on the proposed treaty in 1988 and 1989 demonstrate that the 
Labor party, although recognising that injustices had flowed from the British colonisation 
of Australia and that there was a need for some kind of historical redress, never suggested 
that this position necessarily implied the complementary position that the sovereignty of 
the Commonwealth was therefore somehow impugned (although this may follow as a 
matter of logic.) A treaty or compact would be made in recognition of the status of 
Indigenous peoples as 
i) the prior owners of Australia, and 
ii) their Jtjstoric dispossession, and subsequent contemporary disadvantage. 
The Coalition had opposed any form of words which might have implied that Indigenous 
peoples constituted a separate nation or nations to the Commonwealth of Australia. But in 
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fact the government had never proposed this. The ALP has experimented with self-
determination and with the concept of a Makarrata or treaty. But its advocacy of 
Indigenous rights has taken place within the context of a greater commitment to the unity 
of the Australian nation and to the uncontested sovereignty of the Commonwealth. This 
has forced the ALP to undertake a delicate balancing act- recognising the historical fact 
of unjust treatment, and of prior ownership of the land, whilst at the same time 
maintaining a commitment to Australian sovereignty, considered in the indivisible and 
monolithic sense. Clyde Holding provided one demonstration of such a balancing act in 
1983, when he took up some of the historical themes that were by that time a well 
established part of the political rhetoric of Indigenous peoples. He moved a motion that 
this house acknowledges that...the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people of Australia, were the prior occupiers and original inhabitants of 
Australia and had occupied the territory of Australia for many thousands of 
268 
years.... 
This acknowledgment of original 'occupation' begged the obvious questions: did 
Indigenous peoples possess property in the land and, if so, by what means was that 
property given up and transferred to the Commonwealth? Was it a legitimate process, or 
theft on as a grand a scale as history has ever known? Holding attempted to close off the 
question with a pre-emptive assertion of Australian sovereignty-
House Hansard, 1983, vol 134, p3488; cited in Griffiths, M, opeii, p206. 
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neither the grant of land nor the recognition of Aboriginal prior occupation 
and ownership in any way puts Australian sovereignty in question. 
Sovereignty is vested in the Crown and parliament, for a single people 
united in the Commonwealth. The people who are so united are all 
It "569 
Australians.' 
The ALP's concept of treaty, whatever that term may have been taken to mean by groups 
outside the parliament, never included (at least explicitly) the concept of sovereignty. The 
difference between Government and Opposition, at least on the question of a treaty, 
appears to have been one of degree, rather than of kind. 
Treaty Politics at the Beginning of Reconciliation 
In the early to mid eighties Government ministers did not speak of reconciliation as an 
alternative to self-determination or even to treaty politics, but rather, considered such a 
treaty or compact to be the means by which reconciliation would be achieved. ALP 
Senator Michael Tate, commenting on Two Hundred Years Later, the 1983 report of the 
Senate Standing Committee of Legal and Constitutional Affairs, noted that Indigenous 
proponents of a treaty had also argued that the best means to effect a reconciliation was 
269
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to negotiate 'a comprehensive agreement setting to rights, in so far as it is possible some 
two hundred years later, the dispossession and ill-treatment suffered by the original 
inhabitants of this continent.'270 At Barunga in 1988 Prime Minister Hawke accepted a 
petition from Indigenous people calling on the government to negotiate an agreement or 
treaty.271 Hawke made that commitment, and by doing so he immediately revived a 
dormant treaty talk. Treaty-talk, although never completely subsiding, had last been 
prominent at the time of the government's election in 1983, when the National 
Aboriginal Conference had been advocating a 'Makarrata.' Obviously aware of the 
semantics of the debate, Hawke made it clear that the word 'treaty' was not essential to 
his position- one could call it what one liked, but what was important was the 'spirit' 
behind the agreemeiH, 
-
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The debate on the preamble t© the proposed ATSIC Bill in 1989 marks the transformation 
of what had originally been a Makarrata, and which had been variously known as 'treaty', 
'compact' and 'agreement', into a 'document of reconciliation'. The Coalition opposed 
the passage of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 on both 
substantive and symbolic grounds. Senator Jim Short, a Liberal from Victoria, made 
perhaps the bluntest assessment of the division between Labor and the Coalition. Short 
felt that the preamble was historically inaccurate; 'it assumes that the relationship 
between Aborigines and Europeans from the very beginning was essentially antagonistic, 
brutal and thoughtless. But that is contrary to the facts.1 The parliament ought to 
recognise that 'that there are many examples of the opposite-of cooperation and 
integration. It is this experUpce that we should be building on-not denying its very 
existence.' The preamble was but the latest manifestation of a wide-ranging tendency 
amongst 'some politicians, journalists, clergymen and propagandists .... to denigrate the 
achievements of our forebears.' The government was likewise guilty of dividing 
Australians and had 'officially set the Aborigines apart from other Australians.'274 
Short also prefaced the debate which would follow the Mabo decision three years later 
with his comments on terra nullius. The preamble gave 'the impression that Captain 
Cook and Governor Phillip acted in an illegal and unjust way in taking possession of the 
land by proclamation and settlement.' It was also a de facto attack on the doctrine of 
terra nullius, which had, said the Senator, been correctly applied to Australia: 
Short, J, 18 August 1989, Senate Hansard, p392. 
In 1770 the Aborigines had no agriculture as we understand it. They raised 
no animals* Their few utensfe weapons and ornaments were, by Western 
standards, crude in the extreme....They had no single common language and 
no political institutions. 
The Senator was aware of the judgment of Blackburn J in the Gove Lands Rights 
Case276, but it is almost inconceivable that he had read it, given his wholesale ignorance 
of the Courts findings in regard to Aboriginal social, political and religious life. For 
Short the case was authority for the correctness of terra nullius, and he could not 
understand why there had been 'since that judgment...a litany of academics and 
propagandists... have worked vociferously to attempt to rewrite the history of 
Australia.'277 
The proposed preamble to the ATSIC Bill had included a series of clauses effectively 
reiterating the historical substance of the previous year's debate on reconciliation, and 
was, for that reason, opposed by the Coalition.278 The Coalition succeeded, with 
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" The Coal it ion opposed the A TS1C Bill in its entirety as a 'culturally inappropriate' product of a 'radical * 
and 'extremist* agenda. Liberal MHR John Webster spoke of * a small, unrepresentative group of Australian 
Labor Party ideologues and Aboriginal activists1 who were 'more concerned with challenging the 
sovereignty of what they call the Euro-Australian federal state than wife the mundane priorities of health, 
education and jobs for the Aboriginal communities.' They bad a 'preoccupation with political semantics, as 
evident in the preamble of the principal Bill, and with political structures, as evident in ATSIC itself.' He 
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Democrat support, in having the preamble excised from the Bill and presented to the 
Senate as a separate resolution. Australian Democrats leader John Coulter explained that, 
although the Democrats were completely in agreement with the wording of the preamble, 
they thought that it should be passed as a separate resolution to avoid any suggestion that 
the preamble might have legal force. He described the preamble to the ATSIC Bill as the 
second stage in a larger schema of government policy, the first stage of which had been 
the passage of the motion of reconciliation. The third and final step, according to Coulter, 
was the conclusion of a negotiated treaty with Indigenous peoples. The Democrats 
supported the negotiation of a treaty with two qualifications- that the process be more 
transparent, and that they would prefer a treaty to be referred to as a 'memorandum of 
understanding and reconciliation-between the Government, representing mainstream 
Australians, and Aboriginal people.'279 
Liberal Senator from NSW (and later President of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board) 
Chris Pupiick summed up the transformation as follows-
the Opposition opposes the passage of the proposed resolution in the form 
in which it is now before the Senate-that is, basically a recast version of the 
preamble, to which Senator Coulter has added an additional clause dealing 
with what he calls an instrument of understanding and reconciliation, 
something which has previously been referred to as makarrata, a treaty or a 
preamble to the Bill was described as Mmprudent* and 'self-indulgent.' 23 May 1989, House Hansard, p 
2722. 
Coulter, J, 17 August 1989, Senate Hansard, p251. My emphasis. 
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compact. It has been through all sorts of manifestations and we have 
opposed it in all of them. 
A sharp periodisation between treaty-talk and reconciliation politics is misleading. 
'Reconciliation' was taken up as an alternative term to 'treaty' not to take the issue of a 
negotiated compact or agreement off the agenda but to circumvent the objection, raised 
repeatedly by the Coalition, that a treaty was an agreement between sovereign states and 
as such would divide the nation.281 The distinction between the two kinds of politics does 
hold, however, in so far as the reconciliation process produced a document different in 
kind to that envisaged by proponents of a treaty. Rather than 'setting to rights, as far as is 
possible two hundred years later', the dispossession of Indigenous peoples, the 
Declaration Towards Reconciliation delivered to the people at Sydney in 2000 was 
merely an 'aspirational' document. It is not an agreement at all, let alone a binding 
document, entrenched in legislation or in the Constitution, establishing rights justiciable 
in the courts. The quality of the prose is neither here nor there, for in any event the 
document itself is irrelevant, or will no doubt soon become so simply because it has no 
weight in law. 
The distinction between treaty politics and reconciliation, in so far as it exists in relation 
to the production of a written document or agreement, is not one which developed in any 
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sudden fashion. It was a break which opened slowly and which was not fully apparent 
uftffi the nature of the proposed document of reconciliation became clear. There is a line, 
admittedly somewhat wandering but nevertheless apparent, between Hawke's 
commitment at Barunga to a compact or an agreement- 'call it what you like'- and the 
Documents of Reconciliation produced by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation in 
2000. It should come as no surprise, in light of that conclusion, that reconciliation politics 
always carried with it something of a treaty politics by another name, albeit one that 
largely excluded the discussion of Indigenous sovereignty. 2 
The Origins of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 
Reconciliation was now being used in at least two distinct but not incompatible senses. 
Firstly, reconciliation had been connected to the treaty debate via the preamble to the 
ATSIC Bill. But when Holding had spoken of the 'principles' of reconciliation in 1983, 
and when the Churches had made their decisive statement in 1988, they had had in mind 
a reconciliation that was broader than and more substantial than reconciliation as an 
agreement, or reconciliation through agreement, and for that reason something that was 
" Geoff Ciark wrote that the 'concept of reconciliation grew out of the calls for a treaty or a makarrata 
made by Aboriginal activists in the 1970V; 'From the time Bob Hawke advocated a treaty there was no 
turning back... it's out of the box and it won't go back in'; Clark, G, 'Not Much Progress' in Grattan, M, 
Essays on Australian Reconciliation* pp230-232. 
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also less precise. Reconciliation was here both programmatic, implying a context in 
which policy would operate, and something which, although achieved through policy, 
was not itself part of policy. It related to the relationship between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples, and could not be considered only in terms of the relationship 
between peoples and a government, but was something to be felt at a personal or 
community level. This was the sense in which the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths In Custody had taken up the notion of reconciliation in its final report to 
parliament. Commissioner Johnston did not identify reconciliation as a species of 
agreement or treaty. Rather, reconciliation pertained to the development of better 
'community' or 'race' relations, a change in which would provide the fundamental 
backdrop to improvements in the social position of Indigenous peoples. The great barrier 
to progress had been the Marge reservoir of enmity and anger amongst Aboriginal people, 
and a lack of understanding amongst non-Aboriginal people.' The process of overcoming 
that division of anger, distrust and misunderstanding was 'often called reconciliation'." 
Johnston, E, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, vol V, p38. Commissioner 
Johnston's Final Report included, as its own final recommendation, that 'All political leaders and their 
parties recognise that reconciliation between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities in Australia 
must be achieved if community division, discord and injustice to Aboriginal people are to be avoided. To 
this end the Commission recommends that political leaders use their best endeavours to ensure bipartisan 
public support for the process of reconciliation and that the urgency and necessity of the process be 
acknowledged.' In addition, the Royal Commission's first recommendation had been that 'it is highly 
desirable that the attitude of governments to the recommendations and the implementation of those be 
carried out in a public way as part of the process of education and reconciliation of the whole community*; 
p43. 
134 
Aboriginal Affairs Minister Robert Tickner had circulated a discussion paper in February 
1991 which Commissioner Johnston commented upon in his final report." Tickner's 
proposal had been to establish as a Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation a body 'charged 
with advancing the process of reconciliation both by taking initiatives in that regard and 
by playing a lead role in the educative process*. The paper noted the tendency of 
previous debates to have become 'bogged down' on 'issues and details', such as the use 
and meaning of the words 'treaty', 'sovereignty' and 'compact.' These words had imposed 
'their own tyranny' on debate. It was now necessary to move towards a bipartisan 
position, and to 'consider the issues on their merits and free from party politics.'286 On the 
proposed treaty or compact, the government's preferred term was now a 'an instrument of 
reconciliation.' Such an instrument was, however, secondary to, and would perhaps be a 
'valuable outcome' of, a 'process' of reconciliation. Commissioner Johnston noted that 
Tickner had received expressions of support from the senior clergy, including the 
President of the Uniting Church, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, the 
Moderator-General of the Presbyterian Church and the Primate of the Anglican Church of 
Australia.287 
Tickner's discussion paper formed the basis of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 
Act 1991. The Coalition was entitled to consider the Act to be a significant victory. The 
government had effectively abandoned plans for a treaty, absolving itself of policy 
2M
 ibid,p4\. 
285
 ibid, p42 
2it>
 ibid, p4l. 
287
 ibid, p42. 
135 
responsibility by delegating the matter to an independent body not due to report for 
another decade. And the government had, in any event, emphasised the importance of 
process over outcome. We are left to wonder then if Robert Tickner had taken due notice 
of Patrick Dodson's comments in his Royal Commission Report. Dodson had agreed 
with Commissioner Johnston in so far as he felt that a reconciliation process might be a 
'useful way of removing some of the fear and hostility that clouds both Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal people.'288 But he also saw in reconciliation a paradigm shift in 
government policy in regards to Indigenous peoples. Reconciliation was a new phase in 
government policy following on from assimilation, self-management and self-
determination, all of which were acts of 'welfare* aimed at basic needs and which had 
the effect of'turning Aborigines into replicas of non-Aboriginal people.' Reconciliation, 
on the other hand, was directed at the 'complex and sometimes thorny questions of 
Aboriginal sovereignty rights', and would be achieved by means of 'a treaty or an 
instrument of reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in this 
country.'" Dodson was also reported as saying that he would not have accepted the 
position of Council Chair if he did not believe that a 'treaty' or 'document of 
reconciliation' was not a viable outcome of the process.2 What was the purpose, then, 
of appointing as head of the new CAR a man who had made the connection between 
reconciliation and sovereignty, when that was a link the government was, in effect, 
running away from? 
Dodson, P, Regional Report of Inquiry into Underlying Issues in Western Australia, p263. 
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Tickner described the objective of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation as kthe 
transformation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations in this country.' Introducing 
the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Bill in the House of Representatives in 1991, 
he nevertheless emphasised the practicality of reconciliation, and attempted to paint the 
government's new policy in as positive a light as was possible in the context of the ALP's 
earlier series of back-downs, first on a Makarrata, then on national land rights, and on a 
treaty again in the late eighties. Tickner was eager to prove that 'reconciliation was not a 
vague concept' and that the government had maintained its commitment to justice in a 
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practical sense. 
The opposition spokesperson on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, Dr 
Michael Wooldridge, offered Coalition support to the reconciliation process in his speech 
to the final report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. In that 
speech he outlined the differing approaches Labor and the Coalition would adopt in 
relation to reconciliation for much of the following decade, differences that were not 
brought into stark contrast until John Howard and John Herron adopted their policy of 
'practical reconciliation' in the mid to late nineties. Wooldridge noted that both parties 
had accepted the importance of reconciliation 'for a long time', but he went on to say that 
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'reconciliation is difficult because it means a lot of things to a lot of people.' 
Wooldridge was also concerned that the 'council might end up like another 
constitutional commission' or 'that such a vehicle might be a body for activists.' But 
if the government wanted to talk about economic, social and cultural disadvantage, then 
'we have somewhere we can go together.' The 'main issuer* in Aboriginal affairs policy, 
» J&- mat. ^95 
said Wooldridge, was service delivery."* 
The Democrats embraced the reconciliation project early on. Indeed, it had been Senator 
John Coulter, then leader of the federal party, who had initiated the key change in 
language from 'treaty' to 'document of reconciliation' during the ATSIC debates two 
years earlier. Speaking on the Royal Commission in May 1991, Coulter said that 'the 
process of reconciliation must touch every single person in Australian society', and must 
'permeate the whole of society and not just simply be a document.' This oblique 
reference to the contentious issue of a treaty was complemented by his insistence that 
"Aboriginal Australians are, like the rest of us, Australians. They are no less so because 
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Senator Ian Campbell, Liberal for WA, echoed some of these concerns in his offering of a somewhat 
less 'reconstructed' view of what the reconciliation process might entail. Campbell considered the rapidly 
rising expectations of indigenous peoples, fuelled by irresponsible Labor governments, to be a major 
impediment to reconciliation. He also cautioned against the pursuit of a treaty: 'If we go down the track of 
trying to create a treaty, of building up a political ground swell for a treaty or using the reconciliation 
process to put national land rights back onto the political agenda, then that non-partisanship will disappear 
very quickly1; August 16, 1991, Senate Hansard, p556. 
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of their ancestry, but no more so either. We simply don't have Australians of different 
classes.' 
The Powers and Functions of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act was passed by unanimous vote of the 
Australian parliament in 1991. The object of the Act was to establish a Council to 
promote a process of reconciliation between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and 
the wider Australian community. The process would foster 'an ongoing national 
commitment to co-operate to address Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
disadvantage.' (s5) The preamble to the Act includes an acknowledgment of past 
injustices: 
Australia was occupied by Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders who had 
settled for thousands of years before British settlement at Sydney Cove on 
26 January 1788; many Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders suffered 
dispossession and dispersal from their traditional lands by the British 
Crown. 
396 Coulter, Senator J, May 9, 1991, Senate Hansard, p3091 
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It also acknowledged that there had never been any formal process of reconciliation 
between Indigenous and other Australians: 'by the year 2001, the centenary of 
Federation, it is most desirable that there be such a reconciliation.' 
The CAR Act contained a sunset clause, limiting the life of the Council to ten years, 
finishing on the centenary of Federation in 2001. Three separate councils operated during 
that time, the first two appointed by the ALP and chaired by Patrick Dodson, the third 
appointed by the new Coalition government, and chaired by Evelyn Scott. Each council 
consisted of up to twenty-five appointees, with no fewer than fifteen members at any one 
time. The Act provided that the chair of the CAR was to be an Aborigine. The deputy 
chair was not required to be an Indigenous person, and was in practice a non-Indigenous 
person. At least twelve of the members of the Council were required to be Aboriginal, 
and a further two were to be Torres Strait Islander. One member was to be nominated by 
the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Reconciliation, to whom the Council 
reported. Another member was to be nominated by the leader of the opposition, and a 
further member was to be nominated by any other party in the parliament with more than 
five members. The Australian Democrats were the only party who met this criterion 
during the life of the CAR. The chair and deputy chair of ATSIC were also to be 
members. Reflecting the bipartisan aspirations of the Act, appointments by the minister 
were only to be made after consultation with the leader of the opposition, with the leader 
of any other political party with five or more members of the parliament, and with 
ATSIC. All council members except the chair held office on a part-time basis. 
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The CAR was assigned a number of functions by its enabling statute. These included a 
general responsibility 'to undertake initiatives for the purpose of promoting reconciliation 
between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the wider Australian community.* 
Those activities were to be focused primarily on the local community level. Consistent 
with the belief then current in the ALP that a more progressive Indigenous affairs policy 
could only occur in the context of a more positive public disposition to the situation of 
Indigenous peoples, the CAR was given responsibility 
to promote, by leadership, education and discussion, a deeper understanding 
by all Australians of the history, cultures, past dispossession and continuing 
disadvantage of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and of the need to 
redress that disadvantage. 
The Council was to also make annual reports on progress towards reconciliation between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. The Council was also required to submit to 
the Minister each of its three year strategic plans for approval. 
Perhaps most importantly, the CAR was to take up and possibly resolve the controversial 
question of a treaty, or as the treaty had become known in the late eighties, a document or 
documents of reconciliation. The CAR was required 'to consult Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders and the wider Australian community on whether reconciliation would be 
advanced by a formal document or forma! documents of reconciliation.' The CAR was 
required to make recommendations on the nature and content of, and the means to give 
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effect too, such a document or documents of reconciliation. The CAR was given all the 
powers necessary to perform these functions, including the power to invite submissions, 
hold inquiries, organise conferences, and to undertake research and statistical surveys. It 
was also empowered, subject to the approval of the Minister, to establish sub-committees. 
Ill© Minister was in turn required to consult with the leader of the opposition on the 
establishment of such committees. The Minister was empowered to give 'general 
directions to the Council as to the performance of its functions and the exercise of its 
powers.* The Minister was not permitted, however, to give directions relating to the 
content of any information or advice provided by the Council to any person, or to make 
any direction to the CAR without first consulting its chair. The Council secretariat was 
located within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet The CAR had an annual 
operating budget of approximately $4 million. 7 
Indigenous Responses to the Reconciliation Process 
The reconciliation process was greeted with varying degrees of approval, scepticism, and 
outright rejection amongst Indigenous leaders. Michael Wooldridge claimed that the 
reconciliation process had been received less than warmly in Indigenous Australia: 
' Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Annua! Report, 1992-93, 
www.austlii.edu/au/au/special/rsiproject/rsilibrarv/car/arl 992-93/ 
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There is a lot of cynicism about this in Aboriginal Australia, not just in 
white Australia, and the cynicism in Aboriginal Australia is, 'Is there going 
to be anything in it for me? How is it going to affect my life?298 
Patrick Dodson later reflected that in 1991 'many of our leaders, both black and white 
viewed the Council as a sell-out. A compromise, a feel-good talk fest.' Charles Perkins, 
for example, called the reconciliation process a 'big lie and a sell-out.' Aboriginal 
Provisional Government Chair Bob Weatherall called for a boycott of the Council.2 But 
the response was not entirely negative. Dodson had himself managed to hold 
reconciliation and his earlier commitment to Aboriginal sovereignty in the balance, 
seeing in reconciliation an opportunity for a fresh start, and the chance to revolutionise 
Indigenous/ non-Indigenous relations in Australia.300 Burnum Burnum, like Dodson, had 
held a commitment to Indigenous sovereignty. In an Australia Day 1988 stunt he had 
proclaimed Aboriginal sovereignty over the United Kingdom in a flag-raising ceremony 
on the sands of Dover in England. But Burnum Burnum also made the link between 
sovereignty and reconciliation. Reconciliation, rather than being a formal government led 
process, was fundamentally a matter of the spirit. He held out the idea that it might be 
possible to conclude a treaty or compact 'without having words spoken.' Although 
Indigenous persons had inherited a deep spiritual connection to the land, developed over 
298
 Wooldridge, M, 5 June 1991, House Hansard, p4824. 
The Australian, December 18, 1991; cited in Gardiner-Garden, J, From Dispossession to Reconciliation, 
pl5. 
'Now reconciliation is seen as a dynamic alternative to policies and practices that are divisive, unjust 
and unfair'; Telstra Address Address to the National Press Club, November 28 1997 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/1997/28M.html 
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a very long period of time, non-Indigenous persons were also capable of 'a strong, deep, 
spiritual and emotional affinity to the land.'30 It was this shared spiritual appreciation of 
the Australian land that might serve as the basis for an unspoken reconciliation. 
Paul Coe of the Aboriginal Legal Service in Redfern had brought a landmark challenge to 
the sovereignty of the Commonwealth in 1979. He viewed the official reconciliation 
process as the government's agenda, as an issue for non-Indigenous persons, and as a 
deferral of true justice: 'Aboriginal people never asked for Reconciliation.... Why should 
justice for Aboriginal people be delayed till the oppressor is 'enlightened' in its 
attitudes?' " He also considered the concept of reconciliation to be, in the circumstances 
of Australian history, inappropriate: 'the term reconciliation is premised on the notion of 
a pre-existing state of goodwill between the invaders and Aboriginal people. Such 
goodwill has never existed.' Coe set out his own, more radical understanding of what 
'true reconciliation' would entail. 
The only basis for Reconciliation would be the policy of Aboriginal people 
in an equal bargaining position with non-Aboriginal Australians....The only 
true Reconciliation would be a UN monitored negotiated process between 
Indigenous peoples of Australia and the people of the invaders- a process 
that would ensure we bargain as equals.304 
301 
'Interview with Caroline Jones' in Moores, I, op tit, p426,433. 
Paul Coe, quoted in Tony Duke 'Reconciliation.. .who reckons what!" in Moores, I, op cit, p283. 
ibid. See also Moores, I, 'International Year for Indigenous People' in Moores, I, op cit, p383. 
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Coe offered a treaty politics by another name. He retained the language of Indigenous 
sovereignty- of invasion, and insisted on a formally negotiated agreement. Patrick 
Dodson would later make a similar argument in his Lingiari lecture, although there he 
was more positive than Coe about the value of reconciliation as an official government 
project. Coe's daughter Isabel would make a similar assesment of the reconciliation 
process a decade later. Herself a plaintiff in the failed 1993 challenge by the Wiradjuri 
people to the sovereignty of the Commonwealth, Isabel Coe was nevertheless sceptical of 
the value of what she termed Tecon-silly-nation': 'it's just a feel-good exercise for white 
Australians.9 
Kevin Gilbert was another to examine the conceptual and political limitations of the 
concept of reconciliation: fcWe have to look a the word 'reconciliation'. What are we to 
reconcile ourselves too? To a holocaust, to massacre, to the removal of us from our land, 
from the taking of oor land?' Gilbert was here playing on one of the double meanings 
of the word 'reconciliation', one which I do not think the Churches, the Royal 
Commission or the political parties had in mind when they first showed their support for 
the concept. He was referring to 'reconcile', in the sense of reconciling oneself to, or 
accepting or acquiescing in, one's fate. Matilda House, then Chair of the Ngunnawal 
Local Aboriginal Land Council, made similar comments in her welcome to a CAR 
conference in 1993: 'How can we as nations of people reconcile ourselves, or sovereign 
Boucher, A, Tent Embassy Comes to Victoria Park', Honi Soil, July 19, 2000, no 15, p5. 
Gilbert, K, 'What Are We to Reconcile Ourselves To?* in Moores, I, op tit, p287. 
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position, to a relationship with an Australia government who are cheats, thieves and liars? 
Are we to reconcile ourselves to the detriment or our own culture and sovereignty? 
The Aboriginal Provisional Government refused to accept the terms of the new agenda, 
and in its own way, kept on with its advocacy of a pan-Aboriginal sovereignty. The APG 
considered the reconciliation process to be not only vague, but to be so lacking in 
substance as to be a public relations exercise. In the sense that the process was thought of 
by senior politicians to be a means of improving the public climate for Indigenous affairs 
policy making, the APG was right. But the APG was dismissive of what benefits such 
'progressive' policy might bring to Aboriginal people: 'the whole Reconciliation process 
is nothing more than a government mechanism for enlisting white support for passing on 
some welfare benefits to Aboriginal people.' 8 Rather than engage in such an ill-
conceived venture, the APG claimed that it was now the right time to form a national 
black liberation body. The APG saw reconciliation and 'justice' for Indigenous peoples 
as mutually exclusive terms- the 'promotion of Reconciliation will be at the expense of 
action to immediately move towards self-determination.'30 In relation to white guilt 
however, the APG said that white people 'had every right to feel guilty. Had our lands 
not been invaded, how could their nation exist today?' In this respect the APG was a 
player in the politics of history which dominated parts of the official reconciliation 
period. 
House, M, 'Welcome and Introduction' in CAR, The Position of Indigenous Peoples in National 
Constitutions: Speeches from the Conference, p3. 
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 Aboriginal Provisional Government, 'Reconciliation by 2001* in Moores, I, op tit, p307. 
Aboriginal Provisional Government, *Law Reform and the Road to Independence', in Moores, I, op tit, 
p318. 
146 
Early CAR publications were one forum in which local Indigenous opinion received a 
measure of expression. The CAR was required by statute to conduct a community 
consultation program. Some small snippets of Indigenous opinion expressed in that 
consultation program made it into the national debate via the reports published in the 
Council Magazine, Walking Together, and in the Council's social justice consultation 
compilations. The 1993 Melbourne consultation meeting threw up two interesting 
comments on the reconciliation process. Walking Together reported that the community 
was divided on whether to accept the process. But it also noted that various speakers 
considered that Indigenous peoples needed to be reconciled to each other before they 
could reconcile with white Australia. At the Tasmanian meeting local Indigenous people 
spoke of their struggle to be recognised as a distinct people. One speaker said there was a 
place in the reconciliation process for the making of strong demands on non-negotiable 
Indigenous entitlements. 
In August 1993 Walking Together reported on the Thursday Island meeting in the Torres 
Strait. That meeting was noteworthy for the sheer practicality of the issues raised by the 
panicipants- they spoke of problems with customs and quarantine, of environmental 
pollution, the exploitation of the fishing industry, and of self-government in the Torres 
Strait311 Those issues of symbolism, history and faith that would dominate the national 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together* No 2, Feb 1993. online: 
http://wwvv.austHi.edu.aU/au/other/lndigLRes/car/l 993/16/5.html 
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 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together\ No 5, August 1993. online: 
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147 
reconciliation process were, as far as one can tell from the CAR report, not mentioned. 
This says something of the way in which the Thursday Islanders initially thought about 
reconciliation: as the forum in which to address substantive issues with an impact on their 
daily lives, rather than as a process relevant to national identity, or for the redress of past 
wrongs. In Cairns the participants raised a broader range of issues. Like the Thursday 
Islanders, they saw a link between reconciliation and substantive policy issues, such as 
environmental degradation and unemployment. But the Cairns meeting is most 
interesting because of the way in which the Cairns participants linked reconciliation to a 
treaty. They asked who would sign a treaty or a document of reconciliation on behalf of 
Indigenous peoples. By implication, it might be thought thgt'the Cairns participants saw 
no clear distinction between treaty politics and reconciliation. 
Another forum in which local Indigenous opinion was expressed and recorded was the 
community consultation process which preceded the development of the CAR's post-
Mabo social justice report. Towards Social Justice: Compilation Report of First Round 
Consultations, noted that in Townsville, Dubbo, Karatha and Sydney meeting 
participants had raised the issue of Indigenous sovereignty. In Sydney and Tamworth 
participants called for the development of an Indigenous constitution. And in Alice 
Springs there was a call for the recognition of 'dual' sovereignty. ,4 Participants in the 
CAR, Towards Social Justice: Compilation Report of First Round Consultations, 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/rsiproiect/fsilibrary/car-atsic/tsi2/51 .html, p56. 
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NSW Metropolitan ATSIC Zone meetings advanced the view that self-government, self-
determination and sovereignty were 'three parts of the whole.' 
Native Title Part I: Mabo and Reconciliation 
The first major challenge for the reconciliation process was the Mabo decision of 1992. 
In that decision the High Court ruled that 'native title' had, in some parts of the continent 
and under certain conditions, survived to the present day. The legal significance of Mabo 
was exaggerated in two senses; on the one hand, largely uninformed conservative 
commentators suggested that the decision put the 'backyards' of urban Australia at 'risk', 
when this was clearly not the case.3 6 On the other hand, supporters of the judgment 
tended to overlook the extent to which the judgment subordinated native title to the 
interests of other title-holders and hence rendered it a uniquely precarious form of 
property right. 7 That said, the judgment's evident concern with the darker aspects of 
CAR, Towards SocialJustice: Compilation Report of both Rounds ofConsultation, pp65,68 
Bevis, A, November 23,1993, House Hansard, p3490. kI think probably the worst thing that I have seen 
during the course of the last few months of debate on this issue was when the Western Australian premier 
actually named suburbs in Perth that were going to be subject to Aboriginal land claims. I do not think 
anyone in this House would be foolish enough to suggest, even at the outset of this debate, that residential 
land was about to be taken from underneath people's feet. Yet, for no reason that I can see, other than base, 
racist motivation or a desire to instil fear in people, the Western Australian premier decided to pursue a line 
identifying suburbs where people live; the import of his accusation, the inference being that people's homes 
were going to be taken out from under them.1 
See also G rattan, S and McNamara, L, The common law construct of native title : a 're-feudalisation' of 
Australian land law' Griffith Law Review.v 8(1) 1999, pp 50-85, and The recognition on indigenous land 
rights as 'native title': continuity and transformation.1 Flinders Journal of Law Reform, v3 (2) December 
1999, pp 137-162. See Jeremy Webber's argument that the Mabo judgment was a major shift in Australian 
constitutionalism insofar as it recognises, as the source and definition of native title, the continuing 
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Australian history and its rejection of one of the founding myths of settler society in the 
interests of contemporary justice had much in common with Tickner's understanding of 
the reconciliation process outlined above.318 History, recognition and injustice were 
concerns common to Mabo and to reconciliation. Not surprisingly then, the ALP and the 
CAR saw native title as an 'opportunity' conceptually inseparable from reconciliation. 
Prime Minister Keating had linked Mabo to reconciliation in his Redfern Speech; the 
judgment 'establishes a fundamental truth and lays the basis for justice.... a basis for 
reconciliation formerly denied us.*319 Dodson thought that Australia was in the mood 'to 
apologise and consider reparations.'3 Then Democrats leader Senator Cheryl Kernot 
also drew the link between native title and reconciliation, as did Greens (WA) Senator 
Christabel Chamarette.321 
existence of multiple indigenous legal orders within the Commonwealth of Australia; Webber, J, 'Beyond 
Regret: Mabo's Implications for Australian Constitutionalism' in Ivison, D et al, (eds) op cit, pp60-88. See 
also Patton, P, 'Sovereignty, Law and Difference in Australia: After the Mabo Case', Alternatives, 21 
(1996) p 150; Deleuze and the Political, pi 30. 
See Webber, J, 'The Jurisprudence of Regret: The Search for Standards of Justice in Mabo'' in Sydney 
Law Review, vol 17 no 1 1995, pp 10-11. 
Keating, P, 'Redfern Park Speech', in Grattan, M, Essays on Australian Reconciliation, pp60-64. Robert 
Tickner said that the judgment 'removes a huge barrier to reconciliation. It also opens up a new challenge'; 
CAR, The Position of Indigenous Peoples in National Constitutions: Speeches from the Conference, p6. 
Dodson, P, 'Chairpersons Introduction*, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Annual Report, 1993-
94. www.austlii.edu/au/au/special/rsiproiectj^librarv/car/arl 993-93/ 
" Cheryl Kernot said 'we cannot separate native title from reconciliation. To do so displays a blatant lack 
of understanding of the special attachment that Aboriginal people have for land and that Torres Strait 
Islanders have for the sea.. .How we respond to an understanding of special attachment to land is a 
measure of how we are performing our partnership as we move towards reconciliation.' |5 December 
1993, Senate Hansard, p 4624. The Greens also supported the Bill, again seeing a link between native title 
and reconciliation. Senator Chamarette from Western Australia said that 'until the truth of the historical 
injustice is acknowledged no healing or reconciliation is possible'; 15 December 1993, Senate Hansard, p 
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The Coalition sought to separate the issues of reconciliation and native title 
completely.322 By means of such a split it was able to maintain a commitment to 
reconciliation notwithstanding its opposition to the Native Title Act 1993. Peter Reith 
summarised the Coalition response to Mabo in the following way: 
we said that all Australians should be treated equally under the law; titles 
should be validated immediately; native title is the law and we therefore 
recognise the High Court's decision; jobs and development should not be 
jeopardised; mineral rights should be protected; reconciliation should 
continue to be pursued, but that the Mabo issue and reconciliation should be 
settled separately. 
Reith explained that the Coalition accepted the Mabo decision but opposed the Native 
Title Bill as an unjust and unworkable approach to land management, itself a state and 
not a federal responsibility. The Racial Discrimination Act and the Mabo decision itself 
The years 1991 and 1992 had been marked, according to then Minister Robert Tickner, by an unusually 
co-operative atmosphere in Aboriginal affairs. Tickner attributes this relative peace to the establishment of 
the CAR and to the then leadership of the Coalition. Hewson and Wooldridge were, respectively, Leader 
and Deputy Leader of die Liberal Party. Their leadership was marked by a more constructive approach to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs. But Hewson, mortally wounded after the 1993 election, was 
unable to resist the pressure of conservative state leaders and mining interests to change the tone of 
Aboriginal affairs policy making by becoming increasingly negative on the Native Title Bill. Native title 
became a 'special right' offensive to the legal equality of all Australians, and to the unity of the nation; 
Taking a Stand, pp 90, 98. 
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 Reith, P, 23 November 1993, House Hansard, p 3415 
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were adequate protection for native title holders.324 The Bill before the parliament 
extended beyond the High Court's decision in Mabo, providing native title holders with a 
right of negotiation over future developments. This 'de facto right of veto' meant that 
'any development project is likely to be bogged down in the tribunals and courts for 
years, which will be at very great expense to all Australians. 
Liberal MHR Trish Worth said that the Bill attempted 'to link the Mabo judgment with 
the process of reconciliation.' It was 'reckless', she said, 'to intermingle issues relating 
to reconciliation which are sociological with issues relating to the Mabo judgment which 
are legal and administrative. We cannot legislate for good race relations.' 32 John 
Anderson accused the government of linking native title to historical guilt. Such a 
strategy was 'counterproductive to reconciliation and the pulling together of all 
Australians as one people.' " Senator John Herron contended that' average Australians 
do not believe that this bill will achieve reconciliation with the Aboriginal community.' 
The solution had to come from 
'Our response to the Native Title Bill rests on three pillars of principle. One, recognition of the decision 
of the High Court that native title exists nationally at common law. Two, recognition that native title is 
protected by the existing federal law, the Racial Discrimination Act and affirmation of our support for that 
law. Three, recognition that the states have constitutional responsibility for land management and the need 
for this to be maintained because a Commonwealth takeover is both impractical and will undermine the 
proper functioning of the Australian federation.' Reith, P, 23 November 1993, House Hansard, p3415. 
325
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the Aboriginals themselves; it is not going to come from white Australians. 
We have been shoving money at them—$1.3 billion, on the latest estimate-
but when one goes into these communities it is apparent that, somewhere 
along the line, it is not getting to the people in the communities.32 
The passage of the Native Title Bill into law would be 'a dark day in Australia's history ... 
it will be looked back upon, in years to come, as impeding the reconciliation.' 
Opposition leader Hewson decried the tendency of the government and its supporters to 
tar those who opposed the Native Title BiB as racist. He singled out Noel Pearson as one 
Aboriginal person who had stooped to gutter tactics. But it appears that Hewson had, at 
least in one sense, misunderstood the nature of the accusation made against him. He 
defended his party in classically liberal terms, perhaps missing the point that it was the 
very failure to have due regard to the particular needs of Indigenous peoples that 
constituted the cardinal offence: 
Racism is abhorrent to all of us on this side of the House and, I believe, to 
all members of this parliament. The record of the coalition parties both in 
government and opposition bears testimony to our fundamental 
commitment to the dignity of every individual, to the equality of 
That reconciliation would only come when 'Aboriginal communities themselves take responsibility for 
their health care, take responsibility for their employment, take responsibility for controlling their own lives 
in the way that other Australian communities do'; Herron, J, 15 December 1993, Senate Hansard, p4645. 
153 
opportunity that they should have and to their potential to contribute to the 
common good of society, irrespective of race, religion, gender or belief. We 
believe these things deeply and passionately, and we will not cop it from 
the other side.330 
The CAR expressed its deep concern for the negative response of many in the Australian 
community to the Mabo decision from an early stage. In November 1993 it launched its 
vision statement: 'A united Australia which respects this land of ours, values the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage and provides justice and equity for all.1 
That value statement was characteristic of the Council's repeated calls for both justice and 
unity in the response to the Mabo decision. Dodson wrote in November 1993 that the 
challenge of Mabo was 'to find a national spirit that will allow us all to belong 
comfortably together in one place.' Native title, more than being a matter of justice, was 
also something which could itself help to heal Australia's discord and division.331 
But the CAR stayed largely above the day to day politics of the post Mabo native title 
debate. It acknowledged in Walking Together, its first report to the parliament, that the 
Hewson: 'I want to take a little time to debunk, once and for all, an accusation that is thrown around by 
those who want to demean anyone who opposes this bill. It is the racist slurf Ihis totally outrageous claim; 
that anyone who opposes this legislation is somehow racist. It is a slur that has been leveled at us explicitly 
by some and implicitly by others. The executive director of the Cape York Land Council, Mr Noel Pearson, 
for example, made the charge explicitly at the National Press Club on 10 November when he said that those 
who were opposed to this legislation are returning to a racist debate that occupied Australia in the 
nineteenth century'; Hewson, J, 23 November 1993, House Hansard, p3405. 
.Dodson, P, 'Our Vision' in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together, No€, November 
1993. 
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diversity of its membership made it difficult for the CAR to have input into the 'day to 
day detail of the debate.'332 The Council did become actively involved in the debate, 
although as a mediator only, when it hosted a meeting at Eva Valley of four hundred 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander representatives in 1993. Beyond this, however, the 
CAR aspired to leadership only on the broad thematics of the debate, and sought to focus 
reconciliation on the rights and position of Indigenous peoples, and on a negotiated 
resolution of outstanding issues. 
Noel Pearson, who had earlier described the date of the Mabo judgment as 'the date of 
Australia's redemption5,333 expressed his regret that Mabo, a decision premised on the 
principle of inclusion, had become a 'symbol of government neglect and exclusive 
extravagance in favour of minorities.'334 John Howard had played on that discontent 
when, returned to the leadership of the Liberal party, he based his 1996 campaign on the 
slogan, 'For All of Us.' That slogan implied a liberal equality of citizens, and a rejection 
of'special measures' for minority groups. But the Liberal party has also played its part in 
creating that atmosphere in the first place. The backlash against Mabo, the surfacing 
racism, the critique of'special rights' whteh might fracture the unity of the nation: all of 
these things were fostered by the Coalition in the eighties and early nineties, and were 
portents of what was to come in the late nineties. 
332
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Native Title Part II: Wik and Reconciliation 
The March 1996 election saw the end of thirteen years of Labor government. The newly 
elected Howard Coalition government soon discovered a multi-billion dollar 'black-hole' 
in the federal budget and proceeded to cut funding in a number of politically sensitive 
areas. ATSIC saw its budget cut by some $400 million. This was the political context in 
which the WiJ^35 decision on the rights of pastoralists and native title holders was 
received. In December 1996 the High Court ruled that native title and pastoral leases 
could co-exist in the same piece of land. As with Mabo, the Court's decision set off a 
chain of heated disputation that was to strain both the reconciliation process and the 
relationship between the judiciary and the legislature. The National Farmers Federation 
(NFF) claimed that Indigenous leaders and the former Labor government had agreed with 
it that a valid pastoral lease extinguished native title. It argued that the High Court had 
effectively circumvented the political process by insisting on a construction of the statute 
contrary to that which the parliament had intended. It demanded amendments to the 
Native Title Act to secure the title of pastoralists. 36 The government, describing the Wik 
decision as 'unworkable', agreed. 
See also Bennett, S, op cit, p62. 
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Donald McGauchie, President of the NFF, told Walking Together that 'the famers of Australia do not 
want to abolish native title. Since Mabo, we have accepted the concept of native title and the NFF 
supported the Native Title Act of 1993, on the basis of what we understood to be the negotiated agreement 
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Senator Nick Minchin was to be responsible for the amendments to the Native Title Act 
1993 but his opposition to the principle of native title gave rise to questions about his 
suitability for such a task. Minchin had vociferously opposed the 1993 legislation, 
describing it as 'inherently racist....because only people of a particular race can now 
claim this new title.' He had not experienced any significant conversion in the 
intervening years, describing the right of native title claimants to negotiate with miners as 
a 'special privilege' in 1996. He also reversed the link made by the ALP when in office 
between native title and reconciliation. The Coalition position was no longer that the two 
issues were separate, but that native title was now a potential threat to reconciliation: 
the fear I have, as someone who is committed to reconciliation, is that 
you've got to avoid the risk native title itself becomes a vehicle for creating 
a lot of damage to the reconciliation process itself...where Aboriginal people 
have these special rights that other Australians don't have, that's how you 
get the potential backlash. 7 
that pastoral leases extinguished native title.' Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together* No 
20, December 1997. 
*Chorus of Criticism for Howard's Negotiator' Sydney Morning Herald, June 1, 1996, p34. Minchin 
also tended to equate reconciliation with compromise. In relation to the Wik amendments to the Native 
Title Act 1993 he said: 'clearly agreements about native title, and the mutual respect needed to achieve 
them, are fundamental to coexistence, and to reconciliation...no interests, including indigenous interests, 
pastoralists and the mining community, gained everything it wanted from the governments Bill which 
maintained a fair and careful policy balance-surely such compromise, and provision for a legal basis for co-
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Howard agreed: the Native Title Act 1993 'has been a disaster for reconciliation in the 
Australian community. What the existing Native Title Act has done, because of its flawed 
operation, because of its manifest complications, is contribute to rather than subtract from 
division and argument within the Australian community.' 
Conservative state premiers in Western Australia and Queensland pressed hard for 
amendments to extinguish native title on pastoral leases and to remove the right to 
negotiate on mineral developments. The federal National party was no less insistent on 
the same point. Party leader Tim Fischer criticised the High Court, calling for the 
appointmeniof 'capital c conservatives' to put an end to the Court's perceived activism. 
Fischer promised his rural constituency 'bucket-loads of extinguishment.' When it 
became apparent that complete extinguishment was not an option, Fischer promoted the 
compromise deal as 'effective extinguishment.' As for Indigenous persons, Fischer asked 
them to be patient, promising that reconciliation, although on hold for the duration of the 
native title debate, would be back on track once Wik had been dealt with: 'If it was that 
the Senate passed the legislation on or about the ides of march, the day after that would 
be the first day of a renewed effort by myself as deputy PM...and by the government to 
renew energy and effort into reconciliation.'339 David Russel QC, President of the 
existence, are significant for reconciliation.' Minchin, N, Press Release, April 29 1998, Online Text 
402268, www.aph.gov.au 
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Then Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Mick Dodson hit back; Fischer 
was threatening the Australian people and holding us to ransom over reconciliation because the 
government can't get it all its own way." He described the Wik Bill as 'racially discriminatory, unjust and 
probably unconstitutional/ 'Fischer's Deal: Wik First, Then We Talk1, Sydney Morning Herald, January 
15,1998, p5. 
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Queensland National Party, pointed to the Wik decision as a betrayal of rural Australia: 
'Rural Australia feels absolutely betrayed (by the Wik decision)...the government should 
not discriminate, that is, there should not be separate classes of land title that are 
available to people based on race only.' 
Donald McGauchie of the NFF said that 'the Wik debate is about land tenure': 'It is 
regrettable that other issues such as the '^stolen children" and reconciliation should 
become so enmeshed with this debate about land tenure.' And repeating Minchin, the 
NFF President said that 'the Wik decision itself has done enormous damage to the 
reconciliation process.' McGauchie said that Church leaders, Aboriginal leaders, lawyers 
and academics were responsible for that damage. But there was an element of the 
surreal here- the NFF later ran a highly offensive national advertising campaign featuring 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal children playing Twister. At that point Aboriginal groups 
refused to share the same table as the authors of such a 'putrid' campaign. 
The separation of native title from reconciliation was perhaps at odds with the 
government's professed understanding of reconciliation as a 'practical' enterprise. 
Although highly symbolic and tied up in the public understanding of Australian hisf&ry, 
via terra nullius and the Mabo judgement, native title is also a supremely 'practical' 
right. Native title concerns the rights of Indigenous peoples to access, use and care for 
their traditional lands. The High Court ruled in Wik that Indigenous peoples and 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together* No 20, December 1997 
'Interview with Donald McGauchie*, in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together* No 
20, December 1997. 
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pastoralists could have co-existing rights in the same land. In that case, native title was a 
practical measure by which Indigenous and non-Indigenous could co-exist. But the 
government, under pressure from pastoralists and mining interests, repudiated Wik as 
'unworkable', and in relation to the rights of Indigenous peoples, as offensive to the 
equality of all Australians. Native title, as a right available only to some Indigenous 
peoples, was seemingly at odds with the proposition that all Australians ought to enjoy 
the same legal status. 
The spectre of a double dissolution 'race' election was raised when the Prime Minister 
failed to secure the passage of his Ten Point Plan in the Senate, but was eventqiilj 
averted when the independent Senator for Tasmania, Brian Harradine, agreed to a 
compromise deal which nevertheless reduced the rights of native title holders. 4 Despite 
the CAR's aspiration to leadership, and the insistence of Indigenous groups that they be 
consulted on any proposed amendments to the Native Title Act, the *Wik Bill' was 
finalised without any significant Indigenous participation. The compromise deal was 
largely a product of negotiations between Senator Harradine and the government. In any 
event, Dodson now openly mused that the reconciliation process was 'going backwards.' 
Ian Viner, former Aboriginal Affairs Minister in the Fraser government and then deputy 
Chair of the CAR, said publicly that the government had a 'negative attitude' towards 
" Howard described the compromise as a lfair compromise' that would 'bind us together, and not put 
apart sections of the Australian community.1 Beazley argued that Howard had desired a race based election 
but had been *feitten by another force at least partly of his own creation, in the form of One Nation.'; * Wik 
Deal Scuttles Race Poll' Sydney Morning Herald, July 2, 1998, pi. Aden Ridgway said the deal was 
'opening the way for a new wave of oppression'; 'Wik: The New Deal' Sydney Morning Herald, July 3, 
1998, p7. 
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reconciliation. In December 1996 Dodson described the political situation as a 'period of 
ignorant rhetoric and racial tension.' 
The Stolen Generations and the Question of an Apology 
The apology debate which fallowed the release of the Bringing Them Home report in 
1997 is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, which links that report to the dominant 
rhetorical trope of later reconciliation discourse; the language of healing. This Chapter 
only seeks to place that report and the debate which it sparked in the broader context of 
the reconciliation process itself. Some of the themes of the report had already featured, in 
a more abstract and general way, in the discourses of reconciliation. Australian history, 
national guilt and the unity of the nation were three of those themes which would also 
mark the debate on a national apology to the members of the Stolen Generations and 
their families. 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together, Special Edition, December 1996. In his 1999 
Lingiari Lecture Dodson went further, claiming that 'there is a serious move afoot in this country, by very 
powerful forci§at the highest levels of government, business and society to return the position of 
Indigenous Australians to the situation that existed before the Wave Hill strike in 1966" Lingiari Lecture 
1999.The Howard government's Wik amendments, and its failure to appoint a new Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, also earned Australia the dubious distinction of being the first 
"westenmation to be placed on the early warning list of the United Nations Committee on Racial 
Discrimination; 'Ruddock Helps Cool Tensions With Fire Side Chat*, Sydney Morning Herald, February 2, 
I999,p2. 
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Bringing Them Home was released in May 1997, less than six months after the Wik 
decision. To the dismay of some, including the NFF, the two issues of an apology to the 
Stolen Generations and native title ran together, and were seen as being the two issues 
testing the government's commitment to reconciliation. But the two issues were also 
linked conceptually, or at least bore something of a resemblance for those willing to 
consider them historically; the policy of forced child removal related to the history of 
relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia. Child removal 
was, in a microcosm, the history of past injustice towards Indigenous people, and Wik, 
like a bad memory, was a piece of history repeating itself. 
'Trauma' and 'healing' were feelings and needs extrapolated from the particular 
experience of removed children and their families, to Indigenous people collectively, and 
to the nation as a whole. But if any healing was to come of this, it was a curious kind of 
treatment. The atmosphere was one of indignation, conflict and division. Some 
Australians were left wondering where their nice, corporatist, two-party social 
democracy had gone. Drusiila Modjeska, speaking at the 1997 NSW Premier's Literary 
Awards, summed up the mood of the times: 
it seemed to me during this unusually bad winter, when it was indeed bitter 
once one got beyond the trees, that this too is a time of upheaval and 
conflict in which ways of thinking, and perhaps even of writing , are being 
challenged and changed in most painful ways. I am sure I am not the only 
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one to have had the sensation of waking up to find myself in an Australia I 
barely recognised. Or rather, more to the point, did not want to recognise. 
John Howard, meanwhile, was defending his conservative credentials to Australia's talk-
back radio audiences: 
I'm the Prime Minister who took money out of the ATSIC budget. I'm the 
Prime Minister who was attacked by the media of this country (for doing 
so)....I'm the bloke that has been under constant attack from Aboriginal 
leaders for being insensitive to their situation....I'm also the Prime Minister 
who belonged to the party that voted against the Native Title Act 1993, 4 
Tensions between the government and the CAR leadership eventually became so great 
that Dodson and deputy chair Ian Viner decided not to seek re-appointment to the 
Council. That particular episode degenerated into farce when Dodson attempted to re-
engage with the government by offering to accept reappointment on certain conditions. 
But it was too late. Howard announced that the Chair had already been offered to Evelyn 
Scott, and he could not*iffl good faith, retract the offer. Geoff Clark was later to say that 
Indigenous leaders had kept faith with the reconciliation process whilst Dodson was 
chair of the Council; 'he was our hero.'346 Certainly Dodson had been willing to 
continually stress the link between reconciliation and justice, and to advocate, as a means 
^M^SSks^E^dd^s^Jalh^J^J^NS^ Premier's Literary Awards. 1997. 
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 Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May 1997, cited in Bennett, S, op cit, p88. 
346
 Clarke, Gtopcit, p23I. 
to reconcile the nation, a treaty or 'framework agreement' between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples. He had, moreover, attempted to connect the realpolitick of native 
title to a larger understanding of the issues at stake in the reconciliation process. 
The High Court decision in Mabo was a defining moment on the road to 
reconciliation, a milestone. The justices found that the historical doctrine 
of terra millius was unfounded, based on 'little more than bare assertion'. 
At that moment our relationship with one another changed forever... .From 
that moment, our nationhood, our moral community, our common law, has 
become interwoven with the fact of native title. A just and fair resolution 
of native title has become the ultimate test of Australian justice, of 
Australian decency, and of our national leadership.4 
The appointment of Evelyn Scott as Council Chair saw the development of a more polite 
form of advocacy from the CAR. Scott was patient and enduring, and less inclined to 
mention treaties than was Dodson, or to say of Wik, as Dodson had, that the 
government's native title legislation was the 'final poisoning of the last waterhole.'3 Her 
resolution of the immediate political problem facing the CAR was to reorient the 
direction of the Council's mission. Dodson had said of Howard as he departed, 'if he is 
Dodson, P, Address to the National Press Club, November 28 1997:' In recent times we have seen that 
commitment from the Parliament on reconciliation weaken and dim. It was a multi-party commitment to 
which the Government is no longer.... These issues of social justice, an apology and fair dealing on Wik 
are issues on which we agree. Therefore we are forced to disagree with the Government. Sadly, reluctantly 
but passionately disagree.* 
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deaf, let him remain deaf. He has closed his hears.' The CAR under Scott continued to 
look past the elected leadership of the country to claim an independent support base 
amongst the 'people's movement for reconciliation.'349 She affirmed the importance of 
reconciliation in terms of its importance to the future of Australia as a 'mature, 
harmonious society at peace with itself.' 
By 1997 official CAR publications were putting increasing distance between the Council 
and the government. The CAR now sought to base its legitimacy not on the bipartisan 
support of the major parties, or its own moral authority, but on the claim to widespread 
public support. The 1998-2000 strategic plan, for example, listed the aim of the third 
Council as 'supporting and maintaining the people's movement for reconciliation.' The 
people's 'embrace' demonstrated the maturity of the Australian people. The Council's 
own polling, however, demonstrated how 'thin' much of that support was-just as Labor 
and the Coalition had been able to support the establishment of the CAR in 1991 because 
they understood reconciliation in different ways, it was possible for Australians with 
markedly different political opinions to express an in-principle support for reconciliation. 
The flexibility of the term hid the deeper divisions on issues of unity, equality, 
Indigenous rights and an apology. 
348
 'Howard to Push for Bipartisan Motion' Sydney Morning Bsrald, 28 May 1997. 
349
 As early as its first triennial strategic plan the CAR had pointed to a mandate from, or to be 
representative of, the Australian people: 'the Council is representative of the Australian community and is 
responsible to that community, particularly through the parliament, for charting the direction for change 
along the steps outlined above*; CAR, Strategic Plan 1991-94, 
-^VV^aastlikedu^uyau^ CAR. Strategic Plan 1998-2000* 
www.austlii.edu. au/au/orgs/car/st rat p 1 an/Pases/i ntro.htm 
Scott, E, 'Chairpersons Introduction*, Walking Together, no 21, March 1998. 
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Pauline Hanson, Reconciliation and the Nation 
There is some irony to be found in the early debates on native title and its relationship 
both to national unity and to reconciliation. That irony is the disjunction between 
Coalition rhetoric when in opposition and the development of a highly divisive popular 
debate on Aboriginal affairs whilst it was in government. The Coalition in opposition had 
repeatedly conjured the image of a nation divided on the lines of race. John Howard and 
Chris Miles accused the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of setting Australian 
against Australian, of denigrating Australian history, and of making policy that was itself 
racist. The Coalition claimed that it would govern in the interests of all Australians, 
regardless (or, more properly, without regard to) race. It would bring an ever greater 
unity to Australian national life. The period 1996 to 2000 was marked, however, by 
unprecedented controversy. 1996 saw the election, to the seat of Oxiey in Queensland, of 
the dis-endorsed Liberal Party candidate Pauline Hanson. ' Hanson's maiden speech to 
parliament sparked what appeared, from one perspective, to be a sea-change in Australian 
political debate. Hanson denied that Indigenous peoples were the most disadvantaged 
group in Australia, and claimed instead that a 'reverse racism' applied to 'mainstream 
Hanson was expelled from the party for her refusal to retract statements made in a letter to a Queensland 
newspaper concerning the welfare entitlements and the supposedly 'privileged* status of indigenous 
persons. Hanson ran as an Independent (although still with the benefit of Liberal party endorsement on the 
^ailQt^pfig^t-W3^^ftlqt^jr(^jif'Qg?-ty| jnd wqg..anywgy. There is an already a large literature on Hanson 
and the One Nation party; see for example Two Nations: The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One 
Nation Party in Australia. 
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Australia.' Labor and Coalition governments were encouraging 'separatism' by providing 
Indigenous specific services and by recognising Indigenous land rights. Hanson evoked 
Sir Paul Hasluck's distinction between a racial and a social problem: 
A social problem is one that concerns the way in which people live together 
in one society. A racial problem is a problem which confronts two different 
races who live in separate societies, even if those societies are side by side. 
We do not want a society in Australia in which one group enjoy one set of 
privileges and another group enjoy another set of privileges. 
Hanson further endorsed Hasluck's image of a nation united: 'Hasluck's vision was of a 
single society in which racial emphases were rejected and social issues addressed.' She 
continued, 'to survive in peace and harmony, united and strong, we must have one 
people, one nation, one flag.' Hanson attacked the CAR and offered her own definition of 
reconciliation: 
Reconciliation is everyone recognising and treating each other as equals, 
and everyone must be responsible for their own actions. That is why I am 
calling for ATSIC to be abolished.353 
Hanson, P, House Hansard, 10 September 1996. Gillian Cowlishaw provides an account of Hasluck's 
'final solution' in her book, Rednecks, Eggheads and Blackfellas: A Study of Racial Power and Intimacy in 
Australia, ppl 79-188. 
uH3avf#^d&d^-^ii^ar4y-a5:^^ 
genuinely treated equally, when there are no special benefits based on race, when colour and cultural 
backgrounds play no part in the determination of the delivery of government services.' Oldfield continued: 
167 
Howard ruled out a direct confrontation with Hanson, arguing that her popularity would 
fade when the public realised she offered no solutions to policy problems. 
The 'special rights' or 'reverse racism1 critique of Aboriginal affairs policy did not begin 
with Hanson but has a much longer Australian pedigree. 5 It is embedded in the 
contradictions of assimilation policy, contradictions as evident in Hasluck as in Howard 
and Hanson. The contradictory nature of what justice entails as between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Australians It taken up in chapter five of this thesis. For now I only wish 
to note the recent history of this critique. CD. Rowley had noted in his 1971 work that 
the 'special rights' critique of Aboriginal affairs policy was circulating in the 1960's. 
Patrick Dodson sounded a warning in his Regional Report of Inquiry into Underlying 
Issues in Western Australia in 1991. Dodson cited the study commissioned by the federal 
government in 1984 and conducted by Australian National Opinion Polls, 'Land Rights: 
Winning Middle Australia': 
"When we are truly one people, with a true understanding and acceptance of the past and, more 
importantly, a commitment to a common and positive future as Australians—only Australians and nothing 
else—then we may well have reached what so many call reconciliation.* Extract from the Legislative 
Council Hansard of 04/04/2000 - Corrected Copy, p4018. 
http://www.Darliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/PHWeb.ns^HansardVQpenFrameSet accessed 22/07/2001. 
See also Bennett on equality and reverse racism; White Politics and Black Australians, pp25-27. Rowley 
noted in 1971 that the 'special rights' critique of Aboriginal affairs policy was also current in the 1960*s; 
Aboriginal Policy and Practice, Vol Three, pi 97. 
3
—See1-fer_exam|i%|-igivf ignores Warnings of Hanson Furore' Sydney Morning Herald. May 1 1997. p9. 
353
 See also Rowse, T, Obliged to be Difficult, p221. 
356
 Rowley, CD, Aboriginal Policy and Practice, Vol Three, p 197. 
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the attitude situation in white Australia is quite monstrous: the problem is 
not that white Australians have little sympathy for or appreciation of the 
plight of Aborigines; rather the problem is that white Australians actually 
regard Aborigines as over-privileged, in receipt of overly generous 
Government hand-outs, and living on the benefit on undeserved 
357 
concessions. 
The Coalition did not take an altogether coherent stand on Aboriginal affairs policy 
throughout the official reconciliation period. It shifted between a position as crude as 
Hanson's (rejecting, for example, the Native Title Act as plainly and simply racist when 
the position was altogether more complicated) and an alternative position where it 
supported, at least in some cases, Indigenous specific programs. This latter position can 
be distinguished from that taken by Hanson. Whilst the Coalition did not accept that 
Indigenous peoples enjoyed any distinctly Indigenous rights or that they had any special 
claim on government services arising from their prior ownership or occupation of 
Australia, it did accept that Indigenous persons were, on almost every measure, the most 
disadvantaged in Australia. Whilst disadvantage was to be addressed as an incident of 
citizenship rather than indigeneity, the Coalition did continue to fund some Indigenous 
programs. Indigenous specific programs in housing, employment and health, for example, 
were thought of as 'special measures' or temporary catch-up programs and in that sense 
were compatible with 'equal' citizenship. Hanson, on the other hand, rejected both the 
claim to rights stemming from indigeneity and the need for Indigenous specific programs. 
Dodson, P, Regional Report of Inquiry into Underlying Issues in Western Australia, p279. 
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ATSIC and native title were symptomatic of a reverse racism and therefore ought to be 
abolished or extinguished. Real equality meant identical treatment. 
There is, despite this difference, a certain ideological resemblance between John Howard 
and Pauline Hanson manifested in particular ways of talking about the nation, rights and 
political speech. Comments from Coalition back-benchers highlighted the way in which 
expressing racist sentiment had become a protest against 'political correctness' even 
before the election of Howard and Hanson in 1996. Howard argued that return of the 
Coalition to the government benches marked the end of 'political- correctness' and 
heralded a new freedom in Australia political debate. But the quality of some 
contributions to that debate left much to be desired. Western Australian Liberal Senator 
Ross IJ|Jitfoot made headlines with his thoughts on the relative position of Indigenous 
peoples on 'the colour spectrum.' 3 Hanson was not the first but was perhaps the 
unluckiest Liberal to break ranks on 'the Aboriginal problem.' In the run-up to an 
election, her refusal to retract her comments brought dis-endorsement and national 
publicity. Party dis-endorsement did not however sever the ideological ties between 
Hanson and at least some sections of the Coalition. Then leader of the National Party in 
NSW Ian Armstrong highlighted those links when he told the 1997 National Party State 
Conference in Sydney that 'Hansonism' was the extension of National Party policy. 
Lightfoot said that Aborigines in their 'natural state' were at Ithe bottom of the colour spectrum*; The 
Australitffi* 17 March 1997, cited in Bennett, S, op cit, pl7. Patrick Dodson later argued in his Lingiari 
Lecture that lthe spirit of the ten percent that rejected the basic decency of the "Yes" vote in 1967 have not 
4ififiR-£s«^j^^^ip4R4he-pft nftheir t>wn intolerance. They have taken new guises... .they present their 
arguments in the guise of academic and legal sophistry. They use the vehicles of institutions created to 
promote their particular view. The hard men of Vestey's still walk the corridors of power.' 
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Hanson's maiden speech had been National Party policy expressed in its simple form and 
any objection that the leader thought fit to make was a question of degree, not of 
philosophy. 
Then deputy leader of the ALP and former Foreign Affairs Minister Gareth Evans set out 
a Labor vision of Australian society in response to Hanson's maiden speech. He 
described his commitment to 'the evolution of Australia as a genuinely multicultural 
society with a wholly new kind of relationship with our regional neighbourhood.' This 
Australia had 'come of age' and was a 'tolerant, outwardly looking, genuinely 
multicultural society, revelling in the fact of our diversity...a country genuinely 
committed for the first time to reconciliation.' This vision of Australia as a place of 
joyous diversity was at odds, or was at least uneasily assimilated too, the vision of 
Australia as a single nation united by uniform political institutions and perhaps also by a 
certain uniformity of culture, Jt was this image that was directly repudiated by Hanson. A 
prosperous, multicultural, reconciled Australia may in fact have been an artefact of ALP 
policy which too many Australians had simply taken on faith. Which is not to say that 
cultural diversity or Indigenous self-determination, for example, are not lived realities 
with an existence autonomous to government policy. But that it might have been a 
'Coalition Split over Apology to Aborigines' Sydney Morning Herald, June 16 1997, p8. Rowse argues 
in Obliged to be Difficult that a 'fair description of the political mission of the John's Howard's Minister 
for Aboriginal Affairs (John Herron)' was lto help render the member for Oxley redundant.' P220. See also 
-Leaehriir^^sGiMsmr^Uii^ 
The Rise and Fall of the One Nation Party, pp42-56. 
360
 Evans, G, 30 October 1996, House Hansard, p6164. 
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mistake to think that there was, during the Labor years, a consensus on what Australia 
should be. 
Hanson had not evoked a 'latent racism' in Australian political culture. This critique of 
Indigenous specific service delivery had been circulating in Australian politics 
throughout the years of Labor government, and it is inconceivable that either Hawke, 
Keating, Beazley or Howard were unaware of it. The Coalition was itself adept at using 
similar arguments, and had done so in the debates on ATSIC and on native title. At least 
in that sense, One Nation is not an 'aberration' in Australian politics. One Nation 
rhetoric is not a new kind of political speech. Nor does One Nation possess a vision of 
Australia which is particularly novel. It is self-consciously a party of the past, of an older 
Australia; 'They say I want to take Australia back to 50's and 60's. Well I want to know, 
what's wrong with that?' The same rhetorical tropes, the same vision of the nation and 
the same emphasis on a strict liberal equality have all done the rounds in Australian 
politics for many years. And those years are not far removed from our own time. In fact, 
these political images never left us. That place described by Keating as the Australia of 
the bad old days, insular, xenophobic and racist, was always at work in the counter-
currents of political rhetoric kept alive, in part, by the Coalition during the period of 
Labor government. ' More fundamentally, the drive towards a uniform demos based on 
an identity amongst the citizens is an unfinished modernist project whose Australian 
roots include the White Australia Policy as much as Aboriginal assimilation.362 The 
—^gs^gQ^dsiRS^J^JJ^iiliflfLan^grej and.jGrattan._M. 'Pauline Hanson's Hijack of John Howard* 
in Manne, R (ed) Two Nations. 
362
 See Pearson, JD, The Politics of Ethnicity in Settler Societies, pp 9-10. 
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question of how to manage political and cultural difference within the institutional and 
symbolic structures of a single Australian state persists despite the movement in official 
discourse towards the celebration of unity in diversity. This problem will persist even if 
the One Nation Party does not.363 
An Incomplete Reconciliation 
The CAR ceased to exist by operation of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 
on New Years Day 2001. The CAR acknowledged that the much desired reconciliation 
had not been achieved. Council Chair Evelyn Scott had earlier acknowledged, in the 
context of the Howard government's refusal to apologise to members of the Stolen 
Generations, that reconciliation would not be possible by the end of the CAR'S ten year 
term. Scott argued that the people's movement for reconciliation was, however, 
'unstoppable.' The reconciliation process would outlive both the Coalition government 
and its present institutional shape. Nevertheless, the CAR recommended in its final report 
that the reconciliation process should also be continued in an institutional sense. It 
recommended and drafted legislation to establish three-yearly reconciliation conventions, 
and recommended the establishment of a negotiation process by which Indigenous 
See also Tamir, Y, Liberal Nationalism, pp xvii-xxx. Tamir discusses the problem of political unity 
amidst-CuItumLdi^rsiiyifljerrns of the relationship between Ijvic' and 'national* education. Tamir argues 
that 'separating civic education from national education is thus the key for the continued peaceful existence 
of multinational societies'; p xxix. 
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peoples and the government could reach agreement on 'unresolved issues for 
reconciliation.'364 Unresolved issues included, but were not limited to, a comprehensive 
agreements process for the settlement of native title and other land claims; compensation 
and reparation with respect to loss of legal rights over land and waters; recognition of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander customary law; Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander self-government and regional autonomy; a bill of rights that specifically protects 
the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples; and principles for negotiated 
outcomes at other levels. The CAR had attempted, that is, to put treaty politics back on 
the political agenda. The official reconciliation process had begun in an ambiguous 
relation to treaty politics and finished with the question of Indigenous sovereignty still 
unresolved. The reconciliation process, rather than being in escape from the issue of 
Indigenous rights to land and self-government, ended as a return to that issue. 
There are further difficulties in defining an end-point for reconciliation. The Australian 
reconciliation process ended, institutionally, without ever having finished in a substantive 
sense. And whilst the Howard government could be criticised for its failure to offer a 
parliamentary apology to the members of the Stolen Generations and for its generally 
negative approach to Indigenous affairs (particularly on native title), it seems that the 
government itself cannot be held responsible for the failure of reconciliation in the 
broader sense. The concept of reconciliation, derived from Christian theology, does not 
lend itself easily to problems of political justice. The problem with end-points was not 
simply the problem of finding words acceptable to all parties. The question of what it 
See CAR, Reconciliation Implementation and Framework Agreements Legislation: Discussion Paper, 
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might take to complete an instirtonalised reconciliation process is a problem already 
present in the language of reconciliation. David Oldfield and Evelyn Scott were on 
common ground (although they were not equally happy to be there, and nor were they 
there for the same reason) when they said that the reconciliation process could not be 
completed on time. Scott was referring to disagreements with the Coalition government 
regarding the apology debate, Oldfteld was making the more general point that 
reconciliation was an ambiguous notion. If no one had been able to come up with a 
complete and agreed definition of what reconciliation was, how was anyone supposed to 
know when it had finished? Oldfield asked 
the question of when reconciliation will be reached and by whose judgment 
reconciliation will be considered to have been achieved. Have a panel of 
experts been appointed? Will solely Australians of Aboriginal descent make 
that determination? Regardless of by whom it may be made, by what crteiSs 
will such a determination be made? Will the issue be settled by money, 
housing or land? Will it be settled by the continuation of, and an increase in, 
special benefits? If so, will this special treatment be expected to last 
forever?365 
Oldfield's critique of reconciliation goes to the supposedly racist elements of a process 
which recognised that Indigenous peoples had a distinct status within the nation, and that 
they were entitled to 'special benefits' as a result of past mistreatment and contemporary 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/discuss 
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disadvantage. His comments on the open-endedness of reconciliation might be thought to 
be of only secondary importance to that critique. But Oldfield, whether he knew it or not, 
was touching on one of the great difficulties encountered when applying a religious idea 
to a problem of earthly political justice. Without reference to the divine, and stripped of 
sacramentality, how could this project ever succeed? Reconciliation, incomplete on New 
Years Day 2001, may have been impossible, or always necessarily incomplete or 
insufficient, from the outset. 
Extract from the Legislgive Council Hansard of 06/04/2000 - Corrected Copy, p4018. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
'OH YES, THAT HAPPENED, SORRY' 
THE POLITICS OF HEALING 
177 
The most significant image of later reconciliation discourse is the image of 'healing. The 
reconciliation process was connected, through this image of healing, to those great 
Christian images of guilt, forgiveness, penance and unity. Out of the Stolen Generations 
debate came new ways of talking about the nation, about its moral status, and about the 
relationships between its different political constituencies. Some participants in the 
reconciliation process also applied a derivative Christian penitential technology to the 
imagined moral corpus of the nation. An apology, sincere and delivered in the 
appropriate ritualised form and place (in the parliament, by the government) followed by 
acts of satisfaction, would put an end to the moral disability afflicting the nation, and 
would allow not just national unity but national growth, or even the spiritual fulfilment of 
the nation. But this task of reconciliation, rather than bringing the parties to any 
fundamental agreement or, less ambitiously, to some kind of quiet and patient dialogue, 
was only going to get more rancorous, more difficult, and, to borrow another metaphor, 
more painful. 
Early CAR healing imagery is found principally in connection with women's and 
religious organisations. 66 But it was the release of HREOC's Bringing them home report 
into the child removal policies of Australian governments and churches that sparked the 
debate on national guilt and a parliamentary apology and sent the reconciliation process 
The bulk of references to healing are made in reference to the role of faith groups in reconciliation. 
From 1993 Australian religious organisations have staged a 'Week of Prayer for Reconciliation.' This event 
was the outcome of a meeting between representatives of faith groups and the CAR on 29 January 1993 in 
Canberra. The Week of Prayer coincides with the celebration by some churches of Social Justice Sunday. 
Participants in the Week of Prayer include the Catholic, Anglican, Uniting, Presbyterian, Lutheran and 
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off in the direction of 'telling' and 'healing.' The origins of that report lie in the 
campaign by the various state and territory Link-Up agencies to reunite members of 
separated families. The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody had also 
pointed to the connection between child removal and later imprisonment. The Keating 
government promised an inquiry as part of the social justice response to the Mabo 
judgment. The terms of reference for the inquiry, to be undertaken by HREOC under the 
leadership of Sir Ronald Wilson and Mick Dodson, were issued and subsequently 
amended by then Attorney-General Michael Lavardh in 1995. Bringing Them Home was 
released during the May 1997 Australian Reconciliation Convention; amidst the Wik 
native title debate, in a political climate already marked by great controversy. 
Bringing Them Home documented the experiences of Indigenous children removed from 
their families by various Australian governments, children who collectively became 
known as the 'Stolen Generations.' The report detailed numerous instances where the 
removal of a child had resulted in long-term psychological illness, including trauma, 
grief and depression, and associated self-damaging behaviour such as self-mutilation, 
substance abuse and suicide. The deliberate effort to assimilate Indigenous people into 
the wider Australian community was described by HREOC as 'genocide' within the 
meaning of the International Convention on the Prevention oj Genocide, a convention to 
which Australia is a signatory.36? That particular reference summoned up a debate on the 
Greek Orthodox Churches, as well as the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and Islamic, Hindu and 
Baha'i faith groups. 
Ijenocicie was fii^defirred in a detaiiedAvay-in"\\\*-\^ %-£om£ni\Qn'Onthe Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide. Australia ratified the Convention in 1949 and it came into force in 1951. 
Genocide is defined as 'any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
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'good intentions' of assimilationists that HREOC insisted was strictly irrelevant to the 
definition of genocide. But the word was meant to shock; Wilson admitted that it was 
used 'knowing it was a nasty word, an offensive word ...to emphasise the depth of the 
inhumanity that underlay these policies, however well intentioned they were.' ' 
Numerous submissions from Link-Up agencies and Indigenous health organizations 
pointed to the psychological impact of child removal and to the need for a national 
parliamentary apology. Link-Up submitted that 'insofar as reparation and compensation 
can assist us to heal from the harms of separation, it is our right to receive full and just 
reparations and compensation for the systemic gross violations of our fundamental 
human rights.'369 The Sydney Aboriginal Medical Health Unit submitted that 'this tragic 
experience, across several generations, has resulted in incalculable trauma, depression 
and major mental health problems for Aboriginal people...This process has been 
tantamount to a continuing cultural and spiritual genocide.' Psychiatrist Jane 
McKendrick submitted that 'unless there has been proper recognition of what has been 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a. killing members of the group; b. causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group: c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d. imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; e. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group' (article II). 
HREOC, Bringing them home... Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families. 
368
 'PM's Legal Advice Hampers Apology' Sydney Morning Herald, 30 May 1997, p8. 
Bringing Them Home... Recommendation 3: 'That, for the purposes of responding to the effects of 
forcible removals, "compensation' be widely defined to mean'reparation'; that reparation be made in 
recognition of the history of gross violations of human rights; and that the van Boven principles guide the 
reparation-measures. Reparation SnGuid-eorisist-Gf-i—aeknovy'lsdgrr.erit and apo!ogy,-2. guarantees against 
repetition, 3. measures of restitution, 4. measures of rehabilitation, and 5. monetary compensation.' 
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done, people cannot really begin to heal properly.'371 An act of recognition of Indigenous 
people's suffering would help to overcome internalised guilt. Both an apology for past 
wrongs and recognition of wrong doing by the payment of money compensation were 'an 
essential part of the healing process.' 
HREOC concurred. It recommended that the Commonwealth government offer a 
parliamentary apology to members of the Stolen Generations and their families for the 
child removal policies of past Australian governments. The first step in any healing 
process for victims of gross violations of human rights 'must be an acknowledgment of 
the truth and the delivery of an apology.' Several Christian churches and welfare agencies 
offered apologies to members of the Stolen Generations in their submissions to HREOC. 
The Chair of the Bishops Committee for Social Welfare, the Chair of the National 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Catholic Council, and the National Director of the 
Australian Catholic Social Welfare Commission made a joint submission: 
On behalf of our constituent national groups we sincerely and deeply regret 
any involvement Church agencies had in any injustices that have been 
visited upon Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families. 
371
 HREOC, op cit, pp30-31. 
372
 ibid, p30. 
3 3
 ibid, p31. The Australian Conference of Leaders of Religious Institutes, meeting at Annandale on June 
11,1997, issued an apology on behalf of Christian orders and priests for their role in the policy of child 
removal. Media Release. The Uniting Church had already apologized for its involvement in past injustices 
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The Anglican Church Social Responsibilities Commission and the Kimberly Sisters of St 
John also 'apologised' in their submissions to the Inquiry. The Catholic welfare 
organisation, Centacare, said that it 'deeply regrets the enormous suffering.'371 The 
Australian Catholic Social Welfare Commission argued that there needed to be a 
compensation package *in order that true reconciliation can occur.' HREOC 
recommended that individual members of the Stolen Generations and their families 
receive monetary compensation, and that counselling services be provided. A number of 
these suggestions were taken up by the government in its $63 million dollar response to 
the report. There was to be no monetary compensation, but it was the Howard 
government's refusal to move a motion of apology in the Commonwealth parliament that 
proved most controversial. 
A curious thing happened, however, in the passage of time between the report's release 
and the Howard government's 'motion of regret' in August 1999. The apology debate 
moved from the specific to the general, from the question of whether there ought to be an 
apology to the individual members of the Stolen Generations and their families, to the 
question of whether there was something to be said, something to account for, between 
these two generalised political constituencies- Whether, that is, colonial Australia could 
be called to account for the legacy of dispossession that still shapes the life experiences 
of so many Indigenous persons. Bringing Them Home brought focus to what had 
in July 1994; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Annual Report, 1994-95, 
www.austlii.edu/au/au/special/rsiproiect/rsilibrarv/car/arl994-95/ 
374
 ibid, p3I. 
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 ibid, p40. 
182 
previously been a large and rather abstract claim about the link between present 
disadvantage and colonialism. The report fed into that claim and from this relatively 
modest beginning took on a far wider significance. It did not only document the signal 
failure of the Australian political and legal systems to protect the human and civil rights 
of Australian citizens. Although not expressed as such, the report went to the moral 
legitimacy of the Commonwealth. It resonated with the politics of protest and of 
indigeneity which had marked the Bicentennial celebrations and the debate over native 
title which followed the Mabo judgment. And it connected to the critique Howard, 
Blainey and other conservatives had been making of the Labor party and other 
'politically correct' elites: that the report was an attack on Australian history, a narrowly 
focussed and potentially divisive exercise in guilt-mongering moralism. 
All state and territory parliaments except for Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory passed motions of apology or regret. Howard offered a statement of his personal 
sorrow and empathy for removed children and their families , but he refused to offer a 
Howard, J, "Opening Ceremony Speech', in CAR, Proceedings of the Australian Reconciliation 
Convention, Book One, plO. Then Coalition Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander spokesperson Michael 
Wooldridge, by contrast, had recalled the words of Bishop Malcolm in his second reading speech to the 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation A<$k *One of the most moving speeches that I heard in my time as 
shadow Minister for Aboriginal affairs was at a dinner that the Minister arranged and kindly invited me to 
attend when Bishop Malcolm-an Anglican bishop in northern Australia, an Aboriginal man-got up at the 
end of the dinner and gave a very moving speech about his hopes and aspirations for the future. They were 
quite simple. They were not hopes and aspirations that looked to the past at all; they were hopes and 
aspirations for the future. He said, 'All that Aboriginal people want is for someone to say, "Sorry".' We 
cannot undo the past. We have to look to the future. The first essential step in that is just simply saying 
'Sorry'.* Wooldridge, M, 5 June 1991, House Hansard, 4824. 
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national parliamentary apology to Indigenous persons past and present who had been 
harmed by the child-removal policies of earlier Commonwealth governments: 
The Australian people do not want to embroil themselves in an exercise of 
shame and guilt... for the overwhelming majority of the current generations 
of Australians, there was no personal involvement of them or of their 
parents. To say to them that they are personally responsible and that they 
should feel a sense of shame about those events is to visit upon them an 
unreasonable penalty and an justice...Australians of this generation 
should not be required to accept guilt and blame for past actions and 
policies over which they have no control. 
Howard argued that those who sought an apology would never be satisfied with any 
admission of wrong-doing on the part of the Commonwealth because they sought an ever 
Howard, J, op c/7, pIO. Apologizing for the past acts of governments or other institutions is by no means 
unheard of. Yamamoto noted numerous instances where groups and organizations have apologized to the 
descendants of those to whom the group or organization behaved unjustly in the past; Southern Baptists 
apologized to African Americans for that denominations endorsement of slavery; the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church apologized to Jews for Martin-Luther's anti-Semitism; The United States and Canadian 
governments apologized to Japanese-Americans forcibly interned during World War Two; President 
Clinton apologized to native Hawaiians for the overthrow of the Hawaiian government by the United States 
in 1893; the Roman Catholic Church has apologised for the violence of the Counter-Reformation, for the 
Church's failure to defend human rights in totalitarian states, its complicity in the African slave trade, for 
abuses committed by Christian colonizers against indigenous peoples, and its marginalisation of women; 
Tony Blair apologised for the UK's role in the Irish potato famine; Queen Elizabeth apologized for the 
seizure of Maori lands and the extermination of the Maori people; Yamamoto, E, op ctit pp 52, 56-57. See 
also 'The Debate on National Identity and the Martin Walser Speech: How Does Germany Reckon with its 
past?' Kamenetzky, D SAIS Review, 19.2 (1999) pp257-266; also Degif®-, P, op c/7, pp 146-167. 
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greater 'repudiation of the past and a greater sort of down-grading of the entire Australian 
community.'378 But neither the architects of nor those who participated in the operation of 
child removal policies could be considered blame-worthy: they had acted, in general, 
with the best of intentions. Howard warned against judging yesterday's policy by today's 
standards, hence undercutting the placing of responsibility anywhere. 
The child removal policy, although a 'blemish' on Australia's national history, could not 
then give cause for any revision of what Howard saw as a triumphant progress 
narrative.379 Howard attacked those who described Australian history 'as little more than 
a disgraceful record of imperialism, exploitation and racism1: 'such a portrayal (of 
Australian history) i | a gross distortion and deliberately neglects the overall story of great 
Australian achievement.' 38° Howard had greeted Pauline Hanson's maiden speech as the 
end of 'political correctness' and as the beginning of a more open debate on the politics 
of race. He now suggested that, post-Wile, the 'pendulum had swung too far' in favour of 
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 Howard, J, Canberra Times, December 22, 1998, cited in Gardiner-Garden, op cit, p22. See also Rowse 
on accusations of 'guilt* from Chris Miles in the 1980's, Obliged to be Difficult, p202. It is not self-evident, 
however, that a sense of shame or guilt in relation to the past is equivalent to a lack of national pride. 
Shriver argues kthere is an authentic, moral, even patriotic dignity to be regained in empirically accurate 
public 'lamentation* over evils of the past, sorrowfully confronted for the purpose of not repeating them. 
Indeed, a certain kind of pride glimmers here: pride in the readiness of persons and peoples to acknowledge 
the wrongs that, sooner or later, we all comnstJtF; Shriver, D, 'A Bridge Across Abysses of Revenge' in 
Helmick, R and Petersen, R, Forgiveness and Reconciliation, pi67. 
Edward Said has argued that 'nations are themselves narrations....the power to narrate, or to block other 
narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism and constitutes one of 
the main connections between them.1; Said, E, Culture and Imperialism pp xiii, 10. Ricoeur also notes that 
historical narrative is 'never ethically neutral', but rather, is a 'laboratory of moral judgment'; Ricoeur, F, 
Oneself as Another, p 140. 
380
 Howard, J, op cit, plO. 
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Indigenous peoples.381 He sought balance by adopting the critique of'black-armband' 
revisionist history popularised by historian Geoffrey Blainey 382 
A chorus of conservative commentators and politicians supported the Prime Minister. 
Shane Stone, then Chief Minister of the Northern Territory and presently Federal 
President of the Liberal Party, said that 'notions of apologies are simply grandstanding 
and window dressing.*383 Richard Court, tjh&n Premier of Western Australia, said that 'it's 
not a competition to see who can apologise first and who can apologise most.' In NSW 
National Party leader Ian Armstrong suggested that 
those who seek the apology will surely feel no satisfaction from a hollow 
form of words which some would believe would wipe the slate clean...Let 
us get on with Australia today...no apologies, no dwelling in the past. Let us 
get on with the future.385 
381 CGG, Howard in Conflict over Wik* in Sydney Morning Herald, May 28 1997, pi 
3
 Geoffrey Blainey had attacked supporters of multiculturalism and indigenous rights in his 1985 lecture 
at Mt Eliza Uniting Church. Blainey criticised the "vocal, richly subsidised multicultural lobby1 and 
stressed that Australia needed to be 'one nation/ He claimed that separatists and other 'elites1 were 
spreading the view that Australian history was 'largely the story of violence, exploitation, repression, 
racism, sexism, capitalism, colonialism and a few other isms.' Blainey later coined the term, taken up by 
Howard in the mid nineties, of 'black armband history." Each attempted to emulate a tactic used by fellow 
conservatives Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan; as MacKenna puts it, to 'conscript a vigorous, rosy 
and sanitized past to the service of jingoistic national identity'; McKenna, 'Metaphors of Light and 
Darkness1 Melbourne Journal of Politics, vol 25, no 1, 1998, pp67-73. 
'Reconciliation: Howard Apology too Little, or too Much for Other Leaders' Sydney Morning Herald, 
May 28 1997, p8. 
'Coalition Split over Apology to Aborigines* Sydney Morning Herald, June 16 1997, p8. 
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The Labor party supported the call for a national parliamentary apology. Opinion did not 
divide neatly along party lines however. NSW Opposition leader Peter Collins supported 
the apology offered by the Cart Labor government. And Peter Nugent, the Coalition 
appointee to the CAR, disagreed with the Prime Minister and publicly supported the call 
for a national apology.386 The public debate continued to grow more heated even as more 
and more institutions and organizations offered their own apologies to the Stolen 
Generations. 'Sorry Books' filled with signatures as tens of thousands of Australian 
citizens expressed their own private sorrow in a very public and political fashion. 
The apology debate ran like an open sore through Australian politics for over two years 
before Howard offered a compromise: the government would not support a parliamentary 
apology but it would move a motion of 'regret' in parliament. The statement of regret 
was co-authored by newly elected Democrat Aden Ridgeway, the second Aboriginal 
person elected to the Senate after Queensland Liberal Neville Bonner. Without 
specifically referring to members of the Stolen Generations or to the government policy 
of forced removal of Indigenous children, Howard moved that the House 
'Liberal MP Splits Ranks on Apology1 Sydney Morning Herald* June 3 1999, p5. 
The refusal of the Howard government to offer an apology to the stolen generations generated a mass of 
unofficial apologies from citizens and a wide range of organizations. By National Sorry Day 1998 the CAR 
estimated that one million Australians had signed the 'Sorry Books.* Organisations to offer apologies 
included the Federation of Ethnic Community Councils of Australia, YWCA Australia, the NSW Police 
Service; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together, No 22, July 1998. The Executive of the 
Local Government Association of NSW also apologized; Media Release, Wed 11 June, 1997. 
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expresses its deep and sincere regret that indigenous Australians suffered 
injustices under the practices of past generations, and for the hurt and 
trauma that many indigenous people continue to fee! as a consequence of 
388 
those practices 
Howard considered that the parties to the reconciliation process could legitimately 
'debate the detail of this or that practice. We can argue the detail of particular reports and 
particular propositions.' The purpose of the motion was not to descend again into those 
debates, but to 'generically express in relation to a number of issues the regret that the 
people of Australia feel for those past practices and the continuing consequences of 
them.' Like Keating's Redfern Park Speech, Howard's use of the collective 'our' seemed 
to suggest contemporary responsibility for the injustices of the past. If national history 
could in any sense be owned, then the living must lay claim to the ugly as well as the 
good: 'the greatest blemish and stain on the Australian national story is our treatment of 
the Indigenous people.' But Howard slipped again from the language of the collective 
to an individualism that could not in any meaningful way make a claim to this kind of 
historical ownership: 'present generations of Australians cannot be held accountable...for 
the errors and misdeeds of earlier generations.'390 He doubled this liberalism in an 
historical relativism that suggested that even those Australians who had themselves been 
Howard, J, 26 August 1999, House Hansard, p7046. 
ibid. My emphasis. See also Sparrow, R, 'History and Collective Responsibility' in Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, vol 78, no 3, pp 346-359. 
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directly responsible for past government policies ought not to be judged against current 
standards of justice: 
Nor should we ever forget that many people who were involved in some of 
the practices which caused hurt and trauma felt at the time that those 
practices were properly based. To apply retrospectively the standards of 
today in relation to their behaviour does some of those people who were 
sincere an immense injustice, and I think that is understood by most people 
within the Australian community. 
Reactions to the statement were mixed. Ridgeway had been criticised for his earlier 
compromise deal with the Prime Minister regarding the wording of the proposed new 
constitutional preamble and was again criticised for compromising on the word 'sorry.' 
Charles Perkins responded bitterly; 'they can have as many reconciliation meetings as 
they want- they might as well have them for fun, look at pictures or say hello to each 
other. It's a waste of money and a waste of time. There can be no reconciliation until he 
apologises.' " Ridgeway defended his deal with the Prime Minister by arguing that the 
reconciliation process was 'stalled' and that something had to be done to get it moving 
again. Geoff Clark seemed to agree; Ridgeway 'has got reconciliation out of the starting 
blocks. He's rung the bell and turned their heads.' As was his general practice, Clark 
interpreted this movement in the reconciliation process as a step closer towards a treaty-
'the question now is whether John Howard really wants to negotiate a comprehensive 
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settlement with Aboriginal people/393 Lowitja O'Donoghue, who was then co-patron of 
the Journey of Healing394, (and who was later to be embroiled in controversy when she 
described herself as having been 'removed' rather than 'stolen1) was reported as saying 
that the word 'sorry' was not necessary. She suggested, however, that the word 'regret' 
might be too soft 395 
The CAR continued to affirm the importance of an apology to the reconciliation process. 
Evelyn Scott had greeted the statement of regret as, 'in effect...an apology.' 6 Deputy 
Chair of the CAR Sir Gustav Nossal, however, listed an apology as part of the 
'unfinished business of reconciliation.' The Bridge Walkers in Sydney marched under a 
banner of'Sorry' written in the sky by private individuals. And the Declaration Towards 
Reconciliation included the following apology 
As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and 
expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the 
other part accepts the apologies and forgives. 
'" Perkins, C, quoted in "Charter a waste without apology*, Sydney Morning Herald, December 1, 1998. 
3
 "'Bad Feeling" Over Deal' Sydney Morning Herald, August 25 1999, p2. 
4
 National Sorry Day was renamed as the Journey of Healing in 1998. 
*We all bear emotional scars' Sydney Morning Herald, August 25 1999, p4. 
'However, personally I believe that the expression of regret in effect amounts to an apology, and is of 
great significance in itself. Moreover, taken as a whole, the motion is the most advanced commitment to 
reconciliation which Federal Parliament has yet made.* Evelyn Scott, Media Release, August29 1999; 
http://www.austlii.edu.aU/au/other/lndieLRes/car/l 999/car221 .html 
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The statement of regret had not put an end to the apology debate. Opposition Leader Kim 
Beazley promised an apology in the first sitting week of the new parliament if Labor 
were to win government. Howard, for his part, had moved as far as he would go. But if 
Howard considered the apology debate to be now closed this did not prevent the 
government from opening up a new line of criticism. Even as Indigenous peoples and 
their supporters continued to demand a national parliamentary apology the report on 
which that claim was based came under intense scrutiny and attack. Conservative 
commentators attacked Bringing them home as biased and unscientific. Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs Minister Senator John Herron gave governmental 
imprimatur to those claims when he argued in a submission to the Senate Inquiry into the 
government's response to the Bringing them home report that HREOC had grossly over-
estimated the number of children removed from their families. Herron made headlines 
with his argument that the Stolen Generation did not, in a literal sense, exist: 
there was never a 'generation' of Stolen Children....The term 'generation' 
carries with it the impression of vast numbers....(the report is) based on 
considerably uncertain guesstimates and shoddy research, totally 
inappropriate to the weight of the argument which is based on the 
construction of the conclusion...at most, it might be inferred that up to ten 
per cent of children were separated for a variety of reasons, both protective 
and otherwise, some forcibly, some not. This does not constitute a 
Robert Manne has documented that attack in his essay, 'In Denial', Quarterly Essay, no 1, 2001 
191 
'generation" of "stolen" children. The phrase 'stolen generation' is 
rhetorical. 
Herron repeated the curiously conservative arguments (curious because they were made 
by a conservative) the Prime Minister had already made at the Reconciliation Convention 
and elsewhere: 
the nature and intent of those events have been misrepresented and the 
treatment of separated children was essentially lawful and benign in intent 
and also reflected wider values applying to children of that era...emotional 
reaction to heart-wrenching stories is understandable, but it is impossible to 
evaluate by contemporary standards decisions that were taken in the past. 
This crass excursion into a highly sensitive debate drew a predictable response. Democrat 
Senator Aden Ridgeway accused Herron and Howard of 'throwing an incendiary' into 
race relations and *watching it go off, to see how much harm you can do.'400 Charles 
Perkins predicted burning cars and buildings, and violence at the Sydney Olympics 
Games. But the element of hypocrisy in the government line went largely un-noted. 
Howard, Herron and co had not refrained from making moral judgments about Australian 
history. They had already positively evaluated that history as story of struggle and 
Herron, J, *A Generation was not Stolen1 in Sydney Morning Herald, April 4, 2000, pI5. See also 'Black 
Myth: PM Denies Stolen Generation', Daily Telegraph, April 1,2000, p4. 
399
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triumph. That they could not easily assimilate this saga to the awful facts of colonisation 
forced them to arbitrarily demarcate one aspect of Australian history as beyond the 
bounds of contemporary judgment. The only way to make these two stories cohere whilst 
retaining a positive orientation towards the past is to integrate the story of 
Indigenous/non-indigenous relations into a progress narrative pointing towards the 
emergence of a democratic and just state, of successive policy initiatives as the 
movement from ignorance to enlightenment and an ever greater unity. This is the story 
told by many 'progressive' supporters of Indigenous rights. The 1967 referendum is the 
key moment in that narrative, the turning point from colonialism to a liberal democratic 
and just constitutional order. 
Yet Labor's difficulties in formulating a coherent response to the Bringing them home 
report demonstrate that a revisionist approach to Australian history Si not without its 
difficulties either. The ALP demanded a complete and unqualified apology, and the 
establishment of a compensation tribunal as an alternative to litigation in the courts. 
Beazley moved to amend the motion to read that the House 
unreservedly apologises to indigenous Australians for the injustice they 
have suffered, and for the hurt and trauma that many indigenous people 
continue to suffer as a consequence of that injustice; (and) calls for the 
establishment of appropriate processes to provide justice and restitution to 
members of the stolen generation through consultation, conciliation and 
negotiation rather than requiring indigenous Australians to engage in 
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adversarial litigation in which they are forced to relive the pain and trauma 
of their past suffering. 
Although Labor could admit that history had created contemporary social problems, it 
seemed as though no one had created history- it could not admit that this reading of 
history necessarily cast a pall on the legitimacy of the settler state. In his second reading 
speech to the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act then ALP Senator (and later 
shadow minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs) Bob McMullan had 
said that reconciliation involved a revision of Australian history, and an acceptance that 
that history was 'in so many ways ... a sad history.' It included the dispossession, 
massacre and dispersal of Aboriginal people, as well as confinement in reserves, and the 
forcible removal of Indigenous children from their families: present disadvantage was a 
product of these historical events or 'injustices.* But guilt, or responsibility, was nowhere 
to be found: 'The objective is not to create guilt but to create an understanding of an 
important part of the history of Australia and the place of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people in that history.' 
McMullan's formulation of the relationship between history, disadvantage and guilt is 
typical of that provided not only by successive leaders of the ALP but by most 
402
 Beazley, K, 26 August 1999, House Hansard, p 9209 
The Aboriginal Provisional Government disagreed: 'white people complain about us making them feel 
guilty about the past.. .But they have every right to feel guilty. Had our lands not been invaded, how could 
their nation exist today?*; APG, 'Equality Never was our Aim: We are a Status People Whose Rights Go 
Beyond Equality' in Moores, I, opcit, p310. Then ATSIC Chair Gatjil Djerrkura, by contrast, said that: 
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'progressive' individuals and organizations. HREOC had provided a similar formulation 
in relation to the Bringing them home report. Shame, not guilt, was an appropriate 
contemporary response to the wrongs of the past. This solution to problems of inter-
generational responsibility stands in a somewhat ambiguous relation to Paul Keating's 
1992 Redfern Speech. Keating performed an vact of recognition' of past injustices and 
suffering both past and present when he accepted non-Indigenous responsibility for 
Australia's past treatment of Indigenous peoples: 
Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing. We took the 
traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the 
diseases. The alcohol. We committed the murders... It was our ignorance 
and our prejudice. 
The Mabo decision was, as Keating put it, 'a test of our self-knowledge. Of how well we 
know the land we live in. How well we know our history.' Recognising the wrongs of 
the past was not about contemporary guilt, not because guilt was not warranted, but 
because guilt was not 'very useful.' Keating's use of the collective 'we', even when 
footnoted by his rejection of contemporary guilt, did seem to suggest that living 
Australians did bear an inter-generational responsibility for the injustices of the past. At 
least some Indigenous people understood Keating's speech as an apology. Patrick 
Dodson, for example, described Keating as a friend of Indigenous peoples 
'sorry day is not about guilt. It is about understanding. For our people, saying sorry is simply a way of 
recognising another person's suffering'; CAR, Walking Together, no 22, July 1998. 
Keating, P, 'Redfern Park, Speech* in Grattan, M, Essays on Australian Reconciliation, pp 60-64.* 
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who was not asked to apologise but did so at Redfern and in negotiation 
with Indigenous leaders ensured that his Government moved to protect 
native title rather than extinguish it. He was prepared to face the national 
legacy of the stolen generations through the human rights inquiry. 
The ambiguities of Keating's 1992 Redfern speech aside, it seems that the ALP adopted a 
revisionist reading of Australian history for instrumental reasons, in the belief that an 
awareness of the past might make finding remedies for contemporary social problems 
easier. It did not accept the revisionist reading of Australian history because it accepted 
the broader agenda of Indigenous sovereignty. Quite the opposite. It seemed that the 
legitimacy of the Commonwealth could be enhanced rather than impinged upon by an 
acceptance of the past, in the sense that the nation might become a more just place in the 
process. But the ALP continues to struggle to reconcile its acknowledgment of past 
ownership and unjust treatment with its commitment to the legitimacy and unity of 
Australia. In the late eighties, and again in the late nineties, that contradiction would be 
manifest in the Coalition's accusation that the ALP had based Indigenous affairs policy 
on historical guilt, and that its commitment to the unity of Australia was weak. 
Dodson, P, Telstra Address Address to the National Press Cluby November 28 1997 
http://www.austlii.edu.aU/au/otfier/IndigLRes/car/l 997/2811 .html 
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Religion, Psychoanalysis and Healing 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the most prominent image of latter 
reconciliation discourses was the image of 'healing.* There was always a degree of 
ambiguity, however, as to who or what was to be healed. Commissioner Johnston's Final 
Report and Tickner's discussion paper focused reconciliation on the improvement of 
relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. In that sense, it was the 
relationship that needed to be mended or put right. At other times it was individual 
Indigenous persons who bore the scars of the past, or were traumatised. Or Indigenous 
peoples generally were said to be in need of healing. Kevin Gilbert, for example, felt that 
Aboriginal peoples 'underwent a rape of the soul so profound that the blight continues in 
the minds of most blacks today. It is this psychological blight, more than anything else, 
that causes the conditions that we see on reserves and missions. And it is repeated down 
the generations.'406 
Perhaps this made sense, literally. One could readily imagine that a particular Indigenous 
person might be physically or mentally injured, and how that injury might be manifest as 
a 'dysfunctional' relationship. But something else was at work when healing discourses 
406
 Gilbert, K, 'Voice of Kevin Gilbert* in Moores, 1, op cit^ p45. Kevin Gilbert was talking the language of 
healing as early as 1973: 'we must have Black Israels; places where Aboriginal patriots can help to heal 
their crippled race as well as themselves. Places where clean, black people with firm values will be able to 
set up alcoholic aid centres, hospitals and rehabilitation projects. Where blacks will help their brothers 
rediscover the secret, hidden joys of the spirit known to their ancestors, free of all accretions of dogma.* 
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were applied to the nation. Lisa Hill, in a 1998 article in the Journal Of Australian 
Studies, wrote that 
Keating ... understood that the national psyche needed to excavate, to 
probe and come to terms with the sad memories of its childhood. This 
painful but quite necessary task has been met with vigorous resistance by 
our current leaders who are behaving a bit like bewildered parents 
challenged by the reproaches and revelations visited upon them by their 
adult children. The repressed memories of our past are out once and for 
all; they cannot and should not be stuffed back into the recesses of our 
common psyche....An honest recognition of our status as invaders will 
enable us to get off the analyst's couch once and for all.407 
Gilbert, K, Because a White Man '11 Never Do it. 1973, pp 179-80, cited in Maddock, K and Hodgins, B, 
Aboriginal Self-Government* p459. 
4 7
 Hill, L, 'Pauline Hanson, Free Speech and Reconciliation' Journal of Australian Studies vol 57, nol, 
1998, p!5. Hill considers that Pauline Hanson was the "catalyst of a regression to counterproductive anger 
and denial' rather that the agent by which 'latent Australian racism* was brought 'to the surface.1; pi 5. On 
Howard, Hill writes: 'When we compare his sentiments to those expressed by the former Prime Minister 
Paul Keating at the celebrated Red fern Address we are put in mind of an analysand who, after years of 
torturous analysis, finally effects a profound psychological breakthrough only to renounce it all in the 
following session';p 14. Marcia Langton adopted similar language when she argued that the history of 
denial that also marked the debate on the Stolen Generations pointed to a 'national psychosis'; in Stolen 
Generations, Written and Directed by Charlene Johnson, 2000. Pile and Keith also offer a Freudian reading 
of 'resistance': 'a patients refusal to move to a point which will enable healing to occur. Resistance, in this 
context, is a form of defence against the anxiety which might be produced by recognising some repressed 
'truth' or confronting the repressed emotional traces of past trauma. It is also resistance against that 
knowledge which might badly shake or force an acknowledgement of the existing order of things.' Pile, S 
and Keith , M (eds) Geographies of Resistance^ p208. 
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Soul and psyche often overlapped in the effort to place the nation somewhere on a 
chronological life-map, whereby reconciliation became the path to 'maturity.' Mick 
Dodson, for example, considered that reconciliation was not about health, education or 
housing (these are entitlements of citizenship): 'reconciliation is about far deeper things-
to do with nation, soul and spirit.'408 Sir William Deane said in his Lingiari Lecture that 
'where there is no room for national pride or national shame about the past, there can be 
no national soul.' Evelyn Scott made the point, at her first press conference, that 
reconciliation was essential if Australia was to go into the twenty-first century as a 
'mature, harmonious society, at peace with itself and the world.' George Winterton, 
Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales, similarly opined, 'Australia's 
soul will never be at rest until reconciliation is achieved with her indigenous people.' 
Natasha Stott Despoja considered that reconciliation was 'vital to the healing of 
Australia's spirit and to our maturity as a nation.'410 Norman Habei viewed the Australian 
reconciliation process as a 'search for Australia's collective soul': 
The Australian soul or spirit is not a European soul in the process of being 
acclimatised to a harsh new environment. The Australian soul emerges 
Dodson, M, 'Reconciliation is About Nation, Soul and Spirit: Speech to Corroboree 2000', Walking 
Together, no 29, August 2000. 
Winteron, G, cited in CAR, Proceedings of the Australian Reconciliation Convention, Book One, p47. 
Stott Despoja, N, November27, 1997, Senate Hansard, p972I. See also Jeff Kennett: *a mature nation 
must form a clear identity and come to terms with its past'; Walking Together, Special Edition, Nov ] 998. 
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from our land, our collective history, our people. And that heritage 
embraces both indigenous and non-indigenous Australians. 
Improving Relationships, the CAR's second key issue paper, linked reconciliation to the 
need for non-Indigenous people to heal; i n the process of reconciliation it is 
important...that non-indigenous Australia recognizes that it has been spiritually 
diminished as a result of its treatment of indigenous peoples.' Sol Bellear and Linda 
Burney characterised the problem of race relations in Australia as, in part, one of identity. 
For Burney the problem is one of Indigenous exclusion from the national identity- non-
Indigenous Australians will struggle to know themselves until they reconcile with 
Indigenous peoples and include them in 'the nation.'413 Bellear framed the issue somewhat 
differently: 'When the great majority of Australians know who and what they are, they 
will finally be in an authentic position to deal with those of us who know what and where 
we are. Noel Pearson spoke of a %x>ubling inheritance'- an attitude of racial 
superiority - that 'still infects our national psyche.' This was the baggage that 'all those 
who have loved you and whom you loved have given you. It is a troubling inheritance 
Habel, N, op tit, p86. Malcolm Fraser similarly argued that 'true reconciliation does not involve merely 
material things- it also involves matters of the spirit.1; 'Reconciliation Means Facing Up to the Truth About 
our History', Sydney Morning Herald, April 8, 1999, p 15. 
* Lillian Holt in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Key Issues Paper Number Two: Improving 
Relationships http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lndigLRes/car/1993/2/4.html 
*The real reason why there has always been such a search for identity amongst white Australians is that 
the Aboriginal element of Australian identity has always been left out1; Burney, L, 'Introduction* in 
Moores, I, op cit, p8. 
CAR, The Position of Indigenous Peoples in National Constitutions: Speeches from the Conference,p80. 
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because to deny it is to deny something of yourself.'415 Lois O'Donoghue argued that the 
release of Bringing them home 'represents a very real chance for this nation to 
collectively deal with one of its most traumatic episodes and to provide justice for those 
who continue to suffer the terrible pain caused by such genocidal practices.'416 
Images of sin as disease, and of priests as physicians of souls, are ancient parts of 
Christian culture.417 The link between sin and disease, and in the role of faith in curing 
both, is as old as the Gospels themselves. The story of Jesus curing the sick and the blind 
is a familiar one.418 The penitential literature is also replete with such references. 
Viraldus, in his Compendium Theoiogiae, wrote: 
Heartfelt contrition is the most efficacious, heavenly medicine that alone 
causes the vomiting out of the bilious humours from the stomach of the 
ailing soul. It is the sweetest bath by which the physicians of our souls 
beneficially cures the unwholesome of the human heart.41 
415
 Pearson, N, Address to National Press Club, November 1993, quoted in CAR, Key Issues Paper No 4: 
Sharing History, p7. 
4
 O'Donoghue, L, 'Whither Reconciliation' in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together, 
Special Edition, December 1996. 
417
 Tentler,T, op ciY.pl 57. 
The roles of priest and physician were one and Hie same, or were performed by the same person or class 
of persons, until medical schools became secular institutions in the late middle ages; Wallace, E, 
'Psychiatry and Religion: Towards a Dialogue and Public Philosophy ' in Smith. J (ed) Psychoanalysis and 
Religion, pl96. 
41
 Viraldus, J.L, 'Compendium theologie', cited in Tentler, T, op cit, p257. Also Fourth Lateran Council, 
1215, instructs priests to *be prudent and wise, know how to pour wine and oil on the wounds, to discern 
the circumstances of the sin and the state of mind of the sinner, in order to be able to determine what advice 
to give, what remedy to apply, and what means to adopt to heal the sick person'; cited in Thurian, M, op 
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"The relation between religious institutions and psycho-therapy is one part of the historical 
link between religious practice and images of disease and healing. In the mid to late 
nineteenth century, for example, religious organisations in America, including Christian 
Scientists, Seventh Day Adventists and Quakers, experimented with psycho-therapy and 
'moral treatment.' The product of that movement was a number of moral-psychological 
treatments, which Wallace describes as ksecular-reIigio-moral psychotherapeutic 
syncretisms', of which Alcoholics Anonymous is the most famous example. There are 
also continuing conceptual links between the language of Christian theology and 
contemporary psychoanalytic models of the self, particularly in regard to the image of 
healing. Freud noted these links in relation to his own practice and the Christian 
pastorate. He considered the Catholic confession and the Protestant cure of souls to be the 
forerunners of psychoanalysis, and he termed the analyst a 'secular pastoral worker.' 
He also considered that the great religions of the world included symbolic or totemic 
representations of individual pathologies. The Christian doctrine of original sin, for 
example, was seen by Freud to be a recognition of an historical reality, reconstructed by 
him as the murder of the primal father. But for Freud religion obscured, rather than 
city p63. Or take William of Auvergne's simple analogy; 'thus confession is rightly called spiritual vomit, 
because of the similitude with bodily vomit*; cited in Smith, L, 'William of Auvergne and Confession* in 
Biller, P and Minnis, A, Healing Sin, p95. See also Biller, P, 'Confession in the Middle Ages' in Biller, P 
and Minnis, A (eds) Handling Sin: Confession in the Middle Ages* p7. 
ibid, p206. Wallace nevertheless concludes that psychoanalysis is itself a properly 'secular' activity; 'its 
strongest currents are Enlightenment ones. It Is a fundamentally secular, human-centred discipline, while 
religion is God centred'; p214. 
"" See, for example, Fleischman, P, The Healing Spirit: Explorations in Religion and Psychotherapy. 
422
 Wallace, E, op citt pI96. 
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revealed, deeper psychological truth. In an Enlightenment moment, he described religion 
as a sign of cultural immaturity. " 
Some scholars have found a rather different Freud. Hermeneuticists such as Paul Ricouer, 
for example, have emphasised the interpretive dimensions of psychoanalysis. The clinical 
enterprise is seen as an interpretive process centring on the patients narrative as a means 
of understanding motivation and desire. ** Alternatively, psychoanalysis has been seen as 
a hermeneutic through which to arrive at an understanding of the past by which the 
analysand can live in the present. On this view, psychoanalysis is not to be viewed as a 
science whose results are capable of empirical verification, but is itself not so different in 
kind to some interpretive religious practices. Indeed, the practice and language of 
confession, developed first in the Catholic church and then as taken up by romantics and 
in modern psychiatry, has been a pre-condition for the modern sense of guilt and 
* Vergote, A, 'Confrontation With Reality in Theory and Practice' in Smith, J (ed), Psychoanalysis and 
Religion* pp 75, 83. Angus Nicholls writes: 'religion, says Freud, is a kind of mass delusion created by 
humans as a metaphysical consolation or "palliati ve remedy" for the hardships of life... Freud's aim was to 
cure humanity of its erroneous belief in numinous or supernatural notions (ike fate and destiny...*; 
Nicholls, A, 'The Secularization of Revelation from Plato to Freud' Contretemps, 1, September 2000, 
pp62-70 at 68. Freud: 'let me add that I am in no way in awe of the Almighty. If we ever meet one another, 
it is rather I who should reproach Him, than He me\ 1915, cited in Isbister J, Freud: An Introduction to his 
Life and Work, p208. 
See also Heimbrook, H, 'Psychoanalytic Understanding of Religion* International Journal for the 
Psychology of Religion', vol 1, no 2, 1991, pp73-74. See also Wall wark, E and Wall wark, A 
'Psychoanalysis and Religion: Current Status of a Historical Antagonism* in Smith, J (ed) op cit, pl6I. 
As Michael Roth describes it, psychoanalysis is 'a hermeneutic according to which we construct a 
reading of the meaning and direction of our pasts through which we can live, or with which we can change 
our lives'; Psychoanalysis as History: Negation and Freedom in Freud, p9. 
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individual responsibility, and ultimately, a significant element in the development of the 
modern sense of self. 
Suzanne Kirscher also rejects the conventional view that the psychoanalytic conception 
of the self represents a major break with the Judaeo-Christian spiritual heritage.426 
Instead, she draws a link between the narrative structures with which some forms of 
psychoanalysis and Christianity chart human development. She identifies romantictai, 
particularly nineteenth century German and English romanticism, as a key transitional 
moment in the movement of the narrative structure from a theological or mystical idiom 
to the more familiar secular psychological discourse. 428 The original Christian narrative 
was finite and linear. Creation was followed by the Fall, which was in turn to be 
followed, at the end of time, by the Final Judgment. It was 'right-angled', in that it 
envisaged a sharp turn into salvation and an apocalyptic climax. The present is marred 
by sin, and the best of things is yet to come. The Bible is taken to have a literal meaning 
Brooks argues that psychoanalysis 'offers a secular version of religious confession: it insists on the work 
of patient and analyst-comparable to confessant and confessor-toward the discovery of the most hidden 
truths about self-hood.* Brooks, P, Troubling Confessions, p9. 
'" Foucault suggested in 1980 that the relationship between Freudian practice and Christain spiritual 
techniques would be an interesting field of research; Foucault, M, "About the Beginnings of the 
Hermeneutics of the Self in Carrette, J, op cit, p 177. Although perhaps not completely in the vein that 
Foucault would have imagined, Susan Kirscher's work The Religious and Romantic Origins of 
Psychoanalysis does explore those links. Kirscher describes Foucault as illuminating but limited by his 
inability to grasp the theodicy of psychoanalysis; Kirschner, S, op cit, p20. That is, its importance as a 
means of "making sense of the human condition.* The comment leads one to suspect that the major gulf 
between the two authors might be Foucault's rejection of humanism and consequently, perhaps, of any 
definitive understanding of a "human condition1; See, for example, "Who are You, Professor Foucault? 
Interview with P. Caruso* in Carrette, J, (ed) Religion and Culture by Michael Foucault, p 99-101. 
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for the whole of humanity, but it is also interpreted individually, in parallel to the main 
narrative, as the story of the individual's passage to God. The absorption of neo-platonic 
philosophy into Christian theology imparted a new meaning and shape to this traditional 
narrative. The neo-platonic emphasis on the One, the move outward from unity and the 
disciplined struggle to return to a state of wholeness are all significant. The Christian Fall 
is reinterpreted as the movement out of an undifferentiated unity into a world 
characterised by multiplicity and division. The Fall is further associated with separation, 
self-hood and (false) self-consciousness. In its alienated state, the soul experiences a 
longing to return to the source, to a union with God. 
Eschatology becomes not just redemptive, but unifying and uplifting. The narrative takes 
on a spiral structure, imported from neo-platonism, such that the end is taken to be higher 
than the beginning because time witnesses the unfolding of God's purposes. Evil is taken 
to have a constructive or positive purpose in that it is thought to be created by God so that 
He may overcome it. The nartiiive structure was secularised in the nineteenth century 
by English and German romantics for whom the primary alienation was the separation of 
humanity from nature.431 In the romantic version of the narrative salvation is interiorised 
whilst God is eliminated or relegated to an unimportant position. A key element in the 
romantic narrative was the experience of profound disillusionment and despair, which 
represents a turning point in a process of self over-coming that leads to transcendence. 
On German romantic nationalism see Kamenka, E, 'Political Nationalism*, in Kamenka, E (ed) 
Nationalism, pplO-11. 
429
 Kirscher, S, op tit, pp 97-99. 
430
 Kirscher, S, op tit, pp 117- 123,144-5. 
43lftu/,pp4, 161-171. 
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The romantics also sketched a parallel narrative in which humanity was collectively 
alienated from nature, and struggled to return to a state of unity. Again, the narrative had 
a spiral structure, such that both individually and collectively, the unity to be attained was 
to be higher than that originally experienced. 
Kirscher identifies Margaret S. Maher (1897-1985) as one psychologist whose work 
embodies a similar narrative structure. Maher's psychology was based on four relevant 
principles: 
1. The developmental spiral, including a return to oneness or 
connectedness at a higher level to that originally experienced as a 
child. 
2. The development of the self out of the baby's sense of undifferentiated 
unity. 
3. A period of rupture and disillusionment, hinging on the self s 
recognition of separateness and limitation. 
4. The constructive role of individuation, separation and conflict in 
the development towards maturity.432 
432 Kirschner, S, op citt p77. 
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There is a persistence in goals as well as structure here. Psychoanalysis and earlier 
Christian and romantic narratives share the same relation between unity and separateness, 
wherein an ideal state is conceived of as being an intimate union which preserves the 
sense of self achieved through development. Individuation and union are both prized, and 
the capacity to form relationships without the loss of the sense of self is taken to be 
characteristic of maturity and 'health.' 
There is also an appreciation of the value of verbal expression, which is taken to 
characterise a higher form of personal development, where speech substitutes for 
action.434 Hence the value of personal expression, of recalling and verbalising experience 
and feeling. Speech, which becomes the means to know, or to 'find', one self, is in this 
way connected to identity. The higher forms of development are therefore characterised 
not just by individuation and intimacy with others, but also by authenticity. The balance 
between self-direction, self-reliance and intimacy structures an ideal template of the self. 
But alongside the value placed upon autonomy is the belief that too much independence 
is always (by definition) too much: it represents an inability to engage intimately with the 
whole. A peculiar twist to the psychoanalytic confessional is the aspect of difficulty and 
superficiality associated with authentic and largely irrelevant admissions respectively. 
The psychoanalyst is suspicious of that which is easily admitted: neuroses are blockages 
that prevent confession, which must be worked through, with some degree of pain and 
difficulty, before the deeper, underlying truth may be confessed. Psychoanalysis is 
' ibid, pp 5, 44, 
4
 ibid, pp 49,53, 59, 
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directed towards the resistance to confession: Truth is to be sought in those places that 
have been marked by censorship.' 
The language of the Australian reconciliation process is replete with references to unity, 
maturity and authenticity. Pluralist interpretations of reconciliation bear a particularly 
close resemblance to the narrative structure highlighted by Kirscher; there is the idealised 
end-point of a nation characteised by both unity and diversity, where a more authentic 
Australia comes to know itself through the recovery of the Indigenous experience. A 
period of conflict between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples is experienced as a 
constructive discord which gives way to, and makes possible, a unified and harmonious 
nation. The constituent groups of the nation come to form more intimate relationships, 
and they explore their identity through narrative- the telling of stories. The nation is 
whole, and the relationships between its parts are just. There is, similarly, a fear of too 
much autonomy; the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty or of indigeneity as a source 
of rights is taken to be dangerously divisive. On the other hand, non-Indigenous Australia 
is characterised as being without a sense of identity to the extent that it does not engage 
with Indigenous peoples.4 
435
 Brooks, P, op cit, p52. 
For example, Dearie argued in his Lingiari Lecture that 'until true reconciliation with its indigenous 
peoples is reached, Australia is a diminished nation.' See also Bellear, S, in CAR, The Position of 
Indigenous Peoples in National Constitutions: Speeches from the Conference, pp78-80. Rev. Dorothy 
McRae-McMahon, former National Director for Mission of the Uniting Church in Australia provided one 
formulation of an authentically reconciled Australia: 'we will only know who we are, and build on a firm 
foundation, when we have grieved our past and made a peace with Aboriginal people. When we do this the 
celebration of life here can authentically begin.' www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/faith/6.html, accessed 
August 1999. 
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Minnow notes the 'striking prevalence' of therapeutic language in responses to incidents 
of mass violence, but asks, 'what if any sense is there in drawing analogies between the 
psychological needs and therapeutic responses appropriate to individuals, and issues 
involving entire groups of people, and even societies?' 437 There is no necessary 'sense' 
involved in extrapolating from the individual to the group, only a history of talking about 
the personal and the nation which informs our current understanding of what it means to 
'heal' a collective. The movement from the personal to the national is made possible by 
the use of an analogy with a long history in Western political thought; the image of the 
nation or political community as organic or bodily. Jonathon Gill Harris has examined 
the image of a political community as a 'body politic* in early modern England. The 
bodily image of the polity focused attention on internal balance, hierarchy, and on 
boundaries as sites of potential corruption. The fear of infiltration strategically mystified 
sources of internal conflict. In early modern protestant England, the polluting foreigners 
were identified as Jews and Catholics. Certain 'lingering fossils' of contemporary 
political language, such as the phrases 'head of state' and 'members of parliament', date 
from this period. Harris nevertheless considers the image of the body politic to be largely 
spent. He points out that the currency of the image was rooted in its relation to widely 
held scientific models of the human body, and that the image lost currency when the 
Minnow, M, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, p22. 
438
 Harris, J, Foreign Bodies and The Body Politic, pp 46. See also Hale, D, The Body Politic; A Political 
Metaphor in Renaissance English Literature, pp 7-8. Hale notes that there was, in medieval Europe, a 
notion that the universe, the world, the church, the state and the individual repeated the same pattern or 
arrangment and exhibited precise correspondences. Hale dates this image to ancient Greek philosophy, eg 
Plato; pp 18,47. 
209 
medical images on which it was built lost credibility in the face of a new medicine which 
did not conceive of the body as a template of cosmic or political order. 
The image of the polity as a place of sickness or health has not been forgotten, but rather, 
has been transformed into a psychological idiom. Kirscher draws the genealogical link 
between Christian and contemporary psychoanalytic models of the self and of personal 
development. But those images of personal development are reified along a third 
dimension, outward onto the image of the polity, particularly the national polity, as a site 
of psychic drama. Freud drew an analogy between the individual and the cultures of 
439
 Harris, J, opcit, pi 5-23,141. Harris also notes the emergence of the 'pathological* in Western juridico-
political discourse from the 19 century, and relates these developments to twentieth century functionalist 
social pathology; Comte, Spencer, Malinowski and Parsons were all social scientists who adopted 
biological models of society; p4. Also Hale, D, op cit, p ] 09. Rousseau thought that "the body politic, taken 
individually, can be considered as an organized, living body and similar to that of a man...the body politic 
is therefore, also a moral being which has a will, and this genera! will, which always tends toward the 
conservation and welfare of the whole and of each part, and which is the source of the laws, is, for all the 
members of the state, in their relations to one another and to the state, the rule of what is just and unjust1 R, 
JJ, Rouseeau'sPolitical Writings, Ritter, A and Bondanella, J (eds) New York, WW Norton, 1988, p61, 
cited in Degiser, P, Political Forgiveness, pi 49. Hegel also thought that collective subjects possessed a 
collective consciousness, albeit one that was attained through the individual consciousness of members of 
the collective; a nation attains self-consciousness (ie becomes a subject) when its members come to identify 
with its institutions and practices and regard its national principle as expressive of their own self-
understanding; Hardiman, M.O, Hegel's Social Philosophy, p50. 
4
 Laura Otis takes up those links in her recent work, Organic Memory: History and Body in the Late l?h 
and Early 2(/ Centuries. Otis describes the period from 1870-1918 as the age of 'organic memory.* 
Organic memory theorists drew the link between ontogeny, or individual development, and phylogeny, or 
the ancestral development of races and species. The principle linking these elements together in an 
evolutionary schema was memory. The notion that history and development could be examined 
individually and culturally had been already been thriving for some time in romantic philology. But the 
organic memory hypothesis did not gain a wider currency until it was formulated as a scientific principle in 
the latter decades of the nineteenth century.Some of the premises of organic memory theory were taken up 
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which they were a part In Civilisation and its Discontents (1930), for example, he 
suggested that a culture was a subject fit for analysis, and like the individual, was a 
potential site of neurosis and pathology: 
If the development of civilisation has such far-reaching similarity to the 
development of the individual, and if it employs the same methods, may we 
not be justified in reaching the diagnosis that, under the influence of cultural 
urges, some civilisations, or some epochs of civilisations-possibly the whole 
of mankind- have become 'neurotic'? 
In Totem and Taboo (1913) Freud had suggested that there existed a 'collective mind': 
I have taken as the basis of my whole position the existence of a collective 
mind, in which mental processes occur, just as they do in the individual. In 
particular, I have supposed that the sense of guilt for an action that has 
persisted for many thousands of years and has remained operative in 
generations which can have had no knowledge of that action. 
Freud was referring here to the murder of the primal father by the horde, and the guilt that 
followed. l He did not suggest, however, that this kind of cultural 'passing on' was the 
and given renewed currency in the twentieth century by Freud and later psychoanalysts. Otis, L, Organic 
Memory; History and the Body in the Late Nineteenth and the Early Twentieth Centuries. 
See also Frosh, S, The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian 
Theory, pp42-43. 
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same as physical heredity, merely that the two operated in parallel. For Freud the 
relationship between personal neuroses and collective or public religion was not that of 
an identity but that of an analogy.442 It was not easy, said Freud, 'to carry over the 
concepts of individual psychology into group psychology': 
I do not think we gain anything by introducing the concept of a 'collective' 
unconscious. The content of the unconscious, indeed, is in any case a 
collective, universal property of mankind. For the moment, then, we will 
make shift with the use of analogies. 
Carl Jung (1875-1961) pushed the analogy to an identity. Jung argued that Freud's 
'exclusive concern with the instincts fails to satisfy the deeper spiritual needs of the 
patient.' Freud and his associates were 
too much bound by the premises of nineteenth century science, too matter of 
fact, and they give too little value to fictional and imaginative processes. In 
a word, they do not give enough meaning to life. And it is only meaning that 
liberates. 
Jung argued that cultural groups possessed a collective consciousness. Cultural memory 
was preserved in myth, art and religion. The structure of that consciousness or memory 
Ricouer, P, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia^ p40. 
Freud, S, Moses and Monotheism^ p 132. 
Jung, C, Psychology and Religion: West and East, p330. [lectures at yaie in 1937] 
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was common to each individual consciousness, such that Jung could write, the 'whole 
spiritual heritage of mankind' was fcbom anew in the brain structure of every individual.' 
Rather than existing in parallel, the individual and the collective consciousness interacted 
dynamically. The individual unconscious was engaged in the ceaseless task of grouping 
and regrouping images, but that activity was carried on in relation to pre-existing images 
or archetypes which were common to all members of the collective. The dream and the 
myth were analogous between the individual and the collective: 'Dream is the 
personalised myth, myth the depersonalised dream; both myth and dream are symbolic in 
the same general way of the dynamics of the psyche.'445 Like Freud, Jung saw a link 
between his own practice of psychoanalysis and the Catholic confessional. The sacrament 
of reconciliation had 'served since olden times to gather the lower, instinctual forces of 
the psyche into symbols and in this way integrate them into the hierarchy of the spirit.' 
These images of health, sickness, identity and authenticity, extrapolated from the 
individual to the nation via romantic understandings of the nation and later, from 
psychological models of the self and of the collective conscious, share a twofold and 
common Christian root; the image of sin as disease, and the technologies of the self 
developed as confessional, penitential rituals. As Andrew Lattas put % Christian and 
psychoanalytic confessional techniques, developed for the problematisation of personal 
identity 'have come to be projected onto the wider spatio-temporal domain of the nation': 
Vergote argued that Jung attempted to restore the religious ground to psychological data; op ciu p75. 
See also Roth on Freud and the analog between dream and myth, op cit, p 141. 
446
 Psychology and religion, p352. 
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Australian nationalism is realised through the expanded application of 
techniques of *caring for the self, only now applied to the personhood of the 
nation... Political discourses have become a means for realising the mythical 
personhood of the nation through discourses that question and fix the 
psychological traits, unity and character of the nation. 
Australian spiritual 'alienation', or the national 'identity crisis', is a discursive 
construction 'used continually to authorise discourses which are concerned with giving 
us a sense of national self.'44 Lattas attributes to Foucault and Derrida the insight, 
developed by him in relation to Australian nationalism, that the search for truth separates 
us from ourselves, and opens a space for other discourses which claim the right to speak 
the truth of us.449 
Whilst images of physical disorder or injury no longer feature prominently in Australian 
political discourse, the image of the nation as a psyche with a troubled or troubling 
identity has proven to be one of the most common and potent of the nineties. This 
imagery positioned the task of narrative reconstruction, of dealing with trauma or of 
Lattas, A, 'Aborigines and Contemporary Australian Nationalism: Primordiality and the Cultural 
jftijittcs of Others* in Cowlinshaw, G and Morris, B, Race Matters, p233. Or, as Norman Habel put it, 'the 
spiritual process of repentance, confession and reconciliation found in the Christian tradition has been 
extended into the national spotlight. A traditionally Christian process has been moved from the private 
confessional into the public domain'; Habel, N, op cit, p 125 
448/6i4p233. 
ibid, p248. Brooks also links the practice and language of confession to the image of the self which 
contains inner 'depths* and 'recesses', and notes that 'the very notion of inwardness is consubstantial with 
the requirement to explore and examine it'; Brooks, P, op cit> p 11 i. 
214 
coming to terms with the past lest it haunt us forever, as somehow outside of or perhaps 
as foundational to politics, rather than as something within or as the product of politics. 
Nothing could be more disarming than the promise of release. But it remains to ask, 
where did this imagery come from? In what ways was the image of healing already given 
to us in the language brought to bear on the relationship between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples in Australia? And in what ways was the project of reconciliation 
shaped by other assumptions about political identity, agency and representation given to 
it in already established ways of talking about the nation? 
The language of trauma, for example, has been used in relation not just ISO individual 
members of the Stolen Generations but in relation to the nation. Trauma derives ftom the 
Greek word for 'wound.' It originally related only to the physical, but was imported into 
psychology in the late nineteenth century to refer to a wound inflicted on the mind. As 
Caruth describes it, that wound is one thai; is 'experienced too soon, too unexpectedly to 
be fully known and is therefore not available to consciousness until it imposes itself 
again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions of the survivors. In other 
words, trauma is 'a break in the mind's experience of time.' The life of the traumatised 
Caruth, C, Unclaimed Experience: Traumas, Narratives and Historyt p4. See also Papoulias, T, 'Out of 
the Past: Psychoanalysis, Trauma and the Limits to Recollection' in Campbell, J and Harbord, J (eds) 
Psycho-politics and Cultural Desires, pp 146-154. 
Caruth, C, op ciu p61. Note Petersen's observation that the 'forgiveness studies' movement grew out of 
the North American medical and health care-fields: ' Work among health professionals over the past quarter 
century has drawn increasing attention to forgiveness as a powerful psycho-therapeutic tool. This 
recognition has often come with respect to trauma studies...Particular studies in interpersonal relations, 
marriage and the family, and private and social behaviour are pointing to the deep connection between 
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person becomes the determination to complete the experience of time, and to that end, the 
traumatised person compulsively relives the traumatic event. That the traumaSil event 
returns to haunt the survivor suggests that the trauma is not just the original incident, but 
45'' 
the experience of repeatedly returning to that event. 
The concept of trauma, understood as a break in the nation's experience of time and as an 
endless return to the site of danger or injury, links healing imagery to the larger debates 
on Australian public history. 453 Australian history has been understood as a public 
narrative to be recalled and worked upon. History does not simply exist as the record of 
what happened when to whom, or of who did what and why. Rather, history is seen as a 
particular method or practice of relating to the past, of being in the past because the past 
is in us. We are to do this work of dealing with a traumatic episode by first 
acknowledging and then accounting for the violence of the past lest it return to haunt us, 
traumatically, forever. Shriver, for example, figured the analogy between personal and 
national trauma in the following way: 
personal psychological health, social bonding, and healthy civic life and forgiveness"; Petersen, R, op cit9 
P9 
The story of trauma tells not of an escape from an accident but to its endless impact on life; Caruth, C, 
op tit, p7. 
Andrew Purvis also notes that the language of Jane Stewart, Canadian Minister for Indian Affairs who 
delivered the 1999 apology on behalf of the Canadian government, was characterized by the 'pop-psych* 
jargon of a 'dysfunctional relationship." * Whose Home and Native Land' Time, Feb 15, vol 153, no 6. The 
Canadian Government response to the Royal Commission also included $350 million for community based 
'healing'; www.inac.gc.ca/news/mav98/mav4.html 
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Traumatic pain and guilt plant a time-bomb in the depths of the human 
psyche and in political history. The Balkans, the Ukraine, South Africa, 
Guatemala, Germany and the United States all have some untended, 
politically enacted sins to attend to. Until persons, institutions, citizens and 
leaders do something about their negative pasts, their present and future 
relations are likely to be corrupted by undercurrents of abiding hostility... 
'forgive and forget* was always a misleading motto. 'Remember and 
repent' and 'remember and forgive' are better formulas for the restoration 
of political health. 
Then Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane and now Governor-General Peter Hollingworth 
used a religious idiom to make a similar point when he wrote that the 'unfinished 
business of reconciliation is to deal with the past pain': 
these matters must finally be put to rest through the process of forgiveness, 
reconciliation and healing, and only then can we move on as a people 
sharing a common wtity under God...I believe there needs to be a formal 
document much like a solemn covenant between our peoples in which we 
seek forgiveness, ask for reconciliation. 
454 Shnver,D, A Bridge Across Abysses of Revenge1 in Petersen, R, 'A Theology of Forgiveness: 
Terminology, Rhetoric and the Dialectic of Interfaith Relationships' in Helmick, R and Petersen, R (eds) 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation* ppl 56-157. 
Cited in Council for Aboriginal Recoj^ SJiation, Walking Together, Special edition, November 1998. 
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Such a way of thinking about the past and of our relation to history has a certain appeal. It 
suggest that the discord that marks Indigenous affairs might give way, if only we have 
the will to work at it, to a more peaceful and harmonious future. But politics gets lost in 
such a formulation. Contemporary debates are conceived of as pathological evidence or 
symptoms of the failure of the Australian nation to come to terms with its origins or to 
'put the past to rest.' Conflicts which might be thought of as endemic to a polity built 
upon the appropriation of the lands and jurisdiction of Indigenous people are in need of 
'resolution' in the same sense that we talk about a patient having a 'breakthrough' or 
'resolution' of some psychological 'issue.1 The sovereignty debate, for example, figures 
as a traumatic episode whose point of origin is the doctrine of terra mtllius> rather than as 
a struggle for control over the lives and lands of Indigenous peoples. 
But no final 'resolution' or 'breakthrough' seems possible. These psycho-social 
enactments of an imagined national self constitute a political imaginary whose horizons 
have the character not just of vision but also of depth, of the seen and the unseen. A latent 
and always unacknowledged past threatens forever to return and disrupt the routine work 
of political institutions. This unseen dimension remains as an unassimilable source of 
future traumas, rendering the politics of healing determined as incomplete from the 
outset. Brooks notes that the confessional scene is itself productive of a potential endless 
or infinite guilt. Confessional techniques which promised reconciliation with God were 
not only salvational but were themselves part of a complex of discipline and consolation 
Brooks, P, op cit, p2. 
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productive of the very guilt for which forgiveness was promised. When projected 
outwards onto an imagined national self thes# confessional 'technologies' are similarly 
productive of a potentially endless confession or recollection. There is always something 
more to be said. That each generation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples must 
negotiate the justice or otherwise of their relationship anew does not sit well with a 
psycho-therapeutic model that promises but cannot deliver release, resolution and 
harmony. To talk of trauma in the hope of healing suggests a false promise and may 
solicit only further frustration. The mundane political necessity of processes of 
reconciliation, compromise and accommodation cannot be denied. As Derrida put it, the 
task of making the polity work remains, and must be taken seriously. But it would be a 
mistake to think that the Aboriginal reconciliation process could itself provide the nation 
with any kind of final 'closure.' 
Apology and Forgiveness as Political Transformation 
Whilst the public debate on the Stolen Generations centred on whether or not there 
should be a formal national apology to those affected by government child removal 
policies, there is also, in the text of the Declaration Towards Reconciliation, a related but 
Tentler, T, op cit, pp xii, xxvii. 
Derrida: 'I believe it necessary to distinguish between forgiveness and this process of reconciliation, this 
reconstitution of a health or a 'normality', as necessary and desirable as it would appear through 
amnesities. The 'work of mourning', etc. A 'finalised' forgiveness is not forgiveness^^ is only a political 
strategy or a psycho-therapeutic economy.* On Forgiveness, p50. 
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less discussed problem; the ethics of forgiveness. The Declaration links history, apology, 
healing and forgiveness together in a schema derived from Christian penitential 
technologies. It reads, in part: 
As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and 
expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the 
other part accepts the apologies and forgives. 
The Declaration expresses a symbiotic relationship between apology and forgiveness, 
notwithstanding the repeated assertions by non-Indigenous leaders that reconciliation was 
'not about guilt.' In theological terms, apology and forgiveness are two parts of a whole. 
Forgiveness meets apology in the movement of wrong-doer and victim towards 
reconciliation.459 The Christian technology of reconciliation, particularly in its Thomist, 
Catholic formulation, provides a schema by which this kind of humbling self-recognition 
solicits from the wronged party forgiveness and absolution, effecting between the parties 
a new beginning, a transformation of themselves and of the relationship between them. 
The aim of the final part of this chapter is to follow the way in which this transformative 
logic of apology and forgiveness was applied to the relationship between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous peoples in Australia. 
But note Habel, N, 'those of us who dare to make an apology ought not assume that the victims are 
obligated to forgive'; op tit, p 129. 
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Howards Hawke, Beazley and Wilson all claimed that the reconciliation process, and 
particularly the apology debate, was aot or should not be about contemporary guilt. In 
their varying formulations of Australian history and of contemporary moral responsibility 
for the injustices of past Australian governments, each pointed to the suitability of 
expressing personal, public sympathy for the suffering of Indigenous people. As Sir 
Ronald Wilson said of the Bringing them home report, 'we have never mentioned as part 
of our inquiry, guilt. We have emphasised listening and understanding and responding by 
saying sorry, followed by a commitment to reparation.'46 HREOC later argued that there 
had been a general 'failure ... to distinguish between the ideas of collective guilt and 
historical shame': 
Because guilt for wrongs done is always a matter of individual 
responsibility, any idea of collective guilt genuinely makes no sense. An 
individual cannot be charged with the crimes of others. He or she cannot 
experience remorse on someone else's behalf. ...Talk of sharing in a 
collective guilt over the dispossession of the Aborigines is one thing; 
however, talk of sharing in a legacy of historical shame is altogether 
another. 462 
See, for example, Hawke, R, 23 August 1988, House Hansard, pi 37. 
461
 'Rights Chief Attacks PM*sWikSti&tegy* Sydney Morning Herald, May 28 1997,p8. 
462
 Frequently asked questions about the National Inquiry, 
http://www. hreoc.gov.au/soci a I justice/stolen children/faqs.html#que$2 
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John Howard, so often criticised for his refusal to offer a parliamentary apology, offered 
a statement of personal regret at the 1997 Australian Reconciliation Convention which 
was not so different in kind to the type of parliamentary 'sorry' many non-Indigenous 
people sought. Howard was at one with the many people who argued that an expression 
of empathy or compassion was the appropriate response to the Stolen Generations. 
Malcolm Fraser, for example, argued that the apology debate was not about 
contemporary guilt. Raimond Gaita likewise argued in his book, A Common Humanity, 
that a sense of national shame, rather than national guilt, was an appropriate response to 
the release of the Bringing them home report. 
Why then, despite frequent denials of contemporary guilt (and of the relevance of 
contemporary guilt) did the Australian reconciliation process return repeatedly to this 
subject of apologising for the injustices of not just the recent but also the distant past? 
Why were forgiveness and atonement at issue if there was in fact no guilt to be accounted 
for, no moral stain to be washed away? Two answers seem reasonable. First, that the 
question of guilt and of contemporary responsibility for the consequences of past 
injustices was not completely absent from but was at work, explicitly, in some corners of 
the debate. In August 1991, for example, Archie Roach and Ruby Hunter held a press 
conference at which they called for a national inquiry into the practice of child removal: 
this issue is a 'black spot' in the history of Australia. The damage and 
trauma these policies caused are felt everyday by Aboriginal people. They 
Gaita, R, A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love & Truth & Justice. 
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internalise their grief, guilt and confusion, inflicting further pain on 
themselves and others around them. 
The pair called on the government to pay compensation to removed children and their 
parents and to admit its 'guilt' and 'responsibility.''464 HREOC, despite Wilson's later 
claim that an apology was not about guilt, arguably made that same connection implicitly 
when it argued that an apology was the first step in any reparation that the 
Commonwealth might make for its policy of child removal. That is, apology as reparation 
did not reduce to merely to an expression of sympathy but went to the task of making 
amends for what had previously been done by the Commonwealth. It implied guilt as 
well as sorrow. 
More generally* She issue of guilt was at work in the many ways in which Indigenous 
peoples questioned the legitimacy of the Commonwealth, outside of any specific acts or 
failures on the part of any particular government. Linda Burney, Director-General of the 
NSW Department of Aboriginal Affairs, linked the reconciliation process to the need for 
white Australia to come to terms with a responsibility that 'clearly belongs to it.' Other 
Indigenous persons pointed to the process of colonisation itself as the original wrong 
suffered by Indigenous peoples. The Aboriginal Provisional Government maintained that 
464
 Cited in D'Souza, N, 'Authors of Our Own History: The Stolen Generation- From Removal to 
Reconciliation' 
www.austliixdu.au/au/other/unswli/fQurm/1998/vol4no3/souza.html 
Linda Burney wrote that reconciliation is about 'healing ourselves as Aboriginal people, but it is also 
about white Australians coming to terms with history and a responsibility that clearly belongs to white 
Australia.'; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together, No 13, September 1995. 
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the Commonwealth was illegitimate by virtue of the failure to obtain the consent of 
Indigenous peoples to colonisation. The Right Reverend Bruce Wilson, Bishop of 
Bathurst, echoed that formulation of colonial Illegitimacy in his address to the Anglican 
Synod in 1996: 'I hold that the unjust treatment of indigenous Australians is the original 
sin of this country.'466 
The second explanation for the repeated return of the reconciliation process to the 
question of guilt does not go to the narrowly legal question whether some identifiable 
contemporary Australians are guilty of some injustice towards Indigenous peoples. This 
was not a question amenable to legal resolution in the terms by which guilt is generally 
discussed in Australian society. It could not be. Our legal system generally points to a 
guilt that accrues for an individual's breach of some positive legal duty. The question of 
'national' guilt was of another order altogether. The problem of guilt was a problem of 
the language of reconciliation, not a problem of legal proof, or of individual culpability. 
The language of reconciliation, projected outwards onto a nation considered to have both 
identity and agency, took us towards this question of guilt without providing any 
resolution, any means of accommodating our respect for individual responsibility with 
the necessity of remaining faithful to this project of apologising and forgiving. The 
problem of guilt was a function of the language brought to bear on the relationship 
Former Keating government Special Minister of State Gary Johns critiqued this kind of position in his 
November 1999 article in Quadrant: 'if we assume that all problems in Aboriginal society are caused by 
the original sin of invasion, and that Aborigines are always victims of this invasion, then the prospects for a 
breaking out of the victim/tyrant framework are bleak.* Reconciliation % thus a spiritual instrument, 
perhaps quite important in that regard, but only in that role.' Johns, G "Reconciliation: Read the Fine Print\ 
Quadrant, November 1999, pi 6. 
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between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia, of the intersection of that 
language with certain ways of thinking about the nation as collective and as conscious, 
and with other assumptions about the relationship between personal will and individual 
responsibility. To say that the problem of apologising to the Stolen Generations was a 
problem of language is not to say: this was merely a problem of language. Or even, this 
was a problem of mere language, as though we could, by means of conceptual sifting and 
clarification, get clear of this problem, and find an answer. It is also to say that as much 
as we had these words, 'reconciliation', 'sorry', 'guilt', that they also had us. 
Without a national parliamentary apology forgiveness remained a concern of background 
importance. The responsibility of Indigenous peoples to meet that apology with 
forgiveness simply did not arise. The sporadic discussion of forgiveness by various 
participants in the reconciliation does however illuminate the moral dynamic at work in 
the much larger and more contentious apology debate. ALP Senator Rosemary Crowley, 
commenting on the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Bill in 1991, had argued that 
'another dimension which is important to reconciliation is the notion of forgiveness': 
We are dealing here in particular with the importance of white people 
forgiving themselves for the sins committed by their forebears. The history 
of white people in this country is utterly disgraceful in large areas....We 
have to bring that history into the full light of day. We have to confront it 
and we have to forgive ourselves for being part of it.467 
467
 Crowley R.A., 15 August 1991, Senate Hansard, p394 
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Echoing the remarks of Prime Minister Hawke, themselves a partial response to the 
Coalition suggestion that the ALP had based Aboriginal affairs policy on a sense of 
historical guilt, Crowley also argued that 'it is also very important that we do not then 
become confused about guilt that should be ascribed to people from two and three 
generations ago.' But her remarks were certainly ambiguous. There was no sense in 
talking of the transmission, via some unknown principle of hereditary guilt, of 
responsibility between the generations: 
But we have to appreciate the process of forgiveness that has to be gone 
through. I do not believe we can move to a satisfactory reconciliation 
without admitting that those things happened and without going through 
the process of acknowledging and appreciating it and forgiving ourselves 
for it-or our parents and grandparents-because that forgiveness is part of a 
healing process that is necessary before we can satisfactorily work together 
or achieve reconciliation. 
468
 Crowley R.A., 15 August, 1991, Senate Hansard, p394. ALP Member for Chifley Roger Price also 
reflected on the value of forgiveness in 1998: 'We say sorry if we spill milk, or someone is sick or didn't do 
as well as they wanted to in some endeavour. Sorry is a small word, which we use often in every day life. 
To say sorry doesnt seem to me to be hard and I wonder if %§& enough. To say sorry, it seems so little and 
in return the aboriginal peoples are offering forgiveness. It seems to me that forgiveness is the greater gift.1 
9 December 1998, House Hansard, pi 777. NSW MLC Peter Breen cited the example of South Africa to 
illustrate the link between forgiveness and reconciliation: 'without some form of reaching out to Aboriginal 
people, such as an apology, there is no acknowledgement of our sins of the past and, therefore, no 
forgiveness and no reconciliation. Our words of regret are hollow and empty of meaning....Without a 
formal act of seeking forgiveness, in other words, an apology, there is no reconciliation, either in 
contemporary Christian thought or in traditional indigenous culture'; Breen MLC, P, NSW Legislative 
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Indigenous peoples are strangely absent from Senator Crowley's comments on 
forgiveness. It is in this sense that reconciliation is related more to the needs of non-
Indigenous Australia than to the rights of Indigenous peoples. Apology related to the 
need for moral regeneration promised by forgiveness, as much as it did to the justifiable 
sense of wrong felt by many Indigenous persons. Crowley formulated the work of 
forgiveness as a gift to the self, not as an exchange in which apology and perhaps 
penance solicited a forgiveness from the wronged party which released and transformed 
*u J 469 
the wrong-doer. 
Rev. Tim Costello called on the government to 'acknowledge the truth*, and turned to a 
religious idiom to explain the significance of dealing with the past; 'in religious terms, 
we need repentance. We need to say we, as a government, stuffed up badly.'47 Democrat 
Senator and Uniting Church Minister John Woodley also argued that 'in relationships 
between individual people and between groups of people' 
Council Hansard, April 6 2000, p4256 Senator Brian Harradine quoted Anglican Bishop Malcolm of the 
Northern Territory; ldeep down the majority of Aboriginal people long to hear at government level an 
apology and admission that this was Aboriginal land, and that they are its forefathers and that white 
Australia is sorry and that this was recognised and acknowledged from the start.' 23 August 1988, Senate 
Hansard, p70. 
See also Kenneth Minogue: 'certainly it is the case that saturating Indigenous peoples in a mist of self-
referential Western sympathy is merely one way in which we use them for the luxury of our own self-
regard.' Quadrant, September 1998, p20. 
'Howard's Reconciliation Document Dangerous' Sydney Morning Herald, October 7, 1999, p7. My 
emphasis. 
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it is important to say sorry for the wrongs not just of the distant past but 
of the immediate past, so that forgiveness can be offered and 
reconciliation can then take place and be followed by the practical 
measures which all of us agree are absolutely fundamental and 
important. 
ALP Senator for NSW Michael Forshaw, speaking on the post-Wik amendments to the 
Native Title Act, also related native title to his Christian understandings of justice and 
apology 
The Prime Minister says that he is a Christian. I accept that he is and I 
accept that he fervently holds his Christian beliefs. My knowledge of 
Christianity is that the greatest act of Christianity was the crucifixion, when 
Christ gave his life for the sins—past, present and future—of mankind. If 
Christ could do that, the least the Prime Minister could have done as a 
Christian was to apologise for the sins and injustices visited upon our 
indigenous people. I want to take this opportunity to express my profound 
sorrow and regret and apology for what was done by our forebears to the 
Aboriginal people.47 
Evelyn Scott argued that the reconciliation process was not about guilt but nevertheless 
characterised the process as an exchange of apology and forgiveness. 
471
 Woodley, J, 27 May 1997, Senate Hansard, p 3758 
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We now know, after seven years of work by the Council, that true 
reconciliation is in fact a process, a process of healing, of understanding, 
of forgiving and accepting forgiveness, of dealing with the legacy of gross 
disadvantage and inequality, and of recognising and valuing the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage as a unique element of our 
national identity." 
The offering of apology and forgiveness was 'a noble and dignified human exchange.' 
Scott emphasised, amidst the debate on whether there should be a national parliamentary 
apology, the moral weight of forgiveness; 'It is big step that we're asking the Australian 
people to take - and I want to make the point that the acceptance and forgiveness that we 
propose for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people is just as big a step as the 
apology we propose for non- Indigenous people.' 
Phillip Ruddock made a more pointed critique of the relationship between apology, 
forgiveness and guilt in his reading of the Declaration Towards Reconciliation. Ruddock 
noted that Howard had already offered a statement of his personal sorrow: 'the Prime 
Minister said on 10 May: fctI am sorry for the injustices of the past but I do not apologise 
for them because I was not responsible."' 
472
 Forshaw, M, 27 November 1997, Senate Hansard, p9634. 
Scon, E, Reconciliation and Recognition, Adelaide, 27 October 1998 
http://www.austlii.edu.aU/au/other/T ndiaLRes/car/l 998/2710.html 
4 4
 Scott, E, Speech to World Members Conference of the English Speaking Union, Sydney, 30 August 1999 
http://www.austlii.edu,au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/1999/3008_2.html 
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When those points are made, people say, 'But, look, we're not blaming 
you. Our approach in seeking an apology is not about blame. All we want 
you to do is apologise.' I come to the point—and this is where differences 
do emerge sometimes about words—of: why do you get the concept of 
apology on the one hand but coupled with forgiveness on the other if it is 
not about culpability, if it is not about blame, if it is not personalised?.... 
And yet in much of this debate, regrettably, people say, "Well, don't worry 
about the words. Forget the words and move on.' But the fact is that words 
are used in order to engender a degree of culpability upon which other 
questions, which the Leader of the Opposition wanted to avoid today, are 
being pressed, because culpability ultimately moves you on to another 
question, that ^compensation. The Leader of the Opposition said, 'Look, 
we don't want to talk about these other issues today.' He recognises that 
the Prime Minister has moved on a little. But he talks about the desire for a 
475 
treaty. 
Richard Mulgan argued that the Australian reconciliation process was a project for 
'moralising liberals': 
Ruddock, P, 30 May 2000, House Hansard, pi6540. Yamamoto describes forgiveness as a 'mutual 
transformation' and a 'mutual liberation' that corrects and restores relationships but warns that 'integrating 
victimhood into group identity and political strategies, sometimes for many generations, nurtures claims of 
group entitlement that can be employed to manipulate oppressor guilt'; op cit, pp 196-7. 
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Moralising liberals are particularly prone to take on moral responsibility for 
the sufferings of others and are very comfortable with feelings of collective 
'self-reproach.'...the assumption of collective guilt can be seen as a form of 
moral elitism dressed up in the guise of apologetic humility.476 
For Mulgan, the core of the reconciliation process should be the pursuit of a common 
citizenship in a legitimate nation-state. 7 The legitimacy of the Australian state will stem 
from the recognition of Aboriginal rights. He also discusses the task of accepting 
historical guilt through identifying with the past: 'the main purpose of such acts is not so 
much an acceptance of continuing guilt as an expression of moral condemnation of such 
dispossession and a determination to deal justly in the future. In this respect, non-
Aborigines are to take on guilt in order to be exonerated from guilt.'478 Mulgan also notes 
that expiation is a 'two-way process': 
4 6
 Mulgan, R, 'Citizenship and Legitimacy in Post-Colonial Australia' in Peterson, N and Sanders, W (eds) 
Citizenship and Indigenous Australians, pI85. Mulgan argues that 'collective self-worth is as important for 
predominant majorities as it is for marginalised minorities.' He also argues that, rather than engage in such 
moralistic and dangerous project, we need to need to find a way to legitimate the state, protect rights of all 
citizens, despite 'murky origins' of most states; pi 86. Paddy McGuinness also pointed to an underlying 
moral dynamic animating the apology debate which he interpreted in both material and psychological 
terms. The demand for an apology was 'part of the attempt to alter the moral balance of power to pave the 
way for further concessions to the demands of the official leaders of the Aboriginal community.' For the 
non-indigenous supporters of an apology saying sorry was seen as *a kind of catharsis, an expiation of the 
guilt and shame they feel on behalf of their forebears, and indeed an act of self-hatred and abasement.' 
McGuiness, P 'Howard Risks Backlash By Saying Sorry', Sydney Morning Herald, November 26 1998, 
pl7 
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Acts of atonement and apology all require for their satisfactory completion 
that the injured party accept the admission of guilt as in some sense wiping 
the slate clean and making a new start. Only then can guilt be left behind. 
Mulgan suggests, however, that conflict is endemic to polities which contain both 
colonising and colonised groups. In such situations political discourse should not be 
made up of terms like 'reconciliation', which imply the transcendence of disagreement, 
but should tend towards 'accommodation' and 'compromise', to the recognition and 
legitimation of difference within a framework of'peaceful mutual adjustment.' 
This might sound reasonable (or even realist) enough. But Mulgan's formulation is 
expressed as an ideal rather than as description of the kind of discursive work performed 
on the image of the nation in the name of'reconciliation.' The Australian reconciliation 
process pointed towards an end-point of a grander, more ambitious nature than Mulgan 
himself recommends. The process was a spiritual task in which nation figured as more 
than an institutional or juridical forum for the resolution of conflict. In reconciliation 
politics forgiveness is a transformative political agency which makes possible the 
restoration of the political community.481 It puts an end to enmity, and makes peace, and 
479tf/4pl89. 
480
 ibid, pim. 
For example, Petersen writes that 'forgiveness is not merely a juridical absolution from guilt; it is the 
medium to lead us to communion and reconciliation....it might be said that forgiveness is effective to the 
extent that it draws us into communal life characterized by transformative practices with our neighbour'; op 
cit, pi 9. 
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hence the future, possible. Ted Moses, Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees, spelt out 
what this transformative promise meant for the settler-democracies of the new world. 
'Everyone knows', said Moses, 'that the sovereignty, legitimacy and territorial integrity 
of these states is tainted and fundamentally impaired because of the unjpt, immoral and 
murderous means employed in their establishment upon indigenous lands.' The road to 
legitimacy was via reconciliation; 'it is only upon the achievement of reconciliation that 
these states will be able to achieve legitimacy and successfully reach their full democratic 
development.' 
Daryl Melham, then Opposition spokesperson on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs, was also looking for a transformation of sorts when he addressed a seminar at the 
University of Sydney; reconciliation was 'an essential element of us all becoming 
Australians': 
it is accepting that we are now a part of a unique place that we continue to 
form and be formed by, rather than tourists from another place...it may be 
that we can never have an enduring, authentic national identity until we are 
reconciled to and with this unique and wonderful place, and its unique and 
wonderful indigenous people. Reconciled, we can be Australians. Not 
tourists, not colonists, not invaders, but Australians.483 
482 Moses, T» cited in CAR, Proceedings of the Australian Reconciliation Convention, Book One, pp48-49. 
Melham, D, Contributing comments to panel discussion 'Ethnicity and its Others* University of Sydney, 
December 9,1998, Online text 414756 www.aoh.gov.au 
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Archbishop Peter Hollingsworth, now Governor-General, also pointed to a transformed 
polis as the end-point of reconciliation. A document of reconciliation had to 'promote the 
idea of social transformation. Transformation is the idea of healing and forming over past 
divisions. Of creating the circumstances of something new....making a new start.' 
Apologies function in a manner approaching the miraculous. Tensions between wrong-
doer and victim remain, and are part of the social memory. But for all practical purposes 
'the social slate clean is wiped clean.'485 An apology is affirmative and reintegrative as 
well as transformational. Apology pertains to membership in a designated moral 
community. It is an affirmation of a community's moral norms 'in which the offender 
simultaneously recalls and is re-called to that which binds.' Brooks similarly notes the 
way in which a confession, as no more than a mere form of words, Ms a verbal act of self-
recognition as a wrong-doer and hence provides the basis for rehabilitation.' Foucault 
also refers to the transformative power of confessional technologies. The Chrisitait 
sacrament of penance is a discursive ritual 
in which the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, 
produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it; it 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/ores/car/docrec/relevant/opinion/hollingw , accessed August 1999. Then 
President of the ACTU and now Labor MHR for Throsby Jennie George described reconciliation as the 
process of 'forging a new and vibrant national identity1; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Annual 
Report, 1992-93, www.austlii.edu/au/au/special/rsiDroiect/reilibrarv/car/ar 1993-4/ 
Tavuchis, N, Mea culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation, p4. 
486
 ibid, p8. Tentler also notes that the sacrament of penance effected a reconciliation 'with the self and with 
those social norms that the penitent has internalized1; Tentler, T, op citt 13. 
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exonerates, redeems and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, 
liberates him, and promises him salvation. 
The focus on forgiveness in the restorative justice literature shares this theological dream 
of a unity which trfSscends the obstacles to reparative justice. Martha Minnow, in her 
recent work, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and 
Mass Violence, examines the various experiments in social and political reconstruction 
undertaken in societies ravaged by brutal and often bloody conflict Her goal is to 
'develop and deepen a vocabulary for assessing the goals and limitations of each kind of 
response to societal violence.' In particular, Minnow seeks to broaden the terms of 
such a response from 'truth and justice' to include another pair of goals, vengeance and 
forgiveness, and to find a path between them. 9 Minnow identifies the call for 
forgiveness as derived from 'diverse religious traditions.' 49° Noting that, in cases of mass 
48
 Foucault, M, 'About the Beginnings of the Hermeneutics of the Self, in Carrette, J (ed) Religion and 
Culture by Michael Foucault, pi 62. Tavuchis also notes that the saying of an apology, and not material 
restitution, is of greatest importance; 'we cannot undo what has been clone, only erase it by seeking 
forgiveness',op cit, p22. 
Minow, M, Between Vengeance and Forgive nes, p4. See also Minnow, M, 'The Hope for Healing: What 
Can truth Commissions Do?' in Rotberg, I and Thompson, D (eds) Truth versus Justice; Minnow asks 
whether it is a mistake to 'analogtse individual trauma to the difficulties at a national level following mass 
violence'; p240. Rotberg adds, 'there is a strong sense that a society can move forward only after it comes 
to terms with its collective angst' 'proper remembrances fulfill the collective needs of badly damaged 
societies'; 'the new nation and thousands of individuals achieved an important catharsis*; Rotberg, R, 
'Truth Commissions and the provision of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation' in Rotberg, R and Thompson, 
D (eds) Truth versus Justice: The Morality of truth Commissions, pp 6-7. 
Minow, M, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, pp 10, 21. 
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atrocity, forgiveness may seem inappropriate- how could I reconcile with you after this-
Minnow points to the transformational appeal of forgiveness: 
for some people working within the Christian tradition, forgiveness may not 
even require repentance by the wrong-doer. Instead, they hope that the act of 
forgiving may transform the wrongdoer, softening her or his heart and 
reinviting her or him into the moral community of humanity. 
Much of the restorative justice literature focuses on the example of South Africa.492 But 
Hannah Arendt had earlier made forgiveness part of her philosophy of 'natality'. Arendt 
contended that forgiveness is a political faculty with the power to release recipients from 
the consequences of what they have done: 
Forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by 
constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly. Only 
through this constant mutual release from what they do can men remain 
free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start 
491
 ibid, pi 8 
On restorative justice see Tutu, D, No Future Without Forgiveness, p51, also Yamamoto, E, Inter-
racial Justice: Conflict and Reconciliation in Post Civil Rights America, pi 1. Yamamoto writes of a 'joint 
transformation in consciousness* which might free the future from the past, of recalling pain in order to 
release it. 
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again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something 
' 6 
493 
new. 
This release frees political actors to act anew, unconsttdfoed by the consequences of past 
actions. Arendt counterposes forgiveness tojustice, for while justice insists that we all be 
equal, forgiveness and mercy insist on inequality, 'implying that every man is or should 
be, more than whatever he did or achieved:' Forgiveness is for the person, and always 
takes the person, rather than the act, into account.4 4 But forgiveness is not for that reason 
outside of the concerns of political philosophy. In fact, forgiveness is a feature of 
citizenship or political friendship 'essential to the vitality of the public-political realm.' 
Arendt does acknowledge, however, that not everything is forgivable; forgiveness is 
limited to those who act unknowingly, without criminal intent, to hinder politically 
established relationships. The attempt to forgive that which is unforgivable is outside the 
power of the political community. Arendt attributes to Jesus Christ the discovery of the 
role of forgiveness in human politics. That he made this discovery in a religious context 
and articulated it in a religious language did not detract from its relevance to 'secular' 
politics. In fact, Christ taught, contra the Pharisees, that forgiveness was a human and not 
m
 Arendt, H, cited in Caputo, J.D, 'Reason, History and a Little Madness*, p96. See also Volf, M, 
Exclusion and Embrace, p 120-1. Also Thurian, M, Confession, p50, Digeser, P, Political Forgiveness, 
ppll-12. 
494
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ibid, pp!47-148. As Derrida puts it, Arendt considers that one can only forgive where one can judge and 
punish; the evil that is beyond all possible punishment fefee unforgivable, the place where forgiveness 
stops; On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p59. 
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just a divine faculty. Wrong-doers could now search for forgiveness in places other than 
the temple. 
Tutu makes a similar point in relation to reconciliation in South Africa. Noting that the 
'Nuremberg' option, trials and victor's justice, was as inappropriate to the South African 
situation as a 'general amnesia', Tutu identified a third option; the granting of amnesty to 
individuals in exchange for a full disclosure relating to the crime for which amnesty was 
- being sought. More than amnesty, however, Tutu envisioned that perpetrators would also 
receive 'forgiveness/ The two need not be equated. Amnesty can relate, and in the 
quasi-legal context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission did relate, primarily to 
the end of legal liability for crimes committed. Forgiveness, on the other hand, promises 
much more. Forgiveness was oriented to 'restorative' justice, which aims at harmony, 
redressing imbalances and restoring broken relationships. As in Arendt's formulation 
above, reconciliation in South Africa promised a new beginning, even, as Tutu put it, a 
new birth. 
But Tutu rejected the claim that this work of political regeneration was primarily political 
at all. This quasi-miraculous process of reconciliation, which promised to effect deep 
changes to the polis, to change it, and to create something new, was extra-political, or 
spiritual. • We were inspired not by political motives but by our Biblical faith'499: 
Shriver, D, An Ethic for Enemies, p35. 
Tutu, D, No Future Without Forgiveness, pp24-33. 
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our work would be profoundly spiritual. After all, forgiveness, reconciliation 
and reparation were not the normal currency in political discourse. 
Tutu also notes that nearly all of the black leaders had been educated in Christian schools 
and 'they said their commitment to reconciliation was due to the influence and witness of 
the Christian churches.' 
This image of reconciliation as the process in which justice is both affirmed and 
transcended in an act of grace or forgiveness is a potently attractive one. Reconciliation 
might be the technology of forgiveness that enables communities to make sense of 
wrong-doing and to incorporate that wrong-doing, and that wrong-doer, into its own 
understanding of itself, the means to create a narrative theodicy for the nation. That 
understanding of reconciliation as effecting a new transformation transcending difference 
and the obstacles to reparative justice is itself connected to the Christian language of 
reconciliation, which promises a unity transcending difference, without the bloody 
calculations and necessary insufficiency of 'perfect justice.' But what are the ethics of 
applying such a technology between as opposed to within groups? Whose understanding 
of the wrong done is made to prevail and on whose terms is forgiveness negotiated or 
exchanged? 
Minnow's arguments relate primarily to those situations where social conflict has 
diminished the ability of legal and political institutions to adequately respond to 
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collective and individual wrongs. The South African courts, for example, were never 
going to be able to try all those accused of crimes, even if this were thought to have been 
desirable. In the Australian context the situation is somewhat different. It is not that there 
hasn't been genocide, or at the very least, violence and dispossession on a large scale, but 
that these events or wrongful acts have not disrupted the workings of common set of 
political or legal institutions. Rather, the Australian context is a colonial one, and these 
wrongful acts were the means by which and through which the institutions of the settler 
state were established. The Australian parliament and courts still function in a way that 
the institutions of Rwanda, for example, do not. It is not the failure of particular 
institutions in the face of mass violence that matters here, but the very existence of 
particular kinds of institutions in ongoing colonial context that ought to be of concern. 
That the Howard government could maintain its commitment to reconciliation in the 
parliament and at the same time defend, as Robert Manne has argued, the policies of 
assimilation in the Federal Court in Gunner & Cubillo, indicates that Australia's political 
and legal institutions are still the site at which intersecting neo-coloniai strategies meet.502 
Apology and forgiveness promise the quasi-miraculous regeneration of the social 
condition. Despite or because of that promise, this logic of exchange nevertheless serves 
as a disciplinary tool capable of being used to manipulate social relations. The recipient 
of an apology, the wronged party, 'holds the keys' to the wrong-doer's redemption. But 
ttts regenerative moral power 'also entails a profound moral obligation.' As Tavuchis 
501
 ibid, p43. 
m
 Gunner & Cubillo v Commonwealth, (2000) 174 ALR 97. The case was one of the first of the 'Stolen 
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puts it, 'the helpless offender, in consideration for nothing more than a speech, asks for 
nothing less than the conversion of righteous indignation and betrayal into unconditional 
sin and forgiveness.'503 There are clearly differences between interpersonal and inter-
group apologies.504 The collective apology exists by and for the record. Whereas a 
personal apology works through a logic of sorrow and remorse 
the major structural requirement and ultimate task of collective apologetic 
speech is to put things on record, to document as a prelude to 
reconciliation...(it) does not necessarily express sorrow and, except in a-pro 
forma fashion, need not in order to effect reconciliation between 
collectivities. 
503
 Tavuchis, N, op cit, p35. Tavuchis further explains: 'the earnestness of an apology... is marked by the 
scrupulous self-exposure to justifiable retribution while pleading for unconditional remission....by 
assuming such a vulnerable stance, and only by doing so, we now unobtrusively shift the burdens of belief 
and acceptance to the injured party1; pi 8. Apologies 'constitute strategic instances that illuminate complex 
social practices and the intricacies of moral commitments', p5. See also Moltman, J, 'Forty years after the 
Stuttgart Declaration' in 'Case Study 2: The Forgiveness and Politics Study Project', ed Brian Frost, 
London, New World Publications, 1987, p43, cited in Volf, M, Exclusion and Embrace, pI20. 
Where an apology is offered between groups of people individuals act only as 'official attendants, 
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authority or credentials is no apology at all. Unrecorded personal speech is of no value; Tavuchis, N, op cit, 
pp98-100 
The collective apology 'exists only by virtue of its appearance on the record.. .that it appears on the 
record is the apologetic fact'; ibid, p 102. 
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But the moral dynamic, the shifting burden of apology and forgiveness, remains at work 
in the collective apology as it does in the personal apology: 'a collective mea 
culpa...shifts the moral burden onto the offended party by focusing upon the issue of 
forgiveness.' 
Minnow claims that therapeutic purposes 'contrast starkly with political ones, although in 
practice the two influence one another.' But the language of healing, linked to 
questions of apology and forgiveness, functions in a transformative/regenerative and 
hence political fashion. Apology rehabilitates the Commonwealth and effects a moral 
community between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia. Wole Soyinka, 
in lectures delivered at the DuBois Institute at Harvard in 1997, questioned the ethics of 
this kind of transformational exchange in relation to reconciliation politics in Africa. 
Soyinka wondered if the moral exchange effected by apology, forgiveness and 
reconciliation was a reasonable quid pro quo: 
Truth as a prelude to reconciliation, that seems logical enough; but Truth as 
the justification, as the extraction or condition for Reconciliation? That is 
what constitutes a stumbling block in the South African proceedings.509 
He questioned whether, in the light of a general abhorrence of retroactive punishment, 
'we tend to sense a moral distortion in a proceeding that pursues the opposite- pardons a 
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 ibid, p\\3. 
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Soyinka, W, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness, p!3. 
crime through retroactive dispensation.,5!0 Whilst Soyinka rejected historical amnesia 
and endorsed the need for 'healing', or the 'cathartic bliss that comes with closure' , he 
counterposed two strategies oriented to that end: reparation and reconciliation. 
Reconciliation seemed to offer the hope of a restored social and polWcai community, but 
in fact it 'erodes, in some way, one of the pillars on which a durable society must be 
formed- Responsibility. And ultimately, Justice.0 Having rejected the notion that it is 
open to the human mind to annul such a magnitude of suffering as has been witnessed in 
-parts of Africa, Soyinka affirmed the principle that 'some measure of restitution is always 
essential after dispossession.' 
'Some measure of restitution': this seems reasonable enough. But there remains a sense 
in which restitution for past wrongs, no matter how costly, will always be inadequate to 
effect the reconciliation desired. As Soyinka rightly points out, it is not always open to us 
to affirm and hence forgive suffering of great magnitude. Some things remain 
unforgivable. Australian history is not without incidents that might be thought to go 
beyond the limits of human forgiveness. The recent debates on whether or not the 
practice of child removal was genocidal within the meaning of international law have not 
and probably will not end in agreement. But this is not the point. That it is open to us to 
understand these policies as genocidal indicates that the victims of those policies could 
legitimately feel an enormous sense of injustice, one that might conceivably go beyond 
5i0
 ibid, p\4. 
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ibid, p36.Soyinka continues: 'reparations...serve as a cogent critique of history and thus a potent 
restraint on its repitition'; p83. 
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the realm of the forgivable, whether they use the term genocide or not. And this is but 
one item on what would surely be a very long list of government policies that tended to 
work injustices on Indigenous peoples. And the question of the unforgivable goes deeper 
still, beyond the particular to the very foundations of Commonwealth power. We might 
be able to explain away disparities in socio-economic well-being by reference to the 
operation of particular government policies, and from this point suggest that a change in 
policy x will produce an improvement in socio-economic indicatory. But it is harder to 
counter the point repeatedly raised by Indigenous persons since at least the 1970s that it 
is the jurisdiction of the Australian state to make policy and not the workings of any 
particular policy per se that constitutes the original and continuing injustice. There is no 
treaty, and without it, no consent to the constitutional status quo. 
Could anything ever be said to match and cancel this original and founding act of 
injustice? Or is such a total measure of injustice as the failure to recognize the political 
rights of Indigenous peoples truly unforgivable? This is not a question I can answer. We 
cannot develop an adequate categorisation of particular examples of injustices as either 
forgivable or unforgivable because the choice of whether or not to forgive, or to 
understand this experience of suffering as either forgivable or unforgivable, is one only 
for the victims. But it follows from the fact that the unforgivable remains outside of the 
logic of apology and forgiveness that this economic understanding of reconciliation is not 
enough to do all the work of 'healing.' Something unforgivable escapes it. Marjorie 
*We can imagine, and accept, that someone would never forgive, even after a process of acquittal or 
amnesty. The secret of this experience remains. It must remain intact, inaccessible to law, to politics, even 
to moral1 Derrida, J, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p55. 
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Thorpe pointed to that remainder when she parodied the kind of response to genocide 
dictated by a belief in reconciliation as convenient: 'oh yes, that happened, we're 
sorry.*515 Sorry, itwould seem, is sometimes not enough. 
Unlike Volf, Tutu and Arendt, Derrida attempts to dissociate his approach to forgiveness 
from the conditional and economic aspects of the Christian heritage: 
namely, the fact that forgiveness should be asked for through repentance, 
confession, transformation and in view of reconciliation, salvation, 
redemption and so on and so forth. I try to, against this prevailing part of the 
heritage, of the tradition, I try to show or to affirm that a pure act of 
forgiveness should be totally dissociated from any horizon of reconciliation, 
salvation or the economy of'healing away* as they say in South Africa.51 
Forgiveness offered within this economy of reconciliation was not a pure act of 
forgiveness at all. Rather, a pure act of forgiveness 'should be absolutely gratuitous, 
gracious.' Whilst Derrida accepted that there was a need to 'heal away' historical trauma, 
and 'to make society work', he would not call such healing forgiveness: 
Thorpe expressed her concern about the ambiguity of the term reconciliation, an ambiguity she resolves 
by insisting that reconciliation be premised on the recognition that the colonisation of Australia was 
illegitimate without the consent of sovereign Aboriginal peoples; quoted in It's Not Easy Walking in There, 
p88. 
Derrida, J, * A Discussion with Jacques Derrida' in Theory and Event, 5:1. 
245 
in all the geopolitical scenes we have been talking about, the word most 
often abused is "forgive". Because it always has to do with negotiations 
more or less acknowledged, with calculated transactions, with conditions 
and, as Kant would say, with hypothetical imperatives.51 
These transactions in the name of national reconciliation point to the ecological or 
psycho-therapeutic work of restoring national unity, a work at once important (where 
justified) and irreducible to the maddening, unconditional gift of pure forgiveness. In 
light of Derrida's comments, we could characterise reconciliation as a moral economy of 
exchange, in which apology and penance are met by forgiveness, unity and political 
519 
regeneration. 
Derrida rejects the traditional link between responsibility and freedom, wherein the agent 
is only responsible for that which the agent has willed, and linked that critique to his 
notion of the decision and the impossible: 
Derrida writes: "So if there is a reconciliation in the colonial context, this doesn't require forgiveness, 
that is something else, some other process, and if there is forgiveness, it doesn't necessarily lead to 
reconciliation'; lA Discussion with Jacques Derrida' in Theory and Event, 5:1. 
See also Gutman, A and Thompson, D, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions' in Rotberg, I and 
Thompson, D (eds) Truth versus Justice, pp 32. 
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even where it could justified, this "ecological" imperative of social and political health has nothing to do 
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Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p41. 
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the fact is that we are responsible for some things we have not done 
ourselves. We inherit a language, conditions of life, a culture which is, which 
carries the memory of what has been done, and the responsibility, so then we 
are responsible for things we have not done ourselves, and that is part of the 
concept of heritage. We are responsible for something Other than us....if I go 
on drawing some benefit$rom this violence and I live in a culture, in a land, 
in a society which is grounded on this original violence, then I am 
responsible for it. " 
Derrida does not accept that this need to apologise should be 'constructed as a very old 
conception of collective responsibility.^~ Rather, it relates to his understanding of the 
decision, wherein only that which we are unable to decide is the possible subject of a 
decision. That which is already given or known to us is not a decision: 
that is a terrible paradox, that is what blows up, explodes these traditional 
concepts. The decision, in order to be a decision, however mad it may sound, 
or crazy it may sound, a decision, my decision should not be mine, it should 
be, as impossible, the decision of the Other, my decision should be the 
520 Derrida, J, *A Discussion with Jacques Derrida' in Theory and Event, 5:1 
" Archbishop (now Governor-General) Peter Hoilingsworth doubted whether such an old concept of 
corporate responsibility, such as that of the Biblical tradition, had much sway in Australia today;' the bulk 
of Australians don't understand that notion of corporate sin and guilt. It is a very deep and profound 
theological concept...we are a highly individualistic people, and therefore even our sense of sin is 
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Other's decision in me, or through me, and I have to take responsibility for 
the decision which is not mine. 
Derrida counterposes a pure and unconditional forgiveness, a forgiveness which for that 
reason can never appear as such, to a conditional and transactional forgiveness. But it is 
not simply a case of choosing one or the other of these alternative understandings of 
reconciliation. The relation between them is not one of antinomy but of aporia. The 
unforgivable marks a limit to this economic process of reconciliation. Not everything can 
be transformed by an exchange of apology and penance on the one side and of 
forgiveness on the other. But this limit is also the condition by which it makes sense to 
talk of 'reconciliation.' Forgiveness, if S is to appear as pure forgiveness and not as 
something to be bargained away or exchanged at a price, can only make sense in terms of 
the unforgivable: 'must erne not maintain that an act of forgiveness worthy of its name, if 
there ever is such a thing, must forgive the unforgivable, and without condition?' 
Forgiveness, then, is something mad, excessive, hyperbolic and 'impossible.' To say that 
pure or unconditional forgiveness is impossible is not to say that such an event never 
happens or is completely unthinkable. Rather, forgiveness is impossible in the sense that 
individualistic* www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/docrec/relevant/opinion/holinew.htm , accessed August 
1999. 
Derrida, J,4 A Discussion with Jacques Derrida' in Theory and Event, 5: \. Derrida identifies a similar 
paradox in the concept of'the gift*: 'it is impossible for the gift to appear as such. So the gift does not exist 
as such, if by existence we understand being present and intuitively identified as such.. .if there is a gift, 
through this impossibility, it must be the experience of this impossibility, and it should appear as 
impossible*; 'the gift is totally foreign to the horizon of economy, ontology, knowledge, constantive 
statements, and theoretical determination and judgment', 'On the Gift: Discussion Between J.Derrida and 
Jean Luc-Marion1 in Caputo, J and Scanlon, M (eds) God, the Gift and Postmodernism, pp59-60. 
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we are faced with this aporia: we inherit a tradition which contains irreconcilable and 
indissociable imperatives, 'an injunction at once double and contradictory.' ' We must 
understand forgiveness in these two contradictory senses, as subject to the economy of 
reconciliation and as referring ultimately to the unforgivable, because without this latter 
injunction forgiveness would not make 'the least sense.' 
The impossible does arrive, but it arrives as a great surprise, and cannot be induced by 
political processes, whatever name they go by: 
Because if I say, as I think, that forgiveness is mad, and that it must remain 
a madness of the impossible, this is certainly not to exclude or disqualify it. 
It is even, perhaps, the only thing that arrives, that surprises, like a 
revolution, the ordinary course of history, politics and law. Because that 
means that it remains heterogeneous to the order of politics or of the 
juridical as they are ordinarily understood. 
Derrida, J, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, pp 39, 44. 
ibid, p35. See Norval, A.J on the structurally determined incompleteness of remembrance in South 
Africa. Norval argues that this incompleteness points to a "fundamental impossibility: the impossibility of 
completion as such*; 'Memory, Identity and the (im)possibility of Reconciliation: The Work of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa* in Constellations 1998 5 (2) pp250-65. 'a full 
reconciliation with the other and with the self will never be possible. Since full reconciliation depends upon 
a complete coincidence with the self, it be definition rules out any relation to another which prevents such 
self-completion.' 
- ibid, p39. Derrida continues: 'if "politics" is what you designate in speaking of "pragmatic processes of 
reconciliation", then, taking seriously these political urgencies, I believe also that we are not defined 
through and through by the political, and above all not by citizenship, by the statutory belonging to a 
Nation-State. Must we not accept that, in heart or in reason, above all when it is a question of 
"forgiveness", something arrives that exceeds all institution, all power, all juridico-political authority?' 
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The Australian reconciliation process did not initiate this surprising, maddening 
revolution. Even as the Sorry Books filled with signatures, it remained subject to this idea 
of an economic exchange. It was marked by great outpourings of 'good-will', and yet it 
still could not and cannot account for the unforgivable. That the process remained 
incomplete in 2001 did not point merely to the failure of the Howard government to 
partake of the economic logic of sorrow that the term 'reconciliation1 seems to imply. No 
doubt the government could be criticised for its failure to offer an apology, to engage 
with Indigenous peoples in order to make the polity work. But over and above this failure 
stands the unforgivable as both the condition and the limit of political reconciliation. 
'Sorry* is subject to a remainder for which apologising, with or without restitution, is not 
enough. Burnum Burnum had said that it might be possible to effect a reconciliation 
without words being spoken. He was alluding, I think, to the impossible possibility of a 
pure forgiveness, an unconditional sorrow, and a 'true* reconciliation, outside of this 
question of apologising and forgiving. That we have not yet come to such a reconciliation 
despite a decade of political 'therapy' does not suggest that it is impossible, in the literal 
sense of that word. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CLAIMING A POLICY PENANCE: RECONCILIATION 
AND JUSTICE 
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It was originally proposed that the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation be known as the 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and Justice. Although this name fell victim to 
opposition from within the Prime Minister's office , Robert Tickner asserted in his 
second reading speech to the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Bill, and again 
afterwards, that reconciliation and justice were intimately connected: 'as a nation we 
must not miss the opportunity presented by the centenary of Federation to address critical 
areas of Aboriginal disadvantage. There can be no reconciliation without justice.' 
Commissioner Johnston had noted in his Final Report the discussion paper prepared by 
Tickner on reconciliation, endorsing the view that addressing disadvantage and self-
determination are not outcomes of reconciliation but are its 'building blocks.' Indeed, 
the whole thrust of the Commissioner's reconciliation recommendations was the 
production of a climate of public opinion in which Indigenous disadvantage could be 
addressed, and in that way, the deaths of Indigenous people in custody reduced. 
This particular formulation, of the impossibility of reconciliation in the absence of 
justice, would come to be an almost stock-standard phrase for Indigenous people anxious 
to measure present government policy against the yardstick of reconciliation sentiment. 
Linda Burney, one-time CAR member, Deputy Director-General of NSW Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs, and Chair of the NSW State Reconciliation Committee, wrote that 
'the most fundamental prerequisite' of reconciliation was social justice. And she 
26
 Tickner, R, Taking a Stand, p34. 
527
 Tickner, R, May 30,1991, House Hansard, p4498. 
Johnston, E, Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, Vol V, 38.21 
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employed, again, the formulation 'there can be no reconciliation without justice.' Gatjil 
Djerkurra, then chair of ATSIC, had commented that the heart of reconciliation was the 
coexistence of rights.530 Others set out a more programmatifc claim to the kind of justice 
they envisioned as a pre-requisite to reconciliation. Executive Director of the Kimberley 
Land Council Peter Yu listed seven elements as pre-requisites to reconciliation, including 
the recognition of Aboriginal customary law and the negotiation of a treaty or treaties 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Commonwealth. 
The CAR also took up this link between reconciliation and justice, fashioning and 
recommending specific proposals in a series of reports to government. The CAR's 
submission to the Keating government on its (promised, but never delivered) post Mabo 
social justice package, for example, sets out a comprehensive social justice agenda. 
Going Forward: Social Justice for All Australians included recommendations for 
dedicated seats in the Commonwealth parliament for Indigenous people, the recognition 
of customary law and native title rights and the complete implementation of the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody recommendations. * The Roaamap 
accompanying the 2000 Declaration included national strategies for the promotion of 
'" Burney, L, 'Not Just a Challenge, An Opportunity* in Grattan, M, Essays on Australian Reconciliation, 
p69. 
0
 www.atsic.gov.au/default ie.asp. 23 August 1999. 
1
 Yu, P, The Fundamental Challenge* in Walking Together, November 1998 Sir Gustav Nossal, formerly 
deputy chair of the CAR and Australian of the Year, described reconciliation as a two-sided coin, both 
symbolic and material. In that formulation, an apology to members of the Stolen Generations could not be 
separated from measures designed to reduce indigenous poverty or sickness; Symbolism and Substance in 
Aboriginal Reconciliation, Address to the National press Club 20 April 2000. 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Going Forward; Social Justice for the First Australians, 1995. 
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Indigenous rights, for overcoming disadvantage and for economic independence. Specific 
proposals ranged from constitutional change to changes in the way the Council of 
Australian Governments monitors and evaluates strategies for the delivery of public 
services to Indigenous peoples. Further recommendations included proposals for better 
access to private capital through Australian financial institutions, the recognition and 
protection of intellectual property in Indigenous art and culture and improved 
employment and training opportunities. At the conclusion of its fluird term, the CAR 
identified these proposals, largely ignored over the course of the nineties, as part of the 
'unfinished business' of reconciliation. 
Even if we accept that reconciliation was impossible in the absence of some measure of 
justice for Indigenous peoples, the question still remains: what kind of justice does 
reconciliation require? Various concepts of justice were at work in the Australian 
reconciliation process. The differences between them did not add up to a greater measure 
of justice for Indigenous peoples, as though one could simply add one measure or 
dimension of justice to another to produce some kind of identifiable and measurable 
meta-justice. Rather, the differences between these competing concepts of justice created 
a whole series of confusions and debates which gave little credence to the CAR's claim 
that reconciliation was not vague or slippery, but practical and programmatic. 
Labor and Liberal governments, in many ways far apart on Indigenous affairs, shared a 
base-line commitment to a distributivist conception of justice. Each linked the 
reconciliation process to an improvement in the socio-economic status of Indigenous 
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Australians relative to non-Indigenous Australians. For the Howard government lids was 
where justice stopped. The ALP went somewhat further, accepting, for example, that 
justice for the Stolen Generations would require not just the payment of monetary 
compensation but a national parliamentary apology. It offered, although in rather limited 
doses, two additional measures of justice: reparation, in terms of accounting materially 
for past wrongs, and recognition, by way of the symbolic recognition of a particular 
Indigenous experience of suffering. But if 'recognition' was a form of justice in its own 
right, then it was still necessary to ask, what exactly is to be recognized, and by whom?533 
Supporters of Indigenous sovereignty called for the recognition not just of a particular 
experience of Indigenous suffering, but recognition of indigeneity as a source of political 
and legal rights. Historical wrong-doing and contemporary guilt were at issue in both the 
sovereignty and apology debates. They were easily confused, not least because both bore 
on the debates about Austrahjtn historiography and on the moral status of the 
Commonwealth. But they should be carefully distinguished in order to see how the one 
related to a Christian image of forgiveness and unity and the other called for a more 
exacting reconciliation based on the performance of penance or restitution; that is, giving 
;taik what was lost, understood broadly as the loss of sovereignty. 
The two kinds of recognition politics pursued within the overarching notion of 
reconciliation, recognition of a particular Indigenous experience of suffering and 
recognition of Indigenous peoples as politically organised societies, are not wholly 
compatible. The difference between them is marked by the way in which each 
See also 'Introduction* in Ivision, D et al, op cit> p20. 
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understands the shape of the political and legal structures which ought to govern the 
peoples of Australia. Where the call for a just recognition of Indigenous suffering 
connected to the apology debate, it contributed to the notion that a reconciled Australia 
should or would be a unified political order. Howard drew an explicit connection between 
his statement of regret and the planned celebration of the Centenary of Federation in 
2001. It was important that 
we can all come together as Australians to celebrate the centenary of our 
nation, we want every Australian to feel that they can unqualifiedly and 
without any constraint, without any hesitation, participate in that great 
national celebration. In order to do that, our indigenous Australians must 
feel a proper sense of reconciliation and a proper sense of being, in every 
way and totally, part of the Australian community. This motion will make 
* 514 
a contribution towards that. 
The reconciliation process promised to fashion a moral order to map onto a political order 
already established by the force of colonisation. It promised legitimacy for the settler 
state. The call for the recognition of indigeneity as a source of rights, on the other hand, 
revived the treaty debate. It called into question the notion that Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples in Australia ought to be governed by the same political institutions, or 
that they necessarily had the same rights within the same legal system. 
Howard, J, House Hansard, 26th August 1999, p7046. 
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Justice as recognition of Indigenous sovereignty appeared to threaten the desired or 
assumed unity of the Australian Commonwealth. Reconciliation as forgiveness matched 
by some form of penance promised a unity transcending not only political and cultural 
difference but also the problems of coming to any exact account of what had been done 
and what had been lost. In that sense, the problem of justice goes to the shape of the 
Australian polity, and the nature of the unity desired. For example, would a reconciled 
Australia be an association of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, their relationship 
governed and framed by a treaty? Or would it be a nation in which Indigenous and non-
Indigenous do not exist in anything other than a cultural or social sense, where the only 
political status available is the individual and hence universal citizen? This problem can 
also be characterised as the difference between the politics of sovereignty, which contests 
the legitimacy of the Commonwealth and asserts that there are, within the geography of 
Australia, multiple continuing political orders5 5, and the politics of reconciliation, which 
relies on or assumes difference but which nevertheless seems to point to a unity 
transcending that difference. 
This chapter aims to follow the theological aspects of the link between reconciliation and 
justice evident IE the Australian reconciliation debates. In particular, it considers the way 
in which the establishment of the process both legitimated and limited Indigenous justice 
claims. The link between justice and reconciliation did not derive simply from the 
political struggles of Indigenous peoples to achieve a measure of justice, and to define the 
terms of political debate in a manner favourable to themselves. That link was already 
See Webber, J 'Beyond Regret: Mabo's Implications for Australian ConstfationalisnV in Ivison, D, et al 
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present in the language brought to bear on the problem. The language of reconciliation is 
already open to, it iftiists upon, a kind of penance that can but does not necessarily have 
to be understood as analogous to 'justice.' The language of reconciliation, as a 
background agreement in forms of language derived from Christian theology and 
penitential practice, enabled Indigenous peoples and their supporters to make the claim 
that that 'there is no reconciliation' without justice.' 
Norman Habel took up the link between reconciliation and justice in his book, 
Reconciliation: Searching For Australia's Soul. The story of Jesus *isr as much about 
liberating the socially oppressed as it is about forgiving spiritual sins.' That claim was 
reflected in Habel's distinction between 'true' and 'false' reconciliation, where only the 
former acknowledged the 'justice principle.' Church leaders to stress the link between 
the symbolic and the practical elements of reconciliation included the Primate of the 
Anglican Church, Keith Rayner and the General-Secretary of the Uniting Church, 
Gregor Henderson.3'* 
Some Christians adopted a more ambivalent approach to the government's policy of 
reconciliation. By 1998 the Uniting Church congregation in Pitt St Sydney was pointing 
to the gap between the language and practice of governmental power: 
(eds) opcit. pp60-88. 
6
 Tickner, R, Taking a Stand* pp35-36. Rayner had written to the Ticknen 4Our Church would be very 
pleased to see this symbolic act ofipconciliation followed up by concrete steps to make it a reality between 
white and black Australians. We shall therefore be very receptive of any proposals which the Government 
may make, and we hope that your desire for all-party support will win a positive response from the 
members of other pHiticaJ parties.' Cited in Johnston, E, op tit, 38.21. 
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We remember when 'control' meant slaughter and dispossession, when 
'protection* meant imprisonment, when 'welfare' meant kidnapping 
children, and we wonder now what 'reconciliation' might mean.5 7 
One ambiguity of reconciliation discourse in relation to the problem of political justice is 
the relationship between reparation or penance and forgiveness. On the one hand, the 
structure of reconciliation politics, built around confession and recollection of the past in 
the construction of a new national narrative, recalls, before it can forget or annul, a 
history of injustice. We might say, cynically, that words are cheap. But the 'naming' of 
injustice is not in itself a simple task. In a polity characterised both by deep diversity and 
by competing understandings of the past, agreeing on the nature and extent of injustice, 
and on culpability for that injustice, is not likely to be easy. The apology debate is but 
one example of the difficulty of such a process. There was, however, at least some 
measure of agreement on the history of Indigenous/non-indigenous relations in Australia. 
The Howard government was eager to reduce those 'stains' to mere cosmetic blemishes. 
The Labor Party, for its part, generally accepted a revisionist understanding of Australian 
history but refused to draw from it any conclusions as to the legitimacy of Australian 
sovereignty. Many Indigenous Australians considered that sovereignty to be 
fundamentally flawed. There was, despite these differences, a measure of common 
ground. It was accepted that the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
l & r g y for Reconciliation 1998: Prayers of Hope', Multi-faith Meeting, Uniting Church, Pitt St. 
Sydney 
259 
peoples in Australia was marked by some degree of injustice. And so we could proceed to 
the next point: making a claim for a 'policy penance.' 
Goldman argues that reconciliation is not easy, cheap or hasty. He identifies the call, 
'forgive and forget', or "isn't it time for reconciliation?', as one made mostly by 
perpetrators seeking to remove the focus from their own actions. Goldman also argues 
that reconciliation is not opposed to 'liberation', and that reconciliation can only occur in 
a social context where a commitment to change animates the desire for peace: 'truth 
telling alone does not bring about reconciliation. We are obligated to create conditions 
that will not repeat the violence of the past.' Volf likewise argues that it would be 
"totally unchristian' to seek a final reconciliation before present injustices have been 
resolved: 
Any such plea plays into the hands of the oppressor by trying to persuade 
those of us who are oppressed to accept our oppression and to become 
reconciled to the intolerable crimes that are committed against us. That is 
not Christian reconciliation, it is sin. 4 
Naming injustice licensed a claim to a more exacting reconciliation, preceded by penance 
as well as by apology. But the same language also licenses the claim that reconciliation 
Goldman, G, 'Reconciliation: An Urgent Task; A Review of the Literature' Nelen Yuba, no 67, 1997, 
ppl-23, atp7. 
539/6/4p9. 
Volf, M, The Social Meaning of Reconciliation, Interpretation, 54 (2), April 2000, ppl58-l 72. 
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implies an easy forgiveness or forgetting, in the name, as then NSW National Party leader 
Ian Armstrong put it, of 'getting on1 with the future. The National Farmers Federation 
Aboriginal Affairs Committee Chair, John McKenzie, told a 1993 conference hosted by 
the CAR and ATS1C that 'dwelling on the past' was not a good way to further 
reconciliation. He further elaborated 
Now, a lot of people have, in fact, treated Aborigines badly and they 
probably still do but reconciliation means putting that behind us. Not 
forgetting it but putting it behind us and talking positively about the things 
we agree on, not the things that divide us. 
The theology of reconciliation does not answer the problem, 'what does justice entail in 
this concrete political situation?' but frames that question in a particular way and then 
provides a number of solutions, none of which are determinative. The conservative 
elements of Australian reconciliation politics are not a corruption of theology, but are part 
of that theology in the sense that they are a product of the same theological language 
game which makes drawing a line between orthodoxy and heresy difficult, and for our 
purposes, pointless. It is the language of reconciliation, and not its misuse, which gives 
rise to the claim that reconciliation politics is cheap, and that it implies, or indeed 
demands, an easy forgiveness, without reparation. 
CAR, The Position of Indigenous Peoples in National Constitutions: Speeches from the Conference, 
pp80,85-86. Robert Tickner later wrote, however, that 'most of the contributions by the NFF leadership 
during the Mabo debate were thoughtful and constructive'; Taking a Stand* p91. 
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Social Justice and 'Practical' Reconciliation 
Sharp defines distributive justice as 'giving to classes of people what is theirs by right, 
where classes are distinguished by characteristics that call for or generate those good 
things that can be thought to be demanded for them as a right.' 2 This understanding of 
justice follows from the distributive principle of equality, itself derived from a 
commitment to the equal moral worth of all individuals. Distributive justice entails both 
formal and substantive equality: equality before the law without discrimination or 
unjustified differential treatment and substantive equality of access to public goods and 
services. A commitment to distributive justice also entails compensating individuals and 
communities for any 'undeserved disadvantage' which they suffer. As Patton argues, 
the current discrepancies between the indigenous and non-indigenous 
population in relation to health, education, employment, treatment by the 
criminal justice system and so on constitute undeserved 
disadvantage....The indigenous population is disadvantaged in these and 
other ways as a result of colonial policies inflicted on them by 
543 
governments. 
54; Sharp, A, Justice and the Maori, pp 29-30. 
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 Patton, P, Constitutional Paradoxes: Native Title, Treaties and the Nation^ AIATSIS Seminar Paper, p2, 
http://www.aiatsi5.gov.au/rsrch/smnrs/Dapers/patton2.Ddf Not all contemporary liberals support such 
reasoning. Robert Nozick, for example, rejects 'end-state' theories of justice, arguing instead for 'historical 
process principles' which consider how a particular disttibution of goods originated; * patterned principles 
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The content of distributive justice depends, however, on a measure of equality, but this 
measure must vary depending upon what are taken to be the fundamental social goods to 
which all are equally entitled. In a polity marked by deep cultural differences a concept of 
distributive justice must necessarily be of limited utility. Such a concept does not, 
absent an agreement on a measure of equality, clarify the requirements of justice between 
cultural groups but may in fact tend to illiberality. To reduce the list of possible grounds 
of entitlement to one common ground requires, as Sharp points out, 'an uncommonly 
coherent view of what is good for people; and the more coherent the view is the more it 
excludes competing conceptions of the good life.' " 
This might be putting the case against a distributivist conception of justice too strongly. 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous participants in the Australian reconciliation process were 
certainly able to identify a common set of 'goods1 of which it was possible to talk of a 
of distributive justice involve appropriating the actions of other persons. Seizing the results of someone's 
labor is equivalent to seizing hours from him and directing him to carry on various activities...This process 
whereby they take this decision from you make them a part owner of you; it gives them a property right in 
you...End-state and most patterned principles of distributive justice institute (partial) ownership by others 
of people and their actions and labor'; cited in Thakur, S.C, Religion and Social Justice, p25. 
*.. .once it is realised that cultural differences may affect the conception and weighting of various social 
goods, the limitations of the idea of equal treatment become apparent'; Patton, P, Justice and Difference, 
p86. Sharp is also pessimistic about the prospect of coming to a common understanding of justice in 
conditions of cultural pluralism; 'there can be no permanent settlement of particular cases or agreement on 
conceptions of justice. Hie content of j ustice is contingent on what particular societies take to be good for 
people and what activities are being considered*; op cit, p30. 
Sharp, A op cit, p30. Sharp also argues that even if agreement could be had on who belonged to what 
group, and on what constituted a group, there would still be disagreement on the grounds of entitlement. 
Are rights to goods derived from moral entitlement, legal entitlement, need, desert? 
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just or fair distribution. Even if we account for the possibility that there may in many 
instances have been a good deal of mutual misunderstanding, it still seems that many of 
these disputes went to the sources and measure of entitlement, rather than to the 
identification of goods. Then Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice 
Commissioner Mick Dodson's definition of what social justice means for Indigenous 
peoples does not only refer to a particular Indigenous experience of deprivation but also 
to commonly held ideas of what it means to have an adequate standard of living, ideas 
that non-Indigenous people in Australia readily apply to themselves. This was a point of 
understanding, of agreement concerning at least some of the goods to which a 
distributivist conception of justice might refer: 
social justice must always be considered from a perspective which is 
grounded in the daily lives of indigenous Australians. Social justice is what 
you face in the morning. It is awakening in a house with an adequate water 
supply, cooking facilities and sanitation. It is the ability to nourish your 
children and send them to a school where their education not only equips 
them for employment but reinforces their knowledge and appreciation of 
their cultural heritage. It is the prospect of employment and good health; a 
life of choices and opportunity, free from discrimination.546 
There is a commitment common to both the major parties to redress Indigenous 
'disadvantage' on the basis of need. And there was a wider consensus that included 
264 
almost all Indigenous participants in the process that, even if the focus on the practical 
were not enough to satisfy all the demands of justice, then improved health, housing and 
employment for Indigenous peoples were positive in their own right. Howard echoed 
Tickner when he said that reconciliation must include real and measurable improvements 
in key socio-economic indicators. 
Admitting that this is a point of agreement or understanding does not, however, 
completely solve the problem of what justice for Indigenous peoples entails, or of the 
relationship between justice and reconciliation. 'Need' is not accepted across the 
Indigenous political spectrum as the primary source of entitlement to goods. Noel 
Pearson, for example, has pointed to the destructive consequences of a passive, welfarist 
mentality, and argued for a greater reliance on mutual obligation in Indigenous affairs 
policy. The Aboriginal Provisional Government, on the other hand, has derived title to 
land and hence entitlement to mining royalties and agricultural leases from Indigenous 
sovereignty. The Coalition is diametrically opposed to such a claim: Indigenous 
disadvantage is to be addressed as an incident of Australian citizenship. The APG and the 
Coalition are not even talking about the same concept of justice. Whilst the Coalition 
talks of an entitlement to distribution with the confines of an existing polity, the APG is 
referring to the right to levy taxes as an incident of sovereign nation-hood. 
CAR, Going Forward: SociatJustice for the First Australians\ 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/goine forward/10.html 
Gardiner-Garden notes that the Howard government largely avoided the terminology of social justice, 
and preferred to talk in terms of self-management and self-empowerment; From Dispossession to 
Reconciliation, p20. 
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Justice as distribution could not cover all of the senses in which Indigenous peoples 
claimed that they had been unjustly treated. Such a concept of justice tends to obscure the 
terms in which groups articulate claims to justice by atomizing individuals in order to 
place them in a field of possessive relations. A distributivist conception of justice would 
tend, on its own, to individualise or atomise relations between Indigenous peoples and the 
state, and would for that reason cut against the claim that justice for Indigenous peoples 
requires the recognition of collective and specifically Indigenous rights. To reduce 
Indigenous justice claims to this one category of distribution is to effect something of a 
crude translation which does not do justice to those claims as have already been made, 
particularly when those claims extend beyond the material and into aspects of self-
government and sovereignty.5 ATSIC Chair Geoff Clark, for example, considered the 
policy of practical reconciliation to be demeaning insofar as it was limited to the 
provision of those goods to which Indigenous persons were already entitled as an incident 
Young argues that 'such a model implicitly assumes that individuals or other agents lie as nodes, points 
in the social field, among whom larger or smaller bundles of social goods are assigned. The individuals are 
externally related to the goods they possess, and their only relation to one another that matters from the 
point of view of the paradigm is a comparison of the amount of goods they possess. The distributive 
paradigm thus implicitly assumes a social atomism, inasmuch as there is no internal relation among persons 
in society relevant to considerations of justice'; Justice and the Politics of Difference, pi 8. See also 
Thakur's discussion of David Hume, op cit, p7. Ivison, Patton and Sanders make a similar point: 'the 
distinctiveness of indigenous claims, if understood as deriving from their attachment to the land and the 
history of their relations with the colonial state, is lost or rendered opaque in discussions of distributive 
justice.* The construction of a list of'goods' to be distributed and the principles upon which such goods 
will be fairly distibuted may 'misunderstand not only the particular value of culture or land being appealed 
to, but also the nature of the moral wrongs upon which the claims are based-the historical legacy of 
colonialism'; Ivison, D, Patton, P and Sanders, W, 'Introduction', Political Theory and the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, plO. See also Ivison, D, 'Political Community and Historical Injustice' in 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol 78, no 3, p 362. 
See also Patton, P, Constitutional Paradoxes, p2. 
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of citizenship. Reconciliation would also extend, on Clark's view, to the recognition of 
the political rights of Indigenous peoples. 
Redistribution, on the basis of'need' or 'disadvantage1, and as an incident of citizenship, 
is however the only aspect of justice addressed by the Howard government's policy of 
'practical reconciliation.' The Coalition attempted to dissociate the 'sociological' issue of 
reconciliation from matters more properly considered part of 'property law', thereby 
disconnecting the reconciliation process from the native title regime. The government 
argued that its own policy had refocussed reconciliation on the 'practical' task of 
improving the socio-economic status of Indigenous peoples. The cornerstone of 
reconciliation, said Howard, was to be a 'renewed national focus on the causes of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage. Through practical measures.... the 
government has focussed its efforts on areas of Indigenous health, education, housing and 
employment.' Howard further elaborated on his vision of a reconciled Australia as a 
nation 'in which primarily the opportunities for people of Indigenous background were 
exactly the same as for all of us': 
that means their health, their employment, their education....and proper 
respect of the fact that above everything else we are united together as 
Australians, living under one body of law, that to which we are equally 
Clark, G, 'Not Much Progress' in Grattan, M, Essays on Australian Reconciliation Essays, pp228-234. 
Howard also argued that reconciliation would not 'work' if i t puts a higher value on symbolic gestures 
and overblown promises rather than the practical needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people...'; 
Canberra Times, 27 May 1997; cited in Bennett, S, op cit, p36. 
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accountable but from which we ffl& all entitled to an equal dispensation of 
justice. Now that is how I see, in a nutshell, the reconciliation process. 
John Herron, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Minister in the incoming 
Howard government, outlined the government's understanding of reconciliation as a 
process consisting of three parts: 
1. Working together to ensure all Australians share equally in a common 
future; 
2. a realistic acknowledgment of our inter-related histories; 
3. a shared commitment to overcoming Indigenous disadvantage. 
The Labor party had adopted, to a degree, a revisionist reading of Australian history and 
had acknowledged that injustice had marred the relationship between Indigenous and 
52
 Howard, J, Press Release, November 7 1997, Online Text 972038 www.aph.gov.au 
Howard, Opening Address, Australian Reconciliation Convention, 26 May 1997, Online Text 962966, 
www.aph.gov.au. Bennett notes the shift from self-determination to self-empowerment under Herron. A 
contributor to the ATSIC News described the difference as follows; 'self-empowerment varies from self-
determination in that it is a means to an end- ultimately social and economic equality, rather than an end in 
itself; Summer 1997, p7, cited in Bennett, S, op cit, p66. Tony Staley, federal president, Liberal party of 
Australia, provided a 'liberal view* of reconciliation: full equality of opportunity to participate in 
Australian social, cultural and economic life, and, address unacceptable levels of Aboriginal and Torres 
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non-Indigenous peoples since 1788. It also acknowledged that the legacy of that injustice 
was contemporary disadvantage, and that measures were now required to ensure that 
Indigenous Australians would enjoy a measure of social justice. The Coalition, in its 
vision of reconciliation as a 'practical' policy initiative aimed at health, housing and other 
measures of socio-economic well-being, claimed to have separated the politics of 
Aboriginal affairs from the larger feistorical debates which suggested that not all was well 
with the sovereignty of the Commonwealth. Indigenous disadvantage was to be 
addressed, as the Coalition saw it, as an incident of citizenship. But practical 
reconciliation was not a policy from which the symbolic was absent. The Coalition did 
not link reconciliation to socio-economic well being as a means of performing a penance 
that would account for the past, complement an apology, and solicit forgiveness. Quite 
the opposite. For the Coalition the focus on the 'practical' was not code for penance, but 
an attempt to escape or to subvert the symbolic and moral issues to which penance 
referred. 
Practical reconciliation emerged as the Howard government's answer to the historical 
debates regarding both the Stolen Generations and Australian history in general. This is 
not to suggest that the policy was an absolute beginning, a fresh turn in conservative 
Indigenous affairs policy direction. Practical reconciliation was in one sense a return to 
the view expressed by Michael Wooldridge in 1991, that the most important part of 
Indigenous affairs policy was service delivery, and not political symbolism or historical 
revisionism. But there is a more potent message here as well. The Howard government's 
Strait Islander disadvantage; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together, Special Edition, 
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approach to native title and to the Stolen Generations also recalls the 1991 comments of 
Western Australian Liberal Senator Ian Campbell, who told Indigenous peoples not to 
call for a treaty lest they face a backlash from non-Indigenous Australia. Practical 
reconciliation was not an escape from the politics of history but a calculated attempt to 
nullify the particular kinds of symbolism articulated by Indigenous peoples when they 
derived their entitlements to land or to government services from prior ownership, 
historical dispossession or indigeneity. 
Howard and other conservatives sought to tell a history in which there was little, if any, 
wrong-doing. Why would this have been important to them if they had really refused to 
draw a connection between the politics of today, between the status of the moral 
relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples now, with the events of the 
past? The conservatives were as eager to deny Indigenous entitlement to measures both 
practical and symbolic by refusing to recognise past wrongs as others were keen to build 
a claim for recompense out of that same mistreatment.554 The Coalition's attack on 'black 
armband' history, its refusal to offer a paritamentary apology to the Stolen Generations, 
and its emphasis on the strict liberal equality of all Australian citizens cannot be 
dissociated from the Coalition's opposition to the Indigenous sovereignty claim. Just as 
the official reconciliation project was a response and an alternative to treaty politics, the 
debates and the political imagery which characterised that project were also, in an 
November 1998. 
54
 See also Sparrow, R, 'History and Collective Responsibility* in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol 
78, no 3, pp 346-359. 
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indirect way, a response to the claim advanced by some Indigenous peoples that they 
were and remain sovereign. 
Reparative Justice 
Sharp describes reparative justice as 'the idea that a thing wrongly taken or destroyed 
must be restored or that a substitute good be provided, and that compensation be made for 
the lack of the good in the period when it was wrongly absent.'555 The simplicity of the 
definition belies the great practical and conceptual difficulties of applying a concept of 
reparative justice to an ongoing colonial condition. Jeremy Waldron has pointed to the 
difficulties of discerning exactly what was lost, and the counter-factual dilemma of 
imagining what might have been had such and such an event never occurred. But there 
are problems of justice here too: how is it just to deny title to a land owner who has 
purchased in good faith and without knowledge of competing Indigenous claims, and has 
done so many years after dispossession? 
555
 Sharp, Atopcittp2\. 
556
 See Waldron, J, 'Superseding Historical Injustice1, Ethics, 103, 1992, pp4-28. On the distinction 
between historical and end-state arguments regarding property rights, see Simmons A.J "Historical Rights 
and Fair Hares' in Law and Philosophy, 14, 1995, ppl49-I84. For a critique of Waldron's position, see 
Ivison, D, 'Political Community and Historical Injustice' in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol 78, no 
3, pp 360-373. 
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The problems described as obstacles to reparative justice might derive more from 
confusion surrounding the proper aims of reparative justice than anything else. The aim 
of reparative justice is not the restoration of a prior state by somehow undoing past 
wrongs. Such a process is, in many cases, simply impossible. The aim of reparation is 
more limited. The goal is, as Patton puts it, -not to undo past wrongs but to go some way 
towards removing their consequences and re-establishing what would have been the case 
if those injustices had not been perpetrated.0 The obstacles to reparative justice, 
therefore, are not in all cases insurmountable, and they do not justify the reluctance of 
Australian courts and governments to adopt a concept of reparative justice in appropriate 
cases. The practice of child removal is one policy for which a measure of reparative 
justice would be possible. Certainly the Labor party and HREOC considered it possible 
to make some kind of reparation in the case of the Stolen Generations. Each has 
recommended that money compensation be payed to the victims of the child removal 
policies and their families. Reparations may also have a symbolic significance, 
highlighting society's determination that past wrongs will not be repeated. 
557
 Patton, P, (citing Waldron, J, 1992, p8) Juctice as Difference^ p88. Judge Edward Durie of the Waitangi 
Tribunal also considered that reparation did not aim at an exact equivalence; 'the issue is the fair allocation 
of the country's resources between Aboriginals and the counipy at large'; CAR, The Position of Indigenous 
Peoples in National Constitutions: Speeches from the Conference,p70. 
Patton, P, Constitutional Paradoxes: Native Title, Treaties and the Nation^ p2. Sharp also points to an 
innovative model of reparative justice developed by the Waitangi Tribunal; recognizing the limits of 
'backward looking* justice the Tribunal developed a 'forward looking jurisprudence' based on history (ie 
detailed wrongs) and the establishment of a set of rules, derived from the treaty, breach of which would 
trigger reparation; op citt pp 129-131. 
Waldron, J, op cit, pp6-7: 'quite apart from any attempt genuinely to compensate victims or offset their 
losses, reparations may symbolize a society's undertaking not to forget or deny that a particular injustice 
took place, and to respect and help sustain a dignified sense of identity-in-memory for the people affected.' 
Desmond Tutu has similarly argued that reparation was not to be confused with compensation, for no 
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Rev Brown of the Uniting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Congress saw the need 
for reconciliation as stemming from the 'profound sense of injustice' Indigenous peoples 
rightly felt in regards to their dispossession by and subsequent mistreatment at the hands 
of non-Indigenous people. Although the past could not be undone, justice required that 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples 'negotiate a settlement, an agreement or contract 
in which Indigenous people are treated with respect and equality. Such a settlement will 
need to deal with matters of compensation.' The Declaration Towards Reconciliation 
linked, in a characteristically ambiguous manner, past injustice to contemporary rights of 
self-determination: 
And so, we pledge ourselves to stop injustice, overcome disadvantage, and 
respect that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have the right to 
self-determination within the life of the nation. 
The prospects for Indigenous self-determination are bounded, in this formulation of 
reconciliation, by 'the life of the nation.' That qualification can be looked at 
'pragmatically', and viewed as the inevitable result of a process initiated, funded by, and 
serving the nation-building interests of the settler-state, and in which Indigenous 
aspiration must necessarily be limited. An investigation of the theological elements of the 
money payment could make up for what was lost. Reparations would be primarily symbolic. Reparation 
was not then an end in itself, but was oriented to, and was part of, the higher goal of reconciliation, or the 
restoration of broken relationships; Tutu, D, No Future Without Forgiveness* p?? 
Brown, J, 'Prayers for Healing and National Agreement* Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 
Walking Together, No 5, August 1993. 
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concept of reconciliation provides a different kind of insight: the prospects for self-
determination were already limited to within the life of the nation by the language 
brought to bear on the problem of Indigenous/non-indigenous relations. As a picture 
which held us captive, the language of reconciliation limits at the outset the capacity of 
Indigenous peoples to claim that they were and remain sovereign. Reconciliation, more 
than being simply the end of hostility, is theologically connected to the desire for a unity 
that transcends difference. At the same time, reconciliation is premised upon, and only 
makes sense in terms of, difference. In this particular case the acts of satisfaction or 
reparation required as a kind of policy penance for past injustice cut against that desired 
or promised unity. To restore what was lost to Indigenous peoples is not just to return 
lands, but to recognise the political autonomy of those Indigenous peoples who were and 
remain sovereign. 
Giving back what was lost is in some respects at odds with the end-point of unity 
promised by reconciliation. Such a task of reparation was, moreover, simply impossible. 
How to give back the Australian land mass after it had been so greatly transformed by 
settlement and after it had become the home to some twenty million people? In 
reconciliation politics this insufficiency, related to the unbridgeable gulf between the 
human and the divine, was understood, analogously, in terms of the impossibility of 
coming to any strict account of what had been done and what had been lost. It was not 
rarely said that the past is past and cannot be undone. But the fork in the conceptual road 
was whether the nation should 'move on' and focus on the future, or rather should attend 
to the past lest it haunt us forever. Common amongst those who considered that the past 
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was in need of attention was the view that the past is not altogether behind us, but lives 
on in the present. This was an important point to make in the context of the 'special 
rights" critique of Indigenous specific programs (the notion that Indigenous specific 
service delivery was itself a case of 'reverse racism', as Hanson argued in her maiden 
speech to parliament.) If current disadvantage had its roots in the past, in colonisation and 
dispossession, then 1 was incumbent on the heirs and beneficiaries of those who had 
done the dispossessing to make amends. Then Democrat Leader John Coulter had 
formulated the relationship between Indigenous disadvantage and non-Indigenous 
responsibility in precisely this way in the debates on the A TSIC Bill in 1989: 
We are the inheritors of the advantages which have flowed from the acts of 
those who took this land from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people. That, I believe, places a very great responsibility upon us, not 
because we feel guilty but because we are the inheritors of an 
advantage....So while guilt is not appropriate, certainly the picking up of 
responsibility is. ' 
So this causal formulation established two things: it contested the widely held view that 
Indigenous peoples had only themselves to blame for present parlous living conditions, 
and secondly, it supported a claim for assistance from the government. But this 
recognition was made in the context of a recognition that it was not possible to achieve 
perfect reparation in contemporary circumstances. 
561
 Coulter, J, 17 October, 1987, Senate Hansard, p2020 
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Christian reconciliation does not rely, however, on the satisfaction of all outstanding 
debts. Reconciliation is a process in which injustice is, as Volf puts it, both affirmed and 
transcended. Catholic and Reformed understandings of reconciliation asserted that this-
worldly reparation for sin was not just desirable but required. But those acts of penance 
or reparation were in no way adequate to 'purchase' forgiveness. The impossibility of 
perfect reparation, the radical insufficiency of any human action to that which is received, 
makes this necessary. The suggestion that reconciliation produces a miraculous or 
divine transformation in human relations premised on the agency of forgiveness is linked 
to these tangled understandings of the why and the how of reconciliation. The theological 
supporters of Aboriginal reconciliation ought not to be too quick to accuse those who blur 
such fine distinctions of corrupting the theology, for the theology is itself already 
entangled in these tensions. Vertical and horizontal reconciliation can be considered 
separately, but there is a divine and sacred element, within the theology of reconciliation, 
to relations between persons: a sin against another believer is not just a sin against that 
person, but is a sin against the whole community of the faithful, and against God. Every 
horizontal sin is, in fact, a vertical sin as well. It is this ambiguity between earthly and 
divine reconciliation which enables the Australian reconciliation process to move or slip 
between 'hard* and 'easy' visions of reconciliation. 
Historically, acts of penance became increasingly symbolic as the sacrament of confession became more 
and more private, to the point where the act of confessing was itself seen as a penance. Even in Catholic 
formulations of the working of penance, personal contrition combined with the grace of God to produce 
forgiveness, and it was possible to achieve reconciliation even without, in some cases, the performance of 
penance; Tentler, T, op tit, p 16. 
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John Paul II offered an example of how the theological concept of reconciliation might 
play out into the political relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples 
when he offered an apology to the Indigenous peoples of Oceania, and in particular to the 
Australian Aborigines, for Church complicity in governmental programs: 
The past cannot be undone, but honest recognition of past injustices can lead 
to measures and attitudes which will help to rectify the damaging effects for 
both the indigenous community and the wider society. The Church 
expresses deep regret and asks forgiveness where her children have been or 
still are party to these wrongs. Aware of the shameful injustices done to 
indigenous peoples in Oceania, the Synod Fathers apologised unreservedly 
for the part played in these by members of the Church, especially where 
children were forcibly separated from their families. Governments are 
encouraged to pursue with still greater energy programs to improve the 
conditions and the standard of living of indigenous groups in the vital areas 
of health, education, employment and housing 563 
This apology does not present, I would argue, a clear program of action for a secular 
politics because it does not, and cannot, adequately resolve the tension between 
horizontal and vertical understandings of reconciliation.5 John Paul II and Miroslav 
563
 John Paul Jj, Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Ecclesia in Oceania, November 2001, 
http://www.vatican.va/holv father/iohn paul ii/apost exhortations/documents/hf jp-
ii exh 20011132 ecclesia-in-oceania en.html. accessed 23/11/2001. 
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 Habel argues that separating reconciliation with God from reconciliation between groups is 'simplistic 
and ignores the fact that such a neat formulation separating these "two ways" in which God works is a 
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Volf each struggle to identify what earthly justice might look like once transcended by an 
act of grace or forgiveness. 
Volf acknowledges that the relation of'first justice, then reconciliation' is impossible; 
'justice is to some extent linked to particular groups and inevitably contested by rival 
groups. No peace is possible within the overarching framework of strict justice for the 
simple reason that strict justice is impossible.'565 He further argues that such an approach 
is not only conceptually impossible (injustice is always with us) but that it Is 'at odds 
with the core Christian beliefs inscribed in the narrative of the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ': 
The Pauline version of the Christian faith—the same could be argued for the 
practice and teaching of Jesus—stands and falls with the idea that grace has 
priority over justice (grace, again, that does not negate justice but that 
affirms justice in the act of transcending it). 
To understand that human relations are oriented primarily towards justice is forever to 
understand reconciliation as, at best, a principled compromise. Volf argues that the 
alternative is to place justice within an overarching framework of reconciliation: 
human doctrinal formulation;1 Habel, N, op cit, p21. See also Goldman, G, 'Reconciliation: An Urgent 
Task; A Review of the Literature* Nelen Yuba, no 67, 1997, pp 20-22. 
Volf, M, The Social Meaning of Reconciliation, Interpretation, 54 (2), April 2000, ppl58-172. 
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the placement of liberation within the overarching framework of 
reconciliation is crucial as well as the need to affirm and transcend justice in 
an act of grace. Grace, too, is a compromise of sorts, but not as a negative 
concession to my weakness or to your incalcitrance but as a gift to you with 
the hope of a reciprocal response given in the face of the impossibility of 
• „*i 566 
justice. 
Volf is at one with Sharp and Patton in his description of strict justice as impossible. 
Placing his discussion of reconciliation in the context of long-standing inter-group 
conflicts such as that which engulfed Christians and Moslems in the former Yugoslavia, 
Volf refers to the tendency of each group to construct divergent and irreconcilable 
narratives of oppression. Where there is no common vantage point from which one might 
describe one party as the oppressor and the other as victim, the pursuit of 'justice' can 
feed a spiral of violence from which there is no escape bar the destruction of one or the 
other protagonist. The transcendence of justice claims in what Volf describes as a 
theology of embrace is the alternative exit from such a situation. Volf points to the 
Pauline vision of a transformation or new creation as a model for inter-group relations. In 
doing so, he highlights a particularly potent aspect of the Australian reconciliation 
process; the desire for transcendence in a situation of seemingly intractable conflict. 
566
 ibid. See also Volf, M, 'Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Justice* Si Helmick, R and Petersen, R (eds) 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation^ pp38-45. Goldman sees no conflict between 'liberation' and 
reconciliation; 'nor do I accept that liberation is a prerequisite for reconciliation. I believe that the 
movement of reconciliation jfttasted by the victim before liberation occurs. Through experiencing a small 
part of the unfathomable mystery of the reconciliation the person recognizes that their experience is 
sacred.. .it is this that stirs them to seek a sustained expression of liberation.' op citt pp 16-17. 
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But Volf equivocates, and by doing so, repeats and reveals the ambiguity of this process. 
His earlier formulation of the relationship between justice and forgiveness as an 
asymmetrical dialectic makes way for a reconciliation based on simultaneous forgetting 
and transformation. Volf argues that the final act of reconciliation or of embrace is 
forgetting: 
it is a forgetting that assumes that the matters of 'truth' and 'justice' have 
been taken care of, that perpetrators have been named, judged and 
(hopefully) transformed, that victims are safe and their wounds healed, a 
forgetting that can therefore ultimately take place only together with the 
creation of'all things new.' 
Not only named, but also forgotten, injustice ceases to divide groups once caught in bitter 
conflict. This potent image is not without its own difficulties. Volf s suggestion that the 
act of forgiveness, as a prelude to reconciliation, is an affirmation of justice is in conflict 
with his suggestion that a common historical narrative between conflicting groups is 
Volf, M, Exclusion and Embrace, pi 31. He continues; *sinceno final redemption is possible without the 
redemption of the past, and since every attempt to redeem the past through reflection must fail because no 
theodicy can succeed, the final redemption is unthinkable without a certain kind of forgetting. Put starkly, 
the alternative is: either heaven or the memory of horror*; pi 35. My emphasis. Volf describes the will to 
embrace: 'the will to embrace includes in itself the will to determine what is just and to name wrong as 
wrong. The will to embrace includes the will to rectify the wrongs that have been done, and it includes the 
will to rectify the relationships to correspond to justice. And yet, though an actual embrace requires 
attending to justice, it does not require the establishment of strict justice'; Volf, M, 'Forgiveness, 
Reconciliation and Justice1, p43. 
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impossible. But an affirmation of justice, in the context of reconciliation, cannot be one-
sided. To forgive one party for wrongs it does not accept as its own is to foster further 
conflict; one need only look to the politics of history in this country to see that a process 
of apology and forgiveness must first be premised upon a degree of agreement in regards 
to history. And what if, more fundamentally, the complaint made goes exactly to this 
point; to the political 'unity' of the colonial state? The sovereignty claim suggests that 
Indigenous Australians constitute politically organized and independent peoples with 
rights to land and self-government. It is an identity claim: the injustice of its denial goes 
to the failure to recognize the political identity of Indigenous peoples. To transcend that 
claim would be to forfeit a claim to identity. There would no longer be two parties but 
one. Volf s suggestion that an *embrace' between two parties would not dissolve the 
identity of either does not in this instance ring true. To transcend this particular injustice 
would be to transcend oneself. 
Even if we accept that some agreement could be reached on the nature of the injustice 
suffered, how would we know how much justice is enough justice? Where does 
transcendence kick in and grievance cease? Volf argues that strict justice is conceptually 
impossible and contrary to Christian teaching, but that one must nevertheless seek as 
much justice as is possible in a given situation. But at what point should a person or 
group surrender their claims to justice for the sake of some greater good, such as 
reconciliation? Having subordinated justice to unity, the language of reconciliation does 
not mark any particular place at which the one should give way for the other. It does not 
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mark the point at which Indigenous peoples should give up their legitimate grievances in 
the interests o f getting on with the future' in a united Australia. 
The relation between justice and forgiveness is not that of a dialectic but that of an 
aporia. Reconciliation does not provide the ready means by which to settle, at last, the 
question of justice between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Rather, 1She relation 
of forgiveness to justice is that of two irreconcilable but nevertheless indissociable 
imperatives. To forgive on condition of penance or reparation only makes sense (and yet 
does not make sense) in light of an understanding of forgiveness as a gift; freely given, of 
the unforgivable. The miraculous (or, in Derrida's terms, the impossible) haunts this 
language notwithstanding its supposed secularisation. 
These problems are as evident in the popular discourses of Aboriginal reconciliation as 
they are in academic texts. For example; where restitution might be forever inadequate 
vertically, in the sense that it might, as John Paul II put it, never be enough to 'purchase' 
the gift of divine forgiveness, it does make sense to think of an approximate restitution in 
inter-personal relations.5 And as we have seen, the canon law, hi the context of 
Christian penitential practices, did account for restitution in the relations between 
persons. Christian theology does not. however, provide an answer to this moral problem. 
John Paul II writes of 'satisfaction* as 'the final act which crowns the sacramental sign of penance*. 
Satisfaction is not, however, 'a price that one pays for the sin absolved and for the forgiveness obtained: no 
human price can match what is obtained, which is the fruit of Christ's precious blood.' Acts of satisfaction 
should therefore be 'simple and humble', symbolic of'the personal commitment that the Christian has 
made to God in the sacrament to begin a new life*; ' Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and Penance: 
Origin and Meaning of the Document', December 2, 1984, p29, www.cin.org/cin 
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Both answers seem legitimate. In fact the question itself and the answers provided are not 
outside the language of reconciliation, but are part of that language. The conservative 
suggestion that reconciliation implies an easy forgiveness, that it demands forgiveness, is 
not to be thought of as an illegitimate corruption of Christian theology. Rather, that view 
is a product of the language games which go to make up the theology of reconciliation. It 
is not to be put to one side, and dismissed, but is to be taken up with the language of 
reconciliation itself. 
There is no sense in which an institutionalised process of political reconciliation can itself 
reconcile the contrary impulses of justice and forgiveness. The reconciliation of justice 
and forgiveness is, in theological terms, an act of divine transcendence. Christian 
understandings of horizontal reconciliation, between former enemies, rely on and are 
ultimately incidental to the primary Christian understanding of reconciliation as a relation 
between the individual and God. To 'secularise' and institutionalise the concept of 
reconciliation is to adopt a notion of horizontal reconciliation outside of that vertical 
relationship between man and God in which horizontal reconciliation is possible, and 
indeed, intelligible. Unless forgiveness arrives unsolicited, pure and as an experience of 
the 'impossible', then a secular reconciliation process is doomed from the outset to repeat 
but not resolve the tension evident in Christian theology between forgiveness and justice. 
In a self-consciously secular politics these discourses of reconciliation could refer to 
apology Justice and public ritual but, cutoff from God, not, for an end-point or 'closure', 
to miracles. Reconciliation was a never to be completed, or if institutionally completed, 
then substantially incomplete, process. The unity promised never arrived, and perhaps 
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never could arrive, at least not by these means. The reconciliation process, whilst 
enjoining Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians to unity, compromise (and 
forgetting?) may have cemented in the language of Australian politics two subject 
positions as distinct and permanent political constituencies. 
Justice and Difference 
Against (and with) the idea of justice as equality or uniformity of treatment is the notion 
of justice as the recognition of difference, of measuring and cutting justice to the 
particularity of the other so as not to be unjust by subjecting what must always remain 
unique to the rigidity of formalised law.5 This notion informs, after the ideas of 
reparation and of distribution, a third intuition regarding the nature of the justice owed in 
a colonial context.5 More than simply compensation for past wrongs, the return of lands 
or a commitment to reducing Indigenous disadvantage, justice must also entail respect for 
the colonised party as the colonised party. This understanding of justice is supported by 
the belief that colonisation, over and above any particular act or event that occurred in the 
process of colonisation, was itself a violation of the rights of Indigenous peoples. In 
particular, the legal doctrine of terra nullius was a particularly harsh form of non-
The aporia within justice 'implies on the one hand a respect for universality, and, on the other hand for 
singularity- you cannot be just for everyone and for every single one'; Derrida, J, 'A Discussion with 
Jacques Derrida,' Theory and Event 5:1. 
Patton, P, Justice and Difference•, p84. 
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recognition which, although now abandoned in relation to property rights, still animates 
Australian thinking on sovereignty. 
These three concepts of justice do not, however, fit together in any neat pattern, but 
produce conflicting and apparently paradoxical responses to particular questions of 
justice.572 Consider, for example, the range of responses to the Mabo judgment. 
Conservatives pointed to native title as a source of division in Australian society; as a 
legal right available only to Indigenous Australians it threatened the equality and hence 
the unity of Australian citizens. That claim was met by the argument that the judgment 
established racial equality before the law It extended the protection of the common law 
to the interests held in land by Indigenous as well as non-Indigenous peoples,573 But this 
response did not displace the deep commitment within liberal political theory to a 
principle of 'sameness of identity among members of the political community', a 
principle evident in works such as Rawls' Theory of Justice as well as in Howard 
government rhetoric on Indigenous affairs. 74 
See, for example, Asch, M, 'From Calder to Van der Peet' in Havemann, P, op cit, p439-441 
* See also Nancy Fraser's work on the 'redistribution-recognition dilemma.' Fraser points to the growing 
tendency to pit distributivist models of justice, based on a politics of equality or identity amongst citizens, 
against the politics of recognition or of difference. Fraser notes the growing salience of claims for the 
recognition of group difference at the expense of claims for social equality. This distinction is, Fraser 
argues, a false antithesis; 'I assume that justice today requires both redistribution and recognition.* But 
economic remedies generally involve the dimunition of group difference, especially in circumstances where 
group identity is itself a function of economic marginalisation; 'the upshot is that the politics of recognition 
and the politics of redistribution often appear to have mutually contradictory aims'; Justice Jnterruptus, pp 
12-15. See also Austin-Broos, 'Silent in the Face of the Aranda\ pi 16. 
Patton, P, Justice as Difference, p85. 
4
 ibid, p88. See also Havemann, op c/7, p472. 
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Recognition of difference cuts against the basic liberli commitment to the equality or 
identity of the citizens. But this is not a simple clash of alien ideas, but a tension between 
identity and dignity mediated by a shared commitment to human equality. • The 
movement from hierarchically ordered societies to an appreciation of a universal human 
dignity was part of the democratisation of the old feudal regimes. The emphasis on 
human dignity led to the now universal acceptance of an equal and undifferentiated 
citizenship. But a second movement, related to the modern concept of identity, has given 
rise to the politics of difference. The recognition of human dignity supposes a human 
equality sometimes understood as an affront to authenticity, and hence to identity. The 
equal recognition of human dignity requires, paradoxically, the recognition of difference. 
As Taylor puts it; 
575
 Taylor, C, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, p28. Taylor describes a 'displacement of 
the moral accent* in the idea that each person is endowed with a moral sense, or an intuitive understanding 
of right and wrong. The displacement Taylor describes is the tendency to consider this 'voice within' not 
as a guide to morality but to personal authenticity and identity: 'On the original view, the inner voice was 
important because fefells us what the right thing to do is. Being in touch with our moral feelings matters 
here, as a means to the end of acting rightly....the displacement of the moral accent comes about when 
being in touch with our feelings takes on independent and crucial moral significance. It comes to be 
something we have to attain if we are to be true and full human beings*; ibid, p29. See also Tamir, Y, 
Liberal Nationalism: 'the emergence of the nation-state at the end of the eighteenth century was marked by 
the emergence of public education, whose main goal was to galvanize all citizens into one homogenized 
nation. The spread of the notion of universal citizenship introduced a new conception of equality,. .this 
change prepared the ground for the emergence of state neutrality...newly empowered individuals 
demanded that their rights, especially their right to retain thcfrtmique culture, be respected. These changes 
in turn prepared the ground for the emergence of multiculturalism and the revival of separate ethnic-
national education1; pxvii. 
On the obligation to 'Know Thyself, see also Foucault, M, 'About the Beginnings of the Hermeneutics 
of the Self, in Carrette, J, (ed) Religion and Culture by Michael Foucault, ppI62-181. 
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the politics of difference grows out of the politics of universal dignity 
through one of those shifts with which we are long familiar, where a new 
understanding of the human social condition imparts a radically new 
meaning to an old principle....the understanding of identity as formed in 
interchange, and as possibly so malformed, introduces a new form of 
second-class status into our purview. 
Taylor links the conflict between the politics of equal dignity and the politics of 
difference to this tangled intellectual history. He settles on a presumption of the equal 
worth of all cultures as the bedrock to a politics of difference which does not lapse into 
what he describes as a form of neo-nietzschean condescension, or verges towards cultui&l 
imperialism. Taylor's liberal version of the politics of recognition, based upon a 
presumption of equality between cultures, stands in contrast to Derrida's more radical 
orientation towards the other as other. As Caputo explains, 'deconstruction is the 
affirmation of the coming of the other' : 
Taylor, C, op citt p4I. Taylor relates the upsurge in the 'politics of recognition* to a Hegelian 
understanding of human identity as dialogically, rather than monologically, constructed, 'we become full 
human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity through our 
acquisition of rich human languages of expression...we leam these modes of expression through exchanges 
with others.' To withhold recognition of the other, or to recognise the other in a manner alien to her, is to 
be unjust. Taylor, op citt pp25-32. See also NichoIIs, A 'The Secularization of Revelation from Plato to 
Freud' Contretemps 1, September 2000. See also Smith on separatist pluralism and universalist integration, 
Smith, R, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History, p474. 
5 8
 Taylor, op city p73. See also Volf, M, Exclusion and Embrace, p204. 
Caputo, J, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p53. 
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the work of deconstruction is set in motion, engaged only by a pledge of 
responsibility, indeed of unlimited responsibility...For Derrida, 
deconstruction is set in motion by something that calls upon and addresses 
us, overtakes us (sur-prises) and even overwhelms us, to which we must 
respond, and so be responsive and responsible. Endlessly. 
Justice is irreducible to the order of law and right, but is unthinkable without law and 
right. It 'solicits us from afar': 
justice does not exist, is nothing present, no thing, is not found somewhere 
either here, in present actuality, nor up ahead as a foreseeable ideal, a future-
present. Rather, there is justice, which means: justice solicits us from afar, 
from the future, from and as a future always structurally to come, calls come 
to us, preventing the walls of the present from enclosing us in the 
possible.581 
It is this call, or this responsibility to the other in the name of justice, that renders all law 
deconstructible. -
Caputo, J in Derrida, J, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p51. 
581
 ibid, 135. 
Derrida: the law as such can be deconstructed and has to be deconstructed. That is the condition of 
historicity, revolution, morals, ethics and progress. But justice is not the law. Justice is what gives us the 
impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the Jaw, that is, to deconstruct the law. Without a call for 
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At least one conclusion follows from this: the claim that justice requires the recognition 
of Indigenous sovereignty did not stand on the principles of reparative justice alone. A 
second kind of reasoning, or another concept of justice, also animates the sovereignty 
claim. This stronger concept of justice as the recognition of difference pointed towards 
the recognition of indigeneity as a source of legal and political rights over and above any 
claim to reparation stemming from injustices long since past. The counter-factual 
difficulties of imagining 'what if?' were subverted by a claim to justice that demanded to 
be answered now, for the sake of the present. 
Unity/Treaty/Nation 
Sharp points to the interminable debates on justice in New Zealand in the 1980's as a 
product of cultural difference between the Maori and the Pakeha. Those debates related to 
the moral sovereignty of the protagonist^ the ability to say what was just as between 
themselves. Sharp draws our attention to the way in which the content of justice 
depends on a set of prior evaluations regarding freedom, inequality, obligations and so 
on. In a condition of bi-culturalisms no agreement could be found on these prior 
evaluations, and as a consequence, there could be no agreement on what justice for the 
justice we would not have any interest in deconstructing the law.' Derrida, J, Deconstruction in a Nutshell 
: a Conversation with Jacques Derrida, p 16. 
Sharp, A, op cit, pi. 
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Maori entailed.584 Justice as reparation and justice as distribution were not sufficiently 
precise concepts; they left open too many questions regarding the value of and the source 
of entitlement to goods to provide anyone with a definitive answer to the question posed. 
As a result, Sharp points to the development of a form of legalistic argument based on 
sovereignty. The possession of sovereignty entailed the right to define the content of legal 
justice and to override all other concepts of justice. The problem of the content of justice 
between two political groups was rhetorically circumvented, but injustice remained: 
their conception of the morality that ought to obtain between the two 
peoples was a legalistic one, and one largely derived from contemplating the 
form of the modern state. And it came to this: that each contender proposed 
to visit their own conception of justice on the other and thus still more 
systematically than before to render injustice to them.5 5 
Maori and Pakeha reached for sovereignty as the means to claim for themselves the right 
to say what was just as between colonised and coloniser. As an observation regarding 
debates on reparation and redistribution, on the satisfaction of past wrongs and on the 
equitable distribution of material goods, this seems to be correct, and applicable to the 
Australian reconciliation process and to the politics of Indigenous affairs here in general. 
ibid, pp23-23;* the cultures did not completely share the same views as to the substantive rules of law 
or morals, they differed on the claims of need and had different ideas as to who deserved what. There was 
too much vagueness, too much room for disagreement and misunderstanding and all the ills that travelled in 
their train....It was a form of disagreement that could lead to a politics of competing and starkly opposed 
epistemologies1; p32. Jeremy Webber also characterises the move to sovereignty as a mark of frustration, 
rather than as a claim to justice in its own right; Webber, J, Reimagining Canada, pi 7. 
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But as a general point regarding the nature of justice this observation obscures another 
concept of justice invoked by the very movement towards sovereignty. This is justice as 
the strong form of recognition identified above; recognition of indigeneity as the source 
of legal and political rights, of specifically Indigenous rights. The move to sovereignty 
may well be the product of an endemic frustration amongst Aboriginal peoples regarding 
injustice both present and past, and with their inability to secure agreement on what 
justice entails as between themselves and non-Aboriginal Australia. But it is just as 
plausible to suggest that the move to sovereignty is not merely the means by which to 
claim the right to define the content of justice, but might be an appeal to a form of justice 
in and of itself; the claim to be treated on equal terms to the Commonwealth of Australia, 
to be recognised as politically organised peoples capable of treating with other politically 
organised peoples. And flis to this point that Sharp returns. The way out of the dilemma 
described above was not to argue that the two cultures were united by a shared concept of 
justice; 'it was that the contents of justice should be thought of as constructed by way of 
formal contract or agreement and enforced by authority.'5 6 They turned, that is, to the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
585
 Sharp, A, opciU pi-
386
 Sharp, A, op <M% p32. Sharp described this as a 'thinner' concept of justice and dates its origins to 
'ancient times*; *in the absence of widespread agreement on the depth and detail of justice a thinner 
conception of justice can be constructed by two or more parties. This justice can now be enforced as justice 
must be if it is to be justice and not just an ideal of good conduct. It can be enforced because now justice 
consists in giving people their rights specified in contract rather than their rights according to the disputed 
conceptions of what justice is1; p32. 
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The Australian reconciliation process also turned towards discussion of negotiated 
agreements as a means to spell out, definitively, the rights of Indigenous peoples vis a vis 
the various Australian state and federal governments. There was a degree of pragmatism 
here. A treaty, compact or framework agreement would be the vehicle for the recognition 
of particular Indigenous rights. But the debate operated on a higher level as well. The 
conclusion of a treaty or treaties would not merely recognise particular Indigenous rights 
vis a vis Australian governments, it would recognise the capacity of Indigenous peoples 
to enter into agreements of that nature.5 7 The recognition of Indigenous peoples as 
sovereign peoples would be a form of justice in its own right, over and above the justice 
of particular reparative or distributivist measures included in the text. 
Treaty politics is a tradition of talking about just relationships between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous peoples which has its own history, predating reconciliation, but which 
nevertheless made sense in terms of reconciliation, as a means of putting the past to 
rest.5 8 Reconciliation has been characterised by Michelle Grattan as a response to the 
Patton, P, Constitutional Paradoxes, p3. 
88
 See Rowse*s account of treaty politics in the 1970'sand 80's in Obliged to be Difficult, ppl74-187 and 
The Treaty Debate 1979-J 98 3 and the Continuing Problem of Federalism, AIATSIS Seminar Paper, 
http://www .ai atsis .go v. au/rsrch/smnrs/papers/rowse.htm Elliot Johnston QC provides some discussion of 
the treaty debate in the late 1970's re: National Aboriginal Congress; Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody, vol II, p361. Rowley also notes that a suggestion from a Catholic missionary at a 1929 
conference convened by Prime Minister Stanley Bruce that there be a 'state within a state governed by the 
natives' was discussed and withdrawn. In 1929 the Communist Party of Australia advocated self-
determination including the right to secede; Rowley, CD. Aboriginal Policy and Practice, vol /, p271. 
More generally, Reynolds points out that the justice of the acquisition of jurisdiction over both land and 
peoples was a much debated topic long before the emergence of the politics of indigeniety in the 1970's; 
see, for example, Dispossession; Black Australians and White Invaders, pp3-I6, 78. Griffiths also points to 
earlier debates, such as that ill the 1837 House of Commons Select Committee on Aborigines in the British 
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failure of treaty politics in the late eighties, as an opening from a deadlock pitting Labor 
and Indigenous groups against the Coalition's critique of'black parliaments' and a nation 
divided.589 However, as discussed in chapter threee, the relationship between treaty-talk 
and the official reconciliation process is somewhat more complex and interesting. Just as 
reconciliation discourses demonstrated a- 'polyvalent* capacity to accommodate the 
language of social justice, those discourses also included a kind of subterranean treaty 
politics by another name. 
The treaty debate, although generally absent from the pages of the 'quality' press, had not 
disappeared from view completely, and had only been obscured by the focus on 
reconciliation in the mainstream media and by the major parties. The process of 
formulating a document or documents of reconciliation gave many people the opportunity 
to engage in a treaty politics of another name. Participants in an Indigenous leaders 
forum convened by ATSIC in September 1999, Focus 2000 and Beyond, recommended 
that Indigenous peoples continue to assert that they remained sovereign. The forum 
equated self-determination, defined as the right of a people to freely determine their 
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, with 
Settlements; 'it might be assumed that the native inhabitants of any land have an incontrovertible right to 
their own soil; a plain and sacred right, however, which seems not to have been understood. Europeans 
have entered their borders uninvited and when there, have not only acted as if they were undoubted lords of 
the soil, but have punished thd&atives as aggressors, if they have even evinced a disposition to live in their 
own country'; cited in Griffiths, M, op city p25. Peter Read's account of the split in the Federal Council for 
the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islander's throws some light on the radicalisation of 
indigenous affairs in Australia since the 1970's; 'Cheeky, Insolent and Anti-White', Australian Journal of 
History and Politics, 1990, vol 23, nol, pp73-83. 
Grattan, M, 'Introduction*, Essays on Australian Reconciliation, p7. 
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sovereignty. In turn, they understood the reconciliation process to be 'a platform for 
progressing negotiations over our issues.'590 Whilst some participants expressed concern 
that the reconciliation process was a 'road to nowhere', the forum resolved that 
Indigenous peoples 'need to use the CAR process.' Reconciliation was 'the best chance 
we have...A window of opportunity giving rise to the development of an agreement 
about a framework to identify and negotiate a whole host of issues over time.'5 l 
Reconciliation, whilst something to be approached pragmatically, was not, in the forum's 
view, necessarily opposed to sovereignty. 
Although it is extremely difficult to achieve (as witnessed recently in East 
Timor) there is still a need for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders to 
pursue their sovereignty agenda. Some participants considered that true 
reconciliation could not be achieved without recognition of our sovereignty 
and some form of treaty. 
The forum did not accept that the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty necessarily 
implied secession from the Commonwealth. 
The CAR could not keep faith with Indigenous organisations if it worked to keep these 
issues off the agenda permanently. It held open, in all its submissions to government, the 
Focus 2000 and Beyond: Report on Indigenous Leaders Summit 14-IS September 1999, pp 16-20. 
™ ibid, p22. 
^*$kd,p2Q. 
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right of Indigenous peoples to assert their sovereign rights.593 But the Council's ability to 
take a position on the issues of Indigenous sovereignty and the possibility of entering into 
a treaty was limited. Structural factors were important. The CAR was a supposedly 
bipartisan body, funded by and appointed by the government. It was also a body 
composed of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous persons. The chances of arriving at a 
consensus view on these issues were small from the outset. The CAR, although engaged 
in the process of producing documents of reconciliation, did not take up the language of 
sovereignty as its own. Ian Viner, former deputy chair of the CAR revealed in May 2000 
that the Council had discussed the issue of sovereignty but 'would not go so far as to call 
(the reconciliation documents) a treaty.' 
The CAR took a more assertive role in the treaty debate in the lead up to and the 
aftermath of Corroboree 2000 and the Bridge Walk.595 The election of Geoff Clark 
(deputy Chair of the APG) to the Chair of ATSIC had already added a more radical voice 
to the Council. Clark claimed that the size of the public turnout for the Bridge Walk gave 
Going Forward: Social Justice for the First Australians recommended that the government produce a 
concise statement affirming that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 'are the first peoples of 
Australia* and that 'the wider community recognise that ATSI peoples, by working within the existing 
national structures, do not abandon their views on or a right to advocate separate indigenous sovereignty.* 
CAR, Going Forward: Social Justice for the First Australians, 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/going forward/3 .html 
594
 ibid. 
Former Keating government minister Gary Johns argued that the reconciliation process was the product 
of the failure of treaty politics, but nevertheless accused the CAR of continuing this agenda: 'the 
Reconciliation Council is also keeping the treaty agenda alive with its discussion of a document of 
reconciliation, and its desire to have indigenous customary law recognised.* Johns G 'Reconciliation: Read 
the Fine Print', Quadrant, November 1999, pi 6. 
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the Prime Minister a 'mandate' to begin negotiating a treaty.596 A treaty would recognise 
that Australia was composed of two nations: 'We are here. Stop the denial....What are we 
if we're not separate peoples/597 Michael Mansell, also of the APG, said that 'it is two 
nations. It always has been.' Mansell had now moved some distance from his initial 
response to the reconciliation process as mutually exclusive of sovereignty and self-
determination. Now he posited an inherent and perhaps teleological link between the 
process of reconciliation and a treaty: 'A treaty, or something like a treaty, has to be the 
end product of the reconciliation process. Otherwise there is no substance to it.' 
Mansell and Clark suggested said that the word 'treaty' was not essential to an 
agreement. Said Clark, 'call it a marriage certificate. Call it what you like.' A treaty, 
compact or agreement was not, however, an end-point, but a new beginning. As Clark 
made clear in his speech to Corroboree 2000, a treaty would not be a once and for all 
solution to the problem of justice for Indigenous peoples, but would be the framework in 
which those questions could be asked anew by future generations of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people: 'true reconciliation means forging a new set of ground rules. We need 
a new equation, a change in the relationship. A change based on the distinct rights of 
That reading of the participants intentions is highly arguable, given that we have already seen the wide 
variety of ways in which people who have supported reconciliation have understood the nature of that 
concept. 
'Stand-off looms in push for treaty'; Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2000, p.8 See also *A message 
from 'white nobodies' comes out of the blue*; Tears and prayers as a fire burns for justice*; 'Sorry PM, you 
flunked the test'; 'Deane's history lesson: the past is not anthother country* Sydney Morning Herald, 29 
May 2000, p.8 
'Stand-off looms in push for treaty*, Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2000, p.8 
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Indigenous peoples.'599 The APG was not alone in its enthusiasm for a treaty. Mick 
Dodson echoed the call for a treaty in his key-note address to Corroboree 2000. And the 
previously more subdued Jackie Huggins, who had co-authored the Draft Declaration for 
Reconciliation without once referring to a treaty, now claimed that a treaty was 'the next 
logical step' for reconciliation and a 'winnable proposition' for the CAR. Ian Viner was 
'fascinated' and 'thrilled' that the treaty debate had re-emerged in the wake of the 
People's Walk.601 
These comments may have reflected little more than the optimism of the moment. At best 
they could be seen as part of a longer term effort to raise public awareness of the treaty 
proposal itself (although, given that twenty years of agitation had produced only sparing 
results, it is difficult to imagine what 'long-term' means in this context.) There was no 
prospect that the Bridge Walk would itself bring the government to the negotiating table. 
A mass demonstration of public support for Aboriginal reconciliation did not alter 
Howard's thinking on the issue of a treaty. His oft-noted obstinacy on this issue could 
more charitably be described as consistency. As Opposition leader in April 1989 Howard 
had attacked the Labor government's Aboriginal affairs policy as divisive: 
5
 Walking Together, no 29, August 2000. 
600
 Sydney Morning Herald May 29, 2000,4 Stand-off Looms In Push For Treaty", p8. 
Viner: 'I think h*s fascinating that the treaty word has risen again, because when I was on the council, 
we discussed it... but the council would not go so far as to call (its documents) a treaty. So it was a real 
thrill to see it in the declaration." Sydney Morning Herald June 3,2000 The Other Dirty Word* p35. See 
also Dodson, P, Until the Chains are Broken: Lingiari Lecture, 1999 and Reconciliation at the Crossroads, 
address to the National Press Club, April 1996. 
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If the government wants to divide Australian against Australian, if it wants 
to create a black nation within the Australian nation, it should go ahead 
with its Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Commission and its treaty. In 
the process, it will be doing a monumental disservice to the Australian 
•i 602 
community. 
In 1998 he formulated his opposition to a treaty as a sincere commitment to the unity of 
the Australian nation: 'I don't like the idea of a treaty because it implies that we are two 
nations. We are not. We are one nation. We are all Australians before anything else, one 
indivisible nation.1 6 The Bridge Walk did not alter Howard's commitment to the 
indivisibility of the nation and to an idea of reconciliation as a practical endeavour 
pursued within the context of One Australia. Insisting that a treaty referred only to an 
agreement between sovereign nation-states, Howard argued that an undivided nation 
could not make a treaty with itself: 'I mean to talk about one part of Australia making a 
Courier Mail June 1, 2000, pi 5 'Howard reads the mood on treaty' Peter Charlton. 
603
 Howard indicated prior to the release of the Declaration that the government would not support a treaty; 
it would support "a document that recognizes the prior occupation of the country by indigenous people, 
recognizing their place as part of the Australian community and their right to preserve their culture.' Such a 
document would need to be consistent with 'the notion of one undivided united Australian community 
where our first and foremost allegiance is to Australia'; 'Signs of a Softer Howard' Sydney Morning 
Herald, October 13, 1998, pl3. Philip Ruddock, now the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for 
Reconciliation, said that the word 'treaty' was not necessarily an obstacle for the government. The 
government only objected to the use of the word treaty where it implied the existence of two nations. See 
also Windschuttle, K, 'Why there should be no Aboriginal treaty', Quadrant, 45 (10) October 2001 : 15-
24; *many white people today, especially those who last year walked across bridges for reconciliation, no 
doubt see a treaty as some kind of welfare measure or as a nice symbolic gesture. It deserves to be 
recognized, rather, as a device that, in one stroke, would establish Aborigines as a political ly separate race 
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treaty with another part is to accept that we are in effect two nations.' Any treaty process 
would itself be divisive insofar as it would necessarily include debates about land 
ownership, regional governance and other contentious issues. Echoing McMahon in 
1972, Howard argued that 'self determination' would lead to separate development. 
Howard also rejected references in the Declaration to self-determination, a formal 
government apology to the Stolen Generations and the recognition of customary law. 5 
Much of what was said about Aboriginal affairs and the Australian nation by the Howard 
government in the late nineties had already been said by Coalition parliamentarians in the 
mid to late eighties. But there is a deeper continuity here as well. The Howard 
government understood the nation, and the identity of the people within it, in a manner 
identified by James Tully as the dominant assumption of modern constitutionalism: the 
image of the nation as homogenous and uniform. This image of the nation is an 'empire 
of uniformity' wherein the people are considered as culturally indifferent members of one 
society who aim to set up a constitutional association with a single locus of 
government.607 These assumptions have long marked the institutional relationship 
of people.* A treaty would also pose 'long-term risks to Australian sovereignty'; p24. See also Kymlicka, 
W, Politics in the Vernacular, p33. 
Courier Mail May 30, 2000, p4 'PM rejects calls for native treaty1 Dennis Atkins. 
Courier Mail May 30, 2000, p4 *PM rejects calls for native treaty' Dennis Atkins. 
See also Marr, D on the thematic links between Howard and Hanson; The High Price of Heaven, p45. 
Tully, J, Strange Multiplicity, p58. William Connolly makes a related point: western political thought 
has traditionally privileged relations of identity over relations of difference. Connolly makes the point, 
however, that 'identity requires difference to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure 
its own self-certainty. Identity is thus a slippery, insecure experience, dependant on its ability to define 
difference and vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or 
subvert definiiins applied to them'; Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, 
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between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia. The continuity in 
Howard's rhetoric on national unity and Indigenous sovereignty recalls the words of his 
Liberal and Labor predecessors.608 Paul Hasluck, then Minister for the Territories in the 
Menzies government and later Governor-General, had said in 1955: 'We do not want a 
society in Australia in which one group of people enjoy one set of privileges and another 
group enjoy another set of privileges.'609 Equality was to be achieved by the assimilation 
of Indigenous peoples and migrants to' the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. The 
government would work on the social body to create a unity that was at present lacking. 
The irony being, of course, that the policy of assimilation repeatedly authorised the 
suspension of civil and political rights in the name of creating an homogenous equality 
amongst the citizenry. 
p64. Connolly expands this argument in relation to liberal understandings of democracy as grounded in a 
pre-existent unity marked ideally by race: Connolly: ' a nation is something that has been or will be but 
never is at any actually existing moment....Its promise as future unity is thus defined less by positive 
exemplification than by marking a set of constituencies who deviate from it in need of assimilation, 
correction, punishment, or elimination'; Why 1 am not a Secularist, p85. 
Where Hasluck said in 1963, "the whole tendency in Australia is to eliminate laws that apply especially 
to Aboriginal people*, ALP leader H.V. Evatt had said in 1957 that 'the only thing to be done with the 
Australian Aborigines, full-blood or otherwise, is to give them the benefit of the same laws as apply to any 
other Australians.' Evatt, H.V, Hansard, vol 14, 1957, p!227, cited in Griffiths, M, op cit, p79. Griffiths 
also cites Kim Beazley Snr; 'the deepest aspiration of the native women and those of mixed blood I have 
met, has been to have a decent home, to see their adolescent daughters given some training in domestic 
services and to see their children growing up in an environment that will enable them to lead a civilized 
life*; p73. The 1951 Native Affairs Conference (convened by Hasluck) had defined assimlation as meaning 
that 'in the course of time it is expected that all persons of abefSjiinal blood or mixed bl.ood in Australia, 
will live like white Australians do. The acceptance of this policy governs all aspects of native affairs 
administration1 cited in Griffiths, M, op cit, p74. 
609
 Hasluck, P, House Hansard, 1955, vol 8 p!331, cited in Griffiths, M, op cit, p76. 
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Former Liberal Aboriginal Affairs Minister Peter Howson wrote an opinion piece in the 
Sydney Morning Herald in the lead up to Corroboree 2000 in which he suggested that the 
majority of Australians were opposed to apologising to Indigenous peoples. He further 
asked, rhetorically, 'what is more important, a job or an apology?' He also attacked the 
general direction of government policy in Indigenous affairs: 'the granting of land rights 
to some Aborigines...has created cultural and economic $ul-de-sacs....We should be 
encouraging the movement out of traditional communities.' Some Indigenous persons 
had developed a reconciliation as treaty position, Howson offered reconciliation as 
assimilation: 
Reconciliation is in fact proceeding naturally over the course of time. Surely 
the marriage (de facto or de jure) of nearly two-thirds of indigenous adults to 
non-indigenous spouses, and with more than seventy percent living in urban 
communities and professing Christianity, is evidence of that process. 
Rowse describes Hasluck as the prophet of this vision of an 'affluent, classless and 
monocultural society.' He notes, however, that assimilation policy 'signifies a doctrine of 
610
 See Rowse, T, Obliged to be Difficult, pp 17-21. 
61
' Howson, P,4 Why there should be no apology' Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May 2000 p. 17. Then 
Australian Democrats Leader John Coulter had pointed to this element of Coalition Aboriginal affairs 
policy in the debates on ATSIC in the late eighties: 'Quite clearly the Opposition, from its remarks, does 
not share those views. It does not understand the very point that we are trying to make. The Opposition's 
view of reconciliation is one in which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders integrate totally in the 
mainstream culture. If one could invent a new and useful word, to be used in the same way as we use other 
words, such as * sexist" and 'racist', it would be culturist'. The Opposition's attitude is 'culturist'. It accepts 
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nationhood better than it defines a distinct and internally coherent practice of 
government. 
The policy was ambiguous even in departure. Assimilation made way for 'integration' 
and an acknowledgment of the right of Indigenous peoples to retain their cultures if they 
so wished.613 Prime Minister McMahon's 1972 Australia Day speech nevertheless 
included the familiar nationalist refrain: 
The government's aim is to have one Australian society in which all 
Australians, including Aboriginal Australians, will have equal rights, 
responsibilities and opportunities....The thought of separate development 
of Aborigines as a long-term aim is completely alien to the government's 
objectives...6 4 
This ideology of equality persists in Howard government rhetoric and in Australian 
political discourse more generally despite the abandonment of assimilation as 
government policy. In 1998, recalling Hasluck in 1955, and Hanson in 1996, Howard 
said that 'I cannot accept... the principle that one group of Australians should be given 
that the mainstream culture not only is dominant and superior but also should totally replace the culture of 
Aboriginal people'; Coulter, J, 17 October, 1987, Senate Hansard, p2020. 
~ White Flour, White Power, pl07. Rowse also argues that McMahon rejected assimilation without 
providing any clear alternative framework; p204. 
6
 On 'integration*, see Rowse, T, Obliged to be Difficult, pp24, 27 
614
 House Hansard, 1972, vol 5, pp 122-148, cited in Griffiths, M, op cit, pi 19. 
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rights and privileges that are not available to others.' It is striking that Howard's 
expression repeats, almost verbatim, Hasluck's 1955 speech. 
Whereas the Coalition saw a unified Australia as one in which Indigenous and non-
Indigenous did not exist in anything but a rhetorical sense, the CAR and most advocates 
of a treaty saw a united Australia as being one in which the relationship between the 
constituent parts of the nation was a just and harmonious one. Advocates of a treaty did 
not in general assume, as the government did, that reconciliation was at odds with 
indigeneity as a source of political rights. The CAR, despite its wariness of and its 
dalliances with the language of sovereignty, maintained that Indigenous peoples had not 
surrendered their right to argue that they were and remain sovereign. It also noted that 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples claimed rights stemming from their status 
as citizens of the Commonwealth as well as from their indigeneity. 
Some advocates of Indigenous sovereignty assumed that reconciliation promised a future 
unity, but one which was not at present complete. Fred Chaney argued that 'the task of 
reconciliation is more fundamental than achieving more equal social outcomes for 
Aborigines. There is a deeper issue that so far we have all been unwilling to face....long 
term reconciliation means carrying out that debate with a common position, a common 
acceptance of the legal and moral basis on which we live together and would live and 
Howard, J, The Australian, 16 April 1998; cited in Bennett, S, White Politics and Black Australians, 
pl4. In New Zealand, Sharp has pointed to a 'a powerful and pervasive public (Pakeha) ideology of 
equality' mobilized to deny Maori claims to equalizing treatmen&Current inequalities were seen a being 
justified in terms of work ethics, laziness, drugs, bad parenting, bitterness about the past; Sharp, A, op cit, 
pl94. 
303 
work together in the future.'616 There was a lack or a stain that had to be dealt with first, 
the historical fact of colonisation without consent, before Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
could be said to be reconciled. Aden Ridgeway, for example, rejected the Prime 
Minister's assertion that a treaty would be in itself divisive: 'People need to understand 
that division already exists and any formal agreement is about bringing unity and 
bringing about the co-existence and harmony that's completely absent.' 
Reconciliation was not, in this schema, the dissolution of difference, but the means by 
which difference could be managed, in both a structural or substantive sense and in an 
attitudinal sense. The relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous was not to be 
seen as a competitive or mutually exclusive one, but rather, as one potentially 
characterised by justice and harmony. In these formulations a reconciled nation was 
one in which unity was characterised by just relationships between constituent parts of 
the political community. Indigenous and non-Indigenous remained separate, in the sense 
that each was a particular political constituency, perhaps with differentiated rights and 
autonomous political institutions. But the historical sources of division between these two 
constituencies had been accounted for. In this sense, reconciliation was a peace or 
harmony amongst different parts of a nation, rather than the reduction of all citizens to a 
single, liberal individualism in which all, paradoxically, are the same. Mick Dodson, for 
616
 Chaney, F 'The Hidden Barriers to Reconciliation*, Sydney Morning Herald, November 3 1998, pl5. 
617
 The Australian May 30, 2000, p I 'No treaty: PM rejects black call*. 
Wenten Rubuntja, a member of the first Council, describes reconciliation as 'recognising differences in 
the people, the law and cultural aspects so that we can all work together in harmony to achieve a common 
goal.1 Fellow Council member Belza Lowah saw reconciliation as being 'about agreeing and resolving this 
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example, has argued that Indigenous peoples possess two citizenships, one in relation to 
the Commonwealth, the second in relation to their Indigenous nations. For Dodson, the 
latter is primary. 
The treaty proposal appeals to a strong intuition of justice as the recognition of difference 
as well as to other notions of justice as reparation. Particular measures included in the 
text would conceivably deal with matters of distributive justice. The proposal is certainly 
appealing. It promises to account for pastfcjustices, remedy seemingly intractable socio-
economic disadvantage, and to recognise and manage cultural and political difference. 
But Pocock sounds a note of caution. Treaty making is no selfless business. The 
ascription of federative or treaty making capacity to the Maori, for example, implied a 
capacity to alienate property: 
the Crown was interested in ascribing to Maori a capacity to hold property 
and enter into treaties, in order to acquire sovereignty over the processes 
of purchase and settlement, over which it did not wish the settlement 
companies to acquire an authority preceding its own. 
business of truly co-existing*; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Annual Report, 1992-93, 
www.austIii.edu/au/au/special/rsiproiect/rsilibrarv/car/arl993-4/ 
61
 Dodson, M, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People and Citizenship, Address to Conference, 
University of New South Wales, 20 August 1993; Dodson framed the issue as "how to support, within one 
geographic are or one political entity, different peoples and their different interests and institutions.* 
www.hreoc.gov.au/socialjustice/speeches/i8 7 9 .html 
* Pocock, J.G.A * Waitangi as Mystery of State: Consequences of the Ascription of Federative Capacity to 
the Maori' in Ivison, D et al (eds), op tit, p25. 
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An analogous comment could be made in relation to the Australian Native Title regime. 
Having recognised the existence of native title in principle, the operation of the Native 
Title Act operates to effect an extinguishment in fact, legitimising (again) the 
dispossession of those Indigenous peoples whose native title claims are unsuccessful. 2 
A further analogy extends to the Australian treaty proposal. A treaty between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia, if it were to be negotiated and accepted, will 
not be offered without condition of reciprocal benefit for the Commonwealth. More than 
merely recognising the existence of autonomous Indigenous political communities, treaty 
making promises to legitimise the Commonwealth's occupation of parts of the Australian 
continent. For example, Nugget Coombs, writing in 1979, considered that the treaty 
proposal would 'finally add some colour of right to our occupation of this land.'622 In 
1987 Labor MHR Warren Snowdon quoted Xavier Herbert in his address in reply to the 
Governor-General's opening of parliament: 'until we give back to the black man just a bit 
of the land that was his...we will remain what we have always been so far, a people 
without integrity, not a nation but a community of thieves.' 
For example, Richard Bartlett argues that the National Native Title Tribunal has 'developed a 
philosophy of decision-making that favours certainty and development, and that is in the interests of reott-
Aboriginal parties.* The High Court in Mabo and Wik went some way to establishing equality before the 
law, but 'the Native Title Act has put non-Aboriginal interests to the fore by providing a regime of 
dispossession as much as of protection of native title'; Bartlett, R, 'Native Title in Australia: Denial, 
Recognition, Dispossession' in Havemann, P, op tit, pp425-426, 
622
 Cited in Rowse, T, Obliged to be Difficult, pl77. 
623
 Snowdon, W, September 17, 1987, House Hansard, p270. 
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Difference or Division: 
Union in the Body of Christ? 
The difficulties of coming to any clear understanding of what national unity required, or 
of the character of the unity promised by reconciliation, are analogous to the theological 
disputes regarding the nature of the unity promised by the reconciling Christ. Desmond 
Tutu described what he saw as the unity promised by the South African reconciliation 
process when he wrote of 
a movement, not easily discernible, at the heart of things to reverse the 
awful centrifugal forces of alienation, brokenness, division, hostility and 
disharmony. God has set in motion a centripetal process, a moving towards 
the centre, towards unity, harmony, goodness, peace and justice; one that 
removes barriers. " 
This was a unity in which division, rather than difference, is transcended: 'instead of 
separation and division, all distinctions makes for a rich diversity to be celebrated for the 
sake of the unity that underlies them'625 
Volf introduces this problem of unity and difference as the dilemma faced by St Paul, 
who struggled to understand the God of the Torah, Israel's God, as a universal God. He 
Tutu, D, op city p213. 
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cites Daniel Boyarin's argument that Paul subsumes difference and particularity to 
•universality and equality, a solution predicated on a mind-tedy dualism (where the body 
is particular, the spirit is universal; see Galations 3:26-28.) 626 According to Boyarin 'in 
the process of baptism in the spirit the marks of ethnos, gender, and class are all erased in 
the ascension to a univocity and universality of human essence which is beyond and 
outside the body.'627 Needless to say, and in the familiar formulation of such things, the 
erasure of difference quickly turns into, is in fact the beginning and culmination of, such 
manifest historical and contemporary evils as colonialism, imperialism and sexism. 
Volf argues that Boyarin overplays the parallels between Paul and some neoplatonic 
themes such as the 'One'. Volf argues that Boyarin has misunderstood the nature of the 
unity promised by Christ: 
the 'One' in whom Paul seeks to locate the unity of all humanity is not 
disincarnate transcendence, but the crucified and resurrected Jesus 
Christ far from being the assertion of the one against the many, the Cross 
is the self-giving of the one for the many. Unity here is not the result of 
'sacred violence' which obliterates the particularity of 'bodies', but a fruit 
of Christ's self-sacrifice, which breaks down the enmity between them. 
625
 ibidem. 
Boyarin, Daniel, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity, Berkeley, Uni of California Press, 
1994, p24 at Volf, M, Exclusion and Emb face, p46. See also Paul, Hphesians 2;14-16: 'For He is our peace, 
who has made us both one, and has broken down the wall of hostility.„so making peace, and might 
reconcile us both to God in one body through the Cross'; Cited in Verkuyl, J, Break Down the Walls, p 46. 
* Volf, M, Exclusion and Embrace, p46. 
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From a Pauline perspective, the wall the divides is not so much the 
'difference' as enmity (cf. Ephesians 2:14). Hence the solution cannot be 
'the One'.628 
Baptism into Christ is not the erasure of difference but the creation of a people as 'the 
differentiated body of Christ' in which 'bodily inscribed differences are brought together, 
not removed.'629 Where Boyarin sees a colonising Paul jealous of all difference Volf sees 
the preservation of difference in unity as the end of enmity. The point is not that either 
Volf or Boyarin are correct, (even if we assume that there is a God, how could we 
possibly tell?) but that it is possible for them to have this disagreement in this particular 
language; that the theology of reconciliation is marked by ambiguity and that, even when 
secularised, these ambiguities are also present in the application of that theology to 
concrete political situations. 
ibid, p47. Rev John Saunders described the corning unity of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in 
1838 as an apocolyptic vision: *For be assured that all the peoples of the earth shall yet be gathered to our 
Saviour, for the scene which John beheld in apocolyptic vision, shall yet be realised. "A great multitude 
which no man could number, of all nations, and kindred, and people, and tongues...*"; Sutton, J, (ed) Rev. 
John Saunders: A Beacon Light and Some Baptiste Reflections, p9. 
'" ibid, p48. Volf repeats the argument in his discussion of gender identity and Galations 3:28, the passage 
in which Paul says there is no longer male and female. Boyarin argues that Paul's ideal is a 'state of 
androgyny, a cancellation of gender and sexuality...motivated by a Hellinistic desire for the One which 
among other things produced an ideal of a universal human essence, beyond difference and hierachy'. Volf 
argues that Paul's imity is 'not the abstract "One" or "tSdtj^if' which erases particularity and difference, 
but the single and differentiated body of the crucified and resurrected Christ given for all(l Corinthians 10-
12)'; pi 83. 'what has been erased in Christ is notthesexed body, but some important culturally coded 
norms attachgito sexed bodies...'; pl84,186. Volf points to the Triune God as an example of thjikind of 
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Petersen's discussion of South African apartheid also reflects these ambiguities. Petersen 
describes apartheid, as a doctrine of the irreconcilability of peoples, as a heresy insofar as 
*it contradicts the biblical argument that all humanity is made in the image of God, called 
to be one in Christ (Gal. 3:28). Petersen then notes the proposal to amalgamate the 
various racially based South African reformed Churches into a single Uniting Reformed 
Church 'where all races are treated with equality.' Reconciliation is clearly not, in 
Petersen's formulation, the end of racial distinctions in an homogenised eschatological 
gathering, but an equality between races that will survive the Day of Judgment. It is not 
clear, however, why equality is incompatible with distinct religious and/or political 
institutions. Why create a single institution to serve the needs of diverse constituencies 
with a permanent existence? Why is it essential that an equality between groups be 
preserved within a single institution rather than in the relations between different 
institutions? Petersen's original argument against apartheid must then stand in need of 
qualification: it is not the recognition of difference between groups that is the problem, 
but the failure to give institutional effect to the equality between them that is of concern. 
The objection to the apartheid system must therefore be read down or qualified. 
Reconciliation is compatible with the maintenance of separate political institutions, 
provided only that the relationship between the groups who create those institutions is 
just. The point is not to lend any theoretical defence to the Southern African apartheid 
regime, but to suggest that the concept of reconciliation lends itself to quite different 
understandings of justice: one as the end of enmity, the other as the end of difference. 
unity in diversity: 'distinct persons are internally constituted by thgindwelling of other persons in them.. .a 
self enclosed identity constituted in pure opposition to the other is unthinkable1; pi 87. 
630
 Petersen, R, op tit, pl9. 
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The language of reconciliation does not solve this problem, but repeats it anew in a 
secularised theological idiom. 
Kevin Gilbert had said that all that Aboriginal people wanted was to be given enough 
resources to solve their problems and to be left alone; John Howard had said that true 
reconciliation involved the "recognition of the common destiny we share together as 
Australians.'631 These two images of a reconciled Australia could be characterised as 
relating to the politics of indigeneity and of citizenship respectively. One focussed on the 
rights of Indigenous persons as members of a distinct cultural group within the Australian 
nation, the other attempted to 'reconstitutionalise* the relations between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous peoples in Australia. As Maaka and Fleras describe it, the indigenisation 
of rights discourses which began in the 1970's has ushered in a new 'transformational1 
politics based on original occupancy. That politics 'resonates with references to 
sovereignty and self-determination': 
Particular emphasis is focussed on indigenous peoples as fundamentally 
autonomous political communities, each of which is sovereign in its own 
right, yet sharing in the sovereignty of society through multiple, yet 
interlockingjurisdictions. 32 
Howard, J, 'Opening Ceremony Specif in CAR, Proceedings of the Australian Reconciliation 
Convetion: Book /, p9. 
Maaka, R and Fleras, A, 'Engaging With Indigeneity: Tino Rangatirantanga in Aotearoa' in Ivison, D, et 
al, op cit, p89. Also Fleras, A, 'Politicising Indigeneity: Ethnic Politics in White Settler Dominions' in 
Havemann, P, Indigenous Peoples Righ^pp 187-191. See also Fleras, A, 'Politicising Indigeneity' in 
Havemann, P, Indigenous Peoples Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. For a critical reading of 
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There was room for both of these images of a 'united' Australia within the discourses of 
reconciliation, because those discourses presume difference but promise unity, without 
providing any definitive account of the nature of that unity or even, necessarily, how it 
was to be achieved. One commonality linking these two images of unity is the promised 
authenticity of a reconciled Australia. The nation would exist at a higher state of unity, it 
would no longer be spiritually diminished, and it would have a deeper, more authentic 
understanding of its past, and of itself. But despite this commonality, the unity imagined 
by conservative and progressive supporters of reconciliation was fundamentally different. 
And it was not the case that one or the other had a proper or 'true' understanding of 
reconciliation. The very idea of reconciliation, as a background agreement in forms of 
life or language derived from Christian theology and penitential practice, did not provide 
either with an answer to the question, what should be the shape of the relationship 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia? 
the politics of indigeneity, see Barcham, M, *( Deconstructing the Politics of Indigeneity' in Ivision, D, et 
al, op cit, pp 137-151. An instance of the politics of indigeneity in action is Galarnvuy Yunupingu,4 We 
Know These Things to be True' 1998 Lingiari Lecture: 'it's really all about two Iaws\ yolgnu law and 
balanda law. For a survey of academic debates surrounding the rights of minority oiltures see Kymlicka, 
W, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship\ pp 17-27. 
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Conclusion 
The virtues of bipartisanship are in large part illusory. Tickner and Wooldridge's 1991 
hand shake over the parliamentary dispatch boxes had been a rare moment of co-
operation in one of Australia's most controversial debates. But if anyone was to think that 
the nineties would prove to be a more peaceful period in the politics of Indigenous affairs 
than had hitherto prevailed they would have been mistaken. From the Mabo decision to 
the Bridge Walk in 2000, the Aboriginal reconciliation process was-marked by an 
atmosphere that at times bordered on the venomous. Those Aboriginal people who had 
greeted the process as a sell-out would themselves contribute their own, often radical, 
definitions of reconciliation. This was a politics of difficult moral analysis, of guilt and 
shame as much as apology and redemption, and of unexpected political controversy. Who 
could forget Hanson's maiden speech to the Commonwealth parliament, her wavering 
voice capsizing in a moment an orthodoxy built over a generation? Or the delegates to the 
1997 Reconciliation Convention standing to turn their backs on Prime Minister Howard 
as he struggled to articulate why an apology to the Stolen Generations was not 
warranted? 
Ted Moses put the issues succinctly in his address to the same convention. The road to 
legitimacy for the settler state ran via reconciliation. The perceived illegitimacy of 
colonial occupation now required a remedy. The Australian High Court had in the Mabo 
case abandoned the doctrine of terra nullius in relation to property rights but had 
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provided no alternative legal fiction by which it might be thought that the British 
acquisition of sovereignty had been legitimate. We are left with the unsatisfying news 
that such an acquisition is a question not justiciable in a domestic court. Pending further 
development of the common law, a political solution will be required. A treaty negotiated 
between the Commonwealth and representatives of Indigenous peoples may provide such 
a resolution. But the Coalition in the eighties had already made too much of black 
parliaments and a nation divided, and by their objections had turned the treaty making 
process into the Aboriginal Reconciliation process. Reconciliation was in this limited 
sense a sell-out. 
To ask for forgiveness, to say the word sorry, at one moment implies an undertaking not 
to repeat the offence, to provide restitution, and to recognise the harm that has been done. 
The word meonciliation suggests a bargain, an economic exchange of forgiveness for 
some kind of penance: land rights, a treaty, political representation, the list goes on. To 
come to some kind of political and 'economic' reconciliation entails at least this much. 
But not even this was achieved in Australia. No agreement was reached concerning the 
terms on which a reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia would 
be made. No treaty or framework agreement has been signed. The Council's final 
recommendations were largely ignored by the Howard government. Its documents of 
reconciliation are already reduced to the status of historical curiosities. 
It would appear that the politics of this period testify tm the triumph of style over 
substance, of the transformation of public debate into a pop-psychologica of the nation. 
314 
What does it mean, for example, to say that a nation is traumatised? Notwithstanding 
Jung, it would seem that we should remain sceptical that a national psyche exists in any 
natural-scientific sense. The significance of the terminology is metaphoric. It provides a 
means to express certain aspects of political life that do not have a natural-scientific and 
quantifiable existence. How do we calculate, for example, the pain suffered by those 
children removed from their families, by their parents and their relatives? And how can 
we tally up the guilt and regret felt by those responsible for these policies and by those 
who in later years came to feel that the responsibility was theirs also? 
The reconciliation process was neither strictly legal nor political in the traditional or 
conventional sense of those terms. It created no lasting institutional innovations. Nor did 
it alter the constitutional relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. 
But this is not to say that the period was an entirely unremarkable one in the history of 
Indigenous/non-indigenous relations in Australia. There is a case for saying that it was in 
fact one of the most interesting. The deployment of ancient religious images onto the 
imagined moral corpus of the nation was a fascinating as much as accidental experiment. 
Perhaps only the Christian Churches initially understood the power of these images. They 
had lobbied for a reconciliation process in the late eighties and in the early nineties the 
Hawke Labor government concurred. Few noticed or were prepared to publicly draw 
attention to the religious dimensions of this language. Yet despite its apparent 
secularisation the mundane language of Aboriginal reconciliation retained its Christian 
shape. 
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It was for precisely this reason that the language of reconciliation was able to open new 
ways of talking about the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia. 
It became possible to talk of confessing or truth telling, of healing and of penance or 
restitution for wrongs long since committed and by many also forgotten. And it also 
became possible to think of the nation in different terms than had previously been 
possible. If the language of reconciliation presupposed the existence of two distinct 
political constituencies, Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia, it also allowed us to 
conceive of the relationship between those constituencies in terms of guilt and penance, 
of historical grievance as much as the hope for a future unity based on the principles of 
equality and justice. The language of Aboriginal reconciliation was in this way related to 
the Christian penitential technologies of guilt and forgiveness that also bear the name 
reconciliation. Pluralist interpretations of reconciliation, for example, figured a reconciled 
Australia as a just and harmonious union between different parts of the nation that had 
accounted for the historical sources of division between themselves. The Aboriginal 
Provisional Government, Patrick Dodson and others argued that a true reconciliation 
would be achieved by means of a compact or agreement between the Commonwealth and 
representatives of Indigenous peoples. In the late eighties and early nineties the Hawke 
and Keating Labor governments had also argued that reconciliation was not an alternative 
to a treaty but would be achieved by means of an agreement or compact. 
The Howard government was for its part keen to banish from reconciliation discourses 
any suggestion that Indigenous peoples possessed rights derived from indigeneity or from 
historical dispossession. A reconciled Australia was for the Prime Minister a nation 
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marked by an 'essential unity1 Mi which no one group enjoyed rights not enjoyed by 
others. Conservative interpretations of reconciliation were however somewhat confused. 
Howard, Howson and Hanson offered definitions of reconciliation that were essentially 
variations on an older assimilationist theme: equality as an identity amongst the demos in 
either cultural or political-legal terms or both. A nation, that is, marked either by a certain 
uniformity of culture or by a strict liberalism indifferent to the claims of race or culture. 
Hanson's spasmodic attacks on 'special rights' for Indigenous peoples had only a political 
and not a conceptual ally in her attacks on Asian immigration. On the one hand she 
argued for the state to be indifferent to race, to abolish ATSIC and native title; on the 
other she called for the state to limit certain forms of immigration lest the Australian 
nation lose its Anglo-saxon homogeneity and hence its best chance for a peaceful future. 
That these claims were conceptually incongruent did not limit their appeal. Yet this 
tension also marked Howard's efforts to describe a liberalism that was at home with his 
commitment to the 'essential unity' of the nation. This tension marks the language of all 
liberal-democracies. 
The language of reconciliation was sufficiently malleable to accommodate earlier and 
diverse policy debates without providing the means by which to resolve those debates. 
There was a constant tension between the politics of indigeneity and the politics of 
citizenship. At its most extreme point this tension can be described as the difference 
between a reconstituted treaty politics and the liberal assimilationism of Howson and 
Hanson. In this sense, we could say that the participants in the Aboriginal reconciliation 
process had this language to use as they wished. No one would doubt that the parties to 
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the process adopted positions that were at times highly pragmatic, and this is as true of 
Indigenous leaders as it is of Prime Minister Howard. Yet as much as we had this 
language, there were times when it seemed that it also had us. The language of 
reconciliation was not just a tool but also a challenge and a predicament. The debate on 
whether the Commonwealth parliament should offer an apology to the Stolen 
Generations is perhaps the best example of how this language of reconciliation took us 
toward the issue of apology without providing any definitive solution to the problem. The 
intersection of this language of confession and penance with other assumptions about 
individual will and of the nation as collective and conscious created a tremendous moral 
quandary that remains unresolved. The debate on the relationship between reconciliation 
and justice also demonstrates these difficulties; does reconciliation require that 
Indigenous peoples forgive and forget in the name of a common, united future, or does it 
entail costly reparations? 
Animating both of these debates is the aporia at the heart of reconciliation: the 
relationship between the forgivable and the unforgivable. Sorry isn't always enough. The 
unforgivable remains outside of the logic of sorrow and forgiveness. There is something 
more terrible and only a miracle, the impossible, can provide for it. Yet it is only the 
notion of the unforgivable that makes it possible to talk of forgiveness. Only the 
forgiveness of the unforgivable can escape the economic relation of exchange in which 
sorry is bound to penance, remorse and forgiveness. Forgiveness always risks being 
assimilated to a moral-economic relation of exchange and as such always risks being 
contrived and manipulated rather than gracious, infinite, and freely given. Only the 
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forgiveness of the unforgivable escapes this. This is the double injunction at the heart of 
the Christian language of reconciliation, to forgive on condition of x and at the same time 
to forgive the unforgivable. Forgiveness as a sacramentaliy mediated exchange and 
forgiveness as a divinely given and unpurchasable gift are the two concepts of 
forgiveness identified in Chapter Two as (for simplicity's sake) Catholic and Protestant 
respectively. 
The appalling thing about the reconciliation process then, the deconstructive thing, was 
that it hardly seemed able to bear the ethical weight of its own name.- A government 
sponsored and institutionalised process would never be enough to do justice to this word, 
reconciliation. It would always look too contrived, too bound up with the economic 
calculation of mine and yours, of payments on condition of x. Ruddock, McGuiness and 
Mulgan all pointed to the difficult moral economies of the apology debate. Ruddock, for 
example, suggested that the apology debate was lit the end about the Commonwealth's 
liability for material reparations rather than about expressing sorrow for or empathy with 
Indigenous persons affected by the policy of child removal. And whilst one might 
legitimately disagree with Ruddock's assessment of the motivations of those who sought 
an apology, he had correctly identified the economic relation between apology and some 
kind of penance or restitution on the one hand and forgiveness on the other. This 
economic exchange, a compromised reconciliation in the name of making the polity 
work, is one of the poles identified by Derrida as irreconcilable but indissociable 
imperatives of the language of reconciliation. But to do this, to engage in the bargain 
suggested by the word reconciliation, is to move away from that gracious, infinite, 
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aneconomic forgiveness of the unforgivable by which it makes sense to talk of 
reconciliation. Every attempt to achieve a political or earthly reconciliation between 
individuals and collectives must face this test and most likely fail. 
The Aboriginal reconciliation process did not appear to many as a peculiarly Christian 
project. Certainly there was little mention of the Almighty, at least in 'public'. But as a 
technology of the self deployed upon the imagined moral body of the nation, and-as a 
concept which gave a particular shape to the debate about relations between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous Australia, the Aboriginal reconciliation process was from beginning 
to end a particularly Christian one. Unrecognised as such by a liberalism bound up in the 
distinctions between fact and value, reason and faith, it animated Australian politics for a 
decade, without, in the end, providing anyone with the answers to the question posed. 
The state already possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and it would be 
wrong to allow it a further monopoly on the legitimate use of theology. The institutions 
of Church and State should remain separate. But the apparently secular language of 
Australian politics contains, or is open to, a religious dimension in the form of secularised 
theological concepts that have retained their Christian shape. The 'deregulation' of these 
concepts is, as Beckford put ft the hidden irony of secularisation. The liberal 
constitutional state remains open to this religious language because it cannot finally 
identify the religious* Secularisation, rather than being the gradual rationalisation of the 
world to the exclusion of the sacred, appears here to be the transposition of religious 
concepts into apparently mundane or 'earthly' political discourse. 
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This secularised religious language does not provide the Answers to the Big Questions in 
an age of apparent unbelief. But'it does provide the means by which to pose some of 
those questions, to open up some new ways of thinking about relationships between 
groups. At the same time, this language also closes off other possibilities. As a picture 
which held us captive for a decade the language of reconciliation obscured an older 
debate on Indigenous sovereignty in the image of the desired or expected unity of a post-
colonial Australia. If we had not decided on reconciliation, for example, it would be 
difficult to imagine how the question of an apology to the Stolen Generations could have 
morphed into a question going to the whole history of colonial occupation. But if 
Indigenous peoples had insisted on the word treaty, and decided not to engage non-
Indigenous Australia in the language of reconciliation, perhaps they would have had one 
by now. But such thoughts must remain as speculation only. 
If the language of reconciliation provided a kind of background agreement by which it 
was possible to talk of the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia 
in terms of guilt, apology and forgiveness, it did not settle the question of just terms or of 
the nature of the expected unity. Even when secularised and fashioned as an 
institutionalised political process, it repeated the theological ambiguities and aporias 
between penance and forgiveness, difference and unity. This is not necessarily a 
condemnation of the process, becausflt is from these same ambiguities that the process 
drew its strength. But it does suggest that even if the concept of reconciliation was a 
picture to hold us captive, to point us in the direction of confession, apology, penance and 
above all unity, it still left room for decisions. The language of reconciliation did not 
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provide us with a definitive answer to the question, what should be the shape of the 
political and legal relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia? 
Progressive and conservative supporters of reconciliation imagined a unity that was 
fundamentally different. The language of reconciliation legitimated both of these unities, 
such that neither could credibly say, a true reconciliation requires x, not y. Would a 
reconciled Australia be an association of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, their 
relationship governed by a treaty, or would it be a liberal union of individuals III which 
all, paradoxically, are the same? The official reconciliation process has finished but these 
questions will continue to be asked. 
322 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aboriginal Provisional Government, 'Reconciliation by 20011 in Moores, I, (ed) Voices 
of Aboriginal Australia : Past, Present, Future, Butterfly Books, Springwood, 1995. 
Aboriginal Provisional Government, *Law Reform and the Road to Independence', in 
Moores, I, (ed) Voices of Aboriginal Australia: Past, Present, Future, Butterfly Books, 
Springwood, 1995. 
Aboriginal Provisional Government 'Equality Never was our Aim: We are a Status 
People Whose Rights Go Beyond Equality' in Moores, 1, (ed) Voices of Aboriginal 
Australia : Past, Present, Future, Butterfly Books, Springwood, 1995. 
Abrams, M.H., Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic 
Literature, WW Norton, New York, 1971. 
Adams, P, 'Pauline and Prejudice' in Manne, R (ed) Two Nations: The Causes and 
Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia, Bookman Press, Melbourne, 
1998. 
Aldridge, A, Religion in the Contemporary World: A Sociological Introduction, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 2000. 
323 
Appleby, R, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, MD, USA, 1999. 
Anderson J, 23 November 1993, Hansard, p3455. 
Asch, M, 'From Calder to Van der Peet* in Havemann, P, (ed) Indigenous Peoples1 
Rights: in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999. 
ATSIC Leaders Forum, Focus 2000 and Beyond: Report on Indigenous Summit 14-15 
September 1999. 
Austin-Broos, D 'Silent in the Face of the Aranda' in Austin-Broos, D and Patton, P, 
Transformations in Australian Society, Research Institute for Humanities and Social 
Sciences, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1997. 
Australian Catholic Bishops Conference, Towards A Reconciled Australia, 
www.catholic.org.au/whatsnew/reconweek. accessed September 1999. 
Australian Catholic Social Welfare Commission, 
www.acswc.org.au/ATSIC/ATSIC6.htm, accessed September 1999. 
Australian Conference of Leaders of Religious Institutes, Media Release, Annandale, 
June II, 1997. 
324 
Australian Council of Churches, 'Justice for Aboriginal Australians', Sydney, 1981, in 
Reynolds, H (ed), Dispossession: Black Australians and White Invaders, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, 1989. 
Barcham, M, '(De)Constructing the Politics of Indigeneity* in Ivison, D, Patton, P and 
Sanders, W (eds) Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Cambridge 
University Press, Melbourne, 2000. 
Bartlet^ R, 'Native Title in Australia: Denial, Dispossession and Recognition' 
Havemann, P, (ed) Indigenous Peoples' Rights: in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999. 
Bartelson, J, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995. 
Barunga Statement, 1988, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/docrec/pQlicv/brief/attach.htm#A 
Baume, Senator P, February 13, 1986, Hansard, p268. 
Beazley, K, National Press Club Address, September 30, 1998, Online Text 411112, 
www.aph.gov.au 
325 
Beazley, K, 26 August 1999, Hansard, p7409. 
Beckford, J, Religion and Advanced Industrial Society, Unwin Hyman, London, 1989. 
Bellear, Ss in CAR, The Position of Indigenous Peoples in National Constitutions: 
Speeches from the Conference, Canberra, 4-5 June 1993, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993. 
Bennett, S, White Politics and Black Australians, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 
1999. 
Berger, P, 'The Desecularisation of the World: A Global Overview' in Berger, P, (ed) 
The Desecularisation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, W.B. 
Eerdmans Pub. Co., Washington DC, 1999. 
Bernstein, J, M, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Bhargava, R 'Restoring Democracy to Barbaric Societies' in Rotberg, I and Thompson, 
D (eds) Truth versus Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000. 
Bhargave, R, Secularism and its Critics, Oxford University Press, Dehli, 1998. 
Biller, P, 'Confession in the Middle Ages' in Biller, P and Minnis, A (eds) Handling Sin: 
Confession in the Middle Ages, York Medieval Press, York, 1998. 
Borraine, A, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way' in Rotberg, I 
and Thompson, D (eds) Truth versus Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, 
Princeton University Press. Princeton. NJ, 2000. 
Borraine, A 'Opening Address', in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, The People's 
Movement for Reconciliation : Proceedings of the Australian Reconciliation Convention, 
26-28 May 1997, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Kingston, ACT, 1997. 
Boucher, A, 'Tent Embassy Comes to Victoria Park', HoniSoit, July 19,2000, no 15, p5. 
Bowen-Moore, P, Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Natality, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
1989. 
Breen MLC, P, NSW Legislative Council Hansard, April 6 2000, p4256. 
Brennan, F, CAR Key Issue Paper no 7: Agreeing on a Document, Australian 
Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1993. 
Brennan, F, 'Waiting for the Resolution' Australian Quarterly, vol 61, no 2, 1989, pp 
242-250. 
327 
Brett, J, The Treaty Process and the limits of Australian Liberalism^ AIATSIS Seminar 
paper, http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/srnnrs/papers/brett.htm accessed 26/03/2002. 
Brooks, P, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000. 
Brown, J, 'Prayers for Healing and National Agreement' Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation, Walking Together.'Ho 5, August 1993. 
Budden, C, Reconciliation, Celebration and Aboriginal People: Five Bible Studies on 
Issues Raised for the Australian Christian Community in 1988, Social Responsibility and 
Justice Committee Uniting Church in Australia, St James, 1988. 
Burney, L, 'Introduction' in Moores, I, (ed) Voices of Aboriginal Australia : Past, 
Present, Future, Butterfly Books, Springwood, 1995. 
Butt, P, Constitutional Law in Australia^ 2nd Edition, Butterworths, Sydney, 1996. 
Campbell, A, John Batman and the Aborigines, Kibble Books, Malmsbury, Vic, 1987. 
Campbell, Senator I, August 16, 1991, Hansard, p556. 
328 
Canovan, M, Nationhood and Political Theory, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 1996. 
Caputo On Religion, Routledge, London, 2001. 
Caputo, J and Scanlon, M, 'Apology for the Impossible: Religion and Postmodernism', in 
Caputo, J and Scanlon, M (eds) God, the Gift and Postmodernism, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1999. 
Caruth, C, Unclaimed Experience: Traumas, Narratives and History, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1996. 
Catholic Commission for Justice, Development & Peace (Melbourne Archdiocese) 
"It's Not Easy Walkin' in There" : Aboriginal Reconciliation : Towards Practical and 
Culturally Respectful Solutions, Catholic Commission for Justice, Development & Peace, 
Melbourne, 1999. 
Connolly, W, Why I am not a Secularist, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1999. 
Connolly, W, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1991. 
Coulter, Senator J, May 9, 1991, Hansard, p3091. 
329 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation:: 
Annual Report, 1992-93, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra 
www.austlii.edu/au/au/special/rsiproiect/rsilibrary/car/arl993-4/ 
Annual Report, 1996-97,. Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra. 
www.austlii.edu/au/au/special/rsiproiect/rsilibrarv/car/arl996-97/ 
Documents of Reconciliation : Background Briefing Paper, 2000.r 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/docrec/policv/brietyindex.htm 
Final report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation to the Prime Minister 
and the Commonwealth Parliament, 2000, 
http://ww\v.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lndigLRes/car/2Q00/16/ 
Finding Common Ground: Towards a Document for Reconciliation 2000, 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/docrec/relevant/docbook/p3.htm . 
Going Forward: Social Justice for the First Australians, Submission to the 
Commonwealth Government, March 1995, 
http://www.austlii.edu.aU/au/other/IndigLRes/car/1995/2/ 
330 
Key Issues Paper No 4: Sharing History, 1993. 
'Pilgrimage to the Heart' Walking Together, no 29, August 2000, CAR, Parkes, 
ACT, 1996. 
Proceedings of the Australian Reconciliation Convention, Book One. Australian 
Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1997. 
Reconciliation Implementation and Framework Agreements .Legislation: 
Discussion Paper, 2000, www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/discuss 
Strategic Plan 1991-94, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra 
www.austl ii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/trienn ial_plan/9. html 
Strategic Plan 1998-2000, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/stratplan/Pages/intro.htm 
The Position of Indigenous Peoples in National Constitutions: Speeches from the 
Conference, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1993. 
Towards Social Justice: Compilation Report of First Round Consultations, 1993 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/rsjproiect/rsjlibrarv/car-atsic/tsi2/51.html 
o i l 
Walking Together, No 2, Feb 1993, CAR, Parkes, ACT, 1996. 
Walking Together, No 5, August 1993, CAR, Parkes, ACT, 1996. 
Walking Together, Special Edition, December 1996, CAR, Parkes, ACT, 1996. 
Walking Together, No 21, March 1998, CAR, Parkes, ACT, 1996. 
Walking Together, No 22, July 1998, CAR, Parkes, ACT, 1996. 
Working Together: Australians for Reconciliation Information Kit, Australian 
Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1993. 
Chamarette, Senator C, 15 December 1993, Hansard, p4696. 
Chaney, F 'The Hidden Barriers to Reconciliation', Sydney Morning Herald, November 3 
1998, pi5. 
Chaney, F, December 18, 1987, Hansard, p3457. 
Chesterman, J and Galligan, B, Citizens Without Rights: Aborigines And Australian 
Citizenship. Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1997. 
332 
Clarke, G, 'Not Much Progress' in Grattan, M, Essays on Australian Reconciliation, 
Bookman, Melbourne, 2000. 
Cowlishaw, G, Rednecks, Eggheads and Blackfellas: A Study of Racial Power and 
Intimacy in Australia, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1999 . 
Cox, H, 'Religion and Politics After The Secular City* in Neusner, J (ed) Religion and the 
Political Order: Politics in Classical and Contemporary Christianity, Islam and Judaism* 
Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1996. 
Crowley, Senator, R, 15 August, 1991, Hansard, p394. 
Curthroys, A, 'Mythologies" in Nile, R, The Australian Legend and its Discontents', 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Qld, 2000. 
D'Souza, N, Authors of Our Own History: The Stolen Generation: From Removal to 
Reconciliation; www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/unswli/fourm/1998/vol4no3/souza.html 
Davie, G 'Europe: The Exception that Proves the Rule?1 in Berger, P, (ed) The 
Deseculahsation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, W.B. Eerdmans 
Pub. Co., Washington DC, 1999. 
333 
De Vries, H, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, JohttS Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1999. 
Deane, W, Press Release: A Few Instances of Reconciliation, Millennium dinner, 
Southern Queensland Theology Library, Toowoomba, 5 November 1999, 
www.aph.gov.au Online Text: 434095 
Deane, W, Press Release; Liturgy for Ecumenical Pilgrims to celebrate the 50th 
anniversary of the World Council of Churches. 20 September 1998 www.aph.gov.au 
Online Text: 410989 
Deane, W, ' Some S ignposts From Daguragu', Lingiari Lecture, 1997, 
http://www.austlii.edu.aU/au/other/lndigLRes/1996/2/index.html 
Derrida, J, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Routledge, 2001. 
Derrida, J, 'A Discussion with Jacques Derrida' in Theory and Event, 5:1, 2000. 
Derrida, J and Luc-Marion, J, "On the Gift: Discussion Between J.Derrida and Jean Luc-
Marion' in Caputo, J and Scanlon, M (eds) God, the Gift and Postmodernism, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1999. 
334 
Derrida, J, 'Faith and Knowledges The Two Sources o f Religion' at the Limits of Reason 
Alone' in Derrida, J and Vattimo, G (eds) Religion. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
Derrida, J, Deconstruction in a nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida^ edited 
with a commentary by John D. Caputo, Fordham University Press, New York, 1997. 
Digeser, P, Political Forgiveness, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001. 
Dixson, M, The Imaginary Australian, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1999. 
Dodson, P, 'Until the Chains are Broken', Lingiari Lecture, 1999. 
Dodson, P, Telstra Address Address to the National Press Club November 28 1997 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/1997/2811 .html 
Dodson, P, 'Chairpersons Introduction', Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Annual 
Report, 1993-94, www.austlii.edu/au/au/special/rsjprojecVrsilibrary/car/arl993-93/ 
Dodson, P, 'Our Vision' in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Walking Together, No 
6, November 1993. 
Dodson, P, Regional Report of Inquiry into Underlying Issues in Western Australia, 
Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1991. 
"> " • C 
Duke, T, 'Reconciliation... who reckons what!' in Moores, I, (ed) Voices of Aboriginal 
Australia : Past, Present, Future, Butterfly Books, Springwood, 1995. 
Everingham, P, May 20, 1985, Hansard, p269\. 
Faber, M, Synchronicity: C.C.Jung, Psychoanalysis and Religion, Praeger, Westport, CT, 
1998. 
Fenn, R, Beyond Idols: The Shape of a Secular Society* Oxford University Press, 2001, 
Ferraris, M, 'The Meaning of Being as a Determinate Ontic Trace' in Derrida, J and 
Vattimo, G (eds) Religion, Polity, Cambridge, 1998. 
Flannagan, K, The Enchantment of Sociology: A Study of Theology and Culture, 
MacMillan, London, 1996. 
Fleischman, P, The Healing Spirit: Explorations in Religion and Psychotherapy, Bonne 
Chance Press, Cleveland, S.C, 1994. 
Fleras, A, 'Politicising Indigeneity: Ethnic Politics in White Settler Dominions' in 
Havemann, P, (ed) Indigenous Peoples' Rights: in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999. 
336 
Forshaw, Senator M, 27 November 1997, Hansard, p9634. 
Fortin, E.L, 'St Augustine' in Strauss, L and Cropsey, J (eds) History of Political 
Philosophy, 3rd edition, 1987, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987. 
Fortin, E, L, 'St Thomas Aquinus' in Strauss. L and Cropsey, J (eds) History of Political 
Philosophy, 3r ed, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987. 
Foster, H, 'Indian Administration from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to 
Constitutionally Entrenched Aboriginal Rights* in Havemann, P, (ed) Indigenous 
Peoples' Rights: in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1999. 
Foucault, 'About the Beginnings of the Hermeneutics of the Self, Carrette, J, (ed) 
Religion and Culture by Michael Foucault, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1999. 
Foucault, M 'On the Government of the Living', Carrette, J, (ed) Religion and Culture by 
Michael Foucault, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999. 
Foucault, M, 'On Religion', Carrette, J, (ed) Religion and Culture by Michael Foucault, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, i 999. 
337 
Foucault, M, 'Sexuality and Power', Carrette, J, (ed) Religion and Culture by Michael 
Foucault, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999. 
Foucault, M, 'Who are You, Professor Foucault? Interview with P. Caruso' in Carrette, J, 
(ed) Religion and Culture by Michael Foucault, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1999. 
Foucault, M, The History of Sexuality. Vol One, trans. Hurley, R, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, UK, 1984. 
Fraser, M, 'Reconciliation Means Facing Up to the Truth About our History', Sydney 
Morning Herald, April 8, 1999, pi 5. 
Fraser, N, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a Post-Socialist 
Age' in Willet, C (ed) Theorising Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate, 
Blackwell, Mass, 1998. 
Fraser, N, Justice Interruptus : Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition, New 
York, Routledge, 1997. 
338 
Freud, S, 'Moses and Monotheism1 in the Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. Strachey, J, First Edition, Vol XXIII. 
Hogarth Press, London, 1964. 
Frosh, S, The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian 
Theory, New York University Press, New York, 1999. 
Gaita, R, A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love & Truth & Justice, Text 
Publishing, Melbourne, 1999. 
Gardiner-Garden, J, From Dispossession to Reconciliation, Research Paper, Social Policy 
Group, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Vol 27 (1998/99), 29 June 1999. 
Gaucher., Marcel, The Disenchantment of the World, Princeton University Press, trans by 
Burge, O, first published 1985, English translation published 1997. 
Gaze, B and Jones, M, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1990. 
Gilbert, K, 'What Are We to Reconcile Ourselves To?' in Moores, I, (ed) Voices of 
Aboriginal Australia : Past, Present, Future, Butterfly Books, Springwood, 1995. 
339 
Gilbert, K, 'Voice of Kevin Gilbert' in Moores, K (ed) Voices of Aboriginal Australia : 
Past, Present, Future, Butterfly Books, Springwood, 1995. 
Gopin, M, 'Forgiveness as an Element of Conflict Resolution in Religious Cultures* in 
Abu-Nimer, M, Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice. Lexington 
Books, Lanham, USA, 2001. 
Griffiths, M, Aboriginal Affairs: A Short History, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst. N.S.W, 
1995. 
Grattan, M, (ed) Essays on Australian Reconciliation, Bookman, Melbourne, 2000. 
Grattan, M, 'Pauline Hanson's Hijack of John Howard* in Manne, R (ed) Two Nations: 
The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia, Bookman, 
Melbourne, 1998. 
Grattan, S and McNamara, L, 'The Common Law Construct of Native Title: a "Re-
Feudal isation" of Australian Land Law', Griffith Law Review, 8 (1) 1999, pp 50-85. 
Grattan, S and McNamara, L and 'The Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights as "Native 
Title": Continuity and Transformation', Flinders Journal of Law Reform, 3 (2) December 
1999, pp 137-162. 
340 
Gray, J, Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, 
Routledge, London, 1995. 
Graybill, L, 'Pursuit of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa1 in Africa Today, Jan-
March 1999, vol 45, no 1. p 103. 
Gutman, A and Thompson, D, 'The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions* in 
Rotberg, I and Thompson, D (eds) Truth Versus Justice: The Morality of Truth 
Commissions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000. 
Habel, N, Reconciliation: Searching For Australia's SouL Harper Collins, North 
Blackburn, VIC, 1999. 
Hale, D, The Body Politic: A Political Metaphor in Renaissance English Literature. 
Mouton, The Hague, 1971. 
Hardiman, M.O, Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 19994. 
Haren, M, Sin and Society in 14th Century England: a Study of the Memoriale 
Presbiterorum, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 
Harradine, Senator, B 23 August 1988, Hansard, p70. 
341 
Harris, J, Foreign Bodies and The Body Politic: Discourses of Social Pathology' in Early 
Modern England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
Havemann, P, (ed) Indigenous Peoples' Rights: in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999. 
Hallencreutz, C and Westerlund, D, 'Anti-Secularist Policies of Religion' in Westerlund, 
D (eds) Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence - of Religion in 
Politics, C.Hurst, London, 1996. 
Hawke, R, 23 August 1988, Hansard, pi37. 
Hawke, R, 3 May 1983, Hansard. p90. 
Heimbrook, H, 'Psychoanalytic Understanding of Religion' InternationalJournal for the 
Psychology of Religion 'vol 1, no 2, 1991, pp73-74. 
Herron, Senator J, 15 December 1993, Hansard, p4645 
Hinsley, F.H, Sovereignty, 2nd Ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. 
Holding, C, December 8, 1993, Hansard, p3485. 
342 
Hogan, M,Australian Catholics: The SocialJusiice Tradition. Collins Dove, Melbourne, 
1993. 
House, M, 'Welcome and Introduction' in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, The 
Position of Indigenous Peoples in National Constitutions: Speeches from the Conference, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993. 
Howard, J, Press Release, November 7 1997, Online Text 972038 www.aph.gov.au 
Howard, J, 'Opening Ceremony Speech' in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, The 
People's Movement for Reconciliation: Proceedings of the Australian Reconciliation 
Convention, 26-28 May 1997, Book One, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 
Kingston, ACT, 1997. 
Howard, J, 23 August 1988, Hansard, pi39. 
Howard, T.A, Religion and the Rise of Historic ism: WML de Wette , Jacob Burckhardt 
and the Theological Origins of 19* Century Historical Consciousness, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 
Howson, P, 'Why there should be no apology' Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May 2000. 
343 
Hughes, I, Self-Determination: Aborigines and the State in Australia, Phd Thesis, 
University of Sydney, 1997 
Hughes, R, The Fatal Shore: a History of the Transportation of Convicts to Australia. 
1787-1868, Collins Harvill, London, 1987. 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing them home...Report of (he 
National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children 
from their Families, 1997, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lndigLRes/stolen/ 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Frequently asked questions about the 
National Inquiry, 1997, 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social iustice/stolen_children/faqs.html#ques2 
lsbister J, Freud: An Introduction to his Life and Work* Polity Press, Cambridge. 1985. 
Ivison, D, 'Political Community and Historical Injustice' in Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, vol 78, no 3, pp 360-373. 
Ivison, D, Patton, P and Sanders, W, (eds) Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2000. 
344 
John Paul II, Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Ecclessia in Ocenaia, November 2001, 
http://www.vatican.va/holv father/iohnpaul ii/apost exhortations/documents/hfjp-
ii exh 20011122 ecclesia-in-oceania en.html 
John Paul II, 'Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and Penance: Origin and Meaning 
of the Document', December 2, 1984 vvww.cin.org/cin 
Johns, G 'Reconciliation: Read the Fine Print", Quadrant, November 1999. 
Johnston, E, National Report, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, vol 
V, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991. 
Jones, C, 'Interview with Caroline Jones' in Moores, I, (ed) Voices of Aboriginal 
Australia : Past, Present, Future, Butterfly Books, Springwood, 1995. 
Jorgensen, D, 'Religion and Modernization: Secularization or Sacralization1 in Neusner, J 
(ed) Religion and the Political Order: Politics in Classical and Contemporary 
Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1996. 
Kaiser, D, Romanticism, Aesthetics and Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999. 
345 
Kamenetszky, D 'The Debate on National Identity and the Martin Walser Speech: How 
Does Germany Reckon With its Past?' SAIS Review, 19.2 (1999) pp257-266. 
Kamenka, E (ed) Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea. Edward Arnold, 
London, 1976. 
Keating, P, *Redfern Park Speech' in Grattan, M, (ed) Essays on Australian 
Reconciliation, Bookman, Melbourne, 2001. 
Kennedy, T, Aboriginal Reconciliation, St Vincent's Church Redfern, 29 May 1994. 
Kernot, Senator C, 15 December 1993, Hansard p 4624. 
Kirschner, S, The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis: Individuation and 
Integration in Post-Freudian Theory, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996. 
Kymlicka, W, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 
Lattas, A, 'Aborigines and Contemporary Australian Nationalism: Primordiality and the 
Cultural Politics of Others' in Cowlinshaw, G and Morris, B, (eds) Race Matters: 
Indigenous Australians and 'Our* Society, Aboriginal Studies Press, 1997. 
346 
Leach, M, 'Hansonism, Political Discourse and Australian Identity1 in Leach, M, Stokes, 
G and Ward, I, (eds) The Rise and Fall of the One Nation Party, University of 
Queensland Press, St Lucia, 2000. 
Lenman, B, 'The Limits of Godly Discipline in the Early Modern Period* in von Greyerz, 
K (ed) Religion and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1800, German Historical 
Institute, London, 1984. 
Love, M, Peace Building Through Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK, 1995. 
Maaka, R and Fleras, A, ^Engaging With Indigeneity: Tino Rangatirantanga in Aotearoa* 
in Ivison, D, Patton, P and Sanders, W (eds) Political Theory and the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2000. 
Madan, T, 'Secularism in Its Place' in Bhargava, R, Secularism and its Critics, Oxford 
University Press, Dehli, 1998. 
Maddox, G, Religion and the Rise of Democracy, Routledge, London, 1996. 
Maddox, M, For God and Country: Religious Dynamics in Australian Federal Politics, 
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2001. 
347 
Manne, R, (ed) Two Nations: The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party 
in Australia, Melbourne, Bookman, 1998. 
Manne, R, 'In Denial: The Stolen Generations and the Right' Australian Quarterly Essay, 
no 1 ,2001. 
Marr, D, The High Price of Heaven, Allen and Unwin. St Leonards, 1999. 
Martin, D, Reflections on Sociology and Theology. Oxford University Press, New York, 
1997. 
McCormick, J, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997. 
McKenna, M, 'Metaphors of Light and Darkness', Melbourne Journal of Politics, vol 25, 
no 1, 1998. 
McMullan, Senator B, 6 Jui^l 1991, Hansard, p 4599. 
McGuiness, P 'Howard Risks Backlash By Saying Sorry', Sydney Morning Herald, 
November 26 1998, pi7. 
348 
Meens, R, 'The Frequency and Nature of Early Modern Penance' in Biller, P and Minnis, 
J, (eds) Handling Sin: Confession in the Middle Ages, York Medieval Press, Suffolk. 
1998. 
Meier, H, The Lesson of Carl Schmittr Four Chapters on the Distinction Between 
Political Theology and Political Philosophy, trans, by Brainard, M, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998. 
Melham, D, 'Ethnicity and its Others' University of Sydney, December 9, 1998, Online 
text 414756 www.aph.gov.au 
Melleuish, G, 'Christianity and Australian Political Thought' St Mark's Review, Autumn 
2000, pp24-32. 
Melleuish, G, Cultural Liberalism in Australia: A Study in Intellectual and Cultural 
History, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1995. 
Minchin, Senator N, Press Release, April 29 1998, Online Text 402268, 
www.aph.gov.au. 
Minogue, K, 'Aborigines and Australian Apologetics', Quadrant, September 1998, v42 
n9. 
349 
Minnow, M, 'The Hope for Healing: What Can truth Commissions Do?' Rotberg, I and 
Thompson, D (eds) Truth versus Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000. 
Minnow, M, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, Beacon Press, Boston. 1998. 
Moores, I, 'Internationa! Year for Indigenous People* in Moores, I, (ed) Voices of 
Aboriginal Australia: Past, Present, Future, Butterfly Books, Springwood, 1995. 
Moran, A, 'Aboriginal Reconciliation: Transformations in Settler Nationalism' 
Melbourne Journal of Politics, vol 25, no 1, 1998. 
Mouffe, C, The Democratic Paradox, Verso, London, 2000. 
Mulgan, R, 'Citizenship and Legitimacy in Post-Colonial Australia' in Peterson, N and 
Sanders, W (eds) Citizenship and Indigenous: Australians: Changing Conceptions and 
Possibilities, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1998. 
Nandy, A, 'The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance', in 
Bhargava, R, Secularism and its Critics, Oxford University Press, Dehli, 1998. 
Nelson, B, wWhy We Need More Rather Than Less Church Involvement in Policy 
Formation' address to the Politics and Christianity in Australia Conference, 13-15 July 
1998, Robert Menzies College, Macquarie University. 
350 
Nicholls, A The Secularization of Revelation from Plato to Freud' Contretemps. I, 
Septemeber 2000. 
Norval, A.J 'Memory, Identity and the (im)possibility of Reconciliation: The Work of the 
Truth and Reconbciliation Commission in South Africa' in Constellations 1998 5 (2). 
Nossal, G, Symbolism and Substance in Aboriginal Reconciliation, Address to the 
National Press Club, 20 April 2000. 
Nugent, P, 23 November 1993, Hansard, p3432. 
O'Connor, K, The Psychology of Religion in Australia' The International Journal for 
the Psychology of Religion, vol l,no 1, 1991, pp 41-52. 
O'Donoghue, L, 'Whither Reconciliation' in Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 
Walking Together, Special Edition, December 1996. 
O'Donovan, O, The Desire of the Nations, Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. 
Oldfield, D . Extract from the Legislative Council Hansard of 04/04/2000 - Corrected 
Copy,p4018. 
351 
http://www.parl iament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/PH Web.nst7Hansard?OpenFrameSet 
Oldfield, D, Extract from the Legislative Council Hansard of 06/04/2000 - Corrected 
Copy,p4018 
Papouiias, T, 'Out of the Past: Psychoanalysis, Trauma and the Limits to Recollection" in 
Campbell, J and Harbord, J (eds) Psycho-politics and Cultural Desires. London, UCL 
Press, 1998. 
Pattel-Gray, A She Great White Flood: Racism in Australia: Critically Appraised From 
an Aboriginal Historico-Theological Viewpoint, Scholars Press, Atlanta, GA., 1998. 
Paul VI, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern Age, December 7, 1965, 
www.cin.org.v2.modwor.htm 
Paul VI, Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church, December, 1965, 
www.cin.org/v2miss.html 
Paul VI, Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, December 4, 1963, 
wwwxin.org/v21itur.html 
Paul VI, Decree of Ecumenism, November 21, 1962, www.cin.org/v2ecum.html 
352 
Patton, P, Constitutional Paradoxes: Native Title, Treaties and the Nation, AIATSIS 
Seminar Paper, 28 May 2001, 
http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/smnrs/papers/patton2.pdf 
Patton, P, Deleuze and the Political, Routledge, New York, 2000. 
Patton, P, 'Justice and Difference: The Mabo Case' in Paul Patton and Diane Austin-
Broos, (eds) Transformations in Australian Society, Sydney: Research Institute for 
Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Sydney, pp.83-98, 1997. 
Patton, P, 'Sovereignty, Law and Difference in Australia: After the Mabo Case\ 
Alternatives, 21(1996) 
Patton, P, 'Mabo and Australian Society: Towards a Postmodern Republic', Australian 
Journal of Anthropology, August 1995 v6 nl &2, pp83-94. 
Paulson, G, ' A Just and Proper Settlement: An Aboriginal Perspective' in Pattel-Gray, A 
(ed) Martung Upa: Black and White Australians Seeking Partnership,Harper Collins, 
Melbourne, 1996,pp275-284. 
Pearson, D, The Politics of Ethnicity in Settler Societies, Palgrave, Basingstoke, UK, 
2001. 
353 
Pearson, N, Documents of Reconciliation and Constitutional Issues: A National 
Document of Reconciliation, 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/docrec/relevant/opinion/pearson.htm 
Pearson, N, Address to the National Press Club, November 1993. 
Petersen, R, CA Theology of Forgiveness: Terminology, Rhetoric and the Dialectic of 
Interfaith Relationships'* in Helmick, R and Petersen, R (eds) Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, Templeton 
Foundation Press, Philadelphia, 2002. 
Pile, S and Keith, M (eds) Geographies of Resistance, Routledge, London, 1997. 
Plant, R, 'Antinomies of Modernist Political Thought: Reasoning, Context and 
Community1, in Good, J and Velody, I (eds) The Politics of Post-Modernity, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
Poole, R, Nation and Identity, Routledge, London, 1999. 
Poole, R, 'Justice or Appropriation? Indigenous Claims and Liberal Theory' in Radical 
Philosophy, no 101, 2000. 
Poole, R, Morality and Modernity, Routledge, London, 1991. 
354 
Price, R, 9 December 1998, Hansard, pi777. 
Purvis, A 'Whose Home and Native Land' Time, Feb 15, vol 153, no 6, 1999; 
www.inac.gc.ca/news/may98/mav4.html 
Read, P, 'Cheeky, Insolent and Anti-White', Australian Journal of History and Politics. 
1990,vol23,nol,pp73-83. 
Reid, Senator M, Press Release, 21 September 1998, www.aph.gov.au 
Reith, P, 23 November 1993, Hansard, p34I5 
Ricoeur, P, Oneself as Another, trans, by Blarney, K, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1992. 
Rotberg, R, 'Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation' 
in Rotberg, R and Thompson, D (eds) Truth versus Justice: The Morality of truth 
Commissions, Prinnceton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000. 
Rowley, CD, Aboriginal Policy and Practice, Vol One, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1970. 
355 
Rowley, CD, Aboriginal Policy and Practice: The Remote Aborigines, Vol III, 
Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1971. 
Rowse, T. The Treaty Debate 1979-1983 and the Continuing Problem of Federalism, 
http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/smnrs/papers/rowse.htm. AIATSIS Seminar Paper. April 
30 2001, accessed 25/03/2002. 
Rowse, T, Obliged to be Difficult: Nugget Coombs' Legacy in Indigenous Affairs, 
Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2000. 
Rowse, T, White Flour, White Power: From Rations to Citizenship in Central Australia, 
Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1998. 
Rowse, T, After Mabo: Interpreting Indigenous Traditions, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1993. 
Ruddock, P, 30 May 2000, Hansard, pi654. 
Said, E, Culture and Imperialism, Vintage, London, 1994. 
Schmitt, C, 'On the Counter-Revolutionary Philosophy of the State' in Schmitt, C, 
Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans, by Schwab, G, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MASS, 1985.. 
356 
Schmitt, C, 'Political Theology' in Schmitt, C, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty, trans, by Schwab, G, MIT Press, Cambridge, MASS, 1985. 
Scott, E, Media Release, August 29 1999, 
http://\vww.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lndiuLRes/car/1999/car221.html 
Scott, E, Speech at the World Members Conference of the English Speaking Union, 30 
August 1999. 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/1999/3008 2.html 
Scott, E, The Common Spiritual Foundation of All Peoples* 24 January 1999, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lndigLRes/car/1999/2401.html 
Scott, E, Reconciliation and Recognition, 27 October, 1998 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lndigLRes/car/1998/2710.html 
Scott, E, 'Chairpersons Introduction', Walking Together, no 21, March 1998. 
Sharp, A? Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New 
Zealand Since the J970's, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997. 
357 
Shriver, D, 'A Bridge Across Abysses of Revenge1 in Helmick, R and Petersen, R, 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, 
Tempelton Foundation Press, Philadelphia, 2002. 
Shriver, D, An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1995. 
Skinner, Q, 'Modernity and Disenchantment' in Good, J and Velody, I, (eds) The Politics 
of Postmodernity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
Skinner, Q, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vols I and II, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1978. 
Simmons A.J 'Historical Rights and Fair Shares' in Law and Philosophy, 14, 1995, 
ppl49-184. 
Smith, D.E, 'India as a Secular State' in Bhargarva, R, Secularism and its Critics. Oxford 
University Press, Dehli, 1998. 
Smith, L, 'William of Auvergne and Confession' in Biller. P and Minnis, A, Handling 
Sin, York Medieval Press, Suffolk, 1998. 
Smith, R, Australian Political Culture, Pearson Educational, Frenchs Forest, 2001 
358 
Smith, R, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1997. 
Snowdon, W, November 8 1988, House Hansard, p2563. 
Snowdon, W, December 1 1988, House Hansard, p3629. 
Snowdon, W, September 17, 1987, House Hansard, p270. 
Soyinka, W, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999. 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Vol One, London : 
Macmillan Reference, 1999. 
Sparrow, R, 'History and Collective Responsibility" in Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, vol 78, no 3, pp 346-359. 
Stott Despoja, Senator N, November 27, 1997, Hansard, p9721. 
Sutton, J, (ed) Rev. John Saunders: A Beacon Light and Some Baptiste Reflections, 
Baptist Union of Australia, Melbourne, 2001. 
359 
Tentler, T, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1977. 
Tate, Senator M, September 13, 1983, Hansard, p597 
Tatz, C, 'The Reconciliation Bargain', Melbourne Journal of Politics, vol 25, 1998. 
Taylor, C, 'Modes of Secularism' in Bhargave, R, (ed), Secularism and its Critics, 
Oxford University Press, Dehli, 1998. 
Taylor, C, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1992. 
Taylor, C Sources of the Self, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1989. 
Tavuchis, N, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation, Stanford 
University press, Stanford, CA, 1991. 
Thakur, S.C, Religion andSociaUustice, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1996. 
The Catholic University of America, The New Catholic Encyclopedia, McGraw Hill, 
New York, 1989. 
360 
Thurian, M5 Confession, 2nd Edition, trans, by Hudson, E, A.R.Mowbray and Co, Oxford, 
1985. 
Tickner, R, May 9, 1991, Hansard, p3411. 
Tickner, R, May 30, 1991, Hansard, p4498. 
Tickner, R, Taking a Stand: Land Rights to Reconciliation, Allen and U-nwin, Sydney, 
2001. 
Timberly-Beller, B 'Welcome to Country, Corroboree 2000\ Walking Together, no 29, 
August 2000. 
Troeltsch, E, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, Vols I and II, trans, by 
Wyon, O, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976-
Trompf, G.W, Early Christian Historiography: Narratives of Retributive Justice, -
Continuum, London, 2000. 
Tully, J, 'The Struggles for and of Freedom', in Ivison, D, Patton, P and Sanders, W 
(eds), Indigenous Rights and Political Theory, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 
2000. 
361 
Tully, J, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
Tully, J, 'Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground", Social 
Philosophy and Policy, 11 (2) 1994. 
Tully, J, 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: Understanding Practices of Critical 
Reflection', Political Theory, vol 17, no 2, May 1989, pp 172-204. 
Tutu, D, No Future Without Forgiveness, Rider, London, 1999. 
Uniting Church, Liturgy for Reconciliation 1998: Prayers of Hope, Multi-faith Meeting, 
Uniting Church, Pitt St. Sydney 
Vattimo, G, 'The Trace of the Trace' in Derrida, J and Vattimo, G (eds) Religion, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
Vergote, A, 'Confrontation With Reality in Theory and Practice1 in Smith, J (ed). 
Psychoanalysis and Religion, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990. 
Verkuyl, J, Break Down the Walls: A Christian Cry for RacialJustice, trans by Smedes, 
L, Eerdmans Pub. Co., Grand Rapids, WB, 1973. 
362 
Volf, M, The Social Meaning of Reconciliation, Interpretation, 54 (2), April 2000, 
ppl58-172. 
Volf, M, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity. Otherness, and 
Reconciliation, Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1996. 
Wallace, E, 'Psychiatry and Religion: Towards a Dialogue and Public Philosophy 8 in 
Smith, J (ed), Psychoanalysis and Religion, Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore, 
1990. 
Wallwark, E and Wallwark, A 'Psychoanalysis and Religion: Current Status of a 
Historical Antagonism' in Smith, J (ed), Psychoanalysis and Religion, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1990. 
Webber, J The Jurisprudence of Regret: The Search for Standards of Justice in Mabo" in 
Sydney Law Review, vol 17 no 1 1995 
Webber, J, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community and the Canadian 
Constitution, McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston, Ont, 1994. 
Woodley, Senator J, 27 May 1997, Hansard, p3758 
Wooldridge, M, May 8, 1991, Hansard, p3418 
363 
Williams, P, 'Apologia Qua Amnesia' in The Nation, July 14*. 1997, plO. 
Windschuttle, K, 'Why there should be no Aboriginal treaty*. Quadrant, 45 (10) October 
2001, pp 15-24. 
Wittgenstein, L, Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, Oxford, 1967. 
Worth, T, 24 November 1993, Hansard, 3573. 
Wuthnow, R, Producing the Sacred, University of Illinios Press, Urbana. 1994* 
Yamamoto, E, Inter-Racial Justice: Conflict and Reconciliation in Post Civil Rights 
America, New York University Press, New York, 1999. 
Yardi, R and Stokes, G, 'Foundations for Reconciliation in Social Science: The Political 
Thought of C.D.Rowley', Melbourne Journal of Politics, vol 25, no 1, 1998, pp45-61. 
Yu, P, The Fundamental Challenge' in Walking Together, November 1998. 
Yunupingu, G, We Know These Things to be True, Lingiari Lecture, 1998. 
Waldron, J, 'Superseding Historical Injustice', Ethics, 103, 1992, pp4-28. 
364 
Newspaper Articles; 
'Archbishop finds sorry an easy word1, The Australian, February 29,2000, p2. 
Atkins, D, 'PM rejects calls for native treaty'. Courier Mail May 30, 2000, p4. 
Charlton, P, 'Howard reads the mood on treaty' Courier Mail June 1, 2000, p 15. 
'Stand-off looms in push for treaty' Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2000, p.8 
'A message from 'white nobodies' comes out of the blue', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 
May 2000, p.8 
'Tears and prayers as a fire burns for justice', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2000. p.8. 
'Sorry PM, you flunked the test', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2000, p.8. 
'Deanels history lesson: the past is not another country' Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 
2000, p.8 
'Black Backlash Grows1 Sydney Morning Herald, April 4 2000, p 1. 
365 
'"Bad Feeling" Over Deal' Sydney Morning Herald, August 25 1999, p2. 
'Liberal MP Splits Ranks on Apology' Sydney Morning Herald, June 3 1999, p5. 
'Ruddock Helps Cool Tensions With Fire Side Chat', Sydney Morning Herald, February 
2, 1999, p2. 
'Charter a waste without apology', Sydney Morning Herald, December 1, 1998. 
'I'm not riding tandem: Ruddock' Sydney Morning Herald* November 6, 1998, p9. 
'Signs of a Softer Howard' Sydney Morning Herald, October 13, 1998, p 13. 
'Howard's Reconciliation Document Dangerous' Sydney Morning Herald, October 7, 
1998, p6. 
* Wik: The New Deal* Sydney Morning Herald, July 3, 1998, p7. 
' Wik Deal Scuttles Race Poll* Sydney Morning Herald, July 2, 1998, p 1. 
'Aborigines Gather to Mark Black Day of Slaughter', Sydney Morning Herald* October 
24, 1998. 
366 
'Fischer's Deal: Wik First, Then We Talk\ Sydney Morning Herald, January 15, 1998, 
p5. 
*It Hurts Us, Unapologetic PM Admits* Sydney Morning Herald, December 13 1997, p6 
'Coalition Split over Apology to Aborigines' Sydney Morning Herald, June 16 1997, p8. 
'Waspish Senators Change of Tack' in Sydney Morning Herald, May 30 1997, p8. 
'PM's Legal Advice Hampers Apology' Sydney Morning Herald, 30 May 1997. p8 
'Howard to Push for Bipartisan Motion* Sydney Morning Herald, 28 May 1997, p3. 
fcGG, Howard in Conflict over Wik' Sydney Morning Herald, May 28 1997, pi 
'Reconciliation: Howard Apology too Little, or too Much for Other Leaders' Sydney 
Morning Herald, May 28 1997, p8. 
'Rights Chief Attacks PM's Wik Strategy1 Sydney Morning Herald, May 28 1997, p8. 
'PM Ignores Warnings of Hanson Furore' Sydney Morning Herald, May 1 1997, p9. 
367 
'Chorus of Criticism for Howard's Negotiator' Sydney Morning Herald, June ^ 1996, 
p34. 
'Rocky Path to Reconciliation' Sydney Morning Herald, March 11, 1996, pi 5. 
'PM to Push on With Justice for Aborigines' Sydney Morning Herald, March 28, 1995, 
p5. 
368 
